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2ABSTRACT
This thesis is a philosophical examination of the phenomenon
of drawing. Drawing is considered as the means whereby the draughts-
man makes actual, through making graphic, his perceptual interchange
with and implicit reflection of the world. The concern is set not
so much in what is affected, as what is being affected. Drawing is
viewed primarily as process, as the movement toward meaning. This
movement is evidence of the draughtsman's imaginative engagement and
brings space and time together. Through his drawing, caught within
all its material structuring, he temporalises space and spatialises
time. These together found and promote its image. The drawing, as
image in form, demonstrates the draughtsman's move from the 'lived'
of his experience to the 'thought about'. His transcription moreover
discloses an intrinsic subject/object dialectic and founds the whole
possibility of the drawing's 'world', ordered and sustained through
all its representative and expressive potential. In this context
the views of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Dufrenne, Wollheim and Witkin
among others are examined.
In the light of these theoretical considerations and as visual
3support for the arg-wnents, the drawings of five draughtsmen are
discussed. These are further amplified €hrough transcripts of
conversations about their own drawing activity. The work of three
of these is presented through time-lapse sequence photographs, to
give opportunity to discuss in detail the process of the activity
itself.
The thesis maintains that the draughtsman is a phenomenologist.
Within the scope of all the ways he makes his marks, through all
their transmutations, he seeks routes for the interrogation of how
things are. Through his drawings he seeks to inscribe a fecund
spatiality that gives visibility back to vision. This is the onto-
logical status of drawing and this is the phenomenological concern.
To Sylvia, David and Michael,
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INTrR0DUCT ION
1. 1.
	
Drawing - Preliminary Remarks.
Drawing is essentially the particular means an individual finds
for ordering and uncovering his perception of the world. In the sense
in which I wish to use the term, I will consider 'drawing' as an en-
deavour to bring together, through such elements as lines, strokes and
other marks, made by an implement on a surface, some kind of visible
formulation - a graphic structuring. Drawing is concerned with using
these elements to bring into being something that is not presented as
such in the natural world. To make a drawing is supremely to make an
invention. As Rawson(l) points out, all these elements 'have a symbo-
lie relationship with experience, not a direct, overall similarity with
anything real'(op cit p1). The examination of this 'reality' will, of
course, form part of our philosophical task. However, drawing, in this
sense, is the graphic means through which a particular experience, a
particular visual experience can be brought into such a form as to make
that experience accessible, not only to us as spectators, but also to
the draught sman.
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For the phenomenologist, the examination and description of these
structures is of supreme interest. If as we suggest, they reflect the
individual's interchange with the world, their traces will evidence his
movement through this experience. This movement, as we shall see, dis-
closes the dynamic of his graphic imagination. Any consideration of
this interchange between the draughtsman and his 'world', where he, as
subject, confronts and seeks to penetrate through his drawings, the
world as 'object', immediately raises a dialectic which has profound
phenomenological reverberations and which will continue to occupy us
throughout our ensuing discussions.
In an important sense then, drawing, like the art activity itself,
of which it is an aspect, is a direct means of actualising visual ex-
perience. Furthermore, because of its particularity of means, there
is a necessary uniqueness to the ordering of this experience, which we
shall be considering in some detail later. Essentially drawing is a
means which enables us to clarify an area of our experience that we
cannot reach through words or language, and. this is important. In our
ordinary intercourse with the world we use verbal denotation to fix
and. define our experience. This is one way of forming our experience.
Yet there are, as Rawson suggests,
"... a huge number of other genuine, valid 'forms'
of experience ... for which we have no conventionally
associated words. They probably constitute a sub-
merged 98 per cent of our actual, perceived experience.
But they lie atrophied and inert in our minds, unless
we can find, ways of bringing them forward into con-
sciousness." (ibid p26).
This begins to open something of the 'reality' drawing encompasses. To
make a drawing is to cast thinking in a particular direction; it is to
21
give experience a particular momentum. In experiencing a drawing we
are moving in an area of thinking and understanding that cannot be
reached through any other means. It is important to emphasise that
drawing is not, language, neither is it speaking; it casts 'reality',
however this might be constituted, into a form that we come to recog-
nise as drawing. Drawing is therefore not only a means to the articu-
lation of experience; in an important sense, it becomes experience.
Here, drawing is not simply the vehicle for the expression of thinking,
as though thinking were elsewhere. Drawing is the very embodiment of
thinking, indeed, as Merleau-Ponty(2) has said, when I see the drawing,
"It is more accurate to say that I see according to
it, or with it, than that I see it." (op cit p 60).
We think through and with the drawing. In one sense, we are through
the drawing. As Beittel(3) has also observed:
"The self is not a thing nor inviolable. The
drawing makes the self quite as much as the self
makes the drawing." (op cit p49).
To think graphically is not to think in words, it alters the dimension
of consideration of what constitutes thinking and understanding. What
is no longer becomes only what can be said there is. Indeed, 1Iaden-
fort(4) has pointed out:
"Art is not the expression of the embodiment of
experience which is mediated by means of concepts.
Such expression is reserved for language. Art is
the only form of expression devised by man to em-
body the immediate sensuousness of his living
experiences." (op cit p135).
One of the paradoxes of all art criticism is that it is concerned
with writing about what is essentially expressive in other terms. In-
deed, in writing about the activity of drawing, for example, it becomes
1,
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something else and even the support of the necessarily static photo-
graphic images cannot uncover the primary stratum of that dynamic and
direct interchange of "the very private affair" as Beittel says (op
cit p25), between the individual and his drawing. We can only look
at the shadows that are made on the surface of the paper and make
inferences toward that which inspired the drawing. Any such enquiry
is necessarily lodged within the locus of this speculative limitation.
1. 2.	 Direction of 'present enquiry.
I am not seeking to uphold a particular methodology of drawing.
My enquiry is not toward setting up principles for drawing activity.
I am not concerned to suggest there is only one way that drawing should
be taught or one way in which drawing can be defined. To do this
would be to fall prey to a determinism antagonistic to my philosophical
position. My concern is to demonstrate that the drawing activity, by
whatever means and toward whatever intention, survives the determinism
of a particular methodology and is concerned with a primary activity
of thinking. It is true that the historical and sociological context
of drawing cannot be ignored, but I am not working to demonstrate
that one method or technique is paramount, neither am I suggesting
that only 'objective' drawing is important. Had I been writing in
Ruskin's day my whole thesis would have been clear, I would have been
concerned with describing drawing as a technique for a particular
purpose - a means for the expression of a certain lyrical, romantic
and somewhat nostalgic view of nature. Paul Klee, on the other hand,
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has presented a whole new philosophy of drawing and a fresh attitude
emphasising a more formalist view - a more direct contact with imme-
diate sensory experience.
There is a sense, and Meeson(5) has touched on this, in which
both the writings of Ruskin and Klee show a shift in the central con-
cern for the consideration of drawing today. Ruskin was concerned
with the experience of 'physical-optical' seeing and the recording
of this through the particular techniques and skills of employing tone,
chiaroscuro, perspective etc. - a 'naturalistic' approach. Reference
to an idea or feeling was made via the drawing to an object or form
in nature. In Klee's work, on the other hand, reference is centred
about the drawing itself, where it takes on a more positively symbolic
role. Thus, through the formal elements of the drawing - point, line
and plane - he makes a structural ordering, not unlike mathematics,
that questions not the idea of a 'window on the world' but a 'world
in the window' - the metaphorical importance of pictorial space.
I am considering within this thesis the drawings of individuals
that make reference to the everyday world - and by doing so they
necessarily use the conventions of drawing - lines, strokes and other
marks, to convey the sense of their experience of this world. Ly con-
cern, however, is not that these drawings are set within the 'natura-
list' framework of someone like Ruskin but rather that the means
whereby the individual records his experience is primarily an indi-
cation of the symbolic relationship of the terms of the contract of
his experience. Thus, the people I am working with are employing
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particular techniques to achieve their purpose, but these are not
strictly defined in academic terms - their concern is not so much
to present a record of their 'physical-optical' engagement with the
world but rather to demonstrate a characteristic attitude of thinking.
Arthur di Stephano, a first-year painter at the Royal College of Art,
shows this in his drawings. He uses a flexible and. probing line to
demonstrate the way he sees the articulation of the space surrounding
the model, There is more connection with Klee than Ruskin; indeed,
his drawing is evidence that he draws as he does because of the his-
tory of ideas in drawing that have manifested themselves during the
last fifty years.
1. 3.	 Purpose and intention of drawing.
The idea that drawings are made from other drawings is an impor-
tant one. Any drawing looks more like any other drawing than it looks
like whatever it is a drawing of. What is crucial here is that in the
first place a drawing becomes an object through representing a single
unified space and in turn the drawing through becoming an 'object' in
this sense, can symbolise as well as represent things outside itself.
To these issues we shall return.
Thus the purpose and intentions behind drawings are important.
Further, by seeing, as Merleau-Ponty says, "according to n
 (op cit
p 6P) the drawing, we are no longer engaged in how it may represent
or otherwise physical-optical engagement. We are concerned to see
25
how far, as he(6) points out, the drawing becomes "coherent deforma-
tion"(op cit p91), and how the elements of our own perceptual exper-
ience are reshaped and reformed within an area of logical possibility -
whose forms have a coherence that give fresh insights to seeing.
Nelson Goothnan(7) has remarked:
"In representation, the artist must make use of old.
habits when he wants to elicit novel objects arid
connections. If his picture is recognised as almost
but not quite referring to the commonplace furniture
of the everyday world, or if it calls for and yet
resists assignment to a usual kind of picture, it
may bring out neglected likenesses and differences,
force unaccustomed associations, and in some measure
remake our world. And if the point of the picture
is not only successfully made but is also well-taken,
if the realignments it directly and indirectly
effects are interesting and important, the picture -
like a crucial experiment - makes a genuine contri-
bution to knowledge." (op cit p3).
In an important way, therefore, drawings do not so much define as dis-
close. That is reached in a drawing is still being reached toward. The
search is to disclose what is, yet is always becoming. This is where
drawing becomes process, where its purposiveness is caught in seeking
the means for disclosing what cannot be reached in any other ,
 way.
2. 1.
	
Philosophical framework of present enquiry.
I have spoken of drawing as being the actualising of our exper-
ience of the world in a particular way. Cassirer(8) has noted that:
"Pure experience, which is the source and kernel of
all our knowledge of reality can never be sought
elsewhere than in our simple original perceptions,
untouched by theoretical interpretations. The
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"reality of perception is the only certain and un-
problematical, the only primary datum of all
knowledge." (op cit p23).
My direct experience of the world through my perceptions is the point
from which the phenomenologists begin. Phenomenology is the 'philoso-
phical model from which I will pursue my descriptions of drawing and
from which I will seek to clarify the particular relational signifi-
cance of the on-going dialectic of the activity itself.
Merleau-Ponty(9) has suggested in his book Phenomenology of
Perception that phenomenology is a philosophy for which the world is
'already there', before reflection begins, as an unalienable presence.
Phenomenology seeks to uncover the most primary and. fundamental aspects
of experience. It is a philosophy of radical empiricism, for what it
seeks to do is to reveal the factors of our experience without pre-
supposing anything other than the primary experience of our being in
the world. It studies what all the particular sciences take for granted
and what we also in our 'natural' every-day interchange with the world
take for granted. Phenomenology reaches back to things themselves in
their essentiality and their manner of appearing to us. It questions
the source and origins of our perceptions and. seeks to describe them
without recourse to existing philosophic or psychological positions.
Pierre Thvenaz(lO), in his essay on Phenomenology, has said:
"Phenomenology is neither a science of objects, nor a
science of the subject; it is a science of experience.
It does not concentrate exclusively on either the ob-
ject of experience or on the subject of experience,
but on the point of contact where being and conscious-
ness meet. It is, therefore, a study of consciousness
as intentional, as directed. toward objects, as living
in an intentionally constituted. world." (op cit p19).
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Thus, in that particular area of concern, at that particular point
of contact, in that particular and peculiar and unique interaction
between the draughtsman and his world which we call drawing, can be
seen to appear structures of meaning and significance that give in-
dications of a particular view of mind.
Natural science, for example, can tell me something about the
physical nature of the world of things, but it can do nothing to ex-
plain my experience of things that asks questions about the way I see
beyond the natural presentation of things. Ly experience of pleasure
is an example. My aesthetic experience cannot be contained by laws,
it cannot be formulated as a science - it is a different ordering.
This antepredictive experience is given before science can begin.
Merleau-Ponty in a telling passage says:
"All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific
knowledge is gained from my own particular point
of view, or from some experience of the world with-
out which the symbols of science would be meaning-
less. The whole universe of science is built upon
the world as directly experienced, and if we want
to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and:
arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and
scope, we must begin by re-awakening the basic ex-
perience of the world of which science is the second-
order expression." (ibid pVIII).
And. again Merleau-Ponty( 2) in his essay Eye and Mind says: "Science
manipulates things and gives up living in them." (op cit p55). Objecti-
vity, deductive reasoning and a claim to truth through a causal deter-
minism have become the structures through which science has reached its
conclusions. This has had its effect on philosophy, through a sugges-
tion that truth can be reached through a hierarchical stratum of logical
structuring that can be objectified, set apart and determined as
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propositions. There is a tradition of 'intellection' which sucks
the very life blood from areas of experience that cannot be so cau-
sally and coldly considered as facts. The world loses its 'opaqueness'.
It loses its ambiguity and becomes an 'object-in-itself' for considera-
tion and elaboration. Mind becomes separated from body, and as Rudolf
Arnheim(ll) suggests, thought "moves among abstractions" (op cit pV)
and cognition is determined only by reflective judgement separated
from any context, situation or relational concern. Pre-reflective
experience is negated and antepredictive experience only given credit
by the way it can be described. The tacit dimension of experience, of
being and knowing, is not regarded as a knowing of which we cannot tell.
All thought, all experience is only such as can be crystallisedin lan-
guage. In an important way I wish to demonstrate that the drawing
activity is free from the constraint of language.
Thus, the concern is to re-establish the importance of the parti-
cular experience of seeing, that occurs through drawing. Within the
dynamic of the drawing activity the individual is caught within the
directness of his experience of the world. Each individual casts his
form, his formulation within a framework that reflects his particular
sense and the particular significance of the event. An individual's
drawing, as much as his perception, is in 1ierleau_Ponty's(9) terms "a
way of patterning the world" (op cit pXVIII). Whether or not we are
concerned with the thing perceived, we grasp it, not only for what it
is in representation - its properties, but what is unique in its mode
of existence, what it is for it to be. I wish to examine the drawing
activity for what it is, the manner through which it brings drawings
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into existence. The phenomenologists, particularly someone like
Lerleau-Ponty, are concerned to discover a principle of operation.
As he says:
"It is a matter ... of finding the Idea, in the
Hegelian sense, that is, not a law of the physico-
mathematical type, discoverable by objective thought,
but that formula ... a certain way of patterning the
world ... " (ibid pXVIII)
In drawing, we are concerned to see according to the patterning
of the world as figured within the images wrested from the world by
the draughtsman. As Rawson has clearly pointed out, to talk of an
artist's vision of the world is misleading unless the terms are further
defined:
"This word 'vision' does not mean that he sees the
world - so but that he always makes an image of
his world - so! ... Even if a drawing be purely
topographical in intent, it does not merely point
to an external object." (op cit p23)
It is the visual ontology of this image that rests it within a pheno-
menological concern. Transcendence, as we shall see, is a mark of any
drawing's meaning; it is also a primary phenomenological principle.
(4) MADDENFOIT Well ingt on
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CRAPPER I •
	 BEPRESENTAT ION
I. 1. 1. The drawing - as criterion of the visual experience -
Woliheim's thesis.
Wollheini(1), in his book On Art and the Mind, has a chapter en-
titled 'On Drawing an Object'. In this chapter he discusses ways in
which a drawing can be considered a representation of 'what is seen'.
The following quotation taken from Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investi-
gations, Oxford 1959 II xi) is the basis on which he begins his own
enquiry:
"What is the criterion of the visual experience?
Well, what would you expect the criterion to be? '
The representation of 'what is
I use Wollheim as a starting point for this present discussion because
he opens up issues related to perception, action and knowledge, which
are central to his (and my own) enquiry into the nature of representa-
tion itself.
First, in what ways can we adequately talk of a drawing being a
'criterion' of the visual experience, what indeed is the nature of
this visual experience? Is the visual experience something that can
be eqnated with 'what is seen' and how is the drawing properly a
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representation of 'what is seen'?
It is important that we set the context straight for the whole
of the ensuing discussion in which Wollheim engages. He clarifies
that, for the purpose of his argument, the medium of representation
is to be drawing (op cit p7). He sees drawing as something essen-
tially linear that seeks to present through its linear convention
some kind of representation of the appearance of the visible world
of objects. That is to say, he sees drawing as a kind of nthneographic
activity that presents the objects of the visible world or the objects
within our visual field, in such a way that we might say that we re-
cognise a similarity between the objects in the visible world and the
objects in the drawing. A kind of physical-optical engagement in
which drawing reflects this encounter.
I. 1. 2. Line, contour and 'imitation'.
In differentiating drawings from visual experience, he examines
the nature of the line. The world of visible objects is defined by
the 'edges' of these objects and the linear counterpart in a drawing
becomes not so much an edge as a 'contour'. He adds:
"... I wanted something that differentiates them
essentially. And that is what contours do. For
contours in the sense that they belong to drawings
can belong only to two-dimensional surfaces: which
is why they belong to drawings, and possibly to
other forms of representation, and why they do not
belong to visual experiences." (op cit pp2l/22).
This raises crucial and fundamental issues, but it is important that
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we establish in which sense Woliheim is talking about drawing. It
inevitably colours the whole of what he subsequently discusses.
Now, in its most basic form, drawing by means of linear repre-
sentatiori certainly serves a function in providing some kind of
analogy for the visible world of objects. Indeed, if one looks at
the history of drawing, particularly in the Western world, much of
it is to do with developing techniques that adequately present an
'imitation' of the visual reality. To some extent 'naturalistic'
art falls into this category and it is specifically within this corn-
pass that Woliheim presents his arguments about the nature of drawing.
He sees a direct relationship between drawing and the natural world.
Moreover, he sees drawing as 'representing' the natural world of
appearances and he assumes this natural world is what we see when
we have 'the visual experience'.
It is certainly true that artists in the Western world, even
before Leonardo and up to the 19th century and beyond saw their task
as developing techniques in drawing that adequately mirrored what
they saw as the visual reality - the world of nature peopled by objects.
Indeed, it was commonly assumed that if people wanted to communicate
to others what they had seen, they would use the accepted techniques
and convention8 of drawing, with all its attendant, built-in references
to visual constancies, proportion and perspective. So powerful a means
of communication was it that drawings and the visual arts generally
conveyed information about the visual experience of the artists that
mere words could not match. The artist had the distinct advantage
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over the reporter - or at least, his advantages were of a different
and perhaps more easily recognised kind.
An exemplification of this can be seen in the topographical
artists and draughtsmen of natural history and ethnographical types
who accompanied the first explorers to the New World and paved the
way for the flowering during the 18th and 19th centuries of their
specialised branch of graphic recording. In this sense, the topo-
graphical drawing was executed to the elimination of any information
that might be considered misleading. The aim was to present as ac-
curate a record as possible. Indeed, most drawings done for scienti-
fic purposes are of this order. We shall discover, however, that even
drawings that are purely topographical in intent do not merely point
to an external object. What is important for the present is to see
the context in which Woliheini is presenting his arguments that drawings
might be considered the criterion of what is seen.
Wollheiin does accept that in seeing something we see 'what we
expect to see'. And, as Blakemore(2) has pointed out, that in seeing
what we see
"We do not perceive our retinal image; we experience
an externalised. world of solid things." (op cit p67).
Thus all perception is 'shaped' perception and expectation and mental
set play a crucial part in the way we perceive the world, as world.
Yet we must be careful here, for 'seeing what we expect to see' might
be something that the psychologists of perception have accepted, but
it is a very different matter when looked at from the point of view of
the images that man creates from his perception of the world. The
history of art is full of these images that rise from a very different
intention than that of mere psychological observation. Poussin painted
landscapes in the classical manner and landscapes in their turn came to
be seen 'as a poussin'. The Egyptian draughtsmen drew a generalised.
concept for 'man', but not a man as he would see him in a given situa-
tion wider specific lighting conditions. Indeed, if we were to take
this further and say to someone 'draw what you see' ( that is to re-
construct a representation of his retinal image) we would be asking
him to discount what he knows, to hold back his habitual mental sets
and. his interest in things and to distort his customary constancies
of vision. The attempt to draw what one sees inevitably changes one's
seeing, as artists of the Impressionist and Post Impressionist periods
discovered.
Woliheim's position is clear. Drawing for him is
"... a research into the world of appearances: by
which is meant, of course, how things look to us.
Implicit in such a conception is the view that
draughtsinanship, or the techniques of representa-
tion taken more generally, afford us in certain
cases a direct revelation of what we see, a reve-
lation not mediated by any perceptual judgement."
(op cit p4).
How far this is possible needs clarifying for it raises issues about
the nature of the visual experience itself which we will return to.
I. 1. 3. The drawing - visual experience and knowledge.
Woliheim's main argument is developed like this:
"... it might be objected against this criterion that
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"it allows of the absurd eventuality that we could
come to know what our visual experience was by ob-
serving our representation of it: that when we had
finished our drawing, we could look at the sheet
and, by scrutinising the configuration lying upon
it, learn what we have seen ..." (op cit p5).
He is saying that it is impossible that the artist, by looking at
his drawing, can come to know his own visual experience. He says
the drawing cannot be a revelation to me of how I have seen because
my representation of what I have seen is based on the knowledge of
what I have seen and it is absurd to think that by looking at my
drawing I can come to know of something I had known about all along.
He substantiates this view by saying:
	 -
"... something must have happened at the time of
the visual experience, which allows us, or in-
fluences us, to draw as we do." (op cit pp9/lO).
He feels that this influence is our knowledge of the visual experience
itself and he adds:
"Then we have the visual experience we eo ipso
know what we have seen, and this is why we are
able, at a later point in time, to represent it.
Arid this in turn is why it is absurd to think
that by looking at what we have drawn, we could
come to know what we have seen. For it is this
knowledge that guides the drawing." (op cit p10)
and further
"... even if we accept the contention that the
representation (or let us say, more specifically
the drawing) of what is seen is the criterion of
the visual experience ... we still do not have
to embrace the conclusion ... that we could ever
come to know what we have seen by looking at our
drawing of it ... in my own case, when it is I
who draw, it is not open to me to come to know
by observation what I have done." (op cit pplO/ll).
The first point that needs clarifying here is a crucially impor-
tant one. My knowledge of what I see must be independent of (not
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prior to) my knowledge of what I draw, for if my knowledge of what
I see was dependent on my knowledge of what I draw, I could not make
any judgements to the efficacy of my drawing by reference to what I
see. The knowledge I have in order to make the drawing is one thing,
indeed I must know what I see before I draw it, but having made the
drawing, I can and must have knowledge that is independent of my
making the drawing in order to make any kind of judgement about it.
The problem it seems, is in the use of the word 'criterion'. Any
judgement as to the efficacy of the drawing is made by reference to
the visual experience, or more clearly our total perceptual experiences;
we do not judge the efficacy of our visual experience by reference to
the drawing. Under normal circumstances we would call the visual ex-
perience our criterion of judgement of the drawing - not the drawing
a criterion of the visual experience. Woliheim seems to be stretching
the linguistic sense of the word 'criterion' beyond its normal meaning.
I. 1. 4. The drawing - a temporal as well as spatial construct.
There is a second issue which rises from the foregoing which
also needs clarifying. Wollheim discounts the notion that we could
ever come to know what we have seen by reference to our drawing of
what we have seen. Ra.wson(3) points out:
"... drawing is not seeing ... on the contrary works
of art are in fact, made; they are artistic constructs,
based on ingrained scanning procedures."(op cit pp2l/22).
It is a common fallacy, entertained by many philosophers, that a work
of art, or in the case we are discussing, a drawingis the record of
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something seen. Of course, there is a kind of correspondence
between a drawing - a representational or figurative drawing and the
visual world, but this correspondence is not a one-to-one identity.
It is a paralleling through a particular means and the means lies in
the symbolism of a drawing's visual forms - not by means of imitation.
Goethe called it a kind of 'second nature' related and parallel in
many ways to the first nature. But it is not the first. Rawson has
suggested that in the history of drawing there have been times when
the artist's notion of truth (in Woliheim's phrase, his 'visual ex-
perience') has involved an accurate paralleling of the visual field
of tone by drawn tone, "But this in itself reflects a specific, not
an ultimate, philosophy of visual realisation." (op cit p23). In a
very real sense no drawing, not even the most 'representational' can
ever convey a pure 'likeness'. As Rawson has pointed out, first and
foremost a drawing conveys meaning "... not by a general similarity
of surface but by a structure of symbolic elements which are formu-
lated as method." (op cit p24).
The important point is that drawings are made. Moreover, they
are made in time. The sequence photographs that are appended support
this central concern of my thesis. Drawings present to us a history
of glances, the response to a whole activity of looking. Cezanne, in
a memorable passage recorded by Gasquet(4), said:
"All that we see gets dispersed, goes away. Nature
is always the same, but nothing remains of it, of
what appears to us. Our art has to give the feel
of its duration together with the facts, the appear-
ance of all its changes. It has to make us sense
it as eternal. ... It might be supposed that realism
consists in copying a glass as it is on the table.
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"in fact, one never copies anything but the vision
that remains of it at each moment, the image that
becomes conscious. You never copy the glass on
the table; you copy the residue of a vision.
Each time I look at the glass, it has an air of
re-making itself, that's to say, its reality be-
comes uncertain because its projection in my head
is uncertain ... or partial. One sees it as if it
were disappearing, coming into view again, dis-
appearing, coming into view again - that's to say,
it really always is between being and not being.
And. it's this that one wants to copy."
These extraordinary insights will occupy us more fully later. Any
drawing 'of what is seen' is the representation not of the visual
experience as such, but a whole tissue of glances - the image of the
residue of many visions always from memory, the drawing will be an
accumulation of memories none of which is quite the same as the other
because each of them is affected by what has gone before, by the con-
tinually changing relation between all that has already been put down
and the next glance. Put in these terms, the idea that the drawing
is the criterion of what is seen, becomes a very meagre kind of
description.
I. 1. 5. Drawing - as process.
Drawings are not so much made as achieved. Furthermore, to the
one who is engaged in the drawing, as Cezanne has described, the
drawing does become the arena in which there is a revelation of how
things appear to be. Wendy Thompson, a student at the Royal College
of Art with whom I have been working, remarked to me that while she
was drawing the nude on the chair with feet on an adjacent stool, the
nude seemed to her to be floating away from the stool although anchored
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to it (Fig. 54)Although this eventually became the topic of the
drawing, it was discoverable to her only through the process of
making the drawing. Michael Ayrton(5) in describing the act of
drawing has said this:
"The process of drawing is before all else the pro-
cess of putting the visual intelligence into action,
the very mechanics of taking visual thought ... it
is the process by which the artist makes clear to
himself, and not to the spectator, what he is doing.
It is a soliloquy before it becomes a communication."
(op cit p64).
Drawing is thus better described as a heuristic technique by which
we are enabled to change our visual experience in certain determinate
fashions given the same or similar stimulus patterns, rather than a
means by which we achieve knowledge of a constant and unchanging visual
experience. This is important. As we have seen, visual experience and
particularly the visual experience as part of the drawing process does
not stand still. It is not a hermetically sealed phenomenon that can
be investigated as an entity, it is a whole funding and to talk of the
possibility that the drawing might be considered as the criterion of
this experience is to misconceive the nature of drawing. Drawings
rise from the visual experience, they are the reflection of that inter-
change between ourselves and the world. Furthermore, we do not have a
prior knowledge of how all this relationship will be, and then deliver
it through the conventional techniques of representation. Knowledge
that arises from the drawing process is a coming to know, not a know-
ledge achieved prior to the on-going dialectic of the process itself.
Paul Klee(6) cryptically suggested: "A painter knows a great deal, but
he only knows it subsequently." (op cit p126). Furthermore, this
coming to know may not be entirely a conscious affair; there are many
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agencies at work in the making of a drawing, only some of which are
'known' in a conscious way.
Even the topological artist, to return to the thesis suggested
by Wollheim, draws what he sees and judges his drawing to be a more
or less correct representation of what he sees within accepted repre-
sentationa]. conventions. The drawing is not a confirmation to him
of his unchanged and constant visual experience. Even when natural-
istic art is a 'research into the world of appearances' drawing is
an arduous activity calling for prolonged and concentrated guided
vision, controlled by a predominating interest in particular aspects
of the natural world - to which other things are held in subordination.
Drawings are always made from a point of view and no matter how limiting
it might be, drawing in the sense of its relationship to visual ex-
periences, is charged with its particular flavour and concern. In a
word, the notion of a visual experience to which drawing relates,
is an ephemera. All drawings happen after an event in time, but j
time - drawings are made within the context of a constantly changing
and revisable experience of looking. To this important issue we shall
return in Chapter IV.
Constable remarked once that 'I almost put my eyes out' through
the intensity of persistent perception. In such cases the draughtsrnan
does not simply try to represent what he has seen within familiar con-
vention.s, but exerts himself to perceive more clearly an aspect of his
visual world, by which he is particularly moved. Interdependent on
all we have said is that drawings are made for a purpose, or more
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accurately through a particular intention. What is clear is that
through the process of achieving a drawing, the draughtsman does not
come to a better knowledge of what he has been seeing all along, but
by the concentrated effort of controlled looking guided by a predomi-
nant concern that emerges as the drawing is achieved and helped by
the processes and techniques that are occurring under his hand, he
comes to see differently. Indeed, for the draughtsman the techniques
of drawing may be a useful ancillary in the process of achieving a
changed visual experience which he finds more appropriate. The draughts-
man does not use his drawing to attain knowledge of what he has all
along been. seeing, rather, his drawing reinvests his seeing when he
looks again at those things. It is indeed, and has become for him,
a new way of seeing.
I. 1. 6. The importance of the medium.
Before I leave this aspect of the 'visual experience', I would
like to consider something further. It is this: Drawings are made
in a medium. WolTheim in his discussions does not specifically men-
tion this factor about drawings, except to say that the making of a
drawing is the making of a representation of what is seen, using the
conventions and techniques of drawing. As we have seen, he talks
about drawing as having 'contours' and this he likens to the 'edges'
of objects in the visible world. Thus he is predominantly talking of
drawing as being conceived in linear terms. Drawings, of course, may
be considered as such if one is thinking purely theoretically, but in
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practice drawings are made with materials of different kinds, on
grounds of different kinds. This is important, as we shall subse-
quently discover in Chapter V, because in talking of a drawing as
a representation we cannot legitimately talk in this way without
thinking of the medium in which the drawing is cast. A drawing's
sense, is not just what it represents - its notional reality or what
it might portray. Important as these elements are, its sense is
borne by the way all these various elements are achieved together.
The medium of the drawing is a crucially important part of its total
sense as a drawing,
Thus the draughtsman realises that the means he uses to execute
his drawing are often totally inadequate to represent his visual ex-
perience completely. There is an element of transposition going on
all the time. Moreover, to talk, as Wollheim does, of drawings and
visual experience solely on the basis of the linear aspects of any
drawing is to seriously undermine the sense in which a drawing can
come to be a representation at all, Vhat is crucial for us is to
see that ones change in seeing, in the sense in which we have been
talking, is affected by the way in which the visual idea is caught
and held for contemplation within and through all the means and media
of the drawing itself. It is impossible to separate the sense in
which what is represented and how it is represented is made such
through all the possibilities of the medium. Indeed, the affirmation
of the visual 'reality' of the drawing is brought about through the
marriage of the visual idea within the construct of the medium. The
two are totally interdependent. A Rembrandt brush drawing may have
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surface 'likenesses' to the appearance of groups of people, but the
way in which it has been cast, the form and structure in which the
drawing is founded, delivers a sense about the groups of people in
the drawing that has to be far more than a mere 'representation' of
Rembrandt's visual experience. To talk in such terms is to miss the
whole direction of the drawing's ontology.
Sickert once said that artists fall into two psychological groups.
Those in the first exert themselves to see more clearly the aspects of
the visible world which interest them, and then find, the means to
represent this within available media and techniques. The others see
in the media and this fundamentally influences the way their vision
is directed.
I. 2. 1. The drawing - as representation of 'what is seen'.
I would like now to consider a further linked question. We have
been considering through Wollheiin's arguments the relationship between
drawings and 'visual experiences', but there is a further issue: How
can a drawing be a representation of 'what is seen'?
In an important sense the first question to ask in respect of
any drawing is this: To what features of experience do its basic
visual elements ultimately correspond and how do they do so? What
are the visual realities to which forms both in a drawing and of the
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drawing refer? We have discovered that no drawing, even the most
'representational' or 'figurative' or 'topological' ever simply points
to external objects in the visible world, nor do drawings ever convey
pure 'likenesses', nor a selection from naturally given, objectively
formulated visual data. As we have seen and as Rawson has pointed out,
the drawing's sense (indeed, how it comes to be a representation at
all) is conveyed to us not "by a general similarity of surface but
by a structure of symbolic elements which are formulated as method"
(op cit p24). This symbolic interrelationship of forms in drawing
and forms in the world is something I wish to discuss in a moment.
What is important at this stage is to say that forms in drawing are
and needs must be analogous to the realities which give them their
meaning. Unlike verbal forms which have only a conventional rela-
tionship to the realities they signify, forms in a drawing - indeed
all visual forms an artist might use - must bear in some way an aria-
logous relationship to the realities they signify. What is crucial
is that the realities that a drawing points to are not themselves
things. Language and linguistic forms of expression have an' inbuilt
determinacy. As Cassirer(7) has so aptly pointed out:
"By the same spiritual act through which man spins
language out of himself he spins himself into it,
so that in the end he communicates and lives with
intuitive objects in no other manner than that
shown him by the medium of language." (op cit p15).
It is this linguistic constraint that often forms so much of the
problem to logical positivist philosophers when they come to talk
about the way that a drawing can be a representation of what is seen.
The trap is a very subtle one indeed, for it immediately equates
'things' in the drawing with 'things' in the world to which they
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might refer. This objective definitism paralyses the whole inter-
pretive funding that the drawing offers to vision and. not to language.
So much has this subtle insinuation found its way into the whole dis-
cussion of representation and expression that before long one is
caught within the web of 'translating' one form in terms of another
where the terms of their referencing are taken as being synonymous.
The 'realia' of the drawing is not the 'realia' as constituted by
language and to talk of 'objects' as being the determining factor
of the	 of a drawing is to become involved as Woliheim does
in considering 'edges' and 'contours' to be the determining factors
in the differentiation between visual experiences and drawings.
Rawson points out that:
"... a drawing may be highly representational, as
for example a Rembrandt, and yet at the same time
its whole assemblage will not look 'like' a fac-
tual piece of the world. It may gain part of its
meaning from the relations of its internal struc-
ture to other similar structures, not from their
relations to everyday percepts." (op cit p32).
The 'things' which seem to some to be the 'givens' of perception
are only such in 80 far as they serve as a function of that perception;
and moreover - and perhaps more importantly - in so far as they are
part of the linguistic communication structure of the perceiver. The
logical and causal determinacy of language will propose, in the Witt-
gensteinian sense, that what there is is only what it can be said
there is. The 'realia' of drawings are not 'things', they are cate-
gories of thought and conception which are not reached by language.
Indeed, the utilitarian concerns of language cannot carry the sense
of these visual realities at all and they are lost to those whose
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perceptual ontology is based on categories of thought, structured
and cast solely in verbal or linguistic terms.
In what ways, therefore, can we say that the realities a drawing
refers to are carried to us. What is immediately important is to
point out that the identity of the 'subject matter' of the drawing
and the way this notional aspect might depict or portray or represent
an aspect of the visible world, although important, is not a sufficient
condition for understanding the drawing as being a representation of
what is seen. The subject matter, or as Rawson has pointed out, the
'tenor' (ibid p5) of the drawing is an important element in coming to
understand its meaning, and indeed, to continue Rawson's analogy the
'tenor' of the drawing may be the means by which the 'topic' of the
drawing is achieved. That is, the sense of the drawing's visual
reality may be reached through its subject matter, this is, however,
often only the necessary and not sufficient condition for its total
meaning.	 irthermore, the context in which the drawing was conceived
is equally important if one is to come to an understanding of its
sense. The historical and cultural antecedents of the drawing make
an important and vital contribution to understanding the drawing's
significance. All this is contributory in coming to understand how
a drawing can be a representation of what is seen.
I spoke earlier of the symbolic significance of forms in a
drawing. This has to do with the 'subject matter' of the drawing,
but perhaps it is within the drawing's fundamental visual methodology
that this symbolic sense can be demonstrated: the way in which the
49
notional realities of the drawing are achieved. This includes, as
we have seen, consideration of the media in which the, drawing is
made - its physical attributes, for it is the interdependence be-
tween means and method. that is important in the understanding of
the drawing's total sense.
I. 2. 2. Representation - the significance of relationships
The ability to analogise and the ability to see one thing in
something else lies at the root of our perception of the world. We
are only ever able to make sense of our world because we carry within
us the ability, not only of seeing the relationship between things,
but also because fundamentally we have learnt to see this relational
significance in terms of analogies. Indeed, to see forms at all means
that we see them within groupings or clusters that bear a relational
significance. This ability gives shape to our whole perception so
that our world indeed becomes a world. Further, memory enables us
to store these analogised forms in such a way that makes them irnrned-
iately available to us for recall and recognition. In an important
sense, memory is a repertoire of image forms that have been consti-
tuted as such through our conscious and unconscious activities of
perception. Many of these forms will be visual, many kinaesthetic,
many tactile or sensuous in other ways. Our verbal language reflects
our everyday life fairly comprehensively yet in many respects, as we
have seen, there are a huge number of other genuine valid 'forms' of
experience, produced by the analogisin,g faculty and, therefore, per-
fectly 'true' in any possible sense of that word for which we have
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no conventionally associated words. These forms energise the visual
arts and this is why the need for a schema is, as Gombrich(8) has
pointed out, the need for a code; and drawing is a code - it is a
whole symbolic structuring.
Through maintaining contact with his own forms of association
and feeling the draughtsman is able to shape his marks so as to evoke
the appropriate analogy responses in others. But this is a very com-
plex affair; the analogy response to visual statements goes on all
the time. Furthermore, as is evident, if we are to understand drawings
we must become a party to their symbolism. They offer us routes of
possibility to sense their 'nunen' but unless we are able to match,
or find the response within ourselves that these visual analogues are
offering, the meaning sense of the drawing will be lost to us. Thus,
the particular interest and attention of the draughtsman has shaped
these marks in a specific way that can carry their feeling sense to
us. This is the visual reality of the drawing. This is why drawings
affirm what is. Thus the skill of the draughtsman is to shape his
marks in a determinate and specific fashion if he wants to elicit a
particular response of meaning. Van Gogh's drawings are examples of
this: they are rich in visual analogies that recall, in a particular
way, sensations often of a kinetic kind that are rooted in our own
past perceptual history.
In order that he might achieve this, the draughtsman is directing
his ow-n vision in a particular way, but he is not directing his vision
toward 'things' - we have discovered the fallacy that this suggests.
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His vision is directed toward aspects of the visible world that con-
stitute a relationship, and this relational sense he brings to his
drawing. A good drawing is not made up from a collection of separated.
items; it presents a unified whole, not the units but the system of
connection. This is why when we come to see the drawing as a repre-
sentation, we come to sense the significance of its relationships.
It becomes a representation of what is seen only as the relational
structure in which it inheres, demonstrates the artist's vision of
a world - a tissue of events brought together in time and welded into
a relational framework. This is what we mean when we talk of the
symbolic structure of the drawing and it is made up from a whole inter-
relationship of marks and vectors, of rhythms and enclosures, of im-
plied. structures that support the tenor of the drawing and give it
its particular 'numen'. Drawings are far more than pointers, they
are a means of access into a world of possibility. This, as Gombrich
has so ably described, is the basis for any consideration of what
might be called. 'visual discovery' in art (op cit p232). There is
more to drawing than denotation.
I. 2. 3. Representation and the image.
We have been discussing the ways that the draughtsman, through
the whole assembly of his drawing, can capture and hold for our speci-
fic and. focussed contemplation, visual analogues, or as Merleau-Ponty(9)
would say, visual 'anchoring points' (op cit p249) that in turn reach
out and meet our own response rising from the recalled memories of
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our own perceptual history. In sensing the drawing's meaning, we
are inevitably part of this symbolic contract. We have seen that
this is the central concern in consideration of the features of our
experience to which a drawing's basic elements ultimately correspond.
Further, we have seen that this is achieved from the inbuilt analo-
gising factor present in every aspect of our perception of the world.
We have seen that for analogies to work at all there must be a field
in which their relational structure can operate. An analogue is an
image of relations, A drawing is also an image of relations.
Karl Pribram(lO) has this to say of the image:
"The elements composing the image are relations be-
tween events, rather than events per se .... the
image is thus a sign of relationships. In this way
imaging provides internal meaning to signs." (op cit p7)
rhis will form the basis of a continued discussion in Chapter iii.)
The richness that attaches itself to the concept that the drawing is
an image arises not because the drawing is an image of any 'thing'
but because it is a sign of the relational significance between as-
pects of the visual world of the drawing and aspects of the specta-
tor's own visible world. The symbolic contract completes itself
within the image of the drawing - its total synthesis in form. As
Langer(ll) has said:
"An image does not exemplify the same principles of
construction as the object it symbolises but ab-
stracts its phenomenal character, its immediate
effect on our sensibility...It organises anil en-
hances the impression directly received. (op cit p59).
Furthermore, the only way one can reach one ' s perceptual history
and thus come to a sense of oneself is through the image. Memory
53
images and traces, of all kinds, from one's past . are reawakened, re-
called and given, moreover, fresh direction and intensity as they
find their counterparts within the visual sense of the drawing it-
self. This has to be beyond mere imitation, or resemblance, corre-
spondence or similarity. A drawing can be said to 'represent' what
is seen when it transforms seeing.
This aspect of transformation is fundamentally tied to the
notion that not far from the concept of representation lies the con-
cept of expression. We have argued throughout this analysis that
what drawings 'represent' are not 'things', but relationships. Not,
however, just 'relationships' per se but rather the contract and
field in which this relational significance emerges. This forms
the discussion of our next chapter.
(6)
(7)
(8)
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CHAPTER II.	 EXPRESSION
II. 1. 1. Introduction
Scruton(1) suggests that:
"Expressiveness may be loosely defined as the power
to remind, us, call up for us, evoke or 'symbolize'
objects, such as emotions and states of mind.
It lies, therefore, at the intersection of a com-
plex network of feelings and thoughts and it will
be impossible to describe the recognition of ex-
pression in any simple or unitary way."(op cit p216/
217)
and again:
"In recognising expression I am brought to an aware-
ness of what is expressed. But what I learn can
itself be described, only in terms of an experience
of 'seeing', 'hearing' or 'grasping the meaning of'
a work of art. ... It is the experience of the work
itself that surmnarises what I know." (op cit p239).
Both these descriptions are important because they clarify two things.
First that the concept of expression is a notoriously elusive one and
in seeking to clarify aspects of it one is really only setting up a
framework within which the concept might possibly be held long enough
for certain conditions and implications to be explored. The second
is that any recognition of expression and thus any sense of expressive-
ness can only come from the orbit of the individual's experience of
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the world and those of its objects that hold for him a particular
significance and value. Scruton is particularly concerned, in his
analysis, with aesthetic expression and indeed this is my concern
also. For Croce, aesthetic expression was the only true kind, of
expression, any other expression - like natural expression - being
ruled illegitimate.
Vhat is clear is that there are broadly two kinds of expression -
natural and aesthetic. The first order of expression includes things
like cries of pain, shouts of joy, exclamations etc. and to some ex-
tent a work of art might be said to be expressive in this way if we
were to sense that what proceeds as an outward manifestation bears
upon it the unmistakable marks of an inner state or condition. In
this sense, the word expression' comes very close to its etymological
root 'ex-primere' which literally means to squeeze or press out. An
expression in this sense becomes a kind of 'secretion'. The second
order of expression is really closer to a kind of 'correspondence'.
This is really the area of aesthetic expression. Wollheim(2) puts it
like this:
we think of an object as expressive of a certain
condition because, when we are in that condition, it
seems to us to match, or correspond with, what we ex-
perience inwardly: and perhaps when the condition
passes, the object is also good for reminding us of
it in some special poignant way, or for reviving it
for us. For an object to be expressive in this sense,
there is no requirement that it should originate in
the condition it expresses, nor indeed is there any
stipulation about its genesis ...
	
(op cit p47)
These two conditions that we have outlined however may be logi-
cally distinct, but there is sometimes if not always an interaction
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between the two. If we conceive of a notion of fittingness or appro-
priateness between expression and expressed it might be thought that
this only makes sense in the case of aesthetic expression but even
in natural expression we would sense, for example, the fittingness
or appropriateness of raging to an exclamation of rage. We might agree
also, for example, that a particular gesture is appropriate to a par-
ticular expression. Reid(3) has put it in this way:
"... expression ... changes something, brings some-
thing new into being ... which is known for the first
time ,.. the drawing of the jagged line may express
some feeling which is already there. ... But the
feeling-of-the-jagged-line is a new event, and we
have no right to assume that it 'expresses' exactly
what the artist felt before he began to draw. (He
in fact probably now feels very different.)"
(op cit p45)
What is important --and what Woliheim has pointed out - is that any
affective view of perception is only reached through that relat ion-
ship between inner states and outer conditions. We see it most
clearly demonstrated in the human body itself: the human body as the
expression of the psyche. Wollheim feels that:
"When we endow a natural object or an artifact with
expressive meaning, we tend to see it corporeally:
that is, we tend to credit it with a particular
look which bears a marked analogy to some look that
the human body wears and that is constantly con-
joined with an inner state." (op cit pp48/49)
There is thus a relationship between natural and aesthetic ex-
pression. What is important, as we shall discover, is that for
aesthetic expression to be experienced and achieved, any natural
expression must be given shape in form and this form must be seen
not only to bear a fittingness to the expression, but perhaps more
importantly to shape a fresh significance that holds the form of
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expression in such a way that makes it available to contemplative,
imaginative perception.
II. 2. 1. The perception of expression.
In cassirer's(4) phenomenology the perception of expression
begins with perception itself. He argues that perception is essen-
tially 'two-faced'. There is within perception an 'object' pole and
a 'subject' pole. All perception, in his view, occurs along a con-
tinuuxn between these two polarities. He suggests;
"The world which the self encounters is in the one
case a thing-world and in the other a person-world.
In the one case, we observe it as a completely
spatial object and as the sum total of temporal
transformations which complete themselves in this
object; whereas, in the other case, we observe it
as if it were something 'like ourselves'."
(op cit p93)
All perception of any kind of 'reality' as such is experienced in
this double aspect. Perception of either subjective or objective
'pole' has a different colouring or tone about it. To see things in
an affective way inevitably means that we must immerse ourselves within
their objectivity but in doing so move past this 'objectness' to sense
an aspect of ourselves within them. Cassirer is arguing that expression
as a phenomenon is rooted within this double aspect of perception it-
self. The perception of expression lies at the conjunction of the
seeing of one thing in something else, at the imaginative intersection
of subject with object, at the point where subjectivity meets objecti-
vity. These two terms are useful only in their support of an argument.
It would be a mistake to conceive of either subjectivity or objectivity
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as separate entities; they serve to clarify ways of looking at the
world.
Thus, in the perception of expression we do not so much perceive
'things', as things-immersed-in-an-aspect, as bearing significance,
sense and value. Perception of expression is not a mental interpre-
tation after an event, like the processing of so called 'sense-data',
but perception that in itself is shaped and meaningful. Merleau-
Ponty(5) has suggested, as we have begun to discover, that science
manipulates the world and 'gives up living'in it (op cit p55).
Science as a pursuit of 'objectivity' is a conceptual structure
dealing fundamentally with objectively formed and independent 'facts'.
To view the objectivity of science one must suspend any perception of
expression itself. Science is essentially dealing with cause and
effect, with 'properties' and perhaps more importantly with a whole
system in which the laws of repeatability and constancy play a crucial
part. Science, in Cassirer's terms deals with 'thing' perception.
Art manifests the nature of the perception of expression. There is
a different mode of significance operating within the two areas. In
science we see things as presenting aspects of a temporal, spatial
world; in art we grasp aspects of a world 'like-ourselves'. They
lie within different modes of symbolisation and representation. The
metamorphosis and morphology of the forms in art, rising as they do
from an imaginative funding of continually emerging associations and
interpenetrations, indicates that the whole ambience of art lies in
a different 'direction' • Forms in art have not been built up and con-
stituted from 'fixed properties'. Properties and an atomistic-like
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regard of structures are factors which empiricist observation makes
known to us to the extent that the same determinations and relation-
ships return ever and again over long stretches of time. This aspect
of repeatability, of constancy within an acknowledged and pre-.determined
structural ordering, and which is demonstrable in something like mathe-
matics, for example, is an inherent attribute of that structure.
Moreover, it is built up by a whole symbol structure, where referential
meanings are of the essence. This is the medium, as we shall see, of
object perception - of thing perception - and. in Witkin's(6) terms
has more bearing on impression than expression. The root of the per-
ception of expression lies in the reflective way an individual per-
ceives the world. In all this we are talking about an aspect of the
perception of expression that deals with qualitative interpretation.
Moreover, this qualitative experience is achieved through modes of
symbolising that bear no relationship to fixed and determined struc-
tures built up on laws that have been conceptually framed from primary
qualities and in which the aspect of universality and constancy is
crucial. Much of 'sense-data' philosophy arises from this kind of
determinism and indeed one might say that the whole of logical-
positivist philosophy rises from the premise that any analysis of
expression as a concept must first begin with an analysis of the
'elements' and. 'properties' in sensation that might logically consti-
tute such a formulation.
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II. 2. 2. Expression and the world of 'subjectivity'.
In all this we sense that what is of prime concern in any ana-
lysis of expression as such, must uncover that aspect of subjectivity
which is revealed as Being-in-the-world. The perception of expres5ion
is only such as it rises from an individual's relationship with his
world, in reflexive action that is not simply re-action, but action
charged with a fresh significance arising from the interchange. This,
as we shall see, is Dewey's(7) view: it reveals an aspect of percep-
tion that demonstrates this reflexivity and reciprocal interchange.
Thus the perception of expression is rooted in seeing the world
'like ourselves'; as sensing the impact of the world; as bearing a
reflexive value. Expression is not a 'thing'; expression is value;
expression is dealing essentially with meaning that bears a qualita-
tive stamp, a mark of distinguishing significance relevant to indi-
vidual and idiosyncratic appraisal. Expression perception is what
the world means for us as we are indissolubly linked within its
matrix. As we suspend this personal reflexive view, we necessarily
suspend any interest in the expressive potential within our own world-
view and take on an interest that is toward a different orientation,
a different order. In this suspension we become involved in quanta-
tive assessments that are relevant only within a pre-determined
structural organisation, in which cause and effect, properties and
constants supply the base line and where the concepts of recurrence
and repeatability are a necessary condition.
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The world of subjectivity therefore is not directly open to the
world of science; even psychology does not concern itself solely with
subjectivity, for it seeks to define subjectivity within objectively
formed conditions. There has in recent years been a shifting of view:
built into laws of science are laws of uncertainty, and the concept of
tolerance has been given far greater respect. Nonetheless, there is
always the search for definition. Subjectivity cannot so much be
defined as explored, not so much explained as described. Thus any
interest in the way things appear to us is very different from an
interest in the way things are, built up from a pre-determined given.
Expression perception is thus a perception of the world as becoming
and not the perception of the world as a pre-given, spatially deter-
mined object.
That is paramount, as Cassirer and many others have pointed out,
is that perception itself, in its normal day-to-day functioning is
primarily concerned with the perception of expressive rather than
'thing' qualities. Perception is always shaped and given its signifi-
cance through the orientation of the individual self toward its objec-
tive, whether this be outward or inward. The two aspects are never
separated - even though they may through our reflective experience be
seen as distinct. Perception of things has become the perception of
the expression of things.
II. 2. 3. Expression and the influence of language.
Cassirer points out that the development of consciousness within
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the individual, genetically shows that 'sense-data' which were thought
to be the starting points for all knowledge of reality - are relatively
late products - a gruelling and lengthy process of abstraction is
necessary in order to draw them out from the whole tide of human ex-
perience. He feels that:
"All unbiased psychological observation testifies to
the fact that the first experiences of the child
are experiences of expression. The perception of
'things' and 'thing qualities' comes into its own
much later." (op cit p102).
Language is what turns the tide. The capacity for objective repre-
sentation grows in direct ratio as we begin to give linguistic ex-
pression to our experience of the world. The determinacy which
language brings, as we have begun to sense, is really the root of
the perception of 'things'. Perception of the qualitative aspect
of things; their relational and characteristic ambience and sense,
lies beyong the capacity of language - as verbal denotation to signify.
It is only as one reaches past the determinacy of language to its
metaphorical ordering that one senses what language has some capacity
to suggest, but which other forms of expression, particularly forms
in art, are able sensuously to embody. Language as a structure of
denotation points to objects; art embodies within its 'objectness'
a qualitative value. A drawing, for example, ceases to become a
'thing'; it becomes expressive of potential and possil4lity. It
bears within itself, caught in its objectness, the funding for that
imaginative appraisal of the world and the self that is the mark of
expression perception.
Perception of things in the sense we have been describing,
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belongs primarily to a theoretical world view. It is fundamentally
Cartesian. The cosmology of Plato and Aristotle was founded on an
animate aspect of the interpretation of the cosmos. Plato felt that
the soul was the beginning of all motion, indicating primarily that
the concepts of relationship and connection were the basis for the
soul's existence. The Cartesian view of the universe was essentially
mathematically and mechanically based, a view that was a terminal
rather than an initial one. Basically this view is a product of -
straction and any scientific account of the phenomenon of the
natural world is basically rooted in a system of theoretical abstrac-
tion. Cassirer adds:
"Thus the physical 'nature' of things is that aspect
of appearances which always recurs in the same man-
ner and which as such admits of being reduced to
strict unbroken laws." (op cit p103).
The perception of things, as things, thus belongs really to theoretical
abstraction. The naive world of perception is a world of expression
perception. The recurring aspect of things is only such as we are
able to extract as a constant from the sum total of phenomena known
to us. But what is thus loosened and abstracted can only be the pro-
duct of theoretical reflection; it is a philosophy of ends not a philo-
sophy of beginnings.
II. 2. 4, Expression and the 'I', 'you' re1ationshp.
Thus in a very important way subjectivity is not something iso-
latable, loosened from its world context and abstracted. The 'I' is
crucially grounded in its relationship with the 'you', where the 'you'
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is not theoretically determined but becomes what it is as it is built
up and constituted. by the 'I'. Subjectivity is revealed in and
through the contract of relationships that occurs with its 'objects',
and expression and its perception is the recognition of this rela-
tional concern. Thus in the perception of a drawing for example, we
do not in sensing its expressive quality perceive it as an 'object'
theoretically discerned. We enter into its meaning as a kind of con-
tract of significance that is constantly revealing not a world of
theoretical dimensions but a world that shapes our own world, that
shapes our own perception, that bears in reflexively with ourselves,
that is charged with personal significance. Any expression that is
revealed through the forms in art bears this mark. Their value is
such that this contractual significance is understood. This is not
an end, not a terminus a quo, but a beginning, a terminus ad quem.
This is the context in which any cultural form is perceived at all.
The 'I' and the 'you', the subjective and objective poles in
perception, are never, as Cassirer has pointed out, to be cnsidered
as separate'entities'. As we have seen, they are always located in
the meeting point of that reciprocal transaction which occurs in the
sensuous forms of speech and art. What is important is that these
forms, in their particular way, focus the significance of expressive
value, to the extent that we recognise it. We bring to all our per-
ception of the world this potential - forms in art lift this value
out from the contingency of our day-to--day perception and. enable
us to sense a fresh direction of possibility and. meaning.
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The reaching back to the significance of this relational concern
is, as we have seen, rooted in perception itself. Within all percep-
tion there is this reflexive reciprocation and for Arnheim(8), ex-
pression is considered as the primary content of vision (op cit p430).
The imaginative engagement with the expressive object - the drawing,
the poem, the music - brings this primary content of vision into a
new focus of significance. Yet the perception of expression, as
Arnheim points out, is such only as we experience in it more than
the resonance of our own feelings. There is, as we have seen, a
further cognitive dimension, a reflexive dimension. That resonance
we find in ourselves through expression perception is indicative of
a wider world view - we are thus enabled to sense our place in the
world and moreover, to discern the inner unity of the whole. We are
able to sense symbolic value and go beyond what mere sense experience
can tell us; we can sense the general in the particular, the world in
a grain of sand.
This interpretation of the 'I' with the 'you' is reflected in
Merleau-Ponty's evocative statement:
"... my body is a thing among other things; it is
caught in the fabric of the world, and its cohe-
sion is that of a thing. But because it moves
itself and sees, it holds things in a circle
around itself. Things are an annex or prolonga-
tion of itself; they are encrusted. into its flesh,
they are part of its full definition; the world
is made of the same stuff as the body. This way
of turning things around, ... these antinomies,
are different ways of saying that vision happens
among, or is caught in things - in that place where
something visible undertakes to see, becomes visible
for itself by virtue of the sight of things; in that
place where there persists ... the undividedness
of the sensing and the sensed." (op citp59)
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and again:
"Things have an internal equivalent in me."
(op cit p60).
This physiognomic aspect in perception saturates all we see. As
Merleau-Ponty says, things are no longer 'things'. Neither are they
perceived as things. They are an annex or prolongation of the self.
They are 'part of its full definition'. Moreover, when the self is
able to move past the contingencies of the world of 'objectivity'
toward fresh possibilities of realisation, there comes the knowledge
of that 'undividedness between the sensing and the sensed'. This
characterises all we have been saying about expression perception.
cassirer(9) in characteristic terms puts it like this:
"... for the reality we apprehend, is in its ori-
ginal form not a reality of a determinate world of
things, originating apart from us, rather it is a
certainty of a living efficacy that we experience.
Yet this access to reality is given us not by the
datum of sensation but only in the original pheno-
menon of expression and expressive understanding.
If expressive meaning were not revealed to us
in certain perceptive experiences, existence would
remain silent for us. Reality could never be de-
duced from the mere experience of things, if it
were not in some way already contained and man!-
fested. in a very particular way in expressive
perception." (op cit p73).
II. 3. 1. The act of expression - Dewey 's view.
As we have seen, we cannot move very far in any analysis of
expression without coming to that significant interaction of Being
with world. We have already spoken of this reciprocal transaction,
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and now this needs to be looked at, not just as being crucial to the
recognition of expression, but perhaps at a more fundamental level,
at the level of the individual's action. We have seen that the 'I'
and the 'you' are not separately determined entities, but coalesce
within the individual's transaction with the world. And any full
analysis of expression must include an analysis of the act of expre-
ssion. The act is always that ixnpulsion from the Being of the indi-
vidual outward to the world. Within the various forms of expression
this activity is disclosed. Cassirer(4) feels that:
"Only in this activity do the 'I' and the 'you'
exist with the possibility of simultaneously
distingiishing themselves from each other. They
exist both within and next to each other as they
preserve their unity within speech, thought and.
all manner of artistic creation." (op cit p109).
Let us look more closely at this act. For both Dewey and Witkin every
experience of the individual begins with an impulsion. Witkin feels
that this impulsion consists of 'movements' that the individual makes
prior to those movements being shaped by the adaptation process. He
feels that this impulsion can only properly be called action as it is
adapted to its medium. The medium can be part of the physical world
of objects in everyday perception or the symbolic world. of the indivi-
dual's thought processes.
Dewey's description of action is along similar lines. He feels
that this iinpulsion outward rises from an inner organic need. He too
feels that it can only be satisfied as this need. is met through 'inati-
tuting definite relations (active relations, interactions) with the
environment' (op cit p58). This movement toward a kind of equilibra-
tion is precisely what Witkin talks about when he sees action as
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adaptive behaviour. Action is seen to be such movements as are made
by the individual to adjust his impulsion in the light of interaction
with the 'objects' of the environment. As Witkin is quick to point
out, these 'objects' can be physical - as in the experience of some-
one finding his way around a room, or swimming in the water or jumping
for joy - or they can be mental, in the sense of someone organising
his thinking in symbolic terms. Thus action can take place both in
the physical world - the outside; and the symbolic world of thought
representation - the inside. This is how we can talk of experience
as action being the 'consciousness' of the individual towards these
'objects' be they physical or mental. What constitutes them as being
'physical' or 'mental' is nothing but a different intention of con-
sciousness itself, a different ordering of the experience.
The mere relationship of this inipulsion with its 'objects' is
not sufficient however. Experience, as active experience, is not
merely reactive to the envirrnment. Dewey feels, for example, that
when this iinpulsion meets 'resistance and. deflection' from Qbstacles
in the world 'it does not return and restore itself to its former
state' (op cit p58). This is important; experience is not simply
the equilibration of mere stimulus. Experience, in Dewey's terms,
is something gone through - that is, the resistance and deflection
met by the impulsion now returns to the individual bearing a sense
of the significance of the interchange. These 'objects' (physical
or mental) have now become 'significant objects' - that is they bear
meaning and value, they are not mere 'things', not just sense 'data'.
They have become part of the individual's shaped experienced
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perception of the world. Vlhat of course is crucial here is the aspect
of reflection. Reflection is an imaginative activity, for impulsion
from need is something basic to all living organisms. What makes
this linpulsion and subsequent delivery particularly human is that
ability we have to give shape and meaning to our world, which is con-
stantly shifting and changing, not only in the light of present
experiencing but as this present is funded and given fresh signifi-
cance through experiences of our past perceptual history. This is
what gives the sense in perception. This is why there is an undivided-
ness between the sensing and the sensed. The significance and quali-
tative aspect in perception takes its colouring from the whole analo-
gising and reflective activity of consciousness itself. This is why
'subject' and. 'object' are not separate entities. This is why objecti-
vity is rooted in the ground of subjectivity. Reflection is the hall-
mark of this imaginative consciousness, whose life is funded from the
images of its active experience in perception and whose dynamic is
such through the whole network of its interacting and relating. No
action is therefore separable from the stream of acts in which it is
embedded. No experience per se is only an experience. Experience,
like our conscious life, (In the network of relationships that
make up the fabric of our world.	 tA^k-)	 C	 C'
Within the interaction of impulsion and subsequent resolution
there is a characteristic tension. This one might call the potential
for experience. There is never complete resolution; there is always
a potential that drives the impulsion continually forward and gives
us moreover our sense that experience is 'lived through'. This
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potential and characteristic tension is what funds the art experience
itself, and through the sequence photographs of the drawings of those
who have participated in our project, we can sense this 'lived through-
ness' of their own experience of bringing into being something pre-
viously not existing. Dewey puts it like this:
"The junction of the new and the old is not a mere
composition of forces, but it is a re-creation in
which the present impulsion gets form and solidity
while the old, the 'stored' material is literally
revived, given new life and soul through having to
meet a new situation." (op cit p60).
He comes to see this activity not just as activity but as an act of
expression:
	
-
"It is this double change which converts an acti-
vity into an act of expression. Things in the
environment that would otherwise be mere smooth
channels or else blind obstructions become means,
media. At the same time, things retained from
past experience that would grow stale from routine
or inert from lack of use, become coefficients in
new adventures and. put on a raiment of fresh
meaning." (op cit p60).
II. 3. 2. The act of expression - expressive/impressive,
Witkin's position.
Witkin talks in less eloquent terms but discloses the same sense.
He talks of action as being expressive or impressive. He feels that
what we do to the environment, how we manage the objects of our ex-
perience, how the environment and context is changed through our
action upon it, this is expressive action. Subject managing object.
Similarly, how these 'objects' in our environment change us, affect
us, this he calls impressive action. Object impressing itself on
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subject. We must remember that these 'objects' can be either physical
or mental. They can be part of the outer world of our perceptions or
the inner world of thought representation. It must also be remembered
that these distinctions are only made for the purpose of clarifying
the issues. Only in an ideal sense can we talk of action that is
purely expressive or action that is purely impressive. What the dis-
tinction does is to give a fresh dimension to the act of expression
under consideration at the moment. Dewey feels that not all action
is necessarily expressive in the sense in which he wishes to use the
term. He puts it thus:
"While there is no expression unless there is an
urge from within outwards, the welling up must be
clarified and ordered by taking into itself the
values of prior experiences before it can be an
act of expression ... where there is no adminis-
tration of objective conditions, no shaping of
materials in the interests of embodying the ex-
citement, there is no expression." (op cit pp6l/62).
One cannot separate expression in the sense we are discussing it -
as a direct consequence of action and experience - without its embodi-
nient in some kind of physical or symbolic form. Any perception of
expression becomes of necessity the perception of its form, as Susanne
Langer's thesis testifies - its embodied form. The ordering of the
experience and the action through the mediation of the values of prior
experiences is what characterises an act of expression. Moreover, as
Dewey points out, there is a management of the action. There is a
staying with, a working out to completion. Further to this there is
an added sense of the consequence of one's management. This is reflec-
ted in the imaginative ability of the individual to reflect on the
possible, to entertain possibility. It is this imaginative enterprise
that brings to the act of expression its distinctive 'expressiveness',
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its particular quality. Dewey says:
"The consequences undergone because of doing are
incorporated as the means of subsequent doings
because the relationship between doing and under-
going is perceived." (op cit p62).
In Witkin's terms an expressive action is something like this:
I throw my hat in the air for pure joy and dance on it when it lands.
My action is the expression of a joyous impulse, and is what in our
introduction to this chapter we called a 'natual' expression. My
dance on the hat, on the other hand, is a 'feeling form'. The whole
of my action has a characteristically 'joyous' feeling about it and
this expression has 'got into' the dance - I have managed my acts
subsequently into a hat dance. Impressive action on the other hand
is described like this: Instead of taking my hat off and throwing
it in the air for pure joy, I take it off and aim it carefully at a
hatstand. In this instance I am doing something quite different,
particularly if the hat finds its target and lands on its intended
peg. My behaviour in respect of the hat and the hatstand are very
much under the control of their specific properties as objects. For
example, the lightness of the hat, the stiffness of the brim, all
these qualities are 'impressing' themselves on me and are shaping
up my action in respect of them into an act of propulsion of the right
force and direction. He says:
"To the extent that the impulse determines the actual
form of the action, to the extent that it shapes
behaviour, action is expressive and it gives rise to
'feeling-form'. To the extent that the object in re-
spect of which the individual is acting shapes his
behaviour and not the impulse, action is impressive
and it gives rise to 'object-form'." (op cit p6).
Here we meet again what we discovered in the double aspect of
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perception as described by Cassirer - its subjective and objective
pole. Cassirer felt that the genesis of any perception of expression
lay at the interchange and interrelationship of these two aspects.
Witkin has uncovered the same kind of distinction within the arena
of action and we can now perhaps see more clearly how, for example,
in the making of a drawing both kinds of action are involved. The
impulse to move forward in the shaping of materials gives rise to
an action that is intrinsically expressive, but the 'resistance'
(to use Dewey's term, op cit p65) of the materials in respect of my
action, my impulse, in their turn shape my behaviour in respect of
them, they 'impress' themselves on me to such an extent that the ten-
sion arising from their management is coming both from myself as
subject and the material I am working with as 'object' to produce
a 'feeling-form' whose resolution is always an amalgam of both
expressive and impressive action.
II. 3. 3. The act of expression - the subject/object dialectic.
All action, as Witkin suggests, is projection through a medium.
When my action is expressive, it is my impulse that is projected
through the medium of objects. These as we have seen can be real
or symbolic - shaping and in a reflective sense giving significance
to these objects. When action is impressive the reverse happens,
the objects, real or symbolic,	 action. All action, Witkin
feels, ranges along this continuum and as we have seen in perception
itself, which is also action of a kind, this double aspect is present.
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Witkin sumznarises it thus:
"To the extent that my actions in respect of objects
receive the impression of those objects they consti-
tute a 'medium of impression' through which these
objects are projected. To the extent that my actions
in respect of objects express my sensate impulse, the
disturbing of my being, to that extent the objects
constitute a 'medium of expression' through which my
sensate impulse is projected." (op cit p6).
We can now see why, as Cassirer has pointed out, within the act
of expression, the 'I' and the 'you' exist with the possibility of
distinguishing themselves. He pointed out that they exist both within
and next to each other as they preserve their unity within speech
thought and all manner of artistic expression (op cit p109). Ben
Shahn(l0) has also echoed the same sense when he suggests:
"To me both subjective and objective are of para-
mount importance, another aspect of the problem
of image and idea. The challenge is not to abolish
both from art, but rather to unite them into a
single impression, an image of which meaning is an
inalienable part." (op cit p45).
The act of expression is a fusion of this duality of subjectivity and
objectivity. Yet the fusion is never always complete, just as a re-
solution is never always complete. Within any activity of expression,
for example in the making of a drawing, there is a characteristic
tension and dialectic, Beittel(ll) has pointed out that:
"In short, the art process is one of dialectic
energized by the contradiction of opposites.
Whence come these opposites? Are they a kind of
mental pattern-matching of the remembered with
the on-going, allowing us to attend to qualita-
tive aspects of experience, an essential ingredient
in conscious imagination?" (op cit p26).
We now begin to see that this dialectic, this characteristic tension,
is energised through the relational significance arising from action
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that is expressive and action that is impressive. Action that moves
out from impulse and. action that is shaped by the impinging qualities
of 'objects' through which my total experience of meaning, my exper-
ience of the perception of expression is achieved. Max Black(l2)
put it thus:
"There is ... in all artistic creation a character-
istic tension between the man and the material in
which he works •.. the artist literally wrestles
with his material, while it both resists and.
nourishes his intention. ... He finds himself con-
stantly excited by the qualities objectively present
in the material which ithis aim progressively to
discover." (op cit p290/291).
In the area of making a drawing the draughtsman is both maker
and observer; he is involved in a continuous move from subjective to
objective pole. Moreover, as we have seen, he is acting in respect
of the drawing as his action is being shaped by the drawing. He is
acting in the world of the drawing as his Being is being disturbed
through the arena of his drawing. The question arises, how can he
act in the world, and be thus disturbed, if he does not in some way
know his disturbance, perhaps more importantly recognise his sensing?
For in the previous chapter on Representation we discovered that the
apprehension of the drawing is a continuous movement toward coming
to know - and this coming to know through the agency of the drawing,
is a recognition of the sensing in respect of the drawing. This gives
to expression its qualitiative concern. Knowing and expressing are
very close together. Similarly, knowing and expressing are found
together in action. How do we know our sensing? How do forms evoke
in us a sense of their significance to the point where we can recog-
nise this qualitative aspect? Witkin feels that the simple answer
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to how we know our sensing is that:
"... we only know it in so far as we express our
sensing in displacements in the object world.
Sensing known is sensing expressed. It is sensing
projected through the medium of that which evokes
sensing, through the medium of the object."
(op cit p20).
Thus we can only come to know our sensing as the impulse from Being,
in its action outward to the world, shapes the objects it encounters
in such a way that makes them accessible for recall. This is how
forms in art, for example, can become 'feeling-forms' where there is
a specific managing of the activity to embody the sense - the sensate
impulse. Through these 'feeling-forms' this sense is evoked in me.
1oreover, my sensing is only made known to me as it is built up and
constituted within and through the objects I am acting upon - be they
real or symbolic. The knowing that we are talking about, arising
from action, is a knowing in Being. Through an individual's expre-
ssive actions he comes to know his sensing in respect of the world
and. through his impressive actions he comes to know the world in which
he has his Being. Reid has pointed out:
"There is a real sense in which mind comes into being
through its encounters with the world." (op cit p289).
We have seen these two kinds of action are only such that in an
ideal way they can be spoken of in these terms. We shall see that
through the different media both of impression and expression, the
individual can operate on a symbolic level of knowing that enables
him in a more mobile and flexible way to organise his experience.
Knowing is action resolved within both these aspects of experience;
what each aspect does is to bring a different orientation to knowing.
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We can know our sensing as a 'feeling idea', which is the reflexive
component of the affective life and which brings to the objects of
our experience their distinct 'tone' or 'colouring'. Or we can also
know about ourselves, we can know facts about the world and we can
operate at the level of concepts. This is a form of 'object' knowing
and has its place in the totality of our experience of enabling us
to make sense of the world.
II. 3
. 4. The act of expression - the importance of recall.
We mentioned the importance of recall. This we touched on in
the last chapter when we spoke of the way the sense we give to forms
in art is achieved through our analogising faculty of recalling from
past perceptual experiences their felt response. We have now the
ground for a proper appreciation of what this is. This sense of recall
is fundamental to all knowing and we shall see the importance it has
in the act of expression itself. A child who repeats an op&ration
through the sheer joy of repetition is in essence not only coming to
know the object of his attention but perhaps more importantly coming
to know his sensing in respect of the object. He is really recalling
his sensation; that is, expressing his sensing in order to know it.
Even here in infancy we can see the embryonic forms of expressive
action itself. All expressive action is concerned primarily with
realising our sensing in respect of the action, more than to realise
the object of the action itself. Farther, when we grasp the expre-
ssive content of something like a drawing, it is because within the
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medium and through the form of the drawing we are able to recall,
not just the 'object' of our sensing, but our sensing. In this way
we can talk of the expressiveness of the drawing, for the drawing
has, in its paiticular and unique way shaped our action (our percep-
tion), and therefore the significance of this sensing is directly
known to us in respect of the drawing itself.
Yhat is important is that this recall is going on all the time,
and the individual is continually being transformed by new reflective
and reflexive acts, new knowing. This imaginative, reflective trans-
formation, adds up to an entirely new dimension in the managing of
his acts, It is always a process of transcendence, of moving beyond
the given, of piercing the skin of things to sense their numen. This
lies at the heart of every act of expression.
Within the activity of making a drawing, as the process photo-
graphs clearly demonstrate, we see the shaping of forms to recall
sensing. This is the whole purposiveness of the activity itself.
It is to resolve or attempt to resolve that intrinsic dialectic which
we have seen is the motivation for all action, to make sense known.
The act of expression is an act that deals fundamentally with giving
shape and form to this sense, so that the sense is truly embodied in
the forms themselves to the extent that they are so clarified and
ordered that they give shape to sensation and bring what might be
simply an activity to the point of it becoming an act of expression.
The value that thus resides in them is given them through the history
of their being achieved, through the sensing of the path that has
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brought them this clarification, this new dimension and. reflects the
resolution of that tension, that was the genesis of their very being.
Within the act of expression, the individual is always probing. As
Witkin has pointed out:
"In order to control the development of form in the
expressive act, ... the consciousness of the indi-
vidual must 'oscillate' intensively between the
impulse and the medium. Only in this way can the
impulse (which in itself is blind) be guided by
its effect in the medium." (op cit p22).
This 'oscillation' goes on all the time within the creative act and r
it sets up a kind of guidance system for the impulse, so that the
impulse can continually adjust to its requirement of recalling sen-
sing - for the next impulsion. It is the to and fro movement of the
impulse that funds the on-going process. The process is of finer and
finer adjustments within the individual's sensing. It is in this way
he comes to know his sensing. He is always testing his sensing in
respect of the medium and reflexively managing his actions. The indi-
vidual is quite literally feeling his way through from start to finish.
Witkin has suggested: "Sensing is always in control, shaping form for
recall." (op cit p23). If he is lucky and if the outgoing impulse and
returning response coalesce and the form takes on its own dynamic, not
only does it become truly expressive but it reveals what Merleau-Ponty
has so evocatively called that'undividedness of the sensing and the
sensed' (op cit p59).
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II. 4. 1. The medium of impression.
We have already mentioned the media in which the two kinds of
action, expressive and impressive, have to take place. It will now
be our concern to discuss these media in more detail. In realising
the possibility of there being two kinds of medium we are brought
back to that first disclosure of Cassirer's that perception itself
could be regarded as having an objective and subjective pole. The
relationship between subject and object has given us the model on
which our analysis has been built and provides us now with a way of
looking at two modes of signification.
First the medium of impression. This is the medium in which,
as we have seen, my actions are shaped by objects. To take an
example: If I feel a stone and passively allow the sensation of
roundness or convexity to reach me in sensation, my sensing is being
shaped, is being 'impressed' by the specific properties of the stone.
If now I carve the stone, shape it, then my action becomes expressive,
because it comes under the control of my sensing. In an ideal sense
the medium of impression allows no facility for the expression of
the individual's sensate impulse. Of course at this concrete level
(like the illustration of passively feeling the stone) the medium of
impression is very rudimentary indeed. In areas of concrete operation,
in operating with materials or objects in the world the media of both
impression and expression are very close indeed -, for example, it is
very difficult to feel a stone 'passively'. It is really only in the
more abstract levels of operation, in activities like thinking where,
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to use Piaget's terms, concrete operations have become ynbolically
represented that we can begin to make the distinction between the
two media. It is only in the area of symbolic functioning that the
distinctive aspects of the two media become apparent. Witkin puts
it like this:
"The power of representation permits the individual
operating on a symbolic level to differentiate much
more clearly between media of impression and media
of expression simply because he can construct
symbols that have a purely impressive function in
addition to being able to make use of symbols that
can be used in either context as expressive or
impressive." (op cit p25).
This is enormously important, because it demonstrates the crucial
link between representation and expression. It also indicates that
within representation there are different orders of denotation and
reference. Not all representation is expression - it underlies the
fact, as we have seen in the section dealing with expression percep-
tion, that much philosophy that is to do with 'object' perception and
sense 'data', deals with symbolic representation that more properly
belongs to the domain of impression rather than expression. Little
wonder that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the search
was for sense 'data' and. 'associations' - for ultimate 'units' or
'impressions'. The empirical psychology of the day was inadequate
to deal with art, imagination and aspects of emotional life. Some
indeed sensed that in thinking there was something more than the
recognised contents of the mind - something more than realistic cog-
nition. The writers who felt that there was this something more were
the first to realise that there was a sort of significance that dif-
fered from the definable meaning of words and a logic that was not
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like the logic of language, yet was a form of truth, of 'reasonable-
ness'. It is clear now that the recognition of these two aspects of
thinking, one within the symbolic medium of impression and the other
in the symbolic medium of expression, underline both these different
directions of orientation.
An example of the medium of impression, which ideally is free
from the control of the individual's direct sensing would be mathe-
matics. There is in most mathematics an arbitary relation between
symbol and. object. 1athematic deals with the representation of the
world of objects without embodying any of the sensate possibilities
of the objects themselves, and therefore - and this is important -
without providing any possibilities for the expression of the indi-
vidual's sensate impulses. Thus x can equal this, or y can equal
that. In a similar way words as words bear only an arbitary rela-
tionship to what they signify. Thus the languages of logic, science
and mathematics constitute a relatively 'pure' medium of expression.
Words operating in their definitive sense can often veil an expressive
aspect because of the way they convey their meanings conventionally
and not intrinsically. oreover, a word is readily taken up in think-
ing and follows its course in deviation from the expressive content
originating in vision itself. We have seen how language can veil
the expressive aspects of perception, inhibiting the individual to
operate on the level of his sensing to achieve the sense of signifi-
cance that lies behind words. As we have seen, language really
provides a secondary rather than a primary entry into the world of
the visible, into that world which permits expressiveness as a
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significant value to arise.
However, it may be true that natural language, particularly when
it becomes speech, might serve a dual function of operating both as a
medium of impression and expression. Poetry and certainly metaphor
in language are examples of the move from the medium of pure impre-
ssion, viewed as discursive concatenation, to expression. One might
therefore call the medium of impression - like mathematics - a logi-
cal symbolism. Logical symbolism as a system allows no leeway at all
for alternative or additional meanings.
II. 4. 2. The mediu.th of expression.
The medium of expression on the other hand is entirely different.
The medium of expression consists either in objects that have the
power of evoking direct sensate experience or on a symbolic level
of representation, through, for example - and to use Witkins term
(op cit p27) - images that incorporate intrinsically the 'sensate
possibilities of objects'. Thus media of expression always have the
power of stimulating directly. This is why Susanne Langer(13) des-
cribes the first medium, the medium of impression, as the medium of
discursive symbolism and the latter medium, the medium of expression,
as presentational, that is directly available to sense and able also
thus to evoke sense.
The important distinguishing mark is that the medium of expression
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is essentially iconic. This iconicity would include not only the
visual modes of representation but the audile and tactile as well.
The dominant mode of the iconic is visual, but for the purposes of
expression it can be extended. Visual icons can reach us in a dir-
ect way because visual icons have the power of emulating the stimulus
properties of objects in the world. This is why visual representa-
tions are such a powerful means for allowing and enabling us to see
as. Witkin points out however that:
"The dominance of the word and the visual icon as
modes of representation may well derive from their
capacity to do what neither the purely expressive,
nor the purely impressive media can do, namely to
provide a subtle harmony and blending of subject
and object in a single form." (op cit p28).
This brings us full circle to where we began this investigation into
the phenomenon of expression. Subject meets object in a single form.
Through the perception of expression and the act of expression we
have come to the unitary focus of expression - within a single form.
Value, as we have seen, can only be embodied in form and becomes
value as subject meets object as the individual is given that path
through objects that in his action upon them lends them a significance
which far from dominating, controlling and defining him, releases him
into fresh areas of possibility and action. In this way the indivi-
dual can truly be said to be operating through the medium of objects
to the extent that they lend to him their impressiveness which he in
turn transforms into expressive sense. He has met himself in objects
without their objectivity drowning him. The tension between the
medium of impression - the form in which the object is cast - is
caught within the medium of expression, as sense is seen to be em-
bodied in form, as form and content fuse to make not a single
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determinate and referentially bound meaning, but an arena of meaning-
ful possibility.
The visual ontology of this visual icon is now released: the
sense of it is an expressive sense; it has ceased to be a mere datum
and has taken on the cloak of possibility and potential. In a
drawing, with its direct structural sense, its immediate symbolic
significance, the significance of its expressive sense lies in the
subtle interaction between 'subject' and 'object', form and content,
material and medium. The ultimate 'truth', the ultimate affirmation
of a Van Gogh drawing for example, is such because of the subtle way
the expressive medium of our reciprocating response is shaped by the
impressive medium of the object form in which it has been cast. These
two meet together in the iconicity of the drawing, in its particularity
no less. We know our sensing in respect of the drawing, for its forms
not only shape our perception in an impressive sense but shape them
for recall, so that images of the forms of our past perceptual his-
tory that have already been incorporated within the matrix of our
Being are evoked and recalled to give us in a new way, through the
particularity of this new found form, the sense of its significance.
Forms in drawing - indeed in all expressive media - have the
power, intrinsically their own, of evoking and refashioning the forms
of our past perceptual experience of the world. In a reflective
sense they recall for us that interpenetration of ourselves with the
world. We sense them as immediately expressive. Susanne Langer has
put it thus:
88
"The effect of symbolic expression is primarily the
formulation of perceptual experience, and the con-
stant reforniulations of the conceptual frames which
the cumulative symbolizing techniques - conscious
or unconscious, but rarely altogether absent - esta-
blish, one upon another, one in another, one by
negation of another." (op cit p80).
She goes on to talk of Campbell-Fisher who writes of the expression
of sadness in Mozart's music, that gives evidence to the way percep-
tual experience is thus formed:
"If I could be as sad as certain passages in Mozart,
my glory would be greater than it is. ... The fact
that I know as much as I do of the essence of pathos
comes from meeting with such music. If those pass-
ages made me sad, which in fact they most often do
not, that would be an extaneous and irrelevant de-
tail. 1y grasp of the essence of sadness ... comes
not from moments in which I have been sad, but from
moments when I have seen sadness before me released
from entanglements with contingency." (op cit p88).
Now we see how such a medium can be truly said to be a medium of ex-
pression - how such forms can be expressive, how such iconicity
emulates directly an experience of felt form - of significarft expre-
ssion. What Campbell-Fisher has so eloquently said is that this
feeling idea has become particularised, lifted from the habitual
paths of contingency. That so often happens when we recognise this
through the forms in art is that their intrinsic expressiveness
delivers the particularity of this felt idea to the point where we
feel it too. It comes to us bearing significance because it has been
given significance through the particular clothing of the work itself.
This felt form, this felt idea, is born within the context of the
work and rises as it does because this particular context has given
it its life - its significance and sense. The work has given it the
orbit in which it can now live, in which it can deliver its sense in
which it can be expressed. Contingency and habit, like reference and
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bound meanings, hold it back from sight. The visibility in vision
is born when visibility is freed from the contingency and entangle-
ment of ordinary habitual perception. It is freed when the perception
of things becomes the perception of the expression of things.
II. 5. 1. Drawing as a medium of linear expression.
We have outlined the general conditions implicit in the pheno-
menon of expression and I now want to consider briefly the way drawings,
particularly as linear presentations, support these general conditions.
We shall come to discuss these issues more fully in our last chapter,
but at this stage it would be useful to see the implications of what
we have been discussing with specific reference to linear expression
in drawing. Here it is necessary to point out that in any discussion
of the expressive potential in drawings we must of course be mindful
that the significance of drawings is only disclosed in their total
unity as images of thought and feeling. Having said this, however,
we can still proceed with an analysis of drawings from a particular
point of view, if we constantly keep in mind that there are many fur-
ther aspects which might be looked at. I choose the linear aspect of
drawing as a point of departure, for it seems to me that whatever else
is said about drawings, they are essentially delivered through the
mediation and interrelationships of their linear elements. Line, not
as 'object', but as phenomenal appearing is the raw material for
drawings. An examination of drawings from this point of view will
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reveal a further phenomenological appeal. Line in drawing is always
a bringing into being of that which previously did not exist and any
analysis of it, as a contextual element, gives direct access to the
draughtsman's felt thought and visual intelligence. His use of line
in drawing will be the genesis of a whole ontology that reaches past
his lines as these lines, to a reality that lies embedded within the
very forms these linear elements support. The line in drawing is
the means whereby we can reach past the contingency of things in the
world to a fresh disclosure of sense. Moreover, in its whole contex-
tual interpenetration it is, as Merleau-Ponty has pointed out, a
'blueprint of a genesis of things' (op cit 79). It is symbolic of
a way of ordering and., as we have seen from our discussion of Woll-
helm's thesis in our previous chapter, it is not simply the deliver-
ance of the 'edges' of things in the world, of the contours of things
in space. Drawing, in its linear manifestation and representation,
is not concerned with that 'factual' and 'spatial' pre-given 'reality'
of things in the world. Drawing is misconceived. if it is seen as the
result of the 'tracing' of edges of things that arises from a mecha-
nistic physical-optical engagement with the world. Line in drawing,
fundamentally discloses its symbolic relationship with experience,
not any direct overall similarity with anything 'real'. Thus we are
brought back to our discussion in the first section of this nlysis
of what Cassirer developed. The line can be said to be expressive
in drawing, because of the way it reveals the draughtsman's dialectic
and dialogue with his own ways of seeing within the totality of his
owii. perceptual experience of the world. As Ayrton(14) has said, the
process of drawings
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••• is before all else the process of putting the
visual intelligence into action, the very mechanics
of taking visual thought." (op cit p64).
In all this it becomes clear that in our consideration of the
linear aspect of drawing we are not considering these elements as
'objects', as 'thir.gs', as so much furniture: we are concerned to
disclose the phenomenal nature of these elements within the totality
of the whole, that lends them a significance and sense that can be
truly said to be ex-pressive. We have come to see that expression
is that fusion of the 'I' with the 'you' within a single form and
that the path outward toward the significance of these forms is only
as they find, their counterpart in that path inward to ourselves that
reveals the world to us and, perhaps more importantly, in the refle-
xive reciprocation of this activity of seeing reveals ourselves in
in relation to world. The experience of seeing in drawing and with
drawings, is always a qualitative one. To see them as drawings at
all is to reach toward their value and expressive potential.
Thus we are taking one aspect of drawing and examining its con-
tribution to our thesis. The undividedness of the sense of the whole
image in which this aspect resides will always be borne in mind.
Rawson(15) refers to Arnold Sch5nberg who put it thus:
"In a real work of art it is like this: everything
looks as if it had come first, because everything
is 'born at the same time. The feeling already is
the form, the thought already is the word."
(op cit p77).
We are looking at the means by which this process of putting the
visual intelligence into action is achieved. What, of course, makes
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a great draughtsman is the way in which within his particular and
idiosyncratic graphic forms he makes his endless varieties arid impro-
visations. The richness and texture of the drawing's expressive
sense reaches us through the apprehension of this significance as
borne in by their means. This includes the variation and tension
that arises from the inventiveness of the graphic forms themselves.
The clarity and precision of the draughtsman's felt thought comes
through from the seeming endless thematic variation he achieves through
his graphic forms. Ayrton feels that Ingres "draws ... with the tip of
his tongue" (op cit p67) and Rembrandt "has ... the effect of a man
planting with gentle, stubby fingers, the green fingers of the spirit,
an endless diversity of plants and seedlings" (op cit p68).
II. 5. 2. The line - as figuration.
We are talking, therefore, of seeing drawing primarily as figura-
tion - not configuration. The degrees by which we advance into the
richness of its expressive sense is reflected within the variation
and interpenetration of its various graphic formulations that each
in their relational significance contribute to the wholeness of the
drawing's numinous quality. The line as made and now appearing does
not have its genesis as an attribute of the objects in the natural
world, from which it might spring. The line is not in the natural
world at all, it is read into the world. Gore(l6) has put it thus:
".. the drawn line is seen as line because the mark
is seen as conveying a gesture. If it did not convey
any-thing we would not see it as line. We call it a
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line because it is a mark that records a movement."
(op cit p29).
This implicit gestural sense of the line makes it directly graphic
and indicates the immediate way drawing can disclose visual thought
in action. Line bears in itself this physiognomic quality and visual
force. The line has a tactile and kinetic basis and comes to vision
charged with feeling affect that rises from our own bodily sense.
Movement and dynamic are an implicit aspect of all expression and
as Arnheim has pointed out, gives to perception itself its primary
quality. This affective aspect in perception we have already dis-
covered in Cassirer and we have seen how it lies at the root of
expression perception itself. Arnheim(17) clarifies this dynamic
in perception when he says:
"In looking at an object, we reach out for it. With
an invisible finger we move through the space around
us, go over to the distant places where things are
found, touch them, catch them, scan their surfaces,
trace their borders, explore their texture."
(op cit p19).
In drawing, this perceptual activity is given historicity as
it is caught and formulated through its various elements and made
graphic. The line can restore this sense in us as we follow through
the movements of the artist's own vision. Rawson has further sug-
gested that in order to gain insight into the significance of any
drawing, we must follow or scan the original movements of the point,
all of them, in due scale of emphasis. This is where it has become
invaluable to reach into the historicity of the drawing through the
sequence photographs of our subjects, but it is often possible, even
without this information, to trace the development of the drawing,
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to sense the probing and the shaping for recall within the way the
marks are put together. By 'reading' a drawing in this way one
adopts the mental scanning patterns that the artist originally set
down, as we shall discover when we come to the analysis of the
drawings before us. That gives to drawing its expressive sense is
that this perceptual activity, in action as it were, engages our
imaginative concern and we 'live through' the drawing; we stay with
it and thus entertain the whole possibility of its expressive and
qualitative potential. The greater the richness of the structuring
of this experience by the draughtsman the greater will be our share
in its expressive sense. For this experience is the experience of
felt forms, not forms merely recorded. Their dynamic and qualitative
utterance resides in the tension of what they are as marks and. the
significance they lend to the shaping of our experience of them as
forms that leads us past mere configurat ion to their phenomenal
appearing, the path towards the drawing's ontology.
II. 5. 3. The line - physiognomic significance.
We have spoken of the visual tension that the linear elements -
as indeed all the formal elements in drawing - can disclose, and we
have seen how the line specifically can register that activity of
perceptual dynamic which Arnheim feels is embedded in perception it-
self. Before we are thus able to appreciate j.his dynamic within
drawings, or any other iconic representation, we must already possess
the ability in our perception of the world itself to sense the
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significance and relationships between things. We imist be able to
bring that aspect of ourselves into all our perception of the world.
Arnheim(8) feels that:
"The impact of forces transmitted by a visual pat-
tern is an intrinsic part of the percept, just as
shape or colour. In fact expression can be des.-.
cribed as the primary content of vision."
(op cit p365).
He suggests, for example, that a blanket thrown over a chair can
seem to be twisted, sad or tired (ibid p365). This physiognomic
aspect in perception, he suggests, should not surprise us - our
senses are not self-contained recording devices operating for their
own sake. He goes on:
"The organism is primarily interested in the forces
that are active arount it - their place, strength,
direction ... the perceived impact of forces makes
for what we call expression," (ibid p365).
Moreover, he maintains that the significance of the configuration
of forces - as the basis of expression - is such, not only for the
object in whose image these forces appear but for the whole physical
and mental context of the world in general.
"Motifs like rising and falling, dominance arid sub-
mission, weakness and. strength, harmony and discord,
struggle arid confornance underlie all existence."
(ibid p368).
We do not read into these motifs our feelings, as the theory of em-
pathy might suggest; they are not "dressed up ... by an illusory
'pathetic fallacy'" (Arnheim, ibid p368) as though these motifs were
a clue to a kind of associationist view. These felt forms are imme-
diately perceived and apprehended as observable qualities in the
presentation itself. Therefore, our apprehension of these felt
qualities in a drawing not only seem phenomenologically to be
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immediate and direct; they are so. We do not make an inference from
the physical sign to the mental state, we apprehend expressive sense
directly. Cassirer has also sensed what we have been saying when in
talking about the line he says:
"As we immerse ourselves in the design and construct
it for ourselves we become aware of a distinct phy-
siog-nomic character in it. A peculiar mood. is
expressed. in the purely spatial determination, the
up and the down of the lines in space embraces an
inner mobility, a dynamic rise and. fall, a psychic
life and being. And here we do not merely read our
own inner states subjectively and arbitarily into
the spatial form, rather the form gives itself to us
as an animated totality, an independent manifestation
of life .., all this lies in the line itself as a
determination of its own reality, its objective
nature." (op cit p200).
This immediately raises issues of profound philosophical interest.
It brings us full circle to all we have been saying about the phenome-
non of expression, for we can. see again how within the fusion of a
single form that tension that rises from the line's move outward to-
ward subjectivity is grounded in its own objectivity as line. Its
symbolic and. metaphoric significance is caught within the tension of
its own double aspect. The richness of the experience it can bring
to us is revealed through the endless variety of its own form, its
own objective nature - its own means. Thus, not only in its rise
and fall, not only in its visual tension, but in the way in which it
is constituted and. built up, in the variety of its pressures, of its
expansion and. contraction, of its speed and weight, of the space it
points to, as well as the space it encloses - all these aspects are
impressing us. And as they echo forms already embedded in the matrix
of our Being, shape and. sense, give it direction and, through the
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marriage of felt forms in our past perceptual experience, disclose
a new significance. The line is never visually self-sufficient.
Sonia Rouve(18) .says:
"If forms are to be meaningful, such meanings must
be found within the forms themselves and not
grafted from without on to these forms ... forms
are never visually self-sufficient. They always
refer to meanings which remain beyond all optical
images and. yet are embodied in them. ... This
Janus-like essence of forms is to be clearly
understood. (op cit p204).
Andr Breton(19) writing about Kandinsky's line said:
"He has restored the line to its proper necessity.
It is the thread of Ariadne that leads us through
the maze of appearances, through the mist of ob-
jects stripped of their external and specific
identity ... ." (op cit p11).
The line as the 'thread of Ariadne' has its own internal nece-
ssity. Its very linearity is disclosed in the form of its being line
and yet it comes to us clothed in content, it faces both ways. Thus,
its linearity might point to its visual forms, but it comes to us
bearing significance, the meanings the line refers to are not 'grafted
on', they arise out of the very existence of its own linearity. The
two areas of the contract of significance join in the manifestation
of the meaning which indeed is beyond all optical images. To see
the line as the thread that leads us through the maze of appearances
is to enter into an imaginative contract with it that feeds us with
meaning as the meaning lies embodied in the linearity of its form.
The two tokens are fused within the image of the line's form. Thus
the face of Janus faces inwardly and outwardly at the same time.
The line takes on its own dynamic, becomes expressive.
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The tension arising from the duality of the line's nature, its
metaphorical significance is always present in drawing. Indeed this
tension between the line as a two-dimensional figure on its ground
and its three-dimensional metaphoric sense as figuration, is what
gives to drawing its 'life' and 'presence'. For drawings to carry
this expressive significance we must sense the tension that is caught
and held between their two-dimensional surface unity and their three-
dimensional plastic sense, C 'zanne is often quoted as being pre-
eminently occupied with flat picture surface, the truth is that the
significance of his image forms is achieved through a vivid realisa-
tion of that tension that exists within the two-dimensional sense of
that three-dimensional plasticity, Merleau-Ponty characteristically
grasps this significance when he says:
"Figurative or not, the line is no longer a thing
or an imitation of a thing. It is a certain d.is-
equilibration kept up within the indifference of
the white paper; it is a certain process of gouging
within the in-itself, a certain constitutive empty-
ness - an emptiness which as Moore's statues show
decisively, upholds the pretended positivity of
the things. The line is no longer the apparition.
of an entity upon a vacant background, as it was
in classical geometry. It is ... the restriction,
segregation, or modulation of a pre-given spatia-
lity." (op cit pp79/80)
and again he says:
"The beginning of the line's path establishes or
installs a certain level or mode of the linear,
a certain manner for the line to be and to make
itself line, 'to go line'. Relative to it, every
subsequent inflection will have a diacritical
value, will be another aspect of the line's rela-
tionship to itself, will form an adventure, a
history, a meaning of the line ..." (op cit p79).
Bergson(20) talks of line as being "... not in one place any more
than in another, but it gives the key to the whole" (op cit p229)
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and Leonardo(21) in his Treatise on Painting is reputed to have said:
"The secret of the art of drawing is to discover in
each object the particular way in which a certain
flexuous line which is, so to speak, its generating
axis, is directed through its whole extent •.."
(op cit p229).
It is because drawing can give such direct access to the struc-
tural sense of the draughtsman's vision that makes it so rich an area
for the exploration of his visual thought. There are no lines visible
in themselves, the drau,ghtsman in making his linear manifestation is
unequivocally making an affirmation of the is of his reality. ks
Ayrton has pointed out, drawings are first a soliloquy before they
become communication. Their sense is first private for they structure
in visible sense the draughtsman's structuring of his vision. The
line reveals, like no other mark, the course and clarity of the
draughtsman's visual sense. This is why drawing is more self disclo-
sure than self expression. The line records the draughtsman's search
through the world of appearances. His intention, if his search is
true, is to 'render visible' as Klee once said. Lines, suggested
1erleau-Ponty are "... indicated, implicated and even very imperiously
demanded by the things, but they themselves are not things" (op cit
p78). The qualitative sense of their deliverance lies, as we have
seen, in the relational tension they bear, not only to those struc-
tures within the drawing but to that inherent structural ordering
that the draughtsman has found within 'things' that in this new delivery
breaks the 'skin of things', as Michaux(22) says, and gives them a
fresh qualitative sense. Moreover, he gives to them a fresh dimen-
sion of vision and formulates them within an image that enables us
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to move past the contingency of them as mere 'things' to sense that
new dimension they now hold for us, through the particularity that
is given to them in the whole graphic sense of the drawing itself.
The structural ordering that line can bring to experience through
drawing is of course crucial to an understanding of the drawing's
sense. A drawing that is made up of flowing calligraphic linear ele-
ments has a very different sense to one that is constituted from
elements that have an angularity and. straightness about them. Feliks
Topoiski's drawings for example, are full of an organic rhythmic
sense that arises from the way the lines are used. David Cowley's
drawings, on the other hand, have a very different visual sense be-
cause the line is used primarily as an axis of direction and movement.
These descriptions have more than a mere topological distinction -
they present very different ontologies as we shall discover more
fully later in Chapter V. Of course, in a formal sense, there is
a very different expressive 'feel' to lines that are straight and.
angular and. lines that are curved. Much of this has to do, ãs Am-
heim suggested, with the kinetics of their implied movement, and their
visual sense is brought to us as having qualitative value because of
the visual forces they generate, not only in themselves but in rela-
tion to the co-ordinates of the page. Rawson(15) points out that
straightness implies a fixed sense of direction. It also establishes
a claim to rightness and validity, and if drawn mechanically as for
example, in architectural drawings or mathematical diagrams, present
an ontology that is specifically relating to a system. Drawings done
in this way, as part of systemic art for example, point away from any
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movement of the individual to a world of fixed and unchanging values -
a world of impression - a world of objectness and objectivity. Cas-
sirer has described such linear manifestation5 like this:
"We now perceive a graphic representation of a tri-
gonometric function. ... The spatial form is nothing
but a paradigm for the formula ... it belongs to a
system." (op cit p200).
Curved strokes on the other hand, the varieties of which are
immense, are based on the concept of change. A curve is drawn by
an instrument that is continually changing its direction across the
ground. This sense of time and change which is evidenced in drawing
is a very important part of its expressive sense and shall occupy
our thinking in Chapter IV, Curves have a symbolic significance as
Rawson(15) points out:
"The qualities of curves, and their content of
experience of change,are one of the most important
sources of artistic vitality for they extend the
meaning of drawn forms via the suggestion of change
into the dimension of time. They are symbolic of
life, suggesting the contours of fruit, flesh,
organic substances which are full of sap, juice,
bloodand they are capable of movement, in con-
trast to the inorganic, lifeless and crystalline
immobility of the straight, the flat,and. the
equally faceted." (op cit p90).
This view of time and change caught as it were within the
drawing, makes sense of how drawings can hold our attention and how
so often we can return to them without ever tiring of them. 'What
this also demonstrates is that drawings have been constructed in
time; they are made up from a whole history of looking, a whole
tissue of glances, a visual experience that on the part of the
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draughtsnian has been 'gone through'. He has stru.ctured. his vision
so arid it is this that we ourselves experience as we scan the drawing.
The other further symbolic significance is that within these curvi-
linear transitions there is the expression of a visual ontology which
views reality as fluid and constantly changing, without true static
forms. The calligraphic art of the Far East embodies this sense in
its image forms.
Furthermore, the element of change that the implied movement of
these lines might suggest is beyond all words to describe. We might
that lines may 'plunge' or 'float' or 'swoop' but these verbal
descriptions are crude approximations to what lines do in their
visual sense in drawings. There are lines for movement concepts for
which there are no words, and this is why forms in drawing can cut
across any categories of thought defined by language. Yet the ulti-
mate meaning and sense of the line can be felt and known in a way
that is fully cognitive. As we have seen, Cassirer has pointed out
that all our perception of the world proceeds from an apprehension
and differentiation of certain physiognomic characters with which in
a sense it is saturated (op cit p200). Indeed, the linguistic desig-
nation of movement almost always discloses this factor. It is inter-
esting to notice that instead of describing the movement as such, as
the form of an objective spatial and temporal process, language
names and fixates the condition of which the movement is an expression.
Ludwig Klages(23) suggests that 'quick', 'slow' and 'abrupt' as des-
criptive of lines,
"... may be understood in terms of pure mathematics,
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but 'violent', 'hurried', 'restrained', 'exaggerated'
are just as much names for conditions of life as for
kinds of movement and actually describe the latter
by indicating their characters. Anyone who wishes
to characterise forms of motion and. spatial forms,
finds himself unexpectedly entangled in a character-
isation of psychic attributes, because forms and
movements have been experienced as psychic phenomena
before they are judged by the understanding from the
standpoint of objectivity and because language can
express objective concepts only through the media-
tion of the experience of impression." (op cit p80).
For this reason the dance of the pen-tip across the surface of a
Rembrandt drawing is essential to the image and crucial in helping
us come to understand the full significance of the drawing's expre-
ssive concern. The element of time and change as met and recognised
and moreover experienced through the elements of a drawing have a
fundamental part to play in the expressive content of the drawing
it self.
II. 6. 1. Summary
We have come for the moment to the conclusion of this present
discussion. We have attempted to demonstrate that through one of
the basic ingredients of the drawing we can begin to sense the impli-
cations of all that we have said in connection with the concept of
expression. We have analysed one aspect of drawing which gives an
entry into how the graphic forms in drawing can begin to hold sig-
nificance for us. We have realised, in the course of this appraisal,
that this constitutes only part of how a drawing can deliver its
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expressive sense. Drawings deliver meaning that is rising from
their wholeness. All we have done is to take one aspect which is
a constituent of that structural ordering in drawing and analyse
the way in which it makes its own contribution to this sense of
significance that gives drawing its qualitative aspect. The meta-
phorical concern to which the linear elements in a drawing point
is indicative of that wider qualitative aspect that we bring to our
every-day experience of the world. Drawings, through their graphic
means, hold this sense for contemplation.
(1) SCRUTON Roger
(2) WOLLHEIM Richard(1968)
(3) RE1I Louis Arnaud
(6) WTTKIN Robert(1974)
(7) DEWEY John(1934)
105
REFERENCES
(4) CASSIBER Ernst(1960)
(5)	 Iu-POIT'i Laurice
(1961)
(8) ARNHEBiI Rudolf(1954)
Art and Imagination
London. Methuen (1974)
Art and its Objects
London. Peregrine Books (1975)
Meaning in the Arts
London. George Allen and Unwin
(1969)
The Logic of the Humanities
Translated SMITH HOWE Clarence
New Haven. Yale University Press
(1974)
Eye and Mind	 -
Translated from
The Primacy of Perception
EDIE James Ed
Illinois. Northwestern University
Press (1964)
in OSBORNE Harold Ed
Aesthetics
London. Oxford University Press
(1972)
The Intelligence of Feeling
London. Heinemann (1976)
Art as Experience
New York. Putnams. Capricorn
Books (1958)
Art and Visual Perception
London. Faber (1969)
(9) CASSIBER Ernst	 The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms
Vol. 3
The Phenomenology of Knowledge
Translated MANNFIfl Ralph
•New Haven. Yale University Press
(1957)
(10) sim Ben	 The Shape of Content
Massachusetts. Harvard University
Press (1957)
(12) BLACK lTiax
(13) IANGER Susanne(1967)
(16) GORE Frederick
(17) ARNHEIM Rudolf
(18) ROUVE Sonia
106
(ii) BEITTEL Kenneth
(14) AYP0N Michael
(15) RAWSON Philip
(19) BRETON Andr (1938)
(20) BEIRGSON Henri(1919)
Mind and Context in the Art
of Drawing
New York. Halt, Rinehart and
Winston (1972)
'Education as Art and Discipline'
ETHICS	 July 1944
Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling
Baltimore. John Hopkins University
Press (1970)
'The Act of Drawing'
in Golden Sections
London. Methuen (1957)
Drawing
Appreciation of the Arts 3
Ed OSBORNE Harold
London. Oxford University Press
(1969)
Painting: Some Basic Principles
London. Studio Vista (1965)
Visual Thinking
London. Faber (1970)
'Teaching Art History: A Methodo.-
logical Reappraisal'
in The Study of Education and Art
FIELD Dick and NEWICK John Eds
London. Rout ledge and Kegan Paul
(1973)
in Kandinsky. The Language of the
OVERY Paul
London. Elek (1969)
'The Life and Work of Ravaisson'
in An Introduction to Metaphysics.
The Creative Ifind
Translated AMDISON Mabelle
New Jersey. Littlefield, Adams
and Co. (1965)
(21) LEONkEDO BA VINCI
(22) MICHAUX Henri
107
(23) KLAGES Ludwig
in 'The Life and Work of Ravaisson'
BERGSON Henri (Ref. 20)
in Eye and Mind
MERLFMJ—P0NTY Maurice
p77 (Ref. 5)
in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms
CASSIRER Ernst (Ref. 9)
108
CHAPrER III.
	 THE IMAGE
III. 1. 1. Introduction - Perception and Imagination.
Drawings are images. Their first and. post important function
is that they are representations. The representative principle, as
we have begun to see from our earlier discussions, lies at the root
and source of their meaning. This chapter investigates the image,
not only as it becomes formed in structures like drawings, but also
as idea. We shall consider the underlying relationship between
image and idea. We shall look at the image as external perception
and the image as thought, as it functions in ordinary perception and
in aesthetic perception. However, we shall be careful not to make
too great a separation between perception and imagination, for we
shall discover that in experience no such clear-cut distinctions can
be made,
In Chapter I we considered Susanne Langer's(l) definition of
the image:
"An image does not exemplify the same principles of
construction as the object it symbolizes but abstracts
its phenomenal character, its immediate effect on our
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sensibility ... It organises and erthances the
impression directly received. And as most of our
awareness of the world is a continual play of im-
pressions, our primitive intellectual equipment
is largely a fund of images, not necessarily visual,
but often gestic, kinesthetic, verbal or what I can
only call 'situational'. ... we apprehend everything
which comes to us as impact from the world by impos-
ing some image on it that stresses its salient
features and shapes it for recognition and. memory.t'
(op cit p59).
Thus images are born spontaneously as our consciousness reaches out
into and is invaded by the world. Images are the product of the mind's
unceasing search for meaning. Karl Pribram(2) also, as we discovered,
suggested that:
"... the elements composing the image are relations
between events, rather than events per se ... The
image is thus a sign of relationships. In this way,
imaging provides internal meaning to signs. Imaging
is therefore the first of several ways by which mean-
ing can be achieved." (op cit p7).
This is of enormous importance for it underlines the relational
significance and dynamic of the whole of our image formation and it
also clearly suggests that the image is not a 'thing', it is always
a relationship. Furthermore, for the individual, his images, his
formulations between events, must be the very touchstone of his know-
ledge of the world. All knowledge springs from a grasp of the sig-
nificance and relationship between things. This is the basis of all
ideation. We cannot possibly know one thing without knowing it within
the context of something else. Through our images we can set ourselves
at a distance from ourselves - we can reflect. Images become that
middle term, as Dufrerine(3) says (op cit p345), between our being-in-
the-world and our sense of being-in-the-world. Images lie at the root
of the 'objectness' of things in the world and they are the enabling
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for us to sense through our own objectivity our subjectivity as well.
The image is the coalescence of both poles of our experience in and
of the world.
III. 2. 1. The rise of the image - from 'presence' to representation.
How is this image formed and whence does it spring? In Mikel
Dufrenne's phenomenology the advent of the image takes place within
perception itself. He suggests that:
"Every complete perception involves the grasping of
a meaning. It is thus that perception engages us
in action or reflection and is integrated into the
course of our life. To perceive is not to register
appearances passively - appearances which are mean-
ingless in themselves. To perceive is to know -
that is, to discover - a meaning within or beyond
appearances ... " (op cit p335).
How, asks Dufrenne, is this meaning deciphered? How do we move, in
saussure's(4) terms, from the sign to the signified? To say that it
is simply by judgment is to invoke a deus ex machina, without showing
its origin. Further, to say it is a result of learning is too simple.
As Dufrenne argues, certain meanings appear to be understood at once
in experience - in immediate experience. A child, for example, is
able to comprehend the gestures or language of others as soon as he
is capable of certain modes of behaviour and long before repetition
has been able to establish stable associations and fix them in him.
I:eaning is something I respond to, not something I think with detach-
ment. Dufrenne points out that meaning is something that concerns
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and determines me,
"... resonating in me and moving me. ... 1eaning
is a demand to which I respond with my body."
(op cit p336).
Thus any theory of meaning and thence of knowledge must begin
from realising my existential presence in the world. The duality
that has arisen from a consideration of mind and body is a duality
that forgets the lived experience of myself with the world. We have
seen, from our earlier discussions, that it is because I am in the
world that objects take on a significance for me and that I am able
to catch in them a physiognornic sense which is the bedrock of their
expressive quality. We must take care, however, that we do not move
too swiftly to seeing this activity as being part of representation.
What we are talking about here is that indissoluble fusion I have
with the world that precedes representation. It is as though I come
to the world, bearing in my body its likeness. In fact, as Dufrenne
says, things are present to me,
"... there is no screen between them and us. We are
both of the same race." (op cit p337).
This consideration has enormous implications of course, especially
when we come to Sartre's(5) analysis, where he talks of the implicit
knowledge that rises with the formation of the image and we have seen
that Merleau-Ponty(6) is also fully aware of this area of the pre-
reflective when he speaks of the undividedness between the sensing
and the sensed. As Dufrenne points out, the discovery of the object
in perception is not like the solution to a riddle, in which we are
called upon to decipher sense 'data' - strictly speaking a task for
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the understanding - rather,
"If the thing does not possess ... a secret for me,
this is because the thing is on a level with me, or,
rather, because through my body I am on a level with
it .., My body is, as it were, a branching out from
things and is capable of recording their presence or
absence. The transcendental activity which intellec-
tualism assigns to the mind can also be attributed to
the body. ... As living and mine, the body is itself
capable of knowledge, and this fact represents a scan-
dal only for those who consider the objective rather
than the animated body." (op cit p337).
No statement could be clearer as regards the essential unity of
body and mind. Intellectualism has been the curse that has separated
mind from body, where concept has been split from percept. There is
a knowledge that rises from acquaintance, the very acquaintance I
have as my lived-in body. Can this knowledge, lived at the level
of presence, be conscious? Not in the same sense as conscious
awareness. As Dufrenne points out:
"On the plane of presence, everything is given,
nothing is known." (op cit p338)
and again:
"... here I know things in the same way that they
know me, that is, without explicitly recognising
them." (op cit p338).
It is in this way, from this level of implicit knowledge that conscious
perception gains its sense and meaning. This implicit knowledge gives
to perception, as Dufrenne says, its impression of 'plenitude' (op cit
p338). Conscious perception must add to this the power of seeing - of
detaching itself. This becomes the advent of representation. The
power in perception, in conscious perception, to see, to detach itself
from the Thvel of lived presence is provided by the imagination. But
any theory of perception cannot remain at the level of presence. As
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Dufrenne points out:
"It must break open a pathway from a comprehension
lived by the body to the conscious intellection
affected at the level of representation." (op cit p339).
What of course is crucial for our present enquiry is that it is
precisely aesthetic perception that confirms this. We meet the sen-
suous aspect of the aesthetic object first through our lived experience
in our body. The aesthetic object, the drawing, the painting, the
dance, the music or drama, first manifests itself to the body and as
it were invites the body to join forces with it. How else can we
talk of the movement of the linear elements in a drawing, for example,
if this was not first felt in our body, without our conscious awareness,
but only becoming such through the representation of these lines? The
unity and sense of wholeness that something like a drawing achieves,
the totality of its sense is made known to us because, as Dufrenne
points out:
"The body is the always already established system
of equivalences and intersensory transpositions.
It is for the body that unity is given before
diversity." (op cit p339).
Yet perception cannot be wholly confined to the level of the
pre-reflective. There must be a move from the lived to the thought,
from presence to representation. It is this move that gives rise
to the image. There is, as we have seen, a capacity at the level
of presence that is assumed by the body. This we might see as a
'being-with'. This is still an aspect of the imagination, but now
its work assumes the role of 'seeing-as'. 'Seeing-as' is the hall-
mark of the representative principle and lies at the root of all
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image function. The important issue here is that the move from
presence to representation and beyond is fundamentally the work of
the imagination. sartre(5) tends to make a distinct and sharp divi-
sion between imagination and perception, but we shall discover that
there is no such clear-cut separation. Perception would not assume
its role of 'being-with' and 'seeing-as' if it were not for the work
of the imagination. He sees the imagination largely in its empirical
concerns, whereas Dufrenne, as we shall discover, considers imagina-
tion as having wider powers, that is, as both empirical and trans-
cendental. The fundamental work of the imagination however, is to
make sense of the world and of the body, to consciousness. Imagina-
tion makes up the totality of mental life. Whereas Sartre for example,
talks of a perceptual consciousness and an imaginative consciousness,
Dufrenne prefers to use different terms and, indeed, when it comes
to an analysis of aesthetic perception, he radically parts company
with Sartre on the basis of principle.
III. 2. 2. The image - as middle term between presence and represen-
tat ion.
• We have been considering the move from presence to representation.
This move is affected by the imagination and in coming to representa-
tion we inevitably come to the image. Dufrenne argues that:
"The image, which is itself a metaxu or middle term
between the brute presence where the object is ex-
perienced and the thought where it becomes idea,
allows the object to appear, to be present as re-
presented." (op cit p345).
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This is one of the clearest insights into the definition of the image.
As we shall see from Sartre the focus of intention is not on the image
but on its objective term. The image allows the object to appear.
1ow this 'object' can take the form of things in the world - struc-
tured by sensuous materials - objects of our perceptual life, or this
'object' can take on the form of the content of a thought or idea
arising from all the intersensory projections of our psychic and mental
life. As Sartre has said, there is not a world of objects and a world
of images (op cit p20), there is a different level of existence, a
different orientation of consciousness, a different conscious inten-
tion. We have seen that itis through the imagination that the move
from presence to representation is affected and. even if the imagina-
tion gives us the capacity to see 'as', or to suggest, it is still
rooted in the body and further this implicit knowledge that, as it
were, prepares us to see, located as it is within the level of pre-
sence also nourishes representation. As Dufrenne points out:
"Representation is the heir to what the body has
experienced. Loreover, the body itself prepares
for representation. ... The body reconciles us
with the object instead of separating us from it
(op cit p346).
In an important sense, also discussed by Sartre, impressions
cannot begin to qualify as objects, as having objective content, if
we are not first able to form the image. It is through the image
that objects come to us as bearing objectivity, as objects and not
merely as impressions. It is through the image that we are able to
distance ourselves from impressions so that these impressions come
not undivided to us but as wholes, as making sense. It is through
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the image that the in-itself of objects begins to appear. We must
notice, and Sartre also makes this abundantly clear that it is never•
on the image that our intention and attention is focussed. It is
always by means of the image, through the image that we are able to
reach the Identity of existence of objects in perception and it is
through the image that we are able to reach the identity of essence
that is the mark of all thought and ideation. Dufrenne adds:
"The schematism by which the object can become object
for an intelligence is attributable to the body. In
this view the body does not merely respond to the
object. It imitates the conditions under which the
object can be thought and located in a world."
(op cit p346).
And it does this through the image. This scheinatism is the structure
by which the image appears. This schematism is the basis for the
content and structure of the image. Images of our ordinary percep-
tion have a material frame, are shaped in various ways through their
material existence. Similarly, in considering images in art, they
too are shaped; they become objects of sense for us, built up and
constituted by all the interrelationships and make-up of their
schemata. These schemata, as Sartre points out, are analogues, on
which and through which the image appears. This schematisrii, this
sense, as Dufrenne has pointed out, is first attributable to the
body. The image is born out from the body and is the middle term
that indicates the move from the primary lived experience of presence
to representation, to a re-presentation to me in consciousness of
what has already been prepared in presence. The image allows me to
move from presence, where I am indissolubly linked with the world
and, moreover, to view this move, to sense it, to perceive this re-
lational dynamic. The image is the middle term between presence and
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representation. Its roots are in the pre-reflective. The image
allows its object to appear. How is this 'opening' achieved? How
is this 'distancing' effected? This 'opening' is crucially important
for it represents the disintegration of the unity of subject and ob-
ject at the level of the pre-reflective, in order that the intentional
character of the for-itself can be achieved, so that consciousness
can become consciousness, that is conscious of itself. We have seen
how the image discloses the in-itself of the existence of objects,
clothes them with objecthood. In doing so and for this to happen
there must be a consciousness that views this sense. Herein lies
the rise of the sense of subjectivity. The for-itself of the subject
can only be such in so far as the in-itself of the object is distanced
from it. The dialectic of subject and object that makes representation
what it is now takes on its relational significance. The image carries
this relational significance within itself. The advent of the image
is the advent of the dialectic between subject and object and is the
mark of consciousness itself. Dufrenne puts it thus:
"An opening is involved, in so far as the detachment
of consciousness from object hollows out an empty
space ... in which the object can take on form."
(op cit p346).
The image thus provides the background and context for the in-
itself and the for-itself to appear, the ground for the whole reflex-
ive interchange between subject and object and the field in which
images as we find them in art appear. Herein lies the power of the
icon, for images in art bring about that fusion with subject and
object which, as we saw from our earlier discussions, is the mark
of their expressive concern.
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III. 2. 3. The image - as the means for reflection.
The image provides us with this arena, this opening. 11oreover,
as Dufrenne points out, this opening is achieved and made possible
through time. Through my image I can contemplate, I can survey, I
can cast forward my intentions, I can grasp the possibility of the
possible, I can attend, think, reflect, I can stay with my image in
thought just as my look, in perception, becomes a duration. Space
and time are correlative. Dufrenne adds:
"To be attentive, to give representation its full
due, is to transport oneself into the past in order
to grasp the object in its future ... I perceive
from the past and into the future; in the present,
I can only act." (op cit p347).
The image thus enables me to detach myself from the present; in
the present I can only act, because the image "hollows out an empty
space" (op cit p346) and I can view my relationship with the world
instead of being overwhelmed by it. Furthermore, I can reflect, I
can, as Dufrerme says, "return to the past in order to surprise the
future" (op cit p347). Iy image enables me to anticipate the opening
as created by the image and that which defines this space is the
milieu wherein the object can appear; the image gives to the object
its in-itself and gives to my consciousness its for-itself. Further,
it is by means of the image giving shape to this space that objects
can appear, where seeing becomes a possibility and where I can. both
perceive and conceive.
Dufrenne, in a remarkable passage, puts it thus:
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"Every image possesses a spatial background. I con-
template what is in space from the depth of the past.
If on this basis, I can follow the movement of time -
lie in wait for the future and anticipate it - this is
because space somehow contains the future ... And if
space is the condition or, rather, the nature of every-
thing represented in so far as it is given, we have
evidence that the given is always appearance, that it
is always presented imperfectly and that there always
remains an elsewhere and a beyond. ... The advent of
representation occurs with the upsurge of space and
time." (op cit p347).
To these extraordinary insights we shall return in Chapter IV, but
here we see the dual role of the imagination found in its double as-
pect. Kant distinguished these two aspects when he spoke of the
imagination in its productive and reproductive sense, in its trans-
cendental as well as its empirical concern. The empirical imagination
strives to make the object appear through the image. The transcenden-
tal imagination gives to us the sense that this is only appearance
and that there always remains an elsewhere and a beyond. Sartre's
view of the imagination, as we shall see, is an empirical one and
this leads him, when talking of the image in aesthetic perception,
to suggest that it is 'unreal', that it is 'imaginary' and that in
viewing it one is really suspending one's belief. This is the inevi-
table outcome of viewing the work of the imagination in its empirical
aspect only. The transcendental imagination takes us beyond the
appearance of representation as such to the possibility that there
is a world beyond mere appearances, that appearances are only the
tokens of the real.
Of course, in discussing the work of imagination we can make
these distinctions, but in experience these two aspects function
together and, as Dufrenne suggests (op cit p348), they "nourish"
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perception and prepare perception for the 'fullness' it seems to
possess in experience. 1eaning inheres in perception and is pre-
pared for us from the level of our presence in perception. This
level, as we have seen, is our 'lived' experience of body-with-
world - there, but not consciously known. It arises to knowledge
as awareness through the representational aspect of the image. It
is imagination in both its aspects that prepares the ground for per-
ception and carves out a space in which the image can take on form -
can achieve its 'object' through intentionality. For intentionality
is itself shot through with meaning and carries within itself implicit
knowledge. Imagination, in its work of animating and extending
appearances is not created out of nothing. Imagination is rooted in
perception, at the level of presence, at the level of representation
and at the level of reflection. Further, as we have seen, imagina-
tion is at work in mobilising this knowledge that is implicit in our
lived experience with the world and converts what is acquired in this
experience into something visible. The imagination strives to make
the object appear, to make sense of this level of our experience with
the world. This striving to make explicit what is implicit is what
constitutes the image. Of course, this conversion into something
visible, as visible, belongs to the realm of the image in perception.
The striving toward the visible is also true of the images of our
imagination, our mental images. This 'visible', however, is not, as
we shall see from Sartre, of a 'physical' ordering: it is that ele-
ment that rises from all the psychic and intersensory functioning
of our body - this visible belongs to the imaginative and not the
perceptual consciousness, to use Sartrian terminology. This striving
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to make visible is what gives to our mental images that sense of quasi-
observation which is part of their inherent characteristic. What is
important is that the imagination is the motivating force that strives
to make what is not known, but implicit, known and present through the
agency of the image. This is the mark of the image's function, it is
always a striving to present sense to us - to make sense. This is
why Susanne Langer is able to say that the image is the stamp we give
to every-thing that comes to us as impact from the world. It is the
image that gives form to impressions, stressing their salient features
and shaping them for recognition and memory (op cit p59).
III. 3. 1. Sarire's analysis - the image as Consciousness.
In all the foregoing we have begun to relate imagination to per-
ception and have discussed the context of the rise of the image. We
have seen that the image is that middle term that comes to be as the
move is made from presence to representation. It will be our concern
in this section to look at Sartre's analysis of the image in order to
prepare the ground for an investigation of the place and function of
the image in aesthetic perception, with particular reference to the
image in drawing.
In his book The Psychology of Imagination, Sartre(5) discusses
four characteristics of the image. These he describes as: the image
as consciousness; the phenomenon of quasi-observation; the image as
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positing its object as nothing; and. the spontaneity of the image.
First, let us consider his analysis of the image as conscious-
ness. This is the central concern of Sartre's whole thesis on the
imagination and is the theme that runs through the whole of his
argument. We have begun to see from Dufrenne that the image is the
mark of the move from our lived presence in the world toward our
sense of being in the world. This, as we have seen, give rise to
the advent of representation, for things only represent for us and
therefore become known to us, as the imagination strives to make
visible and thus explicit what is implicitly felt at the level of
presence. Moreover, as Dufrerine has pointed out, in the present I
can only act, but through my image I can reach not only into the
past but into the future; through the image I can attend to the
present and anticipate the future. 	 irther, we have seen that the
image lends to objects their objectivity. We can grasp the object
not only in its existence but also in its essence.
In his book Imagination. A Psychological Critique, Sartre(7)
gives the example of looking at a sheet of white paper (op cit p1).
The qualities of its shape, colour and texture give it a kind of
existence, a kind of place, outside myself as it were, distant from
myself. We might say that the paper possesses these qualities in—
itself. This existence, as Sartre points out, is a kind of inertness.
The piece of paper (with acknowledgement to Berkeley) is always there.
We call the piece of white paper a 'thing', it has an objectness about
it. Now my consciousness, my awareness of this object could never be
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a 'thing' in the same way, because consciousness is never'in-itself'
in the same way; it is never 'inert' as the object of my perception
might be; my consciousness is always 	 consciousness, always for
itself, never in-itself. y consciousness appears as purely spon-
taneous, confronting the world of things, which have in themselves
a kind of passivity about them. In uncovering this in-itself and
for-itself we have begun to describe two kinds of existence. Objects
in the world exist in themselves, apart from me. I, on the other
hand, can never exist apart from myself. I must always exist for
myself. I can, by turning my headannihilate, as Sartre puts it,
this sheet of white paper - it ceases to exist for me. But at another
time and in another place, through an act of imagination I might 'see'
the sheet of white paper and recognise it as the sheet of white paper
I was looking at previously in perception. Sartre feels:
"... this essential sameness is not coupled with
existential identity •.. it exists differently.
I do not see it. ... Nor is it an inert datum
existing in itself. In a word it does not exist
in fact it exists as image." (op cit pp2/3).
The original French, from which the translation has been made has
en image (op cit p3). The sense is: 'by way of the image'. What
is important is that I can distinguish what exists as a thing and
what exists as an image. Sartre is, of course, talking here of what
we would commonly call the 'mental' image. However, much confusion
has arisen from considering this image as a thing. This 'mental'
does not mean 'in' the mind at all, rather it always indicates the
means by which consciousness clarifies to itself the objects of its
intention. Psychological introspective techniques have built up a
picture of mind peopled with 'images' that can be 'inspected'.
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Sartre's whole thesis is that mind is synonymous with the activity
of consciousness. It is the imagination, as we have seen, that
strives to make visible the 'object' of the mind's intention; this
it does through the agency of the image. The image is not in con-
sciousness at all. The image is always a consciousness - the mark
of imaginative engagement. Thinking that images are things in
themselves lies at the root of the whole problem concerning the
relationship between imagination and perception. The image, as
that middle term that represents the move from presence to repre-
sentation is not an image built upon perception - as visible exis-
tence. The image puts us en route for the visible and always is a
representation of appearance. To think that the image is but a
'fainter' copy of the impressions given by perception is to fall
prey, as sartre(5) puts it, to the "illusion of immanence" (op cit
p2). Consciousness and the image as consciousness exist not in
themselves as things in the world, but for themselves. We are never
deceived into thinking, for example, that our images are perceptions
(except perhaps in extreme cases like hallucinations). We know
when we have the image in perception and we know when we have the
image in imagination. We know spontaneously the difference between
perceiving and imagining. The recognition of the image, as imagina-
tive act, is an immediate datum of inner experience. The difficulty
is to rid oneself of the habit of thinking that all modes of existence
must be physical in type. Sartre(7) clarifies it thus:
"After all, the paper as image and the paper in
reality are but one and the same sheet of paper
on two different planes of being. Consequently,
as soon as one shifts from pure contemplation of
the image as such to thinking about images with-
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out forming them, one slides from essential iden-
tity of image and object to an alleged existential
identity. Since the image in this case is the
object, one draws the conclusion that the image
exists in the same fashion as the object."
(op cit pp3/4).
The problem is clear. As soon as we abandon the consciousness
of the 'object' of the image, that is, as soon as we abandon what
the image is aiming at - its content, its meaning - as soon as we
abandon the piece of white paper as something in-itself and consider
the image of it, we turn the image into the object of contemplation
and begin to give it the status of a thing. The illusion of imina-
nence has returned..
It is easy to see how this confusion has arisen. The root of
the word 'image' has its origin in the Latin 'imago'. 'Imago' in
turn is derived from 'imitari', 'to imitate', It more properly
denotes something that is 'graven' or 'made in the likeness of'.
Imagination as a covert process, first came into use through metaphor.
The metaphor has now become literalised. The root metaphor equated.
imaginings with imitatings. Imagination meant copying through the
construction of an object that resembled the model, i.e. the graven
image. When applied in a metaphorical way to what we now mean by
imaginings, the idea became a constructive process whereby likenesses
were created. It is easy to see, as Sartre has pointed out, how the
submerged metaphor has led to calling mental images 'pictures in the
mind'. liume(8) went as far as to say:
"Those perceptions which enter with most force and.
violence we may frame impressions ... By ideas I
mean the faint images of these in thinking and
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reasoning
	 (op cit p1)
Thus the 'ghost was born in the machine' and the whole theory that
sartre(7) has called the "naive metaphysics of the image" (op cit
p4) came into being. Much of the dilemma and futility of the notion
has been caused because 'seeing' in terms of eyes, imagination and
understanding came from the use of 'seeing' as a referent word. The
problem is always, as Sartre points out, due to considering the image
as a thing, as in-itself. Ii becomes clear that if we actually saw
our images (no matter how faintly), we would have difficulty distin-
guishing them from actual perceptions. Thus, through this naive
metaphysical theorising, images became not only things but lesser
things, possessed of their own existence and given to consciousness
like all other things and in the process maintaining external rela-
tions with the things of which they were images - only the relation-
ship was of a lesser degree and of a lesser clarity. The problem is
that these theories and certain psychological speculation have begun
with an a priori speculation. The error once committed was difficult
to eradicate. Images are not things in themselves; their existence
is solely for themselves, arising directly and spontaneously as an
activity of the imagination. The identity of the image in perception
is one of a kind of existence, the identity of my mental image is one
of essence. Both arise from the activity of the imagination but the
'intention' of each image is of a different order. The image is the
means by which I can reach either the 'object' in my perception or
the 'object' in my imagination. In both instances the object is
framed in different ways. In terms of the object in perception the
frame is the physical material existence of the object that is serving
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as an analogue to its representational sense. In terms of the
'object' of my mental image the frame of reference, which is its
content, is arising from all the intersensory relationships of my
psychic life and being, rising from all the interpenetration of my-
self as being-in-the-world, from the level of my presence in the
world. Thus the image rises as the search is made toward meaning.
The image is always the means by which my conscious intention can
be clarified. My intention is always directed to its 'object' through
the image. The image is always the means by which its object might
appear. Further, in order to have a consciousness of an image, I
must reflect. In other words I must take up a different position
with myself than when I am simply perceiving or simply imagining.
Thus to talk of the image at all, as some kind of abstract concept,
is to disclose a kind of second-degree activity where my attention
is turned away from the 'object' of my consciousness to the way or
manner in which this object is made known to me. It is only through
an act of reflection that I can say I have an image. This, of
course, is the basis for any certainty I might hold about myself and
the world and is at the root of my belief. For, through the aware-
ness of having an image I cannot possibly deceive myself - for it
has arisen from my own reflective judgments, This immediate sense
of certainty is a peculiar characteristic of the image. It lies at
the heart of all my images - both in perception and imagination.
What this has enabled us to see, and where earlier thinking on
the image went astray, is that these conclusions are vitiated by a
failure to see that imagination is not some kind of secondary activity
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of perception. Under this guise images become pale copies of percep-
tual objects. sartre(5) admits that if it were not for the difficulty
of ignoring centuries of traditional usage he would dispense with the
term 'image' and use 'imaginative consciousness' (op cit p5) instead,
as this would seem a more appropriate term and would not imply that
the image is an object or thing. The truth is, of course, that by
putting the image into consciousness, consciousness itself is des-
troyed. Putting images into consciousness turns consciousness itself
into an object. This would necessarily involve a further conscious-
ness to judge the first and so on to infinite regress. Sartre main-
tains that consciousness is the image - it is not then conscious of
the image, or if it is, it is operating in a reflective way, having
a different 'object' of intention. By saying that the image is in
consciousness, consciousness ceases to be transparent to itself -
its essential unity is broken. This wholeness is characteristic of
our awareness of the world and of ourselves. All images are for
consciousness, they are always for-themselves, not in-themselves.
As Sartre(5) maintains;
"The word image can therefore indicate only the rela-
tionship of consciousness to the object; in other
words, it means a certain manner in which the object
makes its appearance to consciousness, or, if one
prefers, a certain way in which consciousness presents
an object to itself." (op cit p5).
And again:
"... an image is nothing else than a relationship
my attention is not directed on an image, but on an
object." (op cit p5).
Thus not only is consciousness distinct, it is capable of dis-
tinguishing itself from the object. This is of enormous importance
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in realising the place of images in thinking. Cognition is not some-
thing separated from this intrinsic act of consciousness. The ability
to distinguish through reflexive judgment, my consciousness and my
consciousness in its relation to its objects, is the basis of all my
ideation and knowledge. To speak of my ability to form images and of
my ability to give shape to my impressions and, from the flood of
impressions known and consciously received, as well as all those im-
pressions I am receiving below the level of my conscious awareness,
to structure these impressions into sense, is to speak of the work
of my imagination and indeed is to speak of the structure of my very
Being itself. Furthermore, as Mary Warnock(9) has suggested:
"There emerges a space between the thinking subject
and that which is the object of its thought, between
the perceiving subject and that which it perceives."
(op cit pIx).
The emergence of a space is the indication of a conscious Being,
for to be conscious is to be at a distance from the world, is to main-
tain a relationship with the world. As we have seen from Dufrerme, it
is the imagination that carves out this space - through the image.
The image is the token that this space exists. Furthermore, through
this reflective act of judgment I can grasp the significance of the
in-itself of existence and the for-itself of essence. I can begin
that reciprocal interchange with the world that enlarges my being.
Sensing that a space exists between myself and the world means that
objects can be questioned. Imagination, through the image, gives me
the power to interrogate the world. I can form the image of the pos-
sible, I can see that the appearance of objects is only a token of a
beyond, I grasp the sense that appearance is only appearance. My
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ability to propose that something is not so, is evidence that I am
free from the bondage of a causal determinism that is the mark of
an animal's existence. I do not simply respond to perception as
mere impression. I can reach out into perception and grasp it as
expression. I am free to move through the world and still remain
distinct from it. My image is the path to an ontology that is free
from the here and now of mere action. My action is given the dimen-
sion of purpose and intention, for as Dul'rerine says, through my image,
formed as it is from all my presence in the world, I can reach into
the past in order to surprise the future (op cit p347).
III. 3. 2. Sartre's analysis - the image and the phenomenon of
quasi-observation.
The second characteristic of the image that we discover from
Sartre's analysis is that of quasi-observation. We have begun to
see this aspect revealed by Dufrenne, when he speaks of the image
having a kind of spatial background. In uncovering this present
characteristic Sartre examines the relationship between perception
and conception. Sartre argues that to perceive, conceive and imagine
are three 'types' of consciousness by which the same object can be
given to us. In perception, for example, I 'observe' objects. He
gives the example of looking at a cube (op cit p7). In looking at
it, I know it is a cube if at some time I have seen its six sides.
The cube is certainly present to me, I can touch it, explore it, etc.,
but I always see it only in a certain fashion, which includes and
excludes at one and the same time an infinity of other points of
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view. In fact, we learn to see objects, that is to multiply on them
other points of view. The perception of an object is thus, according
to Sartre, an infinity of aspects. However, when I think of a cube,
as Sartre says, I am at the centre of my idea. I seize the idea of
a cube at one glance. This does not mean that my idea does not have
to complete itself - by a kind of progression. What is important is
that I can think 'cube' in a single act of consciousness. I do not
have to re-establish the appearance, as I do in perception; "I have
no apprenticeship to serve" says Sartre (op cit p6). This is the
clearest distinction between a perception and a thought. It is also
one of the reasons why we cannot think a perception nor perceive a
thought. They are radically different phenomena.
"... the one is knowledge which is conscious of it-
self and which places itself at once at the centre
of the object; the other is a synthetic unity of a
multiplicity of appearances, which slowly serves
its apprenticeship. t' (op cit p7).
What is the relationship of the image to these two modes of conscius-
ness? Does the image have to serve its apprenticeship like perception
or is it immediately known? At first the image seems to belong to per-
ception - people do talk of 'seeing' their images. But in the image
we do not have to make, as Sartre says, a 'tour' of the object as we
do in perception (op cit p7). The object as image is immediately
presented for what it is. In a sense, as Sartre points out, when I
say that I perceive a cube I am making a hypothesis; at the close of
my perceptions I might have to revise my judgments. When I say, how-
ever, that the object of which I have an image at this moment is a
cube, my judgment is final, there is an absolute certainty about my
knowledge. I cannot be deceived by my image although I may well be
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deceived by my perception. In perception, Sartre feels, knowledge
forms itself slowly and. is built up gradually through successive
acts. In the image knowledge is immediately given with the image.
The image then gives us no more than is already known. This,
Sartre calls the "essential poverty" of the image (op cit p8). All
that I have, I have in the image. This knowledge, arising as it
does from this particular act of imaginative consciousness is not -
and never can be - separable from the intention that brought forward
into conscious the object of the image. The very intentionality of
consciousness is charged with knowledge. Moreover, this knowledge
is of a particular kind, it is an imaginative knowledge. It is a
knowledge I cannot reach by description; it is not a conceptual
knowledge; it is a knowledge I have in acquaintance. This knowledge
that is now known to me, made explicit through the very appearing of
the image, has its roots in that level of perception that Dufrenne
has called presence. It is akin to the knowledge that Polanyi(lO)
describes, which is a knowledge that is "more than we can tell" (op
cit p4). Further, Quentin Smith(ll) in his paper on Sartre, argues
that the characteristic of 'pure' knowledge or conceptual knowledge
is that it always envisages 'rules' rather than objects - and in
such a way that objects are viewed in a relational framework that
is rule-bound (like mathematics or language) where the objects or
the symbols of their structuring have an arbitrary relationship to
the objects they signify. Rules sustain the relationship between
their various objects. We caine across this significant difference
when we discussed the various media of Impression and Expression in
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the chapter on Expression. 'Pure' or conceptual knowledge belongs
to the media of impression; imaginative knowledge is given directly
to consciousness through the image and carries with it an expressive
and affective tonality. Imaginative knowledge always envisages ob-
jects before rules. It is a knowledge that is prior to conceptual
knowledge.
Purthermore, there is a difference between imaginative knowledge
and perceptual knowledge. Sartre feels that perceptual knowledge has
the characteristic of never being complete - it has, as we have seen,
its 'apprenticeship' to serve. For the perceptual object, as Smith
suggests:
"... has an infinite number of relationships with
other things and in any given perception we are
only aware of a limited number of these relat ion-
ships." (op cit p70).
Herein lies the 'essential poverty' of my mental image. Essentially
so because the intention on which the image is founded is directed
toward its aim. Sartre feels that objects in perception, objects
in the world, 'overflow' with perceptual intentions (op cit p7).
There is a 'massiveness' about them because they are open to an in-
finity of aspects. Indeed this characterises the very in-itself of
their existence, for as we have seen from the example of the sheet
of white paper, its existence is not dependent on me. Their 'meanings'
moreover cannot be contained. The only way I can reach any degree
of relationship to the objects in the world is through my image.
For my image presents itself as a synthesis, it abstracts the pheno-
menal aspect of the 'massiveness' of objects in the world and allows
me to arrive at their significance, sense and meaning to me. The
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image always presents the for-itself of essence from the in-itself
of existence.
Thus imaginative knowledge is not a structure added onto an
already built-up image that simply serves to clarify it and make it
intelligible, for as Smith points out:
"Once we realise that the image is not a revived sen-
sation that needs to be interpreted and deciphered
by imaginative knowledge, then it becomes apparent
that the imaginative knowledge is an active struc-
ture of the image itself. It is not an addendum to
an already constituted image, but is itself consti-
tutive of the image." (op cit p71).
All that I know I have in the image. The image is the only certain
datum for my experience of the world and of myself. It is the touch-
stone from which I move out into the world to interrogate it instead
of passively accepting it. My image is the only certain thing I have
because it is the only certain thing I know. As Sartre has pointed
out (op cit p8), objects in the world have a kind of 'brimming over'
quality about them and compared to the richness and density of the
perceived object, the image bears within itself this 'essential
poverty'. It tells us nothing for it only contains what we have put
into it. We certainly seem, at certain times to 'observe' our images
but in an attitude that is in no way informative. The image is pro-
duced by one act of consciousness and completely annihilated by
another. Therefore (and this supports Sartre's first claim to the
image) in an important sense the image is tied to consciousness. It
cannot free itself from consciousness in the way that the object
'out there' can remain independent of my perception of it. The image
exists only as long as it is contemplated.
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Although the image teaches me nothing, as Sartre would say, for
it is my imaginative knowledge that has constituted it, my knowledge
of the image is always correlative to my knowledge of it as represen-
tation. As Sartre points out:
"In the act of consciousness the representative ele-
inent and the element of knowledge are united in a
synthetic act. The correlative object of that act
becomes at one and the same time a concrete, sen-
sible object, and an object of knowledge."(op cit p10).
Thus it is that the move from presence to representation achieved
by the image is an imaginative act of knowledge. To move to represen-
tation is already to know, for representation is only sustained through
imaginative knowledge, built from my sense of Being-in-the-world and
now made known to me through the representative function of the image
itself.
III. 3. 3. Sartre's analysis - the image as positing its object
as nothing.
The third characteristic of the image is that it can 'posit'
(to use Sartre's terminology (op cit p10)) its'object' as nothing
or not present. This, as we have begun to see, opens for the imagi-
native consciousness the possibilijy of not being. This sense that
things may be other than they appear to be is the work of the trans-
cendental imagination. Moreover, to sense the possible is to under-
line that we are at a distance from the object we are interrogating.
The object, as it were, fills the space provided for it 'by the empi-
rical imagination, and the transcendental imagination brings to us
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the sense that this 'object' is not only appearance, but we can posi-
tion it as not being, or as not being present. We have seen that the
advent of representation occurs with the upsurge of space and. time
and the dialectic of subject and object is predelineated in the dia-
lectic of space and time. Because the imagination strives to make
the image appear, that is, seeks to give its object a relational frame-
work, this relational sense(that is only an aspect of an implicit
spatial concerr carries with it its correlative of time• 	 The sense
that something might be other than it is, or might even cease to
'exist', is the work of 'possibility. Warnock(12) also has suggested
that there is, as it were, an area of "free play" (op cit p7) around
the object of consciousness that enables the conscious being to
approach it, contemplate it, question and describe it. What is of
course important, is that as soon as a question is asked about the
object of consciousness, there immediately is raised the possibility
of two kinds of answer - an affirmative or negative response. This
existence of negation or of being not could not arise except for
conscious beings who raised questions about the world and haa certain
expectations about how things were in the world. This is a fundamen-
tal and ineradicable fact about the whole of our awareness of the
world. The notion of ambiguity and of uncertainty, which can be so
rich an area for an individual's searching and reasoning arises from
the fact that we can, through the image, hypothesize, we can preview
events and can cast forward an intention. We can, as Dufrenne has
suggested, lie in wait in the present in order to surprise the future.
The holding back of response, which is the mark of anticipation, is
through our imaginative ability to form an image of the possible.
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This whole situational concern is, of course, the mark of creative
activity and is an indispensable factor both in the making and appre-
hencuing of images in art. It lies at the root of all creative thinking
for it lends the necessary tension between the actual and the possible
that funds the whole experience of creating itself.
Furthermore, as we have begun to see, if through the image we
are able to sense the possible and if we are able to sense the rela-.
tionship between the actual and the possible, material reality, as
Grimsley(13) has pointed out, can be kept at a distance. Through
our faculty of being able to imagine the possibility of another kind
of existence we are prevented from being enslaved by what Dufrenne
has called the 'tyranny' of brute existence and from being 'bogged'
in the domain of mere matter. In short, we are able to exercise our
freedom. This of course gives to the intentional activity of cons-
ciousness its meaning. Freedom to move and freedom to exercise
choice is the mark of individuality and the kinds of shaping given
to the 'objects' of this intentionality is the mark of personality.
Imagination inscribes the space in which the individual can take on
his 'persona'. Caught up within the brute presence of the world and
unable to separate ourselves from its bondage, we would be held in a
tyrannical grip with perception. We would have eyes but we would not
see. The image is the middle term that marks the move from the ty-
ranny of the undivided subject/object, to representation, where all
that we see and all that we sense takes on an objectivity which means
we can come to be and to give shape and structure to our world - which
is the token of our experience of it.
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III. 3. 4. Sartre's analysis - the spontaneity of the image.
We have already touched on the fourth characteristic of the
image, as described by Sartre: it is that of spontaneity. Our
imagination in our perception of the world spontaneously produces
images. As Susanne Langer has said, it is part of the very activity
of consciousness itself. Sartre says that in ordinary perception,
when we confront objects in the world, our consciousness is, in a
sense, in a passive state. We open our eyes and the world is there
before us. Yet even though this world is there before us we give
it a kind of continuity - a kind of duration through the image -
spontaneously born; we are able to thold onto' the objects of percep-
tion and give to them a sense of structure and objecthood, a kind of
directional sense. In a similar way, in imagination we are able to
hold onto our ideas, follow them through and reach conclusions. This
is the result of the complete spontaneity of the imagination, both in
the area of our ordinary perceptions and in the whole of our mental
life.
III. 3. 5. Summary
That Sartre has done is demonstrate that the image is not a con-
dition, a solid opaque residue - but a consciousness. Psychologists
have suggested that thought is supported by images. All this does,
as we have seen, is to feed the illusion of immanence. An image is
thought through and through. There is not thought then an 'ima
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of it. The thought is the image. As he says:
"The image is a consciousness which is sui generis,
which can in no way form a part of a larger con-
sciousness. There is no image in a consciousness
which contains it, in addition to the thought,
signs, feelings and sensations." (op cit ppl4/15).
Thus far we have been concerned with the image as a kind of
static, isolated phenomenon. We shall now turn to a consideration
of all that we have said about the image in its functional aspect.
We shall investigate the relationship between the image and its ob-
ject, in other words, were we find them. We should expect to find
that within the situational concern of making and giving shape to
images in art we should begin to grasp the significance of what we
have begun to disclose. The shape the artist gives to his idea, that
forms itself into an image, is not just the means that he has of
clarifying his idea to himself, it is also the route whereby we can
gain an insight into his thinking and, furthermore, provides a
paradigm for mind in its broadest reaches.
III. 4. 1. The image in aesthetic perception.
The aim and intention of aesthetic perception as an aspect of
the imaginative consciousness is always the appearing of the aesthetic
'object', be this in the form of the drawing, the painting, the poem,
the drama. The image as it finds its transformation into shaped
material that delivers a particularity of sense and meaninj is what
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constitutes the aesthetic object, and it is within these terms that
we shall look at drawings. Thus, our aim in this section shall be
to consider how the image as idea becomes the image as formed; that
is, as given form through a material structuring. Thus far we have
been considering the term 'image' as the means whereby consciousness
makes clear to itself its intentions. But this 'mental' image is
only part of what Sartre describes as a wider 'Image Family' (op cit
p16). At no time should we consider images as 'things' - that is as
phenomena set apart from where we find them. There is a further
point we will wish to consider. The movement from image as idea to
image as formed and clarified is not one of simple pro.iection - as
though all I did in a drawing for example, was to draw a line round
my intention. The move is far more complex and much more interesting
than that. The activity is not simply reproductive - it is thoroughly
productive, as our discussions of Wollheini's arguments have disclosed.
Something new and vital emerges from the transaction between my idea'
and my idea as now given form. In a sense, even with thoughts and
ideas, they are not fully known unless and until they are given form.
Form is the registering and the coming together of space and time -
this is why images as ideas can have a kind of spatial background.
But there is a world of difference between the iinge as it is idea
and the image as it takes on plastic form within, for example, the
area of art activity. Sartre has taught us that the mental image
has a kind of essential poverty. Images as they are formed in art
have no such poverty, for they are constructed not only from the
maelstrom and flux of our mental life, where images are often frag-
mentary and fleeting, but they are constructed within material and
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physical structures. They take on an objecthood, a kind of in-itself
existence that sets them apart from the inner world of the artist.
They are open to contemplation, they become part of the world not
only of the artist but also of ourselves. The maker becomes specta-
tor and like ourselves becomes participator of their sense. Herein
lies their richness and herein also lies their power. As Herbert
Read(14) has said:", .what has not first been created by the artist,
is unthinkable by the philosopher." (op cit p70).
These images as now formed thus become the focus for the ordering
and enlarging of our experience. We have begun to sense this in the
whole transactional situation of making and apprehending such things
as drawings. It is often true for example, that we only know what it
is we want to say as we	 it. Our experience, our knowing, our
understanding and all our learning springs from the form that we give
to our activity of experiencing through our images. Not only as they
are part of our inner world of sense, that silent world of our expe-
rience, but as we give these images and intentions realisation
through all the diverse, rich and varied forms of language, science
and art. Herbert Read has put it clearly when he says:
"... man's first instinctive response to any challenge
from across the threshold of knowledge, from the numi-
nous void, is to strive to make it evident to the
senses ... . To realise: that is the literal sense,
the 'primitive sense, of the artistic process."
(op cit p71).
Coleridge grasped the significance of this when he talked of the con-
cept of 'organic' imagination (not unlike the notion of transcendental
synthesis given by Kant to the work of the imagination). Herbert Read
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describes Coleridge's idea by saying:
"... there was an essential difference between a con-
structive activity that merely assembles and re-
arranges discrete elements and an organic activity
that has assimilated these elements into its own
system and proceeds to give birth to a new living
reality - not an assembly of parts, but a new organic
whole, an integrated organism." (op cit p127).
This is precisely what a successful drawing is. A drawing by
Rembrandt is never merely a sum of its parts - it is a totality of
sense, not a collection of single images but a total image, that at
once unites and delivers the uniqueness of the drawing's particular
sense - its numen.
III. 4. 2. 'Image' and aesthetic 'object'.
We have spoken of the total 'image' of the drawing and we have
also used the term 'aesthetic object'. We should now clarify these
terms for the purpose of setting the context for the ensuinE dis-
cussion. We have suggested that the 'aesthetic' object is the object
of a particular kind of perception. A perception that is not so much
interested in the drawing, for example, as so much material but in the
drawing as a drawing - that is as already bearing a representational
and. expressive significance. But further than this, the 'object' of
aesthetic perception is that which appears through all the substructure
and substratum of images in a drawing and is the unique sense that
this particular drawing delivers. In other words, there is a diffe-
rence between the work of art and the aesthetic object. Wollheim(15)
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has amply clarified this distinction.
Works of art, be they drawings, paintings, sculptures, photo-
graphs, all have an existence in the world (like the piece of white
paper in Sartre's example). They have an existence as things, as
material constructs apart from myself, as things in-themselves, as
perceptible objects. In physical ternis they occupy space, as so
much material, paper, pigment, stone, chemicals on paper. For these
materials to come together and begin to function as images, that
existence depends on me. For me to grasp, for example, the pheno-
menal aspect of a drawing, I must have already seen it as a drawing
and have seen beyond its material construction. Yet, in an important
sense, this image that has now appeared could never be what it is,
if it were not for the structure and support given to it through its
material, physical substances. Herein lies the essential difference
between a work of art and an aesthetic object. The work of art has
a constant being which inot dependent on being experienced. The
aesthetic object only exists as experienced, as experienced by a con-
sciousness directed in a particular way, as we intimated in the intro-
duction to this thesis. There is a sense in which in its essential
'thingness', a work of art can be used in various ways. 'We can, for
example, attend to it by noticing its composition and material struc-
ture. We can also use the work , of art for identifying purposes, as
the social historian might use the portrait of someone to determine
a particular aspect of the historical past. The image is here being
used as document. All these ways of attending are legitimate. Ho*-
ever, what makes the transition from work of art ( and. from attending
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to it in all these various ways) to aesthetic object, is a fundamental
shift in attitude. It is only as aesthetically perceived that the
work of art becomes aesthetic object. It now gains a articular
felt dimension which it lacked merely as a work of art. Thus we see
that the aesthetic 'object' of a drawing, for example, is that parti-
cular quality which this particular drawing delivers through every
part of its constructed means. Haftmann(16) in his book on Paul Klee
has described it thus:
"...that form which lies concealed within it. It
cannot be seen unless one looks beyond the surface,
for an eye that stops at surface appearances top-
tical-physical seeing' Klee called this) will only
see a schematic projection." (op cit p154).
He further adds:
"The essential form can only be seen if the eye has
that penetrating spiritual power which Goethe (like
Kant) calls 'the power of intuitive judgment'."
(op cit p154).
Now we can see why Klee(l7) was able to say "Art does not reflect
what is visible, but makes things visible". It is this essential form,
this image, this essence, that makes appearance possible. A drawing,
for example, can never be a 'model', a schematic projection of an
already existing reality 'out there'. As Susanne Langer says:
"An image is different from a model and serves a
different purpose ... an image shows how something
appears; a model shows how something works. The
art symbol, therefore, sets forth in symbolic pro-
jection how vital and emotional and intellectual
tensions appear, i.e. how they feel." (op cit pXIX).
Du.frenne, as we have seen, points out that the three 'moments'
of perception - those of presence, representation and reflection, find.
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their parallel in the aesthetic object (op cit p333). it is impor-
tant to realise that in the grasping of the sense of what Haftmann
is concerned with in the quotation above, we are engaged in aes-
thetic perception in all three 'moments'. The aesthetic object, the
image as formed, is only constituted as such whilst we are actively
and simultaneously engaged with it: firstly in the aspect of sen-
sing it at the level of presence; secondly knowing it at the level
of representation; and, thirdly, experiencing it in its expressive
and felt dimension through reflection.
III. 4. 3. The aesthetic object and the 'sensuous'.
This image, that is, the object of our aesthetic attention, has
to be given form. It has to be structured through material. Now,
when grasping the phenomenal aspect of the work we are not of course
directing our attention to the work's material base as such. Yet
without this material structuring there would be no image. •The
material serves as the medium through which the image appears. Du-
frerme calls this aspect of the work 'sensuous' (op cit p11). It is
that perceptible element of the work which is the frame for the
appearing of the image. Furthermore, the image arises through a co-
alescence of all the sensuous elements. We are talking here of a
metaphorical transition and we can begin to see that all meaning in
art must be, as Dufrenne puts it "immanent in the sensuous, being
its very organisation" (op cit p12). Thus, it is that we begin to
realise the enormous importance of the material substratum of drawings.
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The ground or support on which the draught srnan works and. the part i-
cular materials he chooses to work with crucially determine the
eventual quality and significance of his image. What the draughts-
man works on and what he works with constitute his given• Rawson
(18) points out:
C
"The essential point is that the ground, whatever it
be, is the underlying symbol in the drawing for the
objective-as-such, for the Gegenstand which is set
up facing us as the ontological basis of the commu-
nication. So it can never 'be ignored. Its symbolism
is part of the symbolism of the drawing." (op cit p38).
Of course, this paper on which the draughtsman works, this rock
on which the Paleolithic cave drawings were made, is part of the
actual; it is part of the world of things as existing. What the
draughtsman does is draw into his image this part of the objective
actual that begins to serve as an aspect of the propositional truth
of the drawing. This material basis is part of the in-itself of the
drawing's existence. The image, as representation, could never take
on the for-itself of its essence without the support of the in-itself
that ties it to the world. What is extraordinary, of course, is that
this material takes on a metaphorical significance in the promotion
of the drawing's essence. The material has become the medium through
which the image now appears.
III. 4. 4. Spatiality and temporality of the aesthetic object.
Thus the sensuous is that which promotes the meaninfulness of
the image. But this sensuous is ordered in a particular way. It
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is structured through particular spatial and temporal 'schemata'
(a term used by Kant) which differ in complexity and configuration
from art form to art form. Drawings have particular schemata that
set them apart as drawings and thus make them different from paint-
ings or sculptures, works of architecture or music. Drawings
demonstrate a particular way of organising space and time, for all
drawings are spatial and. thus inherently temporal. Space and time
within the schemata of drawings are correlatives. We begin to sense
the significance of our earlier discussions concerning the contribu-
tion space and time have to the advent of the image as representation.
The image as it appears does so, as we have seen, through the sen-
suous. This sensuous is ordered - that is, given form - by means
of the way space and. time is shaped through the schemata of the
drawing. We shall return more specifically to these important issues
in Chapters IV and V. What of course really occurs through this
ordering is that space is temporalised and time spatialised. The
two correlatives that gave birth to the representative aspect of the
image now coalesce within the image as formed. Indeed, to talk of
form at all is to give to it its content that has arisen from the
union of space and time within the schemata we take as the drawing.
The direct consequence of this spatialising of time and temporalising
of space is to give to the image a realisation. It is to give a
support to the image that can hold it before us for contemplation.
The fugitive image as idea, as fleeting thought, has become trans-
fixed within this ideogram. Yet we must be careful. This fugitive
thought has not become transfixed completely. The conception has
not found total realisation. The gap that exists between conception
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and realisation keeps the whole of the art activity going. The
tension between conception and realisation is the whole funding
for the activity of making, and not only of making, but of appre-
hending as well. If the image was the complete realisation of the
idea, no further acts would be necessary. It is the constant to
and fro from subject to object in reciprocal interchange that marks
the work of the imagination itself. This is why the dry schemata
of the drawing can take on 'life', can become exipressive. Moreover,
as we have said, the imagination in both its epirica1 and transcen-
dental aspects strives to make the image appear, strives toward
giving vision its visibility. There is always a potential within
this activity which is the spur for future and continuing acts of
imagination. It is this potential that prepares the future for me
within the present, from the past, and gives me that unique sense
of the anticipation of objects, not only as they exist in perception
but as they become formed in art. This, in turn, is why the aesthe-
tic object becomes a kind of 'quasi-subject', why we are able to be
taken up and drawn into the sense of the drawing. For the image of
the drawing has become in its
	 capable of harbouring spatio-
temporal relationships within itself. This is why we can talk of
the 'world' of the drawing, a world which is more like an atmosphere
than an objective cosmos.
We begin to grasp here the correspondence to Sartre's charac-
teristic of the image. Furthermore, this is why we can refer to the
aesthetic 'object' of the drawing as an image. This characteristic
of quasi-subject that the image of the drawing possesses is akin to
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the phenomenon of quasi-observation that we have met in Sartre's des-
cription of the mental image. There is one vital difference. Sartre
has shown us that the mental image offers us nothing through its ob-
servation - for its content has already been constituted by what we
have put into it. But the 'object' of our aesthetic attention is
altogether different and altogether richer. Further, as we have begun
to see, it is not constituted in the same way as the objects of our
ordinary perception. Even though it draws its in-itself existence
from being made up through material that ties it to the world, its
material has become transformed into the sensuous base that takes on
a metaphorical significance. It is already a representation. It is
no longer an 'object' like objects in the world. It is a re-presenta-
tion, formed out from all the intentions of its maker and now offering
to me in a unique way a fresh ordering, a distillation, an essence.
Moreover, this essence is thoroughly expressive and this is why there
is a unique and particular quality to its sense. It is this metapho-
rical significance given to what otherwise might be the lifeless
schemata of the drawing that draws us into its significance. We talk
of a kind of 'presence' that a drawing may possess and we are caught
up within what Dufrenne has called its "irresistible and magnificent
presence" (op cit p86). There is a kind of beingness that this image
begins to assert. Thus we enter, in aesthetic perception, what
Ingarden(19) has called "the world of the work". Dufrenne goes fur-
ther and suggests that this world is an 'expressed world' and Casey(20)
comments:
"This expressed world •.. is characterised less by
its specific contents than by the singular affec-
tive quality which permeates it. This affective
quality makes the world of the aesthetic object
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expressive and endows the aesthetic object with the
inner complexity and coherence of a quasi-subject."
(op cit pxxVII).
III. 4. 5. Aesthetic experience arid the aesthetic object.
As a kind of 'world' the aesthetic object shares the fundamental
characteristic of the image; we have seen this from Sartre 's descrip-
tion. Furthermore, this 'world' is always a 'for-itself'; it is not,
just as the image is not, an 'in-itself'. This 'world' only exists
as I apprehend it in imaginative engagement: one shift of attention
can annihilate it. This world could never be and thus never be
expressive without the fundamental union of my imaginative conscious-
ness with it. So it is with my image as idea. I am always at the
centre of it and as such it always holds within it its intentional
character. This intentional character is not simply my knowledge of
it, is is my felt knowledge. So it is with the image as it takes on
form within something like a drawing. The image that constitutes the
world of the drawing is always a for-itself. Yet, as we have begun
to see, this expressed quality is always held in some kind of formal
means - the drawing's schemata. What lends drawings their varying
and distinctive expressive sense is the way these schemata are orga-
nised. But we have further discovered that these schemata have their
roots in the physical world; they have a material existence and form
the basis of the drawing's sensuous quality. Whatever else I know,
I know that this drawing is still a drawing, that is, it occupies
physical space 'out there' and is not an illusion or mental image.
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Thus, there is also an in-itself of existence that joins with the
for-itself of the essence of the drawing to make it what is is.
This is why forms in art are truly metaphorical. It is within the
image as formed that the tension is held between the identity of its
existence as object and the identity of its essence as subject. The
coming together of subject and object poles is achieved through this
image as now formed. Yet this in-itself-for-itself that constitutes
images in art is always an in-itself-for-itself for us. Casey has
put it with admirable clarity when he says:
"Within its expressed world, the aesthetic object
opens up a spatio-temporal field which is cease-
lessly filled then emptied in the unfolding of
aesthetic experience. Hence temporal and spatial
schemata, creating an expressed (and expressive)
world secure for the aesthetic object the status
of a self-transcending for-itself." (op cit pXXVII).
Casey here speaks of the 'unfolding' of aesthetic experience.
We have also spoken of the engagement that we have with the aesthetic
object that is an imaginative activity involving us at all three
'moments' in our perception of it. We have spoken of maintaining
this imaginative stance in order that through the sensuous the image
might appear and be made known to us in all its expressive sense.
We have also spoken of the strange and imperious 'presence' this
image seems to have that is as it were drawing us into the orbit in
which it has its being. Dufrenne has outlined the work of the imagi-
nation in our ordinary perception and from this we have discovered
how the image comes to be at all. He suggested that in ordinary per-
ception, imagination is feeding and as it were 'nourishing' perception
and giving to it its 'plenitude'. In aesthetic perception, however,
152
the 'object' is already represented. In ordinary perception images
are formed from the concrete, physical existence of things. However,
in apprehending the image as formed in something like a drawing, we
are coming to an already constituted essence - as that which is al-
ready brought together and thoroughly representational. This essence,
as we have seen, is of a different order from the existence of objects
in the world and is something set apart. Now, as Sartre says, this
new formed image, this object of our aesthetic attention, is unreal;
we have, in Sartre's opinion, to suspend our belief in respect of
this object and realise it as non-existent. We have discovered that
it is because Sartre limits his view of imagination to its purely
empirical activity, that he comes to this conclusion.
Dufrenne also accepts that the imagination is at work in our
apprehension of the aesthetic object, but rather than its work being
such that it separates the aesthetic object from the real, its work
lies in transcending the real to a constituted world that we begin
to grasp as a possibility. We have seen the implications of this in
Sartre's description, but Sartre never sees the aesthetic object in
this way. His notion of positing 'being not', which we discovered
was at the centre of the notion of possibility, is never taken to
its fulfilment in his description of the aesthetic object. For
Sartre, the aesthetic object always constitutes an unreality. Now
of course the terms 'real' and 'unreal' are misleading, for they only
refer to one aspect of the work of the imagination whose function
lies in the striving to make the object appear. However, in aesthetic
perception, which Sartre hardly deals with, it is the transcendental
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aspect of the imagination that assumes importance. Dufrenne answers
the limitation of Sartre's position. He feels that the aesthetic
object, the represented image, as perceived, is certainly perceived
'out there'; it is not 'imagined' as a mental image might be. He
suggests that the empirical aspect of the imagination, in aesthetic
perception, plays a less central role than it does in ordinary per-
ception. He puts it thus:
"The object as known by ordinary perception is a
present and real object which calls for action on
our part. Imagination projects the possible lines
of this action ... which confirms and develops the
object's signification. But the object represented
by the aesthetic object (whose function lies pre-
cisely in this representation) has a purely repre-
sented .., being. The represented object exists
only by virtue of appearance, which itself exists
only in order to signify this object. Moreover, to
comprehend an object in ordinary perception is to
locate it in a world of external objects ... How-
ever, the object represented by art, does not refer
to anything external. It is not in a world, but
constitutes a world which is internal to itself."
(op cit pp359/360).
This is what we have been discussing as the world of the work.
In aesthetic perception the object tends to separate itself from the
world, to constitute a world apart - the world of the drawing. What
is thus designated is another world, a shift in the modality of
meaning. Herein lies the capacity for images in art to be representa-
tional and this is why a drawing is more like any other drawing than
what it might be a drawing of. Imagination in aesthetic perception
is directed to grasping this other world; it is fully transcendental,
for it is not directed to the control of the 'real' world at all.
Dufrenne feels that the aesthetic object "appears through the deep-
ening, not the surpassing of the given" (op cit p360).
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Appearance is always self appearance; forms in art exist for
themselves and thus they do not so much surpass a 'giveit' as provide
the possibility of a given. They do not point to an external given,
they are their own given. Thus these forms can in no sense be des-
cribed as unreal, rather they inscribe another reality, which deepens
rather than surpasses any given reality. These forms do not have to
'borrow' any of their meaning from outside their world. They refer
to nothing external that is not already what is in their very appear-
ing. All that is 'given' is given within the appearance. This does
not mean that there might not be objective correlatives from these
forms to a world outside this world, but there is never a reference
to these forms that might be in any way an issue of resemblance,
Forms in art always point to themselves as part of their internal
structure; they never simply denote or point to forms outside the
appearance they have within their world.
Thus the role of imagination in aesthetic perception is a rela-
tively limited one (in Dufrenne's view). This derives from the
primary fact that the aesthetic object is already a represented
object. Far from meaning that the imagination is absent, rather it
plays a lesser role than it does in ordinary perception. This does
not mean to say that imagination does not animate the appearance;
of course it does, indeed it must, to give stability and consistency
to the represented object - for after all, the lines in a drawing
take on form, they are not merely figuration. What Dufrenne is
saying is that in this represented object, there is an all given,
a world. Certainly this world can be explored and the depth and
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variety of this world gives the depth and richness to aesthetic
experience, Btill an active on-going imaginative engagement. But
the aesthetic object, this image, is not an occasion for the imagi-
nation to run wild, it is not an opportunity to indulge in fantasy.
The greatest offering that the image in art has is that it directs
and controls the imagination, to the extent that we can talk of
these images as clarifying ideas; as bringing ideas within an orbit
of contemplation. The world of the work exists in comprehension
and intention, not in extension. Thus as Dufrenne suggests:
"The real task of the imagination in aesthetic ex-
perience is therefore to grasp the represented -
object in appearance without substituting for it
an imaginary object held to be more or
uniquely true." (op cit p367).
When Cezanne makes his 'distortions' in the objects of his still
life, we are not called upon to 'correct' him. There is a signifi-
cance and meaningfulness to these forms, for they do not so much
surpass the 'given' order of reality, as point to an internal order
that is only such as it is formed within this work. Thus it was that
Giacometti(21) moved to making smaller sculptures and said: "only
when small were they like". They were 'like' because in their appea-
rance they began to approach his own idea of how they should be.
Thus 'likeness' only exists as it exists within the structure and
organisation of the image that we have discovered makes its appearance
only within and through the orbit and world of the work. We do not
have to join Sarire in suspending our belief as we enter the world of
the work. This world is not unreal, rather it is a pre-real; it does
not so much surpass the given as deepen it. It always provides the
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possibility of seeing and of seeing that things might be other than
they are.
III. 5, 1. The image in drawing - its structural ordering.
We have spoken of the image of the drawing rising from the whole
interrelationship and substratum of the sensuous, built up from the
physicality of the drawing itself. This has led us to a consideration
of the world of the drawing, a kind of spatio-temporal field in which
the image appears. We have looked also at the way imagination ani-
mates this field and holds the image for contemplation. Further, we
have discovered that this image, which is none other than the aesthetic
'object' of our attention, controls and directs the imagination to the
point where we can say that this image as formed begins to clarify
and distil the draughtsman's visual idea.
The schemata of the drawing only serve as ways in which space
and time can be organised; ways in which space can be texnporalised
and time spatialised. This organisation is promoted by the nuclear
idea in the draughtsman's mind which is given projection in form
through the sensuous and becomes the drawing. The idea will have
come to the draughtsman from his direct experience with the world -
the world of his perceptions. He may work directly from nature or
he may work from a synthesis of ideas from memory, from his imagina-
tion. Whatever his starting point, his concern is to realise these
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ideas in some stable form through his drawing. A drawing, as we have
seen, is not a meaningless object, it is fully meaningful. Thjs
sense of meaning, Rawson has described as the drawing's 'topic'.
The terms 'topic', 'tenor' and 'nuinen' are terms which Rawson uses
in his analysis of the structural ordering of the drawing itself (op
cit p5). In considering that every drawing has a topic, one might
suppose that this necessarily meant drawings had to be 'figurative',
that is, have some kind of direct objective correlative to the 'lit-
eralness' of things in the world. But this is not so, for so-called
'non-figurative' drawings can still have a topic, even though, as
Rawson suggests, this might be "a most refined intuition" (op cit
p5).
The topic of the drawing, the nuclear idea behind the drawing,
has, as Rawson suggests, two aspects. The first is the 'tenor' and
the second is the special meaning that is enclosed in the topic that
rises from the structural organisation of the tenor. We can take an
example from the drawing by Wynn Jones called 'Caring Gestures'(Pig.44)
The tenor of the drawing is concerned with the disposition of the
two figures across the space of the paper. In a sense, the tenor
is the 'subject matter' of the drawing - what the drawing is depict-
ing. But these figures are not the whole topic. The topic of the
drawing is something infinitely more complex and begins to approach
what we have been discussing in terms of the drawing's'image'. The
topic of the drawing is supported and given its extension by the
particular iconography of the forms. But it is more than simply two
figures. The two figures form a relationship. We begin to sense
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the strange, almost hypnotic tension that exists between them and
we begin to move out from the drawing (or, as Dufrenne might argue,
further into the world of the drawing) to a consideration of the
drama and theatre of human interaction. For Wynn Jones, this is a
particular field of interest and concern and this is the basis for
the promotion of his topic.
The tenor, as Rawson suggests, can be likened to the tent poles
of a tent. They give the tent its extension in space, but are not
themselves the tent. 'Tenere' in Latin means to 'hold' or 'sustain'.
The topic is held and sustained by the forms that in most drawings
are the recognisable elements like figures, landscapes, objects in a
still-life. The image of the drawing cannot become what it is with-
out the support aru interact ion of the images in the drawing. Yet
the totality of the drawing's sense, which resides in its topic, is
always more than the sum of its parts. In a sense, the topic is the
key to the drawing and the tenor is the means by which we, as spec-
tators, gain entry into the world of the drawing. Thus the topic,
promoted by the tenor, provides the field through which we can grasp
the particular and individual numinous quality the drawing distils.
This finally is the drawing's 'image' and is ultimately the focus
of our aesthetic attention.
III. 5. 2. The image in drawing - the draughtsman's individual
graphic method.
There is a further very important point. The meaningfulness of
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the drawing by Wynn Jones does not reside simply in the forms of
these two figures and their attitude of mutual solicitude. The
meaning lies, not so much in the tenor of the drawing, but in how
it is treated. It is not so much what is said but how it is said.
In drawing this amounts to the graphic way the draughtsinan promotes
his topic. In the drawing by Wynn Jones, the ultimate meaning of
the drawing is bound up with the particular graphic methods he em-
ploys; the way he uses the charcoal and pencil, in consideration of
the white of the paper. This treatment which of course is unique
to the drawing, is what collaborates with the tenor and topic of the
drawing to deliver it particular numinous quality. Furthermore,
the graphic treatment of the drawing is the primary entry we have
into the draughtsman's visual intelligence. Here we shall discover
his strength or his weakness, the truth or falsity of his intentions.
Here nothing can be hidden, there is an imequivocalness about the
visual statement he makes. His treatment will reveal the path of
his progress in bring forward his idea into image. Nothing could
be a clearer revelation of this thinking. .Ayrton(22) describes this
process:
"The thought projected into drawing may or may not
run smoothly; with Leonardo da Vinci it presumably
did, but on the other hand with Cezanne it mani-
festly did not. He was often unsuccessful and some-
times totally confounded by his own intentions. But
paradoxically his drawing gains from this, from his
inexpert manipulation, because he never for one moment
relaxed his grip upon the self-set problem and his
anxious intelligence builds form into conclusive fact
with every pencil stroke. The image which is some-
times very shaky is yet laboriously built touch on
touch by the mind engaged fully in every movement of
the hand." (op cit p66).
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This underlines that before all else drawing is an essentially
private affair. It is a way of clarifying to oneself (an inciden-
tally to others) the rising images of one's thoughts. It is within
this situational contract that these ideas find their ultimate ex-
pression and projection. But they do not come pre-formed.. Czanne
developed his thinking as he developed the image in formation under
his hand. Further, as the conversion with Feliks Topolaki testifies,
the maker is often taken by surprise in their appearing; something
new is born.(appendix p389).
Thus the tenor is important. The subject matter of the drawing,
the images in the drawing, act as a focus around which the draughts-
man can assemble hi graphic forms and create a point of entry for
us, as spectators, into the world of the drawing. But it is always
the way that the 'object' of the draughtsman's perception becomes
transfigured within the context of the drawing that lends a fresh
relevance to seeing. There will always be links between what we see
in a drawing and our experience of the world and this is because
imagination in all its aspects is as much at work in perception as
in aesthetic perception. But, as we have seen, forms in a drawing
never merely point to objects in the world. There will always be
in the tenor of drawings an objective correlative, but this is never
one of mere resemblance, nor is it an identity of mere reference.
Perception, we have discovered, is constantly enriched, prepared
and given its 'plenitude' through the whole interplay and activity of
the imagination. The imagination is the enabling power we have of
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seeing one thing in something else. In our apprehension of forms
in art, we cannot help but make analogies toward the forms of our
experience. Indeed, this is what makes the world of the drawing a
kind of 'observed' world that draws us into its orbit. What is
crucial, and what gives uniqueness to our perception of this world,
is the means by which the draughtsman brings his fleeting idea into
stable form. The way the draughtsmari. assembles his basic graphic
forms and puts together the units that are his graphic repertory
bring into existence this distilled image that can be found nowhere
else but within this unique visual construct, within this drawing.
Now the draughtsrnan develops a repertory of forms that he uses over
and over again, This is his personal handwriting and becomes the
mark and stamp of his image, In the history of drawing, the draughts-
man developed his graphic forms from prepared pattern books and the
rise of drawing methodology is, of course, closely linked to systems
of working from particular forms in particular ways. The coming of
the Plein Air School in the mid 19th century represented the disman-
tling of this tradition. It is nevertheless true that draughtsman
still develop their basic graphic repertory from looking at other
works that they admire. This repertory of forms need not be in any
way sterile because of this, and a good. draughtsman builds from these
forms, so much so that they become an inherent part of his thinking.
As he works he begins to develop his thinking in terms of these forms
and his emerging ideas begin to coalesce as they are inextricably
bound to them in the context of their subsequent realisation. Some-
times the graphic constructs the draughtsman employs can be so
powerful that we, as spectators, can find, ourselves projecting them
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onto the objects of our ordinary perception. The Provenal country-
side will never be the same now that Czanne has given to it his
particular stamp and. identity. Thus it is that we come to drawings
prepared by the graphic constructs of other drawings. We come to
sense significance of their image forms, because we have come to
understand the conventions of their means. Rawson, in talking of
the repertory of graphic forms the draughtsrnan employs, puts it thus:
"They identify his topic for him and provide a veh-
icle for his structure and invention. They are the
means whereby the artist refers to meanings already
implicit or formulated in previous works of art.
The draughtsman may have inherited his stock of
types from tradition, and may use it timidly, re-
peating other men's thoughts. But if he is a
major master, he will develop substantial modifi-
cation of his types and perhaps add substantial
type-ideas of his own from his observation and
synthesis of forms and meanings." (op cit p254).
The graphic forms that Feliks Topoiski uses, for example, have
a clear and identifiable character and quality about them. Moreover,
they have become an integral part of his vision and one senses a
complete ontology beyond these forms. They disclose a significance
that could only ever be through the manifestation of his drawings.
This is why, through these forms, we gain a fresh insight into seeing.
The individual character of his graphic forms opens for us his world.
Further, they demand our attention because they catch that aspect of
our experience which is now made known to us and which before lay
beyond the reach of our awareness. His line has a restless urgency
about it. One senses his hand is never far from the per and that
he does not so much confront objects; they invade him. His line is
like a seismographic probe; it is like the flickeringtrace on an
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oscilloscope, registering points of contact that are no sooner made
than gone. His line is a reminder of appearance; it echoes distant
responses in our body, like the movement and trace of our eyes. His
line not so much defines as explores, and the forms that coalesce
out from this moving trajectory are forms that have been caught and
held as if in webs. Here time is spatialised and space temporalised -
we catch the visibility in vision, as something which forms itself
gradually and comes into focus to be held for contemplation. Here
and there the concentration of lines reaches a climax that becomes
the focus for the appearance of the image and. allows it to coalesce
as form.
The drawings of Wynn Jones are very different. Their strange
introspective dream-like sense is not made knownto us only through
the fact that we recognise in these forms echoes of the gestures of
our own experience, but also because through his graphic formulations,
(for these are his means) he prompts in us that strange sense of
elusiveness and tentative search that constitutes the spacecon-
fronting individuals. Here his line gently probes the space of the
white paper and one sense that infinite care has been taken over the
texture and surface of these forms that in turn respond. to the sen-
sitivity and. texture of our mutual feelings as human beings.
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iii. 6. 1. Suirunary
All our descriptions have registered the rise of the image.
As Haftmann has commented:
"Something emerges out of darkness and takes form
without conscious intention, without direction.
It is like a cryptic writing which strives to be-
come visible, to transmit a communication. But
here again it must submit to a strict discipline:
the process of selection, refinement, fabrication
and completion. That is called 'finding one's
way on the formal plane'. There the image grows
according to the subtle laws of living things.
There too is decided whether a picture will be
born and also what sort of picture." (op cit p143).
We come to meet this emerging image for, as we have seen, we are
prepared for it at the level of presence, at the level of repre-
sentation and at the level of reflection. The engagement we have
with it is an imaginative one, and reflects imagination's dual role.
This image not only strives to appear but it provides the possibility
of sensing the essence in existence, the intangible along with the
tangible and as Klee(23) says "the prehistory of the visible".
David Sylvester(24) has put with admirable clarity what we have
been reaching toward throughout this chapter. It is for this reason
that I quote in some length:
"Working from nature is working from memory: the
artist can only put down what remains in his head
after looking. And the time between the instant
when he looks at the model and the instant later
when he looks at the paper or canvas or clay to
copy what he has just seen might as well be an
eternity. The model can go on standing still for
ever, but the work will none the less be the pro-
duct of an accumulation of memories none of which
is quite the same as any other, because each of
them is affected by what has gone before, by the
continually changing relation between all that has
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already been put down and the next glance at the
model. And it is not merely because of the nece-
ssity to look away from the model to look at the
paper, canvas, clay that, as soon as we try to
copy what is seen, it was seen: it is also because
our mind, has to get outside the sensation before we
can copy it, our very awareness of having a sensa-
tion pushes it into the past, for we cannot think
about our present thought, it slips away as we try
to grasp it, because we try to grasp it. The artist
can never get there, whether he works from nature
and builds up an accumulation of memories modifying
and contradicting one another, or whether he works
from memory and constructs a synthesis of what he
remembers from having seen.".
Of course, as we have seen, the gap can never be closed. But
in spite of this, as Sylvester suggests further on in his article,
there is a 'hard core' which remains from all that has been seen and.
this can be rendered as if indestructible and. this is the image.
The draughtsman, in making his images, is always working "from
the residue of vision", as Czanne(25) put it. This residue is like
a flux, it is always between being and not being. It takes his image,
given form through his drawing to stabilise this vision and moreover
gives to it a duration.
The draughtsman draws to give order to his thought, it is a
process whereby he makes clear to himself what he is doing. It is
a process that simultaneously orders and enlarges his experience.
Drawings are the mark of the draughtsrnan's visual intelligence in
action. They are the clearest indications of that continuing dia-
lectic between image and idea which prompted Baud,elaire to suggest
that the draughtsman was the true philosopher of art. Cassirer(26)
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in characteristic terms has suggested:
"Artistic activity ... shows how impossible it is
to draw a line between inner vision and outward
formation, it shows that here vision is already
formation, just as formation remains pure vision."
(op cit p39).
(8) ll1JE David
(9) WARNOCK Mary
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CHAPTER IV •	 THE SPATIALITY AND TEMPORALITY
OF DRAWING
IV. 1. 1. Introduction
Our purpose in this chapter is to uncover the essential spatia-
lity and inherent temporality in drawing. Our task will be to dis-
cover how these unite to promote the movement of meaning through the
particular graphic means which drawing employs. To this end we shall
ultimately be looking at the work of the five draughtsmen who have
collaborated in our venture and we shall seek to demonstrate how each
in his or her own way has ordered space and time.
This present chapter is divided into three sections. The first
deals with space, the second with time and the concluding section
considers the spatiality and temporality of the aesthetic object,
with particular reference to drawing.
The meaningfulness of any drawing is embedded in its spatiality,
but this spatiality, as we shall see, is not simply the space of ex-
tension, of mere projection, of quantifiable measurement. The spatia-
lity of which we speak lies in the drawing's image. Although drawing
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is primarily an art of space, time is also implicit. Any considera-
tion we shall make of movement, rhythm and tension in drawing, will
point to that aspect of time which is turned toward space. We shall
sense, moreover, what Dufrenne(l) calls the 'solidarity' of space
and time as they coalesce within the drawing's image (op cit p241).
Thus, the spatiality we are speaking of is such that is opened
out for us through our entry into the world of the drawing. We shall
seek to describe this phenomenal spatiality - for it is this spatia-
lity that the image carves out for itself in order that it might
appear. This spatiality is always for us; it is beyond the space
of the geometrician, a mere network of relationshis. It is a spatia-
lity that is always on the move, filled by the reverberation of count-
less images whose very mobility ignites our interest, our attention
and our participation. This is the 'felicitous' space described by
Bachelard(2) - the space we love to inhabit. This qualitative spatia-
lity always bears a value, sustains the world of the drawing and gives
it the status of an expressive world - a world which offers directions
and orientations and dimensions for us - for our Being.
This is the space the draughtsrnan strives to inscribe with his
line. There is a 'logos' of lines which is the privileged domain of
the draughtsman. Through his linear descriptions he can lead our
gaze. He can carry us through the space he has already traversed,
the space of his own imaginative intentions. As words are to the
poetic imagination, so line is to the graphic imagination. In each
we catch aspects of Being, for in each we catch space and time at
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their source.
In Chapter III, we noted Andr Breton(3), writing about
Kandinsky in a catalogue to an exhibition of his work in London in
1938, said:
"He has restored the line to its proper necessity.
It is the thread of Ariadne leading us through the
maze of appearances, through the mist of objects
stripped of their external and specific identity.
It is the quickening thread uniting the pagoda's
long robe to the long robe of the whirlwind, the
sear of lightning to a furrow of a voice in wax,
the nervous complex to a tangle of rigging. He
found a punctuation that fuses into one the firma-
ment of stars, a page of music arid all the eggs of
all the nests under heaven." (op cit p11).
This utterance is testimony to the way Kandinsky's line could ignite
the poetic space of Breton's imagination. Kandinsky's line opens
pathways of poetic thought for him and begins to inscribe an interiority,
which marks depth of feeling and expressive power. These images re-
sonate in us also, for we too are caught up in the passage which this
linear thread traces.
From whence does this sense of space arise? What is this
duration which carries us through the reverberation of these images?
Wherein lies their attractiveness? Why are we drawn into their
'felicitous' orbit? To begin to answer these questions is to begin
to sense why the draughtsman can catch at the roots of visibility in
vision, why the essential spatiality in drawing is a spatiality which
is always more than we can tell.
This space is always at the edge of the drawing as it were - as
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if waiting to be uncovered through the imaginative engagement of the
spectator. For the imagination, the space of the drawing is always
seemingly alive, it engages our attention, it draws us toward itself
in its constant movement toward meaning. These lines seem to have
an imperious presence, they direct and animate our looking. Up and
down, right and left, swooping, plunging, curling, soaring, floating,
impassive, cold, warm, welcoming, savage, dancing, quiescent, shim-
mering, vibrating, resonating, singing - these words which actively
suggest being, are caDable of being evoked through language, but they
are immediately present in their linear deliverance. They are first
of that spatiality which is pre-linguistic. Their evocation lies
beyond all concatenated l.nguage, evocative because they lie within
that space which the poet knows and achieves through a topology of
words and a space which the draughtsman knows through a topology of
line. The space which the poet and the draughtsman seeks to carve
out is a felicitous space - he is always traversing it and never
meets its horizon; his very endeavour is the impetus for his whole
creative activity. It is a space made such through the advent of
representation; it is the space which takes on form and is heralded
through a deeper sense of that pre-objective spatiality that lies
in wait to be surprised, that lies in wait to be opened and evoked
by these new-formed images which the draught sman forms under his
hand. Through these forms these spaces are ignited and magnetised.
The draughtsman has a peculiar and unique privilege, not shared
in the same way by any other practitioner in the visual arts. His
privilege is to make his space visible; to make his space reverberate
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and resonate through his line. The handling of line is full of adven-
ture. It is immediately for the spectator an invitation to the voyage.
The line is the figure which breaks from the silence of its ground.
As soon as the line traverses the field of the surface of the paper,
it rnagnetises the space it subtends. This space becomes evocative, it
calls from the silence it was to the activity it now is. The line is
the mark of the draughtsman thinking towards poetry. Through his line
he muses. Never, in this context, is it the mark of the geometrician,
whose concern is only measurement. For the draughtsman is not marking
off, he is marking within. He is always engaged in that search which
is the process of his drawing - that space which is never an 'all-
done' but a constant coming-to-be, with its horizons always beyond
the given.
We have sought to set the direction of our enquiry. To many of
these issues we shall inevitably return, but the central issue is
clear. Our task now is to describe and establish this spatiality.
Dr. 2. 1. Space - 'a condition of the possibility of phenomena'.
Merleau_Ponty(4), writing in Phenornenology of Perception, follows
and develops the Kantian view of space. Kant(5) spoke of space not as
a concept, but as a fundamental intuition. This is Kant's description:
"Space is a necessary representation a priori, forming
the very foundation of all external intuitions.
Space is therefore regarded as a condition of the
possibility of phenomena, not as a determination
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produced by them; it is a representation a priori
which necessarily precedes all external phenomena."
(op cit p62).
Space is not a thing-in-itself. There is no question of regarding
space as the relationship of container to contained. As Merleau-Ponty
suggests "space is anterior to its alleged. parts, which are always
carved out of it" (op cit p243) and in a telling passage he says:
"Space is not the setting (real or logical) in which
things are arranged, but the means whereby the posi-
ting of things becomes possible. This means that
instead of imagining it as a sort of ether in which
all things float, or conceiving it abstractly as a
characteristic they have in common, we must think
of it as the universal power enabling them to be
connected." (op cit pp243/244).
The area of the pre-reflective is one we have already come across.
We have outlined the pre-reflective 'moment' of presence in perception
in discussing Dufrenne's position in the preceding chapter. We have
discovered that the image rises from this condition and the pre-
reflective 'prepares' the image so that for us we can say that repre-
sentation can achieve its full plenitude. Now Merleau-Ponty also
speaks of two conditions o being - the lived and the thought about -
the advent of representation is the mark of the move from the lived to
the thought about. We cannot always remain at the level of the lived
only, but we needs must move to the thought about - and indeed this is
precisely what occurs when we reflect. Both time and space are involved.
Temporality is the condition of our movement toward. Space provides
the condition for the appearance of the image; for representation to
take on 'object-hood'; for us to sense the 'gap' between pure subjecti-
vity and the sense of ourselves (as we sense the distance affected
between ourselves and objects in that reciprocal interchange between
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subject and object which is borne in on us through the image). The
advent of representation is the 'upsurge' of space and time, as
Dufrenne puts it (op cit p347). It is only as we reflect, as we
sense the 'gap',that we can talk of space or time at all. Merleau-
Ponty describes it well when he says:
"Therefore, either I do not reflect, but live among
things and vaguely regard space at one moment as
the setting for things, at another as their common
attribute - or else I do reflect: I catch space
at its source, and now think the relationships which
underlie this word, realizing then that they live
only through the medium of a subject who describes
and sustains them; and pass from spatialized to
spatializing space." (ibid p243)
Here we sense the very movement of consciousness itself. For
consciousness to be, there must be the constant movement and recipro-
cation between the lived and the thought about. Thus as soon as we
have made a thought about space we have moved from spatialising space,
which is the ground and condition and possibility of all our reflec-
tion, to spatialised space. What is essentially implicit has now
been made explicit. This is the very condition of all thought, the
very condition for the appearance of the image and the root of repre-
sentation itself.
Spatialising space is the condition for the whole mobility of
images; it is the arena for their very reverberation and the ground
from which the objectness of objects can appear. Spatialising space
is the condition a priori for the possibility that things may be other
than they are. Oneiric space, poetic space and cosmic space all feed
from this ground. Art is born out from this space and through its
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forms we can reach back into this space, catch the roots of this space
and come to sense its duration. This space is the possibility of
visibility of vision.
IV. 2. 2. Space - the importance of the body.
The question remains to be answered: How do I sense this pre-
given spatiality? If this is the condition for the whole appearing
of phenomena, whence does it spring? Merleau-Ponty seeks to answer
these questions by saying we should not make the mistake of separating
mind, from body. If this pre-objective spatiality is the condition
for all our being, it must be because we are the totality of mind
and body. We are already situated in the world. We are already
present in the world, we are already at work in the world. Sensations
are not received passively and then 'interpreted', there is, as we
have discovered in his essay Eye and LLind(6), "the undividedness of
the sensing and the sensed" (op cit p59). Now the importance of the
body is crucial to the whole of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. In his
Phenomenology(4), he suggests:
"What counts ... is not my body as it in fact is,
as a thing in objective space, but as a system of
possible actions, a virtual 'body with its pheno-
menal 'place' defined by its task and situation."
(op cit pp249/250)
and again:
"Ly body is wherever there is something to 'be done."
(op cit p250).
We must return, he says(6),
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"... to the sight, the soil of the sensible and
opened world such as it is in our life and for
our body - not that possible body which we may
legitimately think of as an information machine
but that actual body I call mine, this sentinel
standing quietly at the command of my words and
acts." (op cit p56).
So much of the importance of sensing this spatiality lies in the
fact that we are already situated, already at work. Perception is
not a passive affair, we are actively engaged through our bodily pre-.
sence in the world. Merleau-Ponty(4) gives an example of someone
looking into a tilted mirror at an image of a room that seems to be
at an angle (ibid p248). There are two spatial 'levels' - the one of
the room 'outside' the mirror and the one in the mirror. A piece of
card falling in the mirror seems to fall sideways. However, as we
continue to look into the mirror we make the necessary perceptual
adjustments and what we see does not appear odd - for we are able
to orientate our perception toward it.
Before looking into the mirror we are adjusted to the spatial
level outside it and we recognise this - but as we look into the world
of the mirror our perceptions induce another spatial level which is
compatible with what we are looking at, and makes sense of the pheno-
rnena. We find in the mirror fresh anchorages, so that the orientation
of verticality and horizontality might proceed. What, asks Lerleau-
Ponty, is this spatial level which is always seemingly ahead of itself
(ibid p249)? If we say that a new kind of stability is achieved as we
find we can make sense of the image in the mirror, does not the esta-
blishrnent of one spatial level not indicate possible pre-established
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levels? Thus we find no difficulty in orientating ourselves to the
new direction. This must mean that the world of the mirror has be-
come a possible 'habitat' (ibid p250). As berleau-Ponty says, it is
through my body that I make this fresh adjustment, because my body
is already situated in a world and is always a system of possible
actions, a fresh situation demands fresh anchorages, for the whole
activity of the body is to make sense. As we look into the mirror
for a few moments, provided we do not strengthen our initial ancho-
rage by looking away, "the reflected room miraculously calls up a
subject capable of living in it" (op cit p250). This new anchorage
demands a new way of looking - a fresh aspect, a new orientation.
As Lerleau-Ponty puts it:
"This virtual body ousts the real one to such an ex-
tent that the subject no longer has the feeling of
being in the world where he actually is, and that
instead of his real legs and arms, he feels he has
the legs and arms he would need to walk and act in
the reflected room: he inhabits the spectacle."
(op cit p250).
We can give a further example that amplifies the ability we have
of engaging different spatial levels. If we are viewing a distant
landscape from a high vantage point, we sweep the horizon of our
vision, revelling in the distant space of the immensity of a seeming
infinity. By degrees we can come to spaces much closer to us and
eventually we can arrive at the intimacy of the interstices of the
grass close by. One spatial level can dissolve into the other and
as it does so each calls for our anchorage and habitation. The in-
timate is never very far from the immense. The one is capable always
of dissolving into the other.
160
These examples of adjusting to new spatial levels are paralleled
when we can without difficulty adjust to the visual images we find in
art. We can move from what Langer(7) has called actual space, to the
virtual space of the pictorial object without any problem. In Merleau-
Ponty's philosophy the very possession of a body implies the ability
to change levels and to 'understand' space. Thus it is that I can
identify this new spectacle, not through any concept I need to have
of space but because I already am situated, I already live in it,
because as he says:
"... I am borne wholly into the new spectacle and,
so to speak, transfer my centre of gravity into it."
(op cit p251).
Everything that l?Ierleau-Ponty argues for throws us back to that
organic relatedness of the subject and. space - "to that gearing of
the subject onto his world which is the origin of space" (ibid p251).
This picture of gearing onto the world is an evocative one. It suggests
that the body, as a system, has the possibility of an infinite number
of adaptations through the way it can lock onto new situations and
continually make fresh adjustments of levels. The potential for this
possibility is the origin of space. Being situated does not simply
mean being in place, but rather being within the context of extending
possibilities. Not simply a relationship with the world, where the
world and I are things, but a relatedness, a gearing of myself with
the world. The origin of space rises where there is something to be
done, and all action presupposes the ground from which it springs -
my situation in the world.
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Now the painter, says Lerleau-Ponty(6), echoing Va1ry, "takes
his body with him" and he adds:
"Indeed we cannot imagine how a mind could paint.
It is by lending his body to the world that the
artist changes the world into paintings."
(op cit p57).
Thus through being situated we are already immersed in the world. I
do not so much appropriate what I see, I open myself up to what I see.
Moreover, I see because I am already at work in the world. The move-
ment of my gaze, the orientation of my looking is not, as lLerleau-
Ponty says:
"... a decision made by the mind ... It is the
natural consequence and the maturation of my
vision." (op cit p58).
As we have seen, in a truly remarkable passage, he surnmarises all
he has said concerning the importance of the body in the understanding
of space:
"Visible and mobile, my body is a thing among other
things; it is caught in the fabric of the world, and
its cohesion is that of a thing. But because it
moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle
around itself. Things are an annex or prolongation
of itself; they are encrusted into its flesh, they
are part of its full definition; the world is made
of the same stuff as the body. This way of turning
things around (ces renversements), these anti*ies,
are different ways of saying that vision happens
among, or is caught in, things - in that place where
something visible undertakes to see, becomes visible
for itself by virtue of the sight of things; in that
place where there persists, like the mother water in
crystal, the undividedness ... of the sensing and the
sensed." (op cit pp58/59)
This is none other than a description of the primary spatiality
of being. This is the ground out from which things are born, where
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the world becomes world - for me. This is where in all objectivity
one senses the horizon of the pre-objective. This is the root of
all the expressiveness of things - for they seem to grow out from
me - as an encrustation, as a prolongation of my body. This being-
immersed is why vision can happen among things, is caught in things,
where things can take on the spatiality of existence. Vision is
totally and always spatial. It is never that separated activity of
my being. Vision, as my being, is already at work in the world.
Indeed this being situated, this being open to the world, is part
of being's full definition. Furthermore, this manifest interiority,
this undividedness between the sensing and the sensed is the mark of
my presence in the world. The undividedness is the basis of my indi-
viduality, for it foreshadows all my subsequent reflection of the
world and of myself. This cohesiveness, this wholeness is the primary,
pre-reflective, pre-objective ground of my Being. It is, as we have
seen, the implicit which surrounds and gives direction, form and shape
to the explicit.
IV. 2. 3. Space - its indissoluble link with time.
Being already situated implies being already orientated. There
is always in being a directional thrust, a movement toward meaning.
Here temporality is indissolubly linked with spatiality. Space needs
time, as much as time needs space, for the full definition of being.
Being is not wholly spatial; it is temporal as well, as we shall dis-
cover when we come to discuss movement. However, without the one in
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the other, as figure is to ground, there would be no being. The
essence of being is being orientated. This orientation needs clari-
fying. This is not the orientation of a subject faced with a world
where there are already absolute directions. This orientation is
not of a subject outside perception, this is an orientation within
perception. Thus to understand space is not to reduce it to one
spatial level. It is to understand that space precedes itself; it
is already constituted and for any given level of spatiality, for
any one particular orientation, there are previously established
levels, for which a change of meaning can deliver a fresh anchorage,
a fresh spectacle, a new way of looking. As Llerleau-Ponty(4) argues:
"We must not wonder why being is orientated, why
existence is spatial ... why its (our body's) co-
existence with the world magnetizes experience and.
induces a direction in it. The question could be
asked only if the facts were fortuitous happenings
to a subject and an object indifferent to space,
whereas perceptual experience shows that they are
presupposed in our primordial encounter with being,
and that being is synonymous with being situated."
(op cit p252).
Let us pursue Ierleau-Ponty, for the moment, as he examines the
significance of the various spatial 'levels' to which the subject is
orientated. The primary spatiality, this spatialising space, is of
enormous importance in llerleau-Ponty's philosophy, for without the
acknowledgement of it we cannot hope to understand how space can be
the condition for the possibility of objects. To understand why ob-
,jectsmay take on an existence which is more than they at first appear
is to grasp the possibility of successive levels of spatiality beyond
them, and if this is so, of levels of spatiality which precede them,
and indeed 'prepare' them and give them their plenitude, their fullness
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and their expressive significance in perception. The grasping of
the aesthetic object, the indwelling of this 'world', is the orien-
tation to a spatial level, already prepared for us through our own
bodily presence and co-existence in the world. The orientation of
our being in the world animates all our perception of it and this
includes all our aesthetic perception too,
Now we do not live our lives only at this primary spatial level.
Orientation is the movement affected from this primary lived level of
spatiality, this spatialising space, to the spatialised space of the
thought-about - of representation - of the image. The circle of
reciprocity is complete when, through the image, and in our case
through the graphic image, we can catch the roots and sense the hori-
zon of this primary spatiality. Of course, we do not know it, in the
sense of systematising it, for to systeniatise it is to destroy it com-
pletely. We can however catch its presence, as through for example,
the graphic images of Klee, the poetic images of Breton; in these we
sense the visibility, the mobility, the reverberation in vision.
Lerleau_Ponty(4) describes how:
"Each of the levels in which we successively live
makes its appearance when we cast anchor in some
'setting' which is offered to us. This setting
itself is spatially particularized only for a
previously given level. Thus each of the whole
succession of our experiences, including the first,
passes on an already acquired spatiality. The con-
dition of our first perception's being spatial is
that it should have referred to some orientation
which preceded it. It must, then, have found us
already at work in a world." (op cit p253)
"There is, therefore, another subject beneath me,
for whom a world exists before I am here, and who
marks out my place in it. This captive or natural
spirit is my body, not that momentary body which
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is the instrument of my personal choices and which
fastens on this or that world, but the system of
anonymous 'functions' which draw every particular
focus into a general project." (op cit p254).
Witkin(8), as we have seen, also suggests this two-fold aspect
of Being. All that we have been seeking to describe is the space of
subjectivity. This spatiality which is the ground and condition of
all our experience of the world. It is this spatiality which is mag-
net ised through the images and forms in art. This is the spatiality
beneath all objective space. The spatialising space from which
spatialised space rises. The one is incompatible without -the other
and in focusing on the figure of all objective space one catches the
ground of this pre-objective space. This is the spatiality of the
I can of my bodily presence in the world. To see something is to
have already reached it, to be already orientated toward it, to have
caught its directional movement of meaning. The space of the subject
is, as Merleau-Ponty describes, "a communication with the world more
ancient than thought" (op cit p254). This is why space always precedes
itself. It cannot be caught in any kind of immanence, for to spatialise
space, to make a thought of it, to objectify it, is to already acknow-
ledge its pre-history.
Now this understanding of space will make a profound difference
to the consideration of depth. The interiority which this spatiality
hollows out is an interiority without dimensions. It is never
measurable, quantifiable - as extension. This spatiality is known
only in intention. As it is united with time, it forms the condition
of all the movement of meaning, all the flux and constant mobility of
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the productive imagination.
IV. 2. 4. Space - and the 'third' dimension.
We can begin with a consideration of two aspects of space:
breadth and depth. For Berkeley(9) depth was invisible, because when
we stand in front of something that 'hides' something else, all we
receive is a 'flat' projection on our retinas. For Berkeley depth
could not be 'seen' because it is not spread out before our eyes, but
appears only in a kind of foreshortened form. Thus for example, two
dots can be seen when they are side by side, can be seen in breadth,
but if one moves 'behind' the other, all we see is one dot, so depth
has disappeared - is not discernible. Lerleau-Ponty(4) picks up this
argument of Berkeley's and says that this is nothing more than saying
that depth is breadth seen from the side (op cit p255). The reason
it seems that I cannot 'see' the hidden dot is that I am badly placed
in respect of them - although someone else looking from the side at
the two dots would have them clearly in view all the time.
Iow this illustration is important and, moreover, 1erleau-Ponty's
comment is full of insight - for it brings to light an important issue.
To view space as Berkeley does, is to put oneself in one place, one
position, and the world is then viewed from this singular perspective.
Thus breadth is seen, but not depth, for the error has been committed
in equating depth with breadth. Thus, depth becomes a 'third' dimen -
sion ranged alongside the dimensions of height and breadth. To equate
187
depth with breadth is to commit the error of thinking of space in
one way. This is the error of all empiricist and intellectual
determinism. To get beneath the error we must trace back the problem.
For Berkeley, depth belongs to a perspective of the world - a view on
things. Now to see depth as breadth in profile as it were, the viewer
must somehow abandon his position, or think otherwise than he is.
Thus, intellectualism gives us no account of the human experience of
the world. Berkeley's argument is concerned with a view of space of
someone who is, as it were, on the outside looking in - as though
this space were like a cube - space rationalised. iloreover, this
'visible' needs examination for if, as Berkeley suggests, depth is
'invisible', he has become a spectator. This is the trap of all
empiricist and intellectualist dogmatism; its plausibility, moreover,
discounts any originary experience of the world. It takes no account
of the spatiality of the subject, immersed and already at work in the
world. This intellectualist view of space irons out the individual's
affective experience of space and reduces this experience to a kind
of uniform perspective. Moreover, this philosophy makes too great a
separation between subject and object - the subject has become an
object alongside all other objects, reduced to playing a role. Further,
space has become a kind of medium in which these objects, including the
spectator, is placed. The originality of depth must be looked for beyond
the mere intellectualist conception of it.
Depth is only depth because of our indissoluble link with things.
Depth is only such for us. Depth reveals that relatedness of ourselves
with the world - not simply the distance as measured between ourselves
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as an object and other objects. Depth becomes the qualitative inter-
action of our being in the world. Depth announces our situation in
the world, not our separateness from it. Thus objects take on an
expressive potential. They are not merely things. Our affective
experience of the world is an acknowledgement of the originality of
depth. Merleau-Ponty puts it thus:
"By rediscovering the vision of depth, that is to say,
of a depth which is not yet objectified and made up
of mutually external points, we shall once more out-
run the traditional alternatives and elucidate the
relation between subject and object." (op cit p256).
Descartes(lO), too, tried to construct vision as a model in
thought. The Cartesian view of vision and space is based on causality.
Descartes view is modelled on the sense of touch. Reflections in
mirrors are no more than reflected light rays. All things are in
their place because one action causes another. Thus mirror images
are nothing but reflections, caused by light rays coming from the
objects. Similarly, light rays enter our eyes as though streaming
from objects in the world and we 'decipher' the image we receive on
the retina. Thus relationships of objects in space, and phenomena
such as reflections, are nothing but the effect of the mechanics of
things. The Cartesian concept of vision, suggests Merleau-Ponty(6),
removes the 'enigma' of vision (op cit p72). Thus images and illusions
are nothing but a 'class of things' (op cit p65), distinct, separate,
operating through causal laws and totally determined. Rationalism
destroys the oneiric world of the icon. For Descartes, there was no
ubiquity in icons - I.erleau-Ponty comments:
"As vividly as an etching 'represents' forests, towns,
men, battles, storms, it does not resemble them. It
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is only a bit of ink put dowri here and there on the
paper." (op cit p66).
This is crucial: the Cartesian view of the image is that it only
represents, it never resembles. Further, this image is only such
for Descartes as it presents the outside form of objects, their
'envelope'. The bits of ink laid down here and there are only signs
which represent the exteriority of things; they could never resemble
them. Now, says Merleau-Ponty:
"At one swoop ... he removes action at a distance
and relieves us of that ubiquity which is the whole
problem of vision (as well as its peculiar virtue)."
(op cit p65).
The fact is that icons are visual metaphors; images in art always
bring us face to face with the ubiquity of vision. There is far more
to representation than mere reference. Lerleau-Ponty reinforces the
metaphorical idea when he says that the Cartesian argument is finally
lost if the entire potency of images, as they are found in art, is
that of a text to be read, a text totally free of promiscuity (op cit
p66). A metaphor's power of expression lies in that ambiguity between
the literal and the figurative, that area of the possible which main
-
tains the tension of subject and object within the image.
Resemblance in the Cartesian view is the result of perception not
its mainspring. Actually to see one thing in something else is to
sense the possibility of the existence of one thing alongside something
else. The oneiric world of the image, is only such as we see past the
mere reference, the mere signs which are the marks on paper. Within
the Cartesian position, there is no room for analogy, for coherent
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deformation. Cartesian thinking does not begin with the body, but
with deciphering the signs given in the body. Rationalism cannot
equate eyesight with insight. Cartesian thinking could never accept
the spatiality in vision which promotes its visibility.
Furthermore, the Cartesian notion of space is the presentation,
through the forms of the outside of objects, of their spatial rela-
tionships. This is the thinking which characterises space as an
object-in-itself. This in-itself of space rises directly as the
natural consequence of the argument which places objects together
in a world and then uses a determinist system, like perspective, to
represent this space. What is lacking is that there is no room in
Cartesian philosophy for the secondary quality of things, particularly
for qualities like colour. If Descartes had looked for these quali-
ties, qualities which underlie all representations, he would have
been obliged to integrate perspective, which is only one means of
gearing ourselves to the world, into a wider more ample ontology.
As we have discovered, there is far more to drawing than mere exten-
sion through projection. Drawings never merely point to objects in
the world. Within the Cartesian framework of vision and space, icons
'lose their powers', as Merleau-Ponty says (op cit p66). Causality
extinguishes the 'imagiriaire' (op cit p73) in vision and closes down
the route toward the possible; that oneiric spatiality which lies in
wait to surprise us as we come to indwell the world of the icon. Thus
Descartes, like Berkeley, saw depth as a third dimension derived from
height and breadth.
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In Eye and Mind Merleau-Ponty engages a further discussion of
this 'third' dimension of depth (op cit p68). Now we think we 'see'
space when objects 'hide' each other. But actually we do not, for
all this demonstrates is that we are saying we see space by relating
it to the size of objects, that is, through the way we measure objects
by their height and width. In other words, we say we 'see' space when
we derive it from height and width, this plane in front of my face.
It is never the case that things really are behind each other, or
partially hidden by each other. This 'behind' and this 'hidden'
reveal the trap of erecting space into a positive in-itself and betray
only a point of view, a perspective. Now perspective, as the artists
of the Renaissance demonstrated, developed hand in hand with the
rationalism that sought to reduce space to a system. Of course,
Descartes too supported this view. But it was a dangerous moment in
the history of Western thought. Indeed, even in its invention lay
the seeds of doubt. In constructing their theories, the men of the
Renaissance sought to forget the spherical visual field 'perspectiva
naturalis', in favour of 'perspectiva artificialis', capable in prin-
ciple of producing an. exact construction. In doing so they were care-
ful to avoid the Euclidean theorem that no parallel lines ever meet,
Buclidean space is boundless, without horizons. No system can ever
contain space, for a system only produces, as its offspring, object-
ively defined phenomena. Of course, the painters knew this. The
'camera obscura' presented only a monocular view of the world and
offered only a limited ontology. To trace what is on the screen in
front of my eyes is to map out according to a principle, rather than
to be involved in all the ubiquity of vision. A formalised recipe
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replaces visual judgment. A given view of the object from a given
point of view in a given moment of time - the triumph of rationalism.
This represented the capitulation of the human mind to a standard of
mechanical exactitude. However, the seeds of its own destruction
were in the flower of the discovery of the 'solution'. Central per-
spective demonstrates more than any-thing else the symbolism of the
focussed world. However, no means of expression once mastered resolves
the problems of painting or drawing. Lerleau-Ponty points out:
"... no symbolic form ever functions as a stimulus.
Wherever it has been put to work and has acted, it
has gone to work ..." (op cit p70).
And as Bradley(ll) has said of art:
"... it is not symbolic, it is rather a presentiment
which leads us to the symbolic ... one of the most
important functions of art works is ... metaphysical.
They lead us toward rather than simply show. Their
literalness dissolves as they lead us to what they
are not."
Thus the perspective invention of the Renaissance is, as Merleau-
Ponty suggests:
"... no infallible'gininiick'. It is only a particular
case, a date, a moment in a poetic information of
the world which continues after it," (op cit p70).
But what a powerful moments The thinking which produced the system
still permeates our thinking of space, as a dye difficult to remove.
IV. 2. 5. Space - and the spatiality of 'depth'.
Thus, neither the men of the Renaissance nor Descartes 'solved'
the enigma of depth. Once the system so laboriously built up by the
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inventions of Brunelleschi and Alberti had ceased to have any further
function, had ceased to work, new directions had. to be sought and.
found. The acquiring of fresh dimensions in art has always a meta-
physical significance. If the work opens up another field, through
which it now appears in a new light, it inevitably changes and becomes
what subsequently follows. This is the 'texture' of the work, this is
the work working. This is the evidence of that surplus of meaning, of
that fecund and rich 'promiscuity' of the text - never as an 'all done'
but a constant movement toward. This is the work's ever-opening
spatiality, the promise of its depth.
And this search is what draws the painter and the draughtsman on.
Giacometti(12) is reported to have said that Canne was seeking depth
all his life and for Delaunay(l3), depth was'the new inspiration'. No
longer is depth that 'mysterious interval', as Lerleau-Ponty suggests
(ibid p75), between things as though this certain relationship between
things could be measured. Depth is crucial to the draughtsman's
search. This we shall come to deal with more fully in the final sec-
tion of this chapter. We conclude this present consideration with
this telling passage from ker1eau-Ponty, where in talking about depth
he says:
"The enigma consists in the fact that I see things,
each one in its place, precisely because they eclipse
one another, and that they are rivals before my sight
precisely because each one is in its own place. Their
exteriority is known in their envelopment and their
mutual dependence in their autonomy. Once depth is
understood in this way, we can no longer call it a
third dimension. In the first place, if it were a
dimension, it would be the first one; there are forms
and definite planes only if it is stipulated how far
from rae their different parts are. But a first dirnen-
sion that contains all the others is no longer a
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dimension, at least in the ordinary sense of a
certain relationshi according to which we make
measurements. Depth thus understood is, rather,
the experience of the reversibility of dimensions,
of a global 'locality' - every-thing in the same
place at the same time, a locality from which
height, width, and depth are abstracted, of a
voluininosity we express in a word when we say
a thing is there."	 (op cit p75).
This brilliant analysis forces us to recast our thinking con-
cerning space - as he says so eloquently, space becomes the reversi-
bility of dimensions. No longer can depth be seen as a dimension
extrapolated from height and breadth. Furthermore, this very reversi-
bility means that we can no longer call depth a dimension at all,
that is as measured or read off from other dimensions. Depth becomes
not an aspect of spatialised space but spatialisin_g space. A dimen-
sion cannot be such if it holds and envelops all others; it must be
considered as primary, and the basis and ground from which any other
orientation might take place. Depth in this primary sense precedes
all other faces of it, faces we might come to recognise as we theina-
tise it through the directions of height and breadth. This very
reversibility halts pre-cleterminist and rationalist thinking in its
tracks. It asks other questions: it gives us the means for interro-
gating the world in other ways. It reverses depth as a one-way direc-
tion, as breadth seen from the side. This depth is characterised by
the being there, the Da of Dasein. This there has a voluininosity,
has a past as well as a future and is the reason why we sense the
whole affectivity of our experience with the world. The Cartesian
view of space is always a space without the 'thickness' of this
expressive significance, Cartesian space is devoid of all feeling,
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it still makes acknowledgement to the separation of mind and body.
But this there which this primary depth discloses, is outside all
quantitative assessment. This there is always an opening out, an
opening out from within the interiority hollowed out and prepared
through the pre-reflective. It is that which leads us to the quali-
tative sense that we are. This depth is always first lived before
it is thought about. Depth in the sense of its precedence resists
my thought of it and yet the registering of my reflective attitude
is testimony to its presence.
Now to begin to consider depth in this way, as an interiority
which opens out, which has a voluzninosity, is inevitably to imply
the presence of temporality, and it is to this issue we now turn.
IV. 3. 1. Time - a condition for the possibility of movement.
In our previous chapter on the Image, we spoke of the area of
'free-play' (to use Warnock's(14) term) that surrounds the image.
We said that the image was the mark of the 'distancing' of the self
from itself. We spoke of this in terms of the essential spatiality
of the image. Now it was Heidegger(15) who recognised the importance
of this 'gap', which allowed the self to establish itself as a self,
as having a sense of its own being. We suggested that this 'distancing',
which proclaimed the advent of the image, allowed the individual to
reflect, allowed the individual to cast forward possibility and sense
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being not. Moreover, it was the enabling for the individual self to
gain its sense of orientation and direction. Now as soon as there
is any suggestion of movement, time is involved. For Heidegger this
perpetual return of the self to itself, establishing itself in becoming
other as it were, is the very basis of all the sense we have of duration.
Duration is the inner sense we have that we remain the same while con-
stantly changing. Kantç[6) in his Critique, grasped this when he said:
"... it is the form of the internal sense, that is
of the intuition of ourselves and our internal
state." (op cit p77).
He felt that time was thea priori of all our awareness. It is
this primary temporality which hollows out the interiority for us to
sense ourselves, to be aware, to be conscious. Just as there is a
nascent spatiality so there is also a nascent temporality. This pre-
objective time is time seen as the implicit relationship of the self
with itself, or as Kant again puts it, of the self 'affected by itself'
(op cit p87). This is of course the basis for the reciprocity of which
Witkin(8) speaks, when he talks of the relationship and reciprocal dia-
lectic between Being and the self. Now we begin to grasp the extent
of this interiority, this distancing of which we spoke earlier.
Primary time is a pure movement of being, of departing from the self
in order to return to it. It is through this pure novement, this
impulsion, that the sense of our own existence is made known to us.
Indeed, we sense that without this interiority which is carved out
through our nascent temporality, there would be no space, no time,
no	 jectivity at all.
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IV. 3. 2. Time - its symmetrical relatedness with space.
And here we come to an important consideration. This reciprocal
interchange is the pre-figu.ring of that primordial dialectic between
subject and object, whose whole inner necessity is to separate in
order to become whole. The reciprocal movement of the self with it-
self, of Being to other is in order to be. There is a symmetrical
relatedness between time and space. If time lies at the source of
subjectivity, space must lie at the root of objectivity. To talk,
as Kant does, of the form our inner sense takes, is tacitly to imply
space. If the self can only know itself, can only become aware of
itself through a reciprocal movement that is always toward a unity,
the poles of this reciprocation, of the constant oscillation between
being and the self, being and other, can be effected only as time is
joined with space. Thus, the subject only becomes subject as it
opposes itself with its objects - and in the first place with itself
as object. We cannot, as we have seen, always remain at the level
of pure presence. There must be a move from the lived to the thought
about, If a distance is to be effected between ourselves and the
world, this must first be pre-figured within ourselves, within the
sense we have of our own existence. 1oreover, to sense this is to
sense the possibility of our existence. To sense possibility is to
sense being not, is to sense other, to sense that things may be other
than they are. This is the basis of all our transcendence, the
sensing we have that there could ever be a beyond to objects. Trans-
cendence is testimony that being is in movement toward other in order
to return to itself to remain the same. Without this sense we have
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of duration, there could be no transcendence. Our whole imaginative
endeavour testifies to the reciprocal dialectic between subject and
object. There could be no movement toward, no directional enquiry,
no imaginative enterprise, if this essential dialectic were not im-
plicit. Interiority and the voyage we make into depth betrays the
implicit 'solidarity', as Dufrenne says, of space with time (op cit
p241). Thus, movement toward takes on its sense of opening out.
The temporality of the subject needs the spatiality of the object
to make up the full definition of what it is to be, of its being.
Dufrenne clarifies it when he says:
"Space is what is designated in this movement of
opening up - space as the aspect of otherness, as
what is always outside (whether it is far or near),
and as an elsewhere opposed to the here which we
are." (op cit p244).
So presence in perception should be considered both as spatial
and temporal. This is, of course, implied in all that Merleau-Ponty
has said. The 'distance' which is effected by temporality in the
relationship of the self with itself implies a nascent spatiality.
Thus, this withdrawal, this movement of the self within itself, this
interiority which is hollowed out, is a function not only of originary
time, but also of originary space. Indeed, to render the situation of
being in front of, of being before, which is the condition of all the
possibility of objects - of things being other - this primary signifi-
cation is not the sole preserve of time, but of space as well. Through-
out the whole of our analysis we are seeking to underline the complete
symmetry of time and space. It takes space to know time. This is,
as we shall see, what caused so many problems for Bergson. Kant, of
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course, had his finger on the issue when he suggested that both space
and time collaborate and are necessary to that "pure synthesis of
imagination" whose unity "is the ground of the possibility of all
knowledge" (ibid p143).
Thus for any aspect of phenomena to appear, for representation
ever to take on its status of re-presentation, time imist collaborate
with space. For reflection to open up the possibility of there being
other, space and time must come together. If time needs space, this
is because we can only sense the primacy of temporality in and through
our experience and situation within the world. This lived time, the
sense we have of enduring, is only known to us through the intermediary
of space. This duration then becomes a time which we can control and,
moreover, gives us the sense of having an implicit direction and
orientation, a sense of purpose. Of course, this is because we are
part of this lived time, it is a time, as Dufrenne says, which 'has
us' (op cit p246). It is however, through the intermediary of space
that we can take our place within this time, and sense the dourse of
events, not as entities, but as bearing a coherence. The implicit
symmetry between space and time is like the illustration comprising
figure and ground. Even when we focus on one aspect, the presence of
the other is still implied. The figure of spatiality only speaks from
the silence of the ground of our implicit temporality. Furthermore,
in sensing the movement toward, which is the directional thrust of
all meaningfulness and significance, we uncover the way the subject
is in constant reciprocation with other, as object. Being needs the
annexation of the self, to achieve the impulsion of intentionality.
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Now we begin to sense the significance of this movement, as being
always movement toward, movement that seeks always to return to Being
in a constant search for unity, for equilibrium. All action, all
search, all the reaching toward a wholeness which animates and directs
our operations and our projects in the world, which indeed sustains
the image, is here pre-figured in the heart of Being. A constant
returning, which yet remains the same in becoming other. The very
ground for the individual to be an undivided self.
Lovement is characterised by the intimate relationship between
space and time. As Dufrenne has so succinctly put it: "Movement is
the side of space which is turned toward time ..." (op cit p277). It
was Kant who suggested that movement in the object is first movement
in the subject. Thus, what we sense as movement 'out there' in the
world of objects, is first pre-figured in us. What we apprehend as
movement in the world is only such because of its inscription within
ourselves, characterised by the relationship of the self affected by
the self. We have suggested, furthermore, that this movement is also
such because it opens up the possibility of being other; of being not,
so clearly characterised by Sartre in his descriptions of the spatia-
lity and quasi-subjectivity of the image. An interiority is hollowed
out, the positing of the possibility of the other, gives us the basis
not only of self-knowledge, but subsequently of all our knowledge of
phenomena, Now the seeing of possibility, that things may be other
than they are, is to acknowledge that this movement has already
moved us. The possibility that movement might be effected, is to
mark that it has already been anticipated, For us, to know is to
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be implicitly caught up within this movement. For us, knowing is
always movement toward, being orientated. The French have a word
for this: it is sens, which has a double usage, not only does it mean
'sense', it also means 'direction'.
IV. 3. 3. Time - and 'duration' - the limitation of Bergson's
view.
It is this sense of passage which Bergson(17) grasped so con-
vincingly in his philosophic analysis of duration. Bergson sought
to describe duration as being wholly qualitative; for him duration
was the quality of lived time. Artists, and particularly musicians,
have always found a powerful attraction in his philosophy, and his
ideas have had. a profound influence on aesthetic thinking. His
philosophy almost became a philosophy of art, for his metaphysical
insights go to the very heart of all the arts. It has been left to
the practitioners to sense the fecundity of his thinking and its out-
working. One thinks in this respect of Boccioni(18) and the enormous
influence Bergson's thought had on the writing of the Futurist manifesto.
The reason that Bergson's philosophy never really developed into
a fully worked out philosophy of art, in spite of all its promise,
was that he refused to allow that his conception of duration could
have anything to do with space. His all-important insight was that
every conceptual form which is supposed to portray time oversimplifies
it to the point of leaving out the most important and interesting
aspect of it - namely the characteristic appearance of passage, so
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that, in Bergson's view, what we are left with is a scientific -
that is, 'measurable' - equivalent rather than a conceptual symbol
of duration. His challenge was clear: to find a means through which
we can conceive and express our experience of this primary aspect of
time. His own answer to this problem was to say that it was impossible
to reach through any kind of symbolism - such symbolism is only a
metaphysical pitfall. For Bergson, all symbolisation was a kind of
falsification, for all syrnbolisation was essentially spatialisation,
and it was the total eradication of space from time which was his
main preoccupation. Every traffic with space became, for Bergson,
a betrayal of our real knowledge of time. His view of space was that
it only 'measured' time, in extension. His recourse was that we must
give up logical conception and try to grasp the inward sense of this
duration by a kind of 'intuition', but in these terms he admitted
that this was a hopeless task. The artist, however, still finds his
philosophy powerfully attractive, for the artist senses that through
his own symbolism, through the images he can form in and through his
various modalities, he can eclipse the barrenness of the literal.
Bergson sought to develop his metaphysical position through the logi-
cal ordering of linguistic forms - this very discursiveness led to
the failure of his philosophy as a philosophy of	 What he could
not grasp, and what the artist implicitly strives for, is the meta-
phorical significance, that passage of the figurative. Thus, in the
final analysis, it was the realism of Bergson which was his undoing.
The demand Bergson makes of philosophy - to clarify the dynamic forms
of subjective experience, art fulfills. This is the artists's busi-
ness. His aim always is to get back to pure duration. He seeks to
203
achieve this through his image forms, "to join the aimless hands of
nature" as Czanrie(l9) once said. Like Klee(20), he works to 'break
out'; this breaking out is the continual attempt he makes, to 'break
through'. Bergson set up a task which was impossible in the realm
of discursive expression, the realm that is the logic of language.
Caught within his own rationalism, he did not have the means to break
out, and his quest ends in questioning. Furthermore, as he himself
had to admit, blind instinct is no solution. But this is exactly
the artist's concern. Nothing is more reasonable to a poet, a painter
or a musician, and especially a musician, than Bergson's metaphysical
aims. The artist does not ask whether this philosophy is feasible,
he makes his images; as Langer(7) says, he "subscribes to a philosophy
that lays claim to it" (op cit p115).
Bergson saw the shadow of the determinism of language which con-
stantly haunted him. In describing the two aspects of Being, two
forms of 'multiplicity' as he called it, the one of duration and the
other of conscious life, he says in Time and Free Will:
"In other words, our perceptions, sensations, emotions
and ideas occur under two aspects: the one clear and
precise, but impersonal; the other confused, ever
changing and inexpressible, because language cannot
get hold of it without arresting its mobility or fit
it into its common place forms without making it into
public property." (op cit l29)
and again:
"In short, the word with well-defined outlines, the
rought and ready word which stores up the stable,
common and consequently impersonal element in the
impressions of mankind, overwhelms or at least covers
over the delicate and fugitive impressions of our in-
dividual consciousness. To maintain the struggle on
equal terms, the latter ought to express themselves
in precise words; but these words, as soon as they
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were formed, would turn against the sensation which
gave birth to them, and, invented to show that the
sensation is unstable, they would impose on it their
own stability." (op cit p132).
Herein he senses the inadequacy of language, language as denota-
tion. Herein we also discern Bergson's cry for help, his challenge
to philosophy. His challenge is that he asks for a symbolism which
embodies rather than. merely describes this duration. The images in
art do this par exellence, for they always carry a metaphoric signi-
ficance. Their efficacy lies not in their reduplication, but in their
transcription. Thus the spatiality of their symbolism is never the
spatiality of extension of quantitative determination, but always
of intention, of qualitative experience, of expression.
One of the mOst important contributions Bergson made, inspite
of all the limitations of his realism was to uncover that essential
temporality beneath all our conscious awareness of time. His problem
lay, as we have seen, in seeking to describe this duration from the
standpoint of the logical determinism of language, and although he
sensed that his metaphysical ideas were in the direction of the work
of the poet, painter and musician, he could never bring himself to
wholly identify with their position. Nevertheless, through his ana-
lysis of duration he provided a conceptual framework, which the artist
could sense immediately lay in the potency of his image. When Bergson
(21) for example, speaking of movement says: "All movement being in-
deed a passage from one point of rest to another, is absolutely
'indivisible'" (op cit p209), he is talking of the way our sense of
duration makes this possible. (it is interesting that Rodin(22) also
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made the same observation.) Thus, this recognition of the path of
time, of its passage, of its transcience, is crucial for an under-
standing of the form of duration. Passage is something one cannot
measure; it does not enter into any order of measurable time, of
time objectified; it is only known as we live it, as we are on the
inside of it, not viewing it as so much change of position. Indeed
if one takes movement apart, by setting it out in its spatial posi-
tions, one destroys movement altogether. Duration is not a period,
not an actual phenomenon, not a thing in-itself. It is radically
different from the time in which our practical and public life
proceeds.
Thus when we talk, as we do, of the passage of musical time,
or indeed of the passage of movement which we might sense in a drawing,
as Langer(7) says:
"Such passage is measurable only in terms of sensi-
bilities, tensions and emotions; and it has not
merely a different measure, but an altogether dif-
ferent structure from a practical or scientific
time." (op cit p109).
'Clock time' is the ordering of events through a kind of logic. It
is above all the systematising or thematising of time, through setting
it out in relation to positions in space. It enables us through its
one-dimensional linearity to mark out the future from the present and
the past. It is time conceptualised. The way of the clock is the
way of all rationalist systems, it makes us think discursively. The
underlying principle of clock time is change. As Langer has so
lucidly pointed out (op cit p112), it is that which is measured by
contrasting two states of an instrument - the hand of the pointer
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and the point on the dial at successive locations, counted by being
correlated within a series of distinct numbers. Now these states
or positions, we identify by giving them a mark in space. What we
call change is constructed, is extrapolated, in terms of these dif-
ferent positions in space. Change itself is not represented. As
Langer says: "it is implicitly given through the contrast of dif-
ferent 'states', themselves unchanging" (op cit p112).
Change, as movement, is given implicitly, not explicitly; we
sense the passage of movement when we say of something that it moves.
To reduce movement simply to a change of position is to simply make
an observation about positions in space, it is to say nothing of our
experience of it. Thus the experience of time is infinitely more
complex than the simple property of its length. Time can have a
voluminosity, it can have a thickness. Time can have a density.
In all our reference to these aspects of time we are acknowledging
the presence of duration. And in all the affective descriptions of
time, we sense the presence of space, space not as object, 1?ut as
lending its condition of always giving to time a fullness, a pleni-
tude. This time as duration is part of the condition of our situation
in the world, the world of our acts. As Bergson says in Time and
Free Will it is quite possible to divide an object, but not an act
(op cit p112). Langer adds:
"But life is always a dense fabric of concurrent
tensions, and as each of them is a measure of time,
the measurements themselves do not coincide. This
causes our temporal experience to fall apart into
incommensurable elements which cannot be all per-
ceived together as clear forms ... but for percep-
tion they give quality rather than form to the
passage of time, which unfolds in the pattern of
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the dominant and distinct strains whereby we are
measuring it." (op cit p113).
This is the time of the subject, it was this time which Bergson
sought to capture as 'la dure r6elle'.
The problem for Bergson was in seeking to reconcile the two dis-
tinct worlds (for him) of the lived and the thought about. He sought
to describe these two aspects of being as two forms of 'multiplicity'.
His problem lay in seeking to describe the subjectivity of duration
through the objectivity of conscious life. He was caught within the
web which the determinist form of his linguistic expression had spun.
This is a warning against the realism which all behaviourist thinking
would promote. In polarising, one must take care never to make a
separation. To divide consciousness, as we have learned from Sartre,
is to destroy it. For in doing this we make consciousness an in-
itself and it loses the for-itself of its existence. Duration is
the very condition of consciousness, the pre-objective temporality,
which Bergson sought so valiantly to describe within the limitation
of his terms - is the ground of all our experience of the world.
But Bergson's descriptions are enlightening, for they are a warning
to all who would set up the model of consciousness in this way, with-
out the realisation that all experience is an inseparable and inconi-
mensurable web of the relatedness and interpenetration of these
'two worlds'.
Our task throughout is to suggest that it is through the Image,
that this essential dialectic and reciprocal coalescence takes place.
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Musicians have always found Bergson's ideas compelling. Indeed
Bergson himself recognised the close connection between his ideas
and the musical matrix. He sought to clarify the reality of duration
through the discursive symbolism of language, but the musical image
presents directly the sense of passage, which he was at such pains
to describe. The desire to exclude any form of space in his concep-
tion of duration led him to deny this duration any structure at all,
it became an impossible dream. When, for example, as Langer says,
he uses the similie of musical time, he treats it as a completely
formless flow "the successive tones of a melody whereby we let our-
selves be cradled" (op cit p116). Langer continues:
"Consequently he misses the most important and novel
revelation of music - the fact that time is not a
pure succession, but has more than one dimension.
His very horror of the scientific abstractions he
finds typified in geometry makes him cling to the
one-dimensional pure succession of states ..."
(op cit p116).
But form in music, as is true of form in all the arts, is multi-
dimensional, polyphonic. It took Paul Klee's(23) incisive insight
to realise that:
"What the so-called spatial arts have long succeeded
in expressing, what even the time-bound art of music
has gloriously achieved in the harmonies of polyphony,
this phenomenon of many simultaneous dimensions which
helps drama to its climax, does I?pt, unfortunately
occur in the world of verbal didatic expression."
(op cit p17).
Thus it is that the image can give us a sense of this duration,
this inner time, this primary temporality. The image is first lived
before it is subsequently thought about, The literal must give way
to the figurative if we are to catch the sense, and that means the
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directional movement of 'la dure relle'.
We mentioned earlier the influence Bergsonian doctrine had on
Boccioni, and John Golding(24) in an essay on Boccioni's Unique Forms
of Continuity in Space, helps us see this clearly. Boccioni was
writing his Futurist sculpture manifesto and had access to Bergson's
writings through an Italian translation of his Introduction to Meta-
physics. His interest was in movement and he says:
"... the gesture which we would reproduce on canvas
shall no longer be a fixed moment in universal dyna-
mism. It shall simply be the dynamic sensation
itself." (op cit p6).
And this is the passage (quoted by Golding) in Bergson, to which
Boccioni was referring:
"Consider the movement of an object in space. My
perception of the motion will vary with the point
of view, moving or stationary from which I observe
it. My expression of it will vary with the symbols
by which I translate it. For this double reason I
call such motion relative: in the one case as in the
other I am placed outside the object itself. But
when I speak of an absolute movement, I am attributing
to the moving object an inner life and, so to speak,
states of mind. I also imply that I am in sympathy
with those states, and that I insert myself into them
by an effort of imagination." (op cit p7).
He goes on to say:
"Every feeling, however simple it may be, contains
virtually within it the whole past and present of
the being experiencing it, and, consequently can
only be separated into a 'state' by an effort of
abstraction or analysis." (op cit p7).
As Golding points out, Bergson implies that the result of this
sort of analysis can only bring about partial understanding and although,
as he says, an artist in his rendition of a subject can intuitively feel
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"the throbbing of its soul" his depiction of it will inevitably be
"an external and schematic representation" (ibid p7). It will be
the viewer's intuitive apprehension of the work which will allow him
to reassemble the schematic symbols meaningfully: "from intuition
one can pass to analysis", Bergson says, "but not from analysis to
intuition" (op cit p7).
Here we clearly see why Bergson found it so difficult to embrace
a philosophy of art. Any symbol of whatever kind is only an external
schematic representation. He is caught in the same rationalist trap
as Descartes. All significance for Bergson is based on a causality
which sees space as a one-dimensional extensity. He had no other
view of space than that which viewed it from one point of view. The
polyphonies of space, the way space can lend itself to time, to create
that sense of the texture and voluminosity of duration was abhorrent
to him. He could never reconcile space with time in his descriptions
of duration at all.
The distinction Bergson makes between relative and absolute
movement Boccioni challenged in his work Unique Forms of Continuity
in Space. These two aspects of movement he sought to combine within
a single image. Boccioni believed that through his image he could
combine an analytic depiction of the movement of a subject and simul-
taneously embody 'the throbbing of its soul'. He felt he had found
an image which could render the sensation of continuity in space.
He did this through his drawings and his sculpture and he felt that:
"No one can any longer believe that an objects ends
where another begins and that our body is surrounded
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by anything - bottle, automobile, house, tree, road -
that does not cut through it and section it in an
arabesque of directional curves." (op cit p15).
Here in one swoop he exposes all the limitations of Bergsonian
realism. The determinism of the literal symbol which bound. Bergson
to a spatiality which was only the distance and relationship between
objects, Boccioni took and exploded through his images. No longer
are objects points in space surrounded by an envelope, they have an
interiority which invades their surroundings. Thus not only can we
sense through the image the analysis of continuity in space, we can
feel the 'throbbing of its soul', the reverberations which echo along
its path. Boccioni provided through his image-forms what Bergson had
been seeking for in his metaphysics. The image reaches into that
spatiality which is barred to any philosophy which seeks it through
the logical discursiveness of the literal symbol. To catch the fig-
urative beyond the literal is to follow the path of movement of the
image. The image fills the gap left by discursive symbolism. The
image is never a reduplication. It is always a transcriptioh, it
writes a new order of reality as it goes.
IV. 3. 4. Time - as presence.
Before turning our attention more fully to a consideration of
the spatiality and temporality of the aesthetic object, it will be
our task now to look more closely at what we have begun to describe
as tresence, the inner sense we have of duration.
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The language of time, as we have seen from Bergson, is fraught
with difficulty. Words like 'before' or 'after' cut time into spa-
tial segments - they delimit. What we have found from the image as
it occurs in art is that it can present the sense of time's duration,
but only of course as we come to indwell it.
Thus language presents one difficulty. The second is that there
is a certain duality in our experience of time; for to be aware of
time we have to be both in it and beyond it. To be aware of time
is to be able to stand outside it, we have to stand apart from some-
thing we are already in. Our awareness of time comes about because
we are both imprisoned within it and yet also detached from it. Thus
existence is the sense we have of standing out: ex stance. To stand
out we must already be standing in. This is the crucial aspect which
we have already discovered from Lierleau-Ponty; that to move to the
thought about we must already be within the lived. Space collaborates
with time here, but the already being is the condition of our tempora-
lity. This is presence. This presence which is the lived, 'gives to
all our.perceptions their fullness, their density, their quality. It
is the ground and condition, as we have seen, for the rise of the
image and lies at the root of why objects can ever have an expressive
significance.
We cannot grasp together the lived and the thought about, the
standing in as the condition for the standing out, but one is the
ground that allows the other to appear. The silence of the milieu,
the ground of our existence must be the presence, for the voices of
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any subsequent appearing. Time, then, in this pre-objective sense,
is the milieu which gives to all objects a sense of their objectivity,
of their endurance and moreover gives to all our looking a duration.
Time in the sense of this presence gives us the hold we have on
objects and is the reason why they can hold. us, as we follow them
and trace their movements in our perception. They have truly become
motifs. Now this presence, this silence that lies beneath all our
conscious awareness is not absence, is not non-being; rather it is
the ground for all our being. In that unitary experience, in that
undivideciness between the sensing and the sensed, which is our life,
our human life; this ground is the a priori, the given, the condition
for all our coming to know; the basis for all the movement we make
toward meaning, sense and significance. Thus the inner sense we have
of rhythm, the sense we have of the melodic phrasing of the line in
drawing, the apprehension we have of all gestural significance, rises
from the ground of our temporality, our presence in the world, our
already being situated. Time, thought of in this way, is not a line
unfolding as one unravels a ball of string; rather, as er1eau-Ponty
(4) says, it is "a network of intentionalitie&' (op cit p417). Time
considered as succession is already time 'thought about'. Viewed in
this way time has been sipatialised. In order to view time as a line,
there would only be one real point, the present, with two imaginary
vectors - past and future - radiating from it. This destroys time
altogether; it is to thematise or rationalise time; to take up a point
of view with regard to it. It becomes an in-itself and we make a
separation between ourselves and things. As Merleau-Ponty puts it:
"Time is, therefore, not a real process, not an
actual succession I am content to record. It
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arises from	 relation to things. Within things
themselves, the future and the past are in a kind
of eternal state of pre-existence ... Wtiat is past
or future for me is present in the world."
(op cit p412).
And with extraordinary insight he adds:
"If we separate the objective world from the finite
perspectives which open upon it and posit it in it-
self, we find everywhere in it only so many instances
of 'now'. These instances of 'now', moreover, not
being present to anybody have no temporal character,
and could not occur in sequence." (op cit p412).
Thus any description of time must underline the fundamental
relationship I have with the world. Without a subject the past would
not be the past, nor the future the future. It is the subject,
being, which introduces into the world the perspective of a past and
a future and thus also of the possibility of not being, of being
other. Thus the passage from one moment to another is never purely
conceptual. To experience passage, movement, rhythm, is to be already
engaged in a relatedness with the world. Time is not a set of objec-
tive positions through which one passes. Time as the metaphor of
flowing presents more difficulties than it solves. This image falla-
ciously leads us to believe that time comes from the past pushing
the present then the future. This necessarily entails the view that
the future is prepared behind the observer. It is impossible to con-
ceive of the present, without taking account of the becoming which
comes from the future. Merleau-Ponty senses this when he says that
time seems to move from the future to the present as "a brooding
presence moving to meet" man (op cit p411).
Mel Larshak(25) has also so clearly grasped this when she says
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that attainment is "a pull, a burden from above" (op cit p56). In
attaining it is we who become captive. Perception is an attainment,
a constant pull from the now of mere action. In all our perception
it is not the past only which holds us, it is the future as the
possibility of objects which directs our looking and captures our
gaze. How significant this becomes as one is literally caught up
in the creative act, as in drawing one is drawn on. All making is
an attainment and all the making within the process of drawing is
the testing of the possibilities of the future against the present
of action prepared from the past of my memory. The consideration
of drawing as process - and. this includes not only the activity but
also the image as formed - is grounded on this view of time as a
'network' of intentionalities. The image now takes on the aspect
of always becoming, of a spatiality and a temporality, of a depth,
which it is constantly disclosing.
Thus there is a 'future' for me in the world, this is the I can
of all my projects. 'Lived experience' becomes a kind of destiny, a
journey outward, for I can, with the help of the image, project possi-
bility. I can surprise the future within the present; the sensing of
possibility is the indication to me of the future on all my horizons.
Thus time is not a line, nor does it flow; all these metaphors do is
establish my position in respect of time and effectively detach me
from it. I am already situated, I am already at work in the world,
Thus it is that this inner time is where I learn the nature of passing,
and transience. Moreover, I can sense the directional movement of
meaning, I can transcend the now and reach toward other. As
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Llerleau-Ponty says:
"... my presence in the world is the condition of
the world's possibility ..." (op cit p432).
How rich this insight becomes as we consider the world of the aesthetic
object. Herein lies the path to all our consideration of its depth,
its plenitude, its being.
The already-being-situated, the situation for all my actions in
the world, is my field of presence. This is never a single instant,
like a point along a line, rather it is a situation built from the
actions of my immediate past and the possibilities that lie within
any future projects. Furthermore, this field of presence can have
a kind of 'density' about it. ii' the future broods too heavily I
can be caught in anxiety. Thus there is a certain qualitative 'weight'
to my field of presence which can characterise the style of my acti-
vities. In this way I learn to make contact with time as I sense the
horizons of the past and the pull of the horizons of the future.
Time in this most fundamental sense is what is "traversed bymy lifet
(op cit p416).
[V. 3. 5. Time - the need for a synthesis - Husserl's view.
Yet time needs a synthesis, it needs some kind of form, some
kind of structure through which we can sense it. As we found in our
discussions concerning Bergson earlier, to catch the movement of the
duration he was describing, we needed Boccioni's irnag. The image
is the synthesis through which we can sense time. Llerleau-Ponty
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senses the difficulties when he says:
"The problem is how to make time explicit as it comes
into being and makes itself evident, having the
notion of time at all times underlying it, and being,
not an object of our knowledge, but a dimension of
our being." (op cit p415).
This is precisely what images in art do. They are such because
they are the synthesis through which we can make contact with time,
as it is made explicit. The musical image a fort ion presents us
directly with the image of duration. Furthermore, as we have dis-
covered, these images are never objects-in-themselves - objects for
our conceptual knowledge only. They are always the synthesis of
that for-itself which is always
	 The world of
this image is not simply a represented world; it is an expressed
world. Thus truly can these images transcribe a fresh reality, for
they become not simply objects of our knowledge, but dimensions of
our being. Their very metaphoric utterance is because as images they
have first touched the depths before they have stirred the surface.
It was Husserl(26) who used the musical image to explore the
richness of time consciousness. In his Lectures on the Phenomenology
of Internal Time-Consciousness (hereinafter referred to as Time .-
Consciousness) he uses the example of listening to a sounding note
in seeking to describe the enduring quality of duration. Our task
is to explore how the spatiality of the pictorial world of the
drawing can take on the quality of duration and it is with this in
mind that we follow Husserl's analysis. His example is taken from
the temporal image of music but one can immediately sense the link
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to the visual counterpart in drawings. We talk quite naturally, for
example, of the phrasing of the line, of its rhythmic quality, of
the movement of the line in its passage. To talk of the line in
this way is to sense its qualitative duration and. the parallel to
the temporal world of the musical image is not without significance.
Time to Husserl was an inner time, indissolubly linked to the
notion of subjectivity. We have sensed that for Merleau-Ponty this
is a 'lived' time, the inhabiting condition of our body with world.
Verleau-Ponty's indebtedness to Husserl is very apparent, but for
both philosophers, this temporality pervades all our actions, all
our perceptions and is the silent milieu for all our being.
In Husserl's view, while the note is sounding we are attentive
to it as an 'impressional consciousness'(op cit pp46/47). When the
sound ceases it still lingers, it still 'continues' and Spicker(27),
in his analysis of Husserl's position calls this our 'retentive con-
sciousness' (op cit p236). While the note is sounding it is called
an 'impressional' object; when it ceases to sound but its sounding
still lingers, it is called a 'retained' object. (We can also see
Witkin's(8) indebtedness to this description.) All perception is
like this if, as e have seen, perception is our gearing to the world,
our being already situated. There is a constant reciprocity between
impression and retention. In our scanning of a drawing, for example,
our gaze is held within the movement of its lines, the phrasing of
its tonalities, for we move with it. We do not see its elements as
isolated impressions, but always as a constant resonating, a constant
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oscillation between impression and retention. We hold onto the move-
ment within the drawing, because it first holds us. Perception is
thus eventful, not simply extended looking.
Spicker, in commenting on Husserl's analysis, points out that
as we listen to this sounding note and subsequently hear another note,
we don't hear another 'thing', as though the 'previous' note was shut
off and sealed in its own invisibility; we hear the new note, not as
something entirely different but as bearing a continuing essence which
relates it to the first, a continuing identity. This retentiveness is
an internal characteristic of consciousness. As he says, in his com-
ment (op cit p237), the temporal positions are not separated from one
another through divided acts. The unity of perception is a breachiess
unity which dispenses with all interrupting internal differences.
Thus there are distinct temporal points but these are never separated.
In hearing the note, says Husserl, these are two different modes of
appearing. The first is as it breaks in on our perception - the
imDression of the souiid and then the further retention of this sound
which isajijfication of this initial impression. Thus, as Husserl
says, the consciousness of the sound is a complex. It includes an
impression of the sound, a modification of the sound as we continue
to hear it and also a third characteristic which is a synthesis that
is arrived at as the appearing both of the sound and its modification
which enables us to sense it as the same sound through these various
appearances. Thus the sound endures. What }iusserl does is to intro-
duce into the notion of duration a kind of temporal perspective,
where we sense that what we hear is the same sound, where it is held
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in perception under varying orientations and out from differing con-
texts. This is what JJ. Gibson(28) refers to when in calling our
senses 'perceptual systems', he says, we are able to grasp the in-
variable within the variable (op cit p262). Our perception is fully
active, fully eventful, and demonstrates our implicit relatedness within
the world. Husserl, in his analysis, is attempting to demonstrate how
we can hold the presence of the past in the present. The tone of the
note he says:
"... appears in the form of a concrete present with
the now-point, the horizon of the continual past,
on one side and that of the future, on the other.
This present phenomenon is in a continual, original
flux from Now into an ever new Now, under corre-
sponding alterations of the past and future horizons."
(Spicker op cit p237).
Now we sense berleau-Ponty's indebtedness to Husserl, for he too
has said that time needs this synthesis, which is never complete,
never 'fixed', but is undertaken afresh in every act of perception,
a continual becoming. Husserl asks, what then is the relationship
of succession to this duration? How is it we hear the same tone, how
is it that it seems to endure even though its modes of appearing have
undergone modification and alteration? Husserl feels that the 'now-
point' of the impression of hearing the note is not lost as it recedes,
but undergoes a modification, it is still, as it were, 'held-in-ones-
grasp' (Spicker, op cit p237). Thus because we can hold this present
in hand as it recedes, we can turn our attention to it in a new way -
in a way which can properly be called an act of reflection. Thus each
'moment' in perception contains beside its present content a retro-
spective perception of one or more prior moments. This continuation
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of the past in the present, he says, gives to consciousness its retro-
spective and reflective character. Reflection is made possible by a
retention which is a continuing modification of the 'now-point' of
impression as it is still held in one's grasp, even though it sinks
back from its original entry into our perception to what we call the
past. This is why every act of perception can be made an act of re-
flection. flusserl maintains that the sense we have of sequence is
because of the fundamental and breachless unity of consciousness.
It is this unity which is our enabling to 'hold onto' objects, to
'stay with' objects and which lends to objects their enduring quality
of objectivity. The grasping of this invariability within the complex
variability of our conscious life is what gives us in the end our
sense of stability, our sense of wholeness and is the characteristic
of consciousness in its constant reaching toward meaning. Thus in
listening to a sounding note, every phase has in essence the quali.
-tative content, the invariable which allows us to perceive this note
as the same note, even when its tone may recede and become fainter.
Indeed when its tone has ceased, it has not become lost, for it still
takes its place in the passage of the melody of which it at some point
has been a part.
The whole of this analysis seeks to preserve in the present the
presence of the past and of course the anticipation of the future.
The horizon of this 'now-point' extends not only backward and. down-
ward, but forward and upward, for this present now is only what it
is as it also contains the anticipatory 'pull' of the future. I1.ore-
over, there is a certain ambiguity about this 'now'. Its knife-edge
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notion fits philosophic language as an invention, more than it does
actual experience.
Husserl, even though he described time as a 'flux', still thought
of it basically as a line. It was Merleau-Ponty who developed
Husserl's thinking by suggesting that far from being a line, time
was a "network of intentionalities". Thus the 'now' of my experience
reaches back into the past and forward into the future as a whole
network. This, of course, is why I can talk of the texture of my
experience, the tissue of the passage of my life. In the present
I can only	 Moreover if my act did not take its place within
a context, it would be a now that would be a miniature eternity and
all my awareness of time would be a series of jumps from one 'now'
to another. Furthermore, we should never be able to explain how we
come to be aware of past or future, we would be locked into an eter-
nal present, we would have no experience and no sense of existence.
Time would cease because there would be no duration. Thus the pre-
sence of experience is not simply the present 'moment', it is not
simply an awareness of what is now, but carries with it, in all its
complex network of intentions the past, as memory and the future as
anticipation. Husserl described our awareness of the past in any
experience, its retention, and the awareness of the future, its pro-
tention. He says in Time-Consciousness (referred to by Jacques(29):
"Every perception has its retention and protentional
halo." (Jacques, op cit p40).
These are the temporal overtones and undertones which characterise
the 'thickness' of time, its density and voluzninosity. Time can drag,
time can fly, we can be 'lost' in time. Time takes on an interiority,
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a depth, duration is not simply a formless flow: in all the spatia-
lity of its intentionality it seeks a synthesis. Here the image is
born.
The draughtsman too works from within this presence he has in
his relatedness to the world. As he makes his drawing, he builds
up out from the constellation of his looking visual analogues that
will give him a graphic fixation, which never become 'points' mere
'positions' in space - they in their turn, like Husserl's sounding
note, take their place within the fabric of his emerging image.
These visual analogues are like the threads in the texture of his
emerging drawing. They reflect a whole history of looking, but a
history that is not a simple 'succession' of causes, a history that
has a depth woven from all the multiplicity of his memories and his
anticipations. These visual 'elements' are always yielding more,
always yielding a qualitative reciprocity. His looking is surrounded
by the halo of what he has already seen and the anticipation of how
it will appear once he has found his visual transcription, for his
visual transcription will modify his looking. Temporality is the
rootedness of drawing, for drawing is always a process, a process
that seeks to hold in this image the depth from which it has risen,
the tissue of its making and the texture of its continuing possibi-
lities, the directional thrust of its meaningfulness, the opening
up of that oneiric space which not only shapes it but is its shaping.
The process photographs which accompany this enquiry, within
the stark limitation of their presentation, seek to demonstrate this
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movement of the passage of the draughtsman immersed in the presence
of his drawing activity. Of course they are shadows, like footprints
in the sand, for nothing can adequatly show what this essential ex-
perience is. Arid yet they show the trace of it. The pleasure one
gets from viewing a process is that one relives, even though less
intensely, what first occured. from within the activity - the antici-
patory pull of the future. It is akin to the pleasure one gets from
listening to a familiar melody, or returning to resavour a favourite
drawing.
The future is always there, beckoning, like a brooding presence
that is about to burst upon our present. Thus it is that all our
actions contain some apprehension of how the action will go. As the
draughtsman moves out across the primal whiteness of his paper and
makes his initial mark, he is pulled forward by the future coming to
meet him. He projects his line across this ground, he throws it out-
ward into this space he is now shaping; he has been caught up within
the adventure of this journey. Yet what he makes registers its im-
pression upon him and he makes fresh marks as they arise from the
history of what he has already seen, apprehended within the antici-
pation of how it will appear. Luch of the pleasure which arises from
the activity of making comes from the sense of risk. Risk is the
registering of the anticipation of the future in the present. It
is the acceptance of the pull of the future from beyond the now.
Risk is a hypothesis we make, it is calling the bluff of the future
aM is one way we have of making our way in the world. The making
of the line, the handling of all its interpenetrations, of all its
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opening possibilities, is full of adventure because it is full of
risk. Drawings that are full of visual clichs are tired and dead
because they have taken no risks. It is as this sense of risk is
kept alive that innovation is born. Innovation rises as the means
is found of embodying this sense, this sense that the hypothesis has
been made. A Rembrandt drawing is full of adventure because it is
full of the daring, of the venturing to go. Within the literalness
of his graphic means he has embodied his venture, so we can enter
into its transcription, we can sense its innovation as we sense its
metamorphosis. Letaphor is the perfect example of the anticipatory
pull of the future on the present from the past.
IV. 4. 1. The spatiality and. temporality of the aesthetic object.
We have spoken of the symmetrical relationship of space with
time. We have also begun to sense that for us in any way to grasp
time as duration, time needs a synthesis. We have seen that this
synthesis, this coalescence, is achieved through the image. In our
previous chapter, we spoke of the iriage as having a kind of spatial
background, of its quasi-subjectivity and this characteristic led
us to talk of the aesthetic object as constituting a world. Thus
the space and. time of which we speak is always in relation to this
world, as an expressed world. This world of the aesthetic object
is always a world for us, a qualitative experience and. not simply
a quantifiable datum. This,we have discovered, lies at the basis
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of the difference between the aesthetic object and the work of art.
Moreover, this world is not self—sufficient, it is only ever
a 'world' as it becomes such for a subject who participates in it.
There is always an indeterminacy about this world, not only because
it is 'represented' and not
	 but because its incompleteness
is acknowledged as we realise there is always a 'beyond' to it, it
is never an all—done. As we have begun to sense, this constant
search toward, which characterises the movement of meaning in this
world, is such because it is first inscribed in us. Therefore, any
descriptions of its spatiality and temporality are wholly qualitative
and are not reached through any extensity which is quantifiable
through objective measurement. The source of its very openness, its
evocation is to be found within the spatiality and temporality that
are the basis of its phenomenal appearing.
And yet there is a striving for wholeness and unity which is
the basis for us calling the world of the aesthetic object a world
in the first place. Moreover, this unity is given with it, we do
not have to labour to build it up through its parts. It registers
a unity because its wholeness is always more than mere addition,
Space and time lie at the basis of this ordering, which is always
a seeking toward an opening and not a closure. It is only closed,
it only ceases to work as a world, when through its signs, we sense
no risk, no venturing, no possibilities of a beyond. We become
bored with it and it no longer holds us, it collapses upon itself
as we cease to participate with it. It has become no more than a
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dead thing.
Now this opermess is always an openness of intention rather than
extension. This network of intentionalities is the degree of the
possibilities of its depth. Thus this 'indefinite' is a potentiality
which no actualisation can exhaust. This is always for us the
possibility of a world, the possibility of objects, the glimpse we
catch of their interiority, the horizon of their futures for ever
distilling from this present. cassirer(30) has talked of the 'preg-
nancy' of symbolic form - this is the 'halo' which surrounds all our
perceptions and is specifically that which 'holds' this world in its
unity, but always a unity that is the ground for the potentiality of
its continuing openness. Like Husserl's sounding note, it carries
within it the polyphony of immeasurable harmonic overtones.
Thus the aesthetic object has the dimensions of a world - but
these dimensions are dimensions which defy measurement. As we have
seen from Merleau-Ponty, it is because it exists first in its depth.
This is not a world, as Dufrenne(l) says "... crowded with objects;
it precedes them" (op cit p182). Thus we do not so much see its
space, as its essential spatiality prepares this world to be seen.
Always this world presents the potentiality of space and time and
never space and time objectively determined. The duration we grasp
within the passage of the symphony is never its length of time as
determined by the clicks of the metronome. The movement of a linear
passage within a drawing is never a mere geometrical projection of
subtended points.
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Hovever, this is not to say that the aesthetic object cannot
be the source of its own space and time. Indeed, it can and indeed
it must in order to be expressive. The work works, the work is
animated because the work is first expressive before being merely
representative. The directional thrust of its meaningfulness is
to be expressive for this is the very ground of its ajpearing in the
first place. To merely 'represent' time is to invoke chronology and
to merely 'represent' space is to invoke geometry. The expressed,
as Dufrerine points out:
"... is, as it were, the possibility of the represented
and the represented is the reality of the expressed.
Together with the style which gives them body, they
compose the world of the aesthetic object." (op cit p185).
IV. 4. 2. Movement and motif.
Now our task is to consider how drawing can manifest its own
particular style of space and time through its modalities. Drawing
is essentially a 'spatial' art. Time and space serve only as broad
generalisations for the character of works of music or works of
drawing. lusic unfolds in time while drawing manifests itself in
space, but as we have begun to sense, a more thoroughgoing examination
diminishes the differences. So always, the aesthetic object implies
both space and time, even though in a given case it appears to be
only to do with space or only to do with time. Drawing is not without
its relationship to time. Whenever we talk about movement within
drawing and drawing as movement, we acknowledge that its spatiality
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has been ignited and magnetised through time. Here is Paul Klee's(31)
unforgettable description:
.2
"liovement is the basis of all becoming. When a dot
becomes movement and line, time is involved - a
work of art is built up, piece by piece, just like
a house. Scene of the action: time. Character:
movement ... The genesis of writing provides a
very good parallel for movement. A work of art is
also first and foremost a genesis; it is never ex-
perienced ready made. Paths are cut through a work
oTit for the venturesome eye of the spectator as
it might be an animal grazing. The eye follows the
paths prepared for it through the work of art. The
pictorial work originated in movement, is itself
recorded movement and is received as movement."
(op cit pp93/94).
Thus Kandinsky's line can become for us the thread of Ariadne
leading us through the world of appearances. The felicitous space
this line inscribes is hollowed out for us, bears an interiority and
a depth which we catch through its movement. The coalescence of
space and time, their dialectical reciprocity, is here prefig-ured.
The space which unites'the pagoda's long robe to the long robe of
the whirlwind' is not 'empty', it is fully evocative. We sense the
reverberation of this space within the resonance of the continual
movement of the metaphoric tension within this poetic utterance.
The network of our felt experiences that make up the fabric and tex-
ture of our lives, oar being, is here magnetised through these images.
What we sense 'on the surface', as it were, has first been inscribed
in us, through that primordial dialectic between subject and object.
In this way we have no difficulty in ascribing a 'living' quality
to the world of the aesthetic object. We can say of the line that
it moves, it is a movement caught in immobility. Like our being, it
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is a constant returning, a genesis which yet remains the same in
becoming other.
It is in search of this depth, it is to make this depth speak
which animates the draughteman, the painter, the poet and the musi-
cian. Thus the draughtsman, through his unique modality and through
the harnessing of his means, makes speak his space. He may speak
with different voices, he may employ different tongues, yet what he
strives for is not the mere imitation of some spatlo-temporal world
'out there', not simply the envelope of things but the beingness of
objects. In his seeing they are always rivals before his sight;
they strive to take their place within the spatio-temporal world of
his drawing. Thus he uses sensuous means, the ink, the graphite,
the ground of his surface. Indeed, the magic is that through these
means he can reach into that interiority which is the mark of his
transcendence of object as mere 'things'. If he is successful, all
the elements in his work will herald a sense of appearing to have
been born together. Depth here is everything in the same place at
the same time. Simultaneity is what is meant by the 'moment' in
drawing. Indeed, if we sense this coming together this is where the
image of the drawing can become evocative for us and we can begin to
revel in the promiscuity, the fecundity and the richness of its ever
opening sense, of its mobility.
Now the draughtsman works from his 'motif'. These may be the
images of his imagination, or the images he finds in the actual world.
In working from it however, he always seeks to penetrate it, or rather
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be penetrated by it, for he constantly strives to imcover the direc-
tion, the depth, this motif has magnetised. It is interesting to
realise that the root of the word 'motif' is motive, that is, the
tendency to imitate movement. This is why Czanne(32) could say that
the painter, in the face of his motif, is about "to join the aimless
hands of nature".
The motif for the draughtsman is such that it has just moved
him. They are motifs because they have already moved him, have al-
ready rnagnetised his gaze. Some motifs for the draughtsman are so
rich, so full, they almost ask to be drawn. This is what prompted
Klee(33) to say that he painted "to break out", as though the inte-
riority oI' the world of his vision was pressing itself upon him,
impressing him, emblazoning the tracks of its movement within him,
so that he had to find the means of exorcising this movement; join
the aimless hands of nature; make his drawings.
This is what we mean when we say that vision is caught or happens
among things; this is the inherent spatiality in vision, and it is
toward this visibility that the draughtsman moves as he seeks to bring
his image to form. He searches for a fixation. His line is one of
the means he uses to bring to a kind of concentration what he has
seen. This is what Ricoeur(34) talks about when he uses the term
'iconic augmentation' (op cit p40). Far from his drawing being a
mere'copy' of reality it actually pre-Lfigures it. Thus this inscrip-
tion of his line is never reduplication; it is always a transcription,
a metamorphosis. This is the peculiar effectiveness of drawing, for
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drawing in a particular way, through its limitation of means, as
Ricoeur says, "yields more by handling less" (op cit p40). This
it does through a kind of contraction, a kind of miniaturization
(not a reduction) which is like a concentration, an opening out.
In order to pierce the skin of things, to show how things become
things, how the world becomes world, there must be some kind of
fixation, some way in which reality can be pre-figured. The draughts-
man in his unique way makes this fixation by writing his reality.
Ricoeur points out that the main effect of painting (and we will
include drawing) is to resist the entropic tendency of ordinary
vision (ibid p40). Ordinary vision constantly tends to dissipate,
it flows away. The grasping of the motif is the beginning of the
path toward the fixation which the draughtsman makes in his drawing.
The image he forms under his hand can hold the potentiality in vision,
can saturate it, can concentrate it, until it gives birth to the
visible, the yielding of the more. Ricoeur puts it thus:
"This effect of saturation and culmination, within
the tiny space of the frame and on the surface of
the two dimensional canvas, in opposition to the
optical erosion proper to ordinary vision, is what
is meant by iconic augmentation." (op cit p40).
Thus the inscription the draughtsman makes, his transcription,
is always a metamorphosis. Through this fixation he can clothe ob-
jects in a new objectivity, he can promote a fresh ordering, a new
dimension of being. Thus objects, his motifs, are never merely 'out
there', they are here in the heart of vision. Through his ability
to yield more by handling less the draughtsrnan can uncover their
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essential spatiality, their essential voluminosity and thickness,
their expressive physiognomy, their depth. Depth is born out from
this pre-figuring. No longer are objects merely items, they are
motifs, they are drawn into that relatedness with the subject which
lifts them to a new plane of existence.
Beckmann(35) has grasped this essential movement when in his
essay On My Painting, which is more like a prose poem than an essay,
he says:
"I am seeking for the bridge which leads from the
invisible to the visible, like the famous cabalist
who once said: 'If you wish to get hold of the in-
visible you must penetrate as deeply as possible
into the visible' ... It is not the subject which
matters but the translation of the subject into the
abstraction of the surface by means of painting.
Therefore I hardly need to abstract things, for
each object is unreal enough already, so unreal
that I can only make it real by means of painting.
Liy dream is the imagination of space - to
change the optical impression of the world of ob-
jects by a transcendental arithmetic progression
of the inner being." (op cit ppl32fl34).
And in a truly evocative passage at the end of his essay he says:
"Thus the figure from my 'Temptation' sang to me for
a long time, trying to escape from the square on
the hypotenuse in order to achieve a particular con-
stellation of the Hebrides, to the Red Giant and the
Central Sun." (op cit p137).
For Beckrnann it was this translation, this transcription, this
transcendence that he sought. What was at first not his, unreal,
he had to make real by making it his own through an act of appropria-
tion, through his means. The images he made was his move to fill
the gap, to make productive the distance between himself and other.
This is why it is only in making this distance productive, making it
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work, that the draughtsrnan can be said to come to know through his
drawings. Thus before his motif he seeks to 'rescue' (to use
Ricoeur's term, op cit p43) images which would have a tendency to
dissipate, in 'rescuing' them he gives them form. He joins the aim-
less hands of nature. He makes his fixation.
For the draughtsman, the surface of the white paper he works on
can be like alien ground, it can fill him with apprehension. This
feeling can sometimes be so strong that Redon(36) is reported to have
said:
"I have a horror of a white sheet of paper. ... A
sheet of paper so shocks me that as soon as it is
on the easel I am forced to scrawl on it with char-
coal or pencil, or anything else, and this process
gives it life." (op cit p80).
Now this 'life' rises because he has rescued this space from mere
oblivion and given it order and direction. It has become expressive
because he has brought it into a new relationship of proximity. He
has made it his own.
This actual space of the format of the surface has now become
pictorial space. The two-dimensionality of its format, the in-itself
of its objectivity begins to take on the possibility of the opening
out of the dimension of the for itself of its depth. This inherent
dialectic founds the whole possibility of the visual arts. The work
of the draughtsman is a constant effort to move us away from the mere
'illusion' of depth, of mere trompe l'oeil and establish that intrin-
sic tension which arises from the space he is seeking to inscribe and
the integrity of the flatness of the format he is working on. It is
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from within the dialectic of this tension that the image, the world
of the aesthetic object coalesces as world. The synthesis of which
we have been speaking cannot be achieved except it is caught and
made visible through the sensuous. Furthermore, the quality of this
space he is shaping is directly related to the ways and means the
draughtsman employs. Thus the line that is made with the soft full-
ness of the brush dipped in ink will have a very different quality
to the taut sharpness of a line made with the pencil or the pen.
These qualitative aspects we will explore further as we look at the
work of our five draughtsmen. However, these various ways of shaping
his space, these various modalities, give to the space heis inscrib-
ing a richness, a density. They give to it more than a singular
direction. These modalities add a whole network of meanings to this
space, which makes it reverberate as a polyphony, where we seem al-
ways to be on the threshold of fresh dimensions of meaning.
'We have said also, that the draughtsman builds his image as he
is immersed within the activity of making, of shaping. His drawing
is a putting together, a gathering from, a harvesting from his visual
activity. His drawing emerges from the history of his looking. The
movements he makes, the graphic analogues he finds are put together
and begin to interpenetrate each other, and this in turn yields the
richness and density to his visual search. Now one of the chief
attractions of drawing is that drawings, because of the way they
write the 'space' the draughtsman is moving toward, leave a record
of the passage of his looking. His linear descriptions are the indi-
cations to us of where his vision has been caught in what has already
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moved him in his motif. Drawings are one of the clearest means
within the visual arts of taking hold of time through space. Further-
more we have no difficulty in sensing this implicit movement, the
imprint of the draughtsman's searching gaze. In seeing the drawing,
we see 'according to it', as Merieau-Ponty(6) says, when we grasp
this movement by immersing ourselves within it (op cit p6O). This
is also why drawings can present us so forcibly with this sense of
process. This is never the concatenation of mere sequence, for this
would destroy the implicit movement altogether. The unity of the
drawing is the acknowledgement of this movement.
There is a difference of course between the movement we have
been speaking about and the representation of movement within the
'subject matter' of the drawing. Thus the sower in Van Gogh's drawing
seems to be caught up within the action of sowing. Gricault's horses
seem to epitomise the whole movement of galloping. Where a photograph
can so easily 'freeze' a movement, a drawing can distil it. Thus the
leap of a dancer across a stage when photographed can become an incon-
gruous distortion, where he seems only to be suspended. Lerleau-Ponty
sensed this when he says characteristically:
"The photograph keeps open the instants which the
onrush of time closes up forthwith; it destroys
the overtaking, the overlapping, the 'metamorphosis'
of time." (op cit p81).
One might add that the incongruous photograph has no presence. The
'instant' made visible within the photograph is frozen because it
gives no sense of 'leaving here', 'going there' (ibid p81). It has
become the portrait of a miniature eternity, there is no sense of
passage. Time has ceased to collaborate with space in animating the
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image. Now the limitation of the photograph is the opportunity of
the drawing. The draughtsman can catch the aspects of the movement
of a figure and bring these together within a single image. These
aspects he can reach as he first senses the whole of the movement
and then finds the graphic means which together incorporates these
faces of movement into a sense of the movement's passage. So Van
Gogh's drawings of his peasants are full of action. His sower sows,
his field 'fields'. Not only is movement represented, it is fully
implied. Dufrenne clarifies it thus;
"In other words, pictorial space becomes temporalized
when it is given to us as a structured and oriented
space in which certain priveleged lines constitute
trajectories that, instead of appearing to us as the
inert residue of some movement, appear as filled with
movement realized in immobility." (op cit pp277/278).
This livingness, this animate is crucial. This is central more-
over to the whole rise and sustaining evocation of the image. As we
have seen from Bergson, it is impossible to arrive at mobility by
taking it apart. The whole activity of perception, including aesthetic
perception is grounded in the presence of mobility. We cannot talk of
the world of the drawing unless we acknowledge the movement of pre-
objective time which gives the enabling for this image to appear.
Images are never static thirg. They have a primacy and a mobility
which precedes all conceptualisation. The very sensing of movement,
the catching of time within pictorial space is at the heart of why
this image is now image. This image, as now appearing; as a continuous
mobility toward meaning; as the continuous outpouring of many echoes
of sense, many directional networks. In memory it rises from the
past and carries with it all the possibilities of a beyond. This is
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where the image reverberates, not only because it has a history in
us, but also because we have a future in the world. The 'l'lan
vital' of Bergson. This is not just a feeling of being, of existence,
not just the acknowledgement of the 'gap', but an active participation
in the roductivity this gap afford. Bachelard(37) has already
grasped the richness of the image's mobility. He quotes Gabriele
D'Arinunzio who says:
".. when we begin to open our eyes to the visible,
we have long since committed ourselves to the in-
visible." (op cit p16).
This is the whole basis for our imaginative grasp of the world
of the drawing. We may not be conscious of time, but for this image
to work, for it to be sustained as a whole movement, for this image
to sing, we must already be living it within the depths of our
imagination, for this is where it has first stirred and burgeoned
into life. Genuine movement is never simply displacement, genuine
movement is always an aspiration, an affirmation of the self, a
striving toward other, a search, an appropriation, an unfolding net-
work of meaning. This is why the world of the drawing is always
pointing outward from itself, toward an ontology. It is never self-
sufficient. The work works because it has a certain impatience to
be heard, an impatience to disclose its meaning, to be 'rescued'.
This is why it holds us, this is why it seems to embody a kind of
imperious demand, a longing for other. This demand is what makes
us reach forward to appropriate it, to make it ours. Its whole
beingness as world is only such as there is a kind of concentration
of all its elements toward meaning and wholeness. Drawings are
239
metaphoric deliverances, and the very tension which keeps alive their
metaphoric sense is sustained by this impatience toward a resolution.
Tension, which is the very dynamic of metaphor, is sustained movement.
lIT. 4. 3. Movement and rhythm.
There is another aspect of movement which I now wish to discuss
and this has enormous importance in any description of the space and.
time which is disclosed within the world of the drawing. This is
rhythm. We have spoken of the movement we can sense within the draw-
ing, we have spoken of movement as a continuous dialectic reciprocity.
We have acknowledged that in its metaphoric sense this is how the
image comes to be evocative, to reverberate. We shall now discover
that rhythm is a particular form which movement takes and is an aspect
of the character of movement. The first important thing to establish
is that to sense rhythm within a drawing is to sense it within the
whole of the drawing. As in life, so in the spatio-temporal world
of the drawing, rhythm is related. to organic wholeness.
Rhythm is unequivocally present in all drawings which can be
said to work, to have gone to work. To talk of the form which the
spatiality of the drawing suggests, is to acknowledge the way this
spatiality is ordered. Rhythm, as an aspect of movement and given
with it, as we shall see, is never simply a measureable phenomenon.
The draughtsrnan creates rhythms with as much freedon as he creates
other forms. Rhythm is the indissoluble mark of the draughtsman's
240
personal handwriting. It is bound in to the whole qualitative and
expressive thrust of the drawing. If a drawing has no rhythm it has
no heartbeat.
Repetition is not the essence of rhythm. The ticking of a clock
can be repetitious but it is the listening ear which organises this
repetitious beat into a rhythmic sequence. We form phrases of the
beats which group around accents that provide the focus for the rise
and fall of what now becomes rhythm, a temporal form, not simply equal
ticks. To sense rhythm as an aspect of time is to recognise a quali-
tative engagement. Furthermore, as Langer suggests, 'rhythmic con-
tinuity' (ibid p127) gives us the feeling of endurance, a kind of
permanence to things and events which is really a pattern of changes.
Thus it is we can sense throughout all the variability of perception
an invariability. It is through this sense we have of rhythmic con-
tinuity that we can bring a sense of wholeness to events, we can grasp
their essential relatedness. Langer(38) points out:
"Rhythmic concatenation is what really holds an orga-
nism together from moment to moment; it is a dynamic
pattern, i.e., a pattern of events, into which acts
and act-like phenomena very readily fall: a sequence
wherein the subsiding phase, or cadence, of one act
(or similar element) is the up-take for its successor.tt
(op cit p323).
This of course we have begun to discover through all our discussions
concerning the primary temporality of presence. Inscribed within our
being is this rhythmic reciprocity. This is the ground of our lives,
it is that which makes us human. This inscribed rhythm prepares us in
presence, for all that we subsequently meet in representation and which
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we further sense as being the basis for expression. Thus our whole
activity, our whole orientation in the world is born out from a
situation, of already being engaged in the world. All acts occur
from within a situation of a stream of preceding acts, To make a
complex structure like a drawing is to be thoroughly inunersed within
what Langer calls 'a situation', "... a constellation of other acts
in progress .,," (ibid p281), and what Ierleau-Ponty(4) talks about
as a specific spatial 'level' (op cit p249). Rhythmic continuity is
what holds all our acts together, it gives to our actions a sense
that they are not discrete entities but form part of an on-going whole.
The inception of any specific act is the impulse toward; the search
for meaning. But this impulsion has arisen from a previous action
that has now died away. As Langer(7) points out:
"... the situation that begets the new crisis must
be inherent in the denouement of its forerunner."
(op cit p127).
So rhythm is a continual alternation of tensions which build to a
crisis and ebb away in a gradual course of relaxation which prepares
the build-up to a new tension that has in its turn a fresh crisis and
its cadence of falling away. If these series of actions point toward
a series of contraries, such as rise and fall, push and pull, we call
the rhythmic sequence dialectic. The tick-tock of the clock is a
dialectic rhythm. Indeed these dialectical rhythms are so powerful
we find them everywhere in our perception. It is this very dialectic
that prepares us for grasping the expressive nature of perception it-
self. It should not surprise us that this is so, for as we have seen,
this dialectic reciprocity is inscribed in the heart of our being -
as the continual movement of the self toward other in its implicit
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reverberation. Thus what we see as the rise and fall of the line,
what gives inanimate objects their animation is because their ex-
pressive significance is prefigured within the profound rhythm of
our being. Thus the rhythm which animates and indeed holds together
the world of the drawing, which is indeed its heartbeat, is because
it is first inscribed within our own subjectivity. The merely
represented has now become the expressed. Moreover, because this
rhythmic continuity holds this world together, is always a continuity,
this prepares the way for all the subsequent opening out of this world
and founds its very interiority.
However, we need a synthesis - for just as we saw that to grasp
the pre-objectivity of time, the inner time of the subject, we need
the space of the object, so also, for us to reflect on this inner
rhythmic reciprocity we need a structure through the schematism of
the drawing. It is by means of this schernatism that rhythm can be
spatialised, or given a spatial determination. Without this 'external'
structuring, without this extension across the format of the drawing,
we would have no way of sensing the drawing's inner movement, where
rhythm is the secret law of it internal development, its internal
logic.
In this sense there are two kinds of rhythm. The one extrinsic,
a kind of marking without; the other intrinsic, a kind of marking
within. We might distinguish these two aspects by saying that one
is external and the other organic. One is a kind of measure for the
other. External rhythm is a means whereby we can gain access to the
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rhythmic movement of the whole work, its duration. In music, for
example, there can be a rhythmic schema which is beaten out by the
metronome and indicated by the time signature at the beginning of
the piece. But such measurement only acts as a structuring, a frame-
work for the true movement in the music to appear; the movement of
its duration, But this duration needs its synthesis, it needs a form
to be made perceptible. This formal framework is achieved in music
through the schema of rhythmic 'markers'; one mimics these markers
by beating time, tapping one's foot. However the real expression
of rhythm is not so much the mechanical succession of intervals as
the almost imperceptible 'push' and 'pull' of those intervals, their
tension together which forms the rhythmic rise and fall of the piece -
this is how we reach into its sense of duration. There is inevitably
a spatial element, and even in the fundamentally 'temporal' form of
music, space is always implied. But this is never merely the spatia-
lity of extension, which caused Bergson so much problem. It is that
essential spatiality without which we could never know movement or
rhythm. This spatiality is not that which simply allows for the
adding of instants together, it is that spatiality which is the en-
abling of rhythm to organise movement, for rhythm to be made per-
ceptible and take on form.
Now what is apparent within the musical matrix is also dis-
coverable within the spatial manifold of the drawing. To scan a
drawing and begin to participate in its rhythmic determination is
far from simply the adding up of instants. Rather to sense rhythm
in drawing is to be penetrated by all the 'push' and 'pull', the
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rise and fall, the here and there, of its elements, which coalesce
into a rhy-t.hmic continuity. In some instances this rhythmic sense
can be so completely realised that within a single line, as one drawn
by Latisse, we grasp a tremendous sense of the drawing's presence -
that moment when all the drawing comes together simultaneously, as
though it were a single act-form.
Rhythm then is not simply the counting of instances. Rhy-thm
never implies a stretch of time, a measure, which is subsequently
divided into units. Rather, rhythm is always the possibility of
identifying equal intervals or periods between units and referring
to their repetition. A series of equally spaced points is not
rhythm, but these only provide the'markers', which can indicate for
us the passage of transition. A curve is an act-form, it has impli-
cit to its being curvilinear, a gathering from, a climax and then
a cadential dying away. In all rhythm there is an ictus or stress
and an answering relaxation. It is this fundamental dialectic which
gives rise to all that we describe as the tensions within a drawing.
We indeed talk of the tautness of the line, the gentleness of a
curve. These descriptions acknowledge that these elements are act-
forms and carry their discrete rhythmic resonance. It is in this
way that the spaced intervals within a drawing are gathered into
groups, begin to form themselves into aspects which help us determine
the movement of the drawing. Perception is always an active search,
rhythm is the means it can use to give a particular orientation to
its activity. Thus it is through the 'external' rhythm of the
schematism of the drawing, this rhythmic pattern, that allows us to
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move through into that interiority the drawing provides. An interio-
rity that is never empty, for it resonates as it reciprocates with
the external schematism that has provided the very means for its
appearing and lends a qualitative dimension to its opening and un-
folding. These two aspects of rhythm which we have discussed are in
constant resonance. The one provides the ground for the other to
appear. It is only as we coincide with the drawing that we ever sense
its inner rhythm. Thus in Dufrenne's terms:
"Rhythm is a means of taming time without betraying
it to the repetition of the constantly identical."
(op cit p309).
It is within the visual arts, and particularly within the art of
drawing that this becomes evident. Drawing is essentially a rhythmic
ordering of all its space, because of its use of less to yield more,
it can resonate directly through all the act-forms embedded within
it. The line is immediately given in movement; the substructure of
drawings, revealed through all the whispers of tiny marks and addi-
tions, can open out upon a whole rich rhythmic texturing.
There is always in drawing the richness of this diversity within
its unity. David Cowley's drawing (Fig. 1 ) can demonstrate this.
Its whole rhythmic direction is announced in the same way as a time
signature is placed at the beginning of a piece of music. Its tempo
is con brio: written 'with energy'. There is a rhythmic thrust to
the whole matrix set up by the directional axis of its linear vectors.
However, within the main rhythmic movement, there are minute adjust-
ments that are made, which are like side currents; they are like the
harmonies of the sounding note, which lend an amplitude to the main
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metric form. These counter rhythms are enormously important in
drawing. Sometimes, as in Feliks Topoiski's drawings, they are
minute flecks on the surface which together build into a kind of
constellation that is indicating the passage of his hand across the
drawing as he makes his main axis marks. There is an implicit rela-
tedness between the main rhythmic directions and these counter
rhythms. It is almost as though the one throws up the other in the
course of its development, and this second harmony is orchestrated
into the main 'beat'. Sometimes the main metric measure is a single
line. Arthur Di Stephano's drawings are full of these, (Fig.33)
is a good example. The main rhythmic measure is the sweep of the
line as it unites the bent head of the model and her hair as this
runs into the contour of her leg. Or it could also be the running
line over the model's back, which breaks in a tiny folded curl and
then is picked up on her thigh. However, within these basic metric
forms there are other very subtle rhythms - like 'pulses' along the
line. We begin to catch the significance of saying the line 'breathes'.
Its rhythmic dialectic is caught within its movement. In all of this,
what is important is that these rhythms, these act-forms take their
place within the whole and lend their animation to this world.
We have spoken of the formal schemata of the drawing as giving
us the means to reach toward the drawing's inner rhythms and we shall
return to this consideration more fully in the next chapter. However
for the moment, we should not dismiss the importance of the 'subject
matter' of the drawing. We have spoken in our earlier chapters of
the importance of the 'tenor' of the drawing. The recognition that
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Arthur Di Stephano is drawing a nude can become the means of our
entry into the world he is seeking to inscribe. This notional sub-
ject can provide us with a key around which the rhythmic structures
can condense. This is one of the reasons why the nude has provided
such a rich motif for draughtsmen. Our participation within all its
suggested rhythms is immediate. Rhythm is always an aspect of move-
ment which in turn betrays time. Dufrenne clarifies what we have
been seeking to disclose when he says:
"Temporality, which is evident in the arts of time
and secret in the arts of space, resides in the
internal movement by which the work unifies itself
in order to appear and deliver its song. Rhythm
manifests and marks off this movement."
(op cit p299).
IV. 4. 4. lllovement and the interiority of depth.
All that we have been discussing promotes the depth of this
always-becoming-world of the drawing. Spatiality and temporality
unite to give to us what we only know as the drawing's Dresence, its
feeling. Depth is a certain quality of lived experience and it is
only as we feel it that we can talk of the Drofound when we talk of
the meaningfulness of this world. In conclusion, let us examine a
little further this notion of depth. There is about it the idea of
the hidden. Something yet to be, sonething not as yet revealed.
Thus the progress toward this unveiling, the process which is the
drawing, is what challenges our project and lends to it its direc .
-tional concern and pulls us forward toward its own disclosure. This
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adventurous move, magnetised in drawing by all the act—forms which
animate the format, all the schematism of its marks and traces, is
a 'letting go'. As we move into the world of the drawing we are in
a state of readiness to be surprised. Bachelard(37), in the book
On Poetic Imagination and Reverie, speaks of this 'letting go', this
opening out as 'L'invitation au voyage (op cit p19). imagination,
he says, is so often talked about as the faculty we have of forming
images, rather than, as he thinks it should be, as the faculty of
deforming them. Now we can see why the images which the artist forms,
the images which the poet evokes through his language, do not point
simply to existing images, rather they change existing images; their
task is to bring about unexpected unions that give rise to a swarm
of aberrant images. Thus mere reproductive imagination is the prose
of productive imagination. This is why Ler1eau-.Ponty(39) can call
the image the artist makes 'coherent deformation' (op cit p91 ). Thus
if a present image does not work in recalling an absetit one, if an
occasional image does not give rise to an explosion of images, there
is no opening out, no imagination. Images in art pick up the ordinary
habitual images of perception and throw them toward a fresh direction,
a fresh dimension of being. We begin to sense their depth, because
they begin to open fresh paths in us, they begin to reverberate; we
do not so much imagine them as irnagiriate with them, Undoubtedly, as
Bachelard(37) says, the imaginary lays down images during its prodi-
gious life, but always it appears to exist beyond its images (op cit
p20). Indeed it does, for the image we now have in representation
has been prepared in presence. Depth rises as a directional enquiry
as we participate within the image's essential mobility. Drawings
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which work, have gone to work, are images which refuse to stand still.
Their impatience to be heard is their invitation. To feel their
fecundity, we must be ready to loosen our grip on levels of habitual
spatiality; we must be ready to see according to these images; we
must engage them and be engaged with them in their expressive potential.
Each artist, says Bachelard,
".., owes us his invitation to the voyage. With this
invitation we register, in our inner being, a gentle
iinpulsion which shakes us, which sets in motion bene-
ficent reverie, truly dynamic reverie. If the initial
image is well chosen, it is an impulsion to a well-
defined dream, to an imaginary life that will have
real laws of successive images, really vital meaning.
The sequence of images arranged by the invitation to
the voyage takes on, through the aptness of its order,
a special vivacity that makes it possible to designate
a movement of the imagination. This movement is
not just a metaphor, we shall actually feel it within
ourselves ... an effortless imagination of connected
images, an eagerness to pursue the enchanting dream."
(op cit pp2l/22).
With truly remarkable insight he adds:
"The true voyage of the imagination is the voyage to
the land, to the very domain of the imaginary
the imnanence of the imaginary in the real, the
continuous passage from the real to the imaginary."
(op cit p22).
The depth of the world of the aesthetic object is only for us as
we are caught within this movement. We can talk of the intimaqy of
this world because it now has come to Dossess us. As we sense the
explosion of its aberrant images, we are drawn on through an interiority
which constantly affir'is. This is why drawings can point toward an
ontology, this is why there can be a visual philosophy of forms. In
its affirmation, within its productive ambiguity, the draughtsman
makes a this is. Moreover, if his utterance is clear, if his utterance
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shines forth, if the revealing reveals itself, then we begin to sense
the profundity, the fecundity of this new found depth. Its very on-
tology is an invitation to us to project ourselves into what it
affirms and participate wholly in its celebratory powers. This
becoming, this revealing, reveals an ever disclosing hiddenness which
is not 'not seeing'; it is rather an increasing for us of this now
appearing visibility. To grasp the affirmation of the visionary in
vision is to commit ourselves, is to move forward in the-always-coming-
to-be, the constant self-disclosure of the aesthetic object. This
kind of depth belongs to the world of feeling, particularly to aes-
thetic feeling. The world of the aesthetic object does not belong
to us in its intimacy unless we belong to it. For it to work for us
we must live it. The depth of its feeling is because it reaches into
every part of the texture of our being. We cannot detach feeling
from that which it is a part. We sense duration, we sense the pleni-
tude of this world, because this duration is first in us. We are the
duration of which this world makes us aware.
Depth is a directional enquiry, a yearning, a reaching toward a
resolution. Depth is always our project in the world, filled from
our immanence in the past and rnagnetised through the possibility of
our future. There remains in us a potential for being surprised,
this readiness is the mover-ent of our imagination. The mobility of
images is testimony to this movement. Their depth, their interiority,
their power to evoke is such because they have the power of revealing
ourselves to ourselves, of laying open the self, the depth in our-
selves.
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This 'hiddenness' of which we have spoken has nothing to do with
opacity. We must be wary of the rigidity of the images of physical
depth. The 'hiddenness' is an aspect of depth which has about it
always the feeling of the more to be revealed, as though this world
possesses a secret which it seems to have an impatience to disclose.
Further, this opacity is not strangeness, neither is it to do with
the task or difficulty of 'unravelling' the secret. Wynn Jones's
drawings possess a 'strangeness' but this has to do with our possible
unfamiliarity with them. This strangeness they have is nothing to
do with any kind of confusion. If we do not understand them the
strangeness is in us. Thus the hiddenness in these drawings is such
because it possesses a potentiality for making plain. Their hidden-
ness is like that part of the voyage ahead which is yet uncharted
but beckons us. Their hidd.enness is the pull we sense from their
future possibility, the uncovering of their secret interiority is
what holds us within the orbit of their expressive potential. This
yet-to-be-discovered, is a productive hiddenness, a hiddenness with
promise, one that discloses itself as it constantly affirms.' Its
very hiddenness calls us from the known to the unknown. Its hidden-
ness is its power to uproot us from the habitual, 'to bring us into
new worlds of meaning, new worlds of being.
This hiddenriess rises from this interiority only if the aesthetic
object is capable of igniting us, capable of surprising us, capable of
being evocative. If it does not we turn away from it. If what is
represented does not also express, it remains only on the level of
the represented. If there is no sense of mobility in this image, it
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becomes simply an object of habit, it fails to move us. The work,
if it is working, is always calling for us to experience its depth,
not merely to understand it by rationalising it. Thus its hiddenness
is not a secret to be 'solved' like some kind of riddle. Its demand
is to be known in feeling rather than merely known in understanding.
We come to understand it thrg feeling. The mobility of its images
are only such as we let go, as we allow the work to work. Its very
working suggests that we are already committed to its power of de-
forming the images of habit. To rationalise the work by seeking to
find 'solutions' through causality is to misunderstand the productivity
of this hiddenness. It was through Cartesian determinism that icons
came to lose their powers.
Thus this strangeness is not to be confused with an equation,
as though we were seeking its 'solution' according to whether it
matches an existing 'norm'. This hiddenness has an aspect that not
so much deters, that negates, but that affirms, that welcomes our
engagement. The comprehension of this depth is, as we attain it
through the agency of feeling, a world that is inexhaustible because
it cannot be defined. The work invites us to a world that is not a
world of obscurity, there is no obscurity for feeling, only for the
understanding which has not caught the mobility of the expressive
and still remains in the world of the merely represented. Its power
to express is because this world is an analogue of a subjectivity.
There is no confusion for a subject, only for a subject that does
not understand its object, because it has included itself as object.
Confusion is the mark of separation, of disintegration, not of
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wholeness. The world of the aesthetic object is always a movement
toward a unity. It is an analogue of consciousness. It is always
a for-itself for us. Thus its spatio-temporal world discloses a
world because this world is first in us. Any sense of its structure,
any sense of its order, any sense ofits depth come first because the
individual that moves out to meet this world, that moves out to par-.
ticipate in this world is already an undivided whole. But this
individual needs the world just as the world of the aesthetic object
needs its seneuous ordering. Each is in need of the other for being-
ness to arise. We only come to know this world of the drawing as we
sense it through all its physicality, through all its graphic deli-
verance. So also do we know ourselves, become aware of our being,
come to know, as we mark out that interiority in ourselves which
arises through our reciprocal relatedness within the world. Space
and time collaborate in what it is for us to be. They collaborate
too in making the world of the drawing a world for us; this image-
world which is our route toward all the possibilities of becoming.
It is to this world that we now turn, as we examine its formal struc-
turing through the work of those who have taken part in our venture.
(3) BFtON Andr (1938)
(4) LERLEAU-PONTY 1aurice
(1945)
(5) KAIIT Emrranue1 (1781)
(6) LRLEAU-PONTY Iaurice
(1961)
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CHAPTER V. ANALYSIS OF TRE DHAWINGS
V. 1. 1. Introduction
This chapter is concerned primarily with a formal analysis of
the drawings of the five draughtsmen who have participated in our
project. The analysis of the particular drawings will inevitably
make wider reference to the formal ordering and structuring of drawing
in general and this is important.
It was necessary to limit the number of people included, so as
to bring the documentation within reasonable proportions for this
thesis. Lore than five draughtsmen were involved in the project,
but these that are included were chosen because between them they
demonstrate some of the most important formal concerns in drawing,
as I shall attempt to show.
Of course, within the necessary limitation of the work of only
five draughtsmen, this analysis cannot be exhaustive, but we shall
discover that the dialogue which engages each of them touches the
roots of all drawing and illuminates, moreover, the concerns which
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have occupied us thus far.
We have begun to discover that drawing is a particular way of
ordering space and time; that it provides a particular means of spa-
tialising time and temporalising space and the sequence photographs,
within the limitation of their presentation, seek to demonstrate this
directional enquiry. Their limitation is that they mark only instances
in time which for the draughtsmen did not exist as such. However, they
suggest something of the constellation of his looking and will be use-
ful in the analysis that follows.
It will be our task now to demonstrate the unique way in which
these five draughtsmen have reached into their own highly individual
graphic interiority, and. further, how they have brought this into
form. Thus we hope to sense, through the structures they have made
and in conjunction with what they have said, something of the mobility
of their own imaginative engagement and something also that points
toward an ontology which is in support of our epistemological enquiry.
Our investigations will be toward uncovering formal elements
within these drawings that contribute to the ordering of their inherent
spatiality. Any consideration of aspects will always be grounded in
the acknowledgment of the organic wholeness of the drawing, which,
as we have suggested, promotes the essential movement of its meaning.
The purpose of this formal investigation therefore is not so much to
'fragment' these images through an analysis which might only 'take them
apart', but to demonstrate how these draughtsmen, through their
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particular means, have achieved the directional significance of their
own graphic enquiry. This movement is always more than the sum of
its parts.
V. 1. 2. lvlaterial structuring of the drawing.
We have considered already in Chapter III on. the 'Image', the
importance of the physical materials the drau.ghtsman works with and
the kind of surface he works on and. we shall be giving further con-
sideration to this during the course of our investigation. As we
have begun to see, these material elements provide the 'givens' which
the draughtsman uses to interrogate the world of his vision. Here is
where the for-itself of the drawing's graphic essence is joined with
the in-itself of the drawing's material existence to promote the meta-
phoric utterance of the drawing's image.
V. 1. 5. Phenomenological importance of the line.
We shall consider the importance, within the whole of this con-
text, of the line. Drawing is an inscription of space, and the line,
through all its passage, is the animation of this spatiality. The
line is, par excellence, the spatial image of all process. Whenever
we think of any kind of movement toward, the first and most readily
available graphic image which transcribes this spatial metaphor is
the line. Movement, rhythm and tension which the line gives to drawing
262
is the tracery of its suspension in time and space. To pursue the
line in all its accents, along all it pathways, is to uncover the
'felicitous' spaces of which Bachelard(l) speaks. He has described
these spaces through the metaphors of poetic language; my task is
to demonstrate that the draughtsman, in the handling of his line,
in all its aspects, can open through this his own graphic metaphor,
similar and new evocative spaces. And why should this not be? It
is first in the image that we grasp the mobility of thi5 spatiality.
Through being made graphic, we reach immediately, without any inhi-
bitory mediation of language, dwelling spaces that remain unique and
are always testimony to this particular mode of transcription and
metamorphosis.
We shall thus pursue the line. We shall pursue it as it marks
out its spaces, its enclosures and its openings. We shall sense it
as it evokes its texturing of dark and light and as it sings its con-
tinuous song of touch.
V. 2. 1. 'Format' of the drawing. Two kinds of implied spatial
directions.
The figure of the line is only such as it also animates the ground
which it traverses. The surface across which it moves and the direc-
tional significance given to it through the verticality and horizon-
tality of the format edges of the sheet are implicit in our reading of
all its spaces. We shall look first, therefore, at these implicit
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supports.
The actual space of the drawing surface and the boundness of
the format edges of the sheet form an integral part of the drawing's
image. The way in which the draughtsman relates his drawing to the
surface format and its boundaries gives us clear access to the direc-
tion of his own spatial enquiry. Any directional significance that
we give to the elements of the drawing will be in relation to the
verticality and horizontality of the sheet. We have become accustomed
to accepting these orientations whenever we look at drawings and they
form a powerful datum in our scanning of them and our entry into them.
All the drawings of our five draughtemen have been made on manufactured
sheets and the format boundaries are used in different ways.
There are perhaps two polar ways of considering the representation
of space in respect of the format. We have come across these to some
extent already. In instances where the format edges are treated as a
frame and where there are clear subdivisions within this frame, the
concentration is on the representation of space as a thing-in-itself.
In this case the frame becomes a boundary, like the open side of a
box which contains all its space. All perspective systems belong to
this mode of space representation and indeed depend on it for their
very functioning. Here the surface of the format is treated very
much like a transparent plane through which we see objects and their
relations. This, as we have seen, is a reading of the space inward
from the boundaries and presents to us a symbolism of the focussed
world, the view of a spectator outside looking in.
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In contrast to this view, the surface, instead of being treated
as the primary plane behind which are ranged all the others, is
treated as an open unspecified area, where the concentration is on
particular graphic forms that evolve their own space and where areas
of the surface are energised and not defined. This is echoed in Claes
Oldenburg's(2) comment when he says:
"It is characteristic of all my drawings that the
paper 'opens up' and that its whiteness ... is re-
garded as an area or space of light and atmosphere,
in which energies, represented by the dot, crystal-
use in forms partially suggested by outline."
(op cit p249).
John White(3), in his book The Birth and Rebirth of Pictorial
Space also discusses these two modalities of space representation.
In many ways, as he points out, each represents different ways of
considering the drawn object. In the first, the consideration is
focussed on the space between objects, positively determined and
represented, from which developed the whole geometric projection of
the perspective system.
He suggests, however, that the second method of space represen-
tation, where the focus is on the drawn object itself and its intrinsic
spatiality, is, in fact, a far older convention, and is seen most
clearly in primitive art. As he points out (op cit p29) it was deve-
loped fully, prior to the Renaissance, by artists like Cirnabue.
This view of the space of the surface as open and unspecified is
characterised by the art of the Far East. Here the surface emphasis
is negative rather than positive. The unmarked silk or paper becomes
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at once the 'atmosphere' where the space is evoked rather than defined.
Henri Foil1on(4) described these two modes of space representa-
tion as l'espace limite, space as limit, and. l'espace milieu, spac.e as
environment. They are, of course, only moments in the history of pre-
senting space graphically and are not mutually exclusive. Aspects of
their methodology are often found together. C(zanne always sought to
reconcile both modalities within a single image. For him, the format
with all the tautness of its two dimensionality, all its planar sig-
nificance, became an invitation to examine the whole possibiliy of
painting. He broke across the endless illusion of l'espace limite
and brought it together with l'espace milieu to create a fresh ordering
of metaphoric space. Here for us is a further indication that depth
cannot be contained. and as soon as one methodology emerges this becomes
the spur for fresh enterprise, because the pursuit of depth is a con-
tinual directional enquiry. The fecund possibility of this search
animates all creative endeavour.
The designation of the format is an important consideration with
all five of our draughtsmen. It is particularly important to David
Cowley and is clearly acknowledged when he says:
"... for a drawing to work, ... it8 got to live within
a kind, of environment and I know that sounds a bit
strange, but you've got to get it somehow to be able
to operate, or work ... live within that kind, of en-
vironment which is both two-dimensional, you can never
get away from the flatness of the paper ... the marks
have got to be both on the surface of the paper but
they have also got to work beyond it and in front of
it, so you are really working within that old conven-
tion of a 'cube' ..."	 (appendix p343).
Here, as he speaks, one senses that for him the format within which he
266
works is also something on which he works. It is for him an arena
for possible action. He describes his active and dynamic relation-
ship with it as he seeks to move beyond. it and in front of it through
the marks he makes. He is continually sensing the space he is
shaping as it rises from the actual surface he is working on. All
the space he shapes is a celebration of all the space that , that
is offered him through his format and beyond. When asked whether he
was affected by the format edges, he agreed that to be bound by them
was a limitation. However, he marked a kind of frame for himself
"four or five inches in from the edge and four or five inches outward".
He wished it were possible "to have such a large piece of paper that
you never really were limiting the edges of this" (appendix p343).
One is reminded how Giacometti would inscribe a linear 'boundary'
within the format edges which in. its relationship with them would
amplify the 'box' of space in which his figures sat. For David Cowley,
the format edges are only a reference; they do not rigidly define the
cube of space he works within, rather they help to determine and es-
tablish the initial scale of the drawing. This is also constantly in
flux as he establishes directions within the format that also seem to
move outside it. However, once the drawing begins to become established,
there is a concentration inward toward the spatiality the figure itself
seems to contain.
Artthxr Di Stephano treats the format very much more freely,
although he recognises its importance. In making his drawing (Figs. 28,
29), he actually moves out of the format into the space beyond it and
then returns to it. In his conversation he says;
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"... because all the figure isn't there, doesn't mean
that its not complete. I think there's more of a
foot that 's not shown than one that is, because one
has to imagine things as well, we're not mindless,
we do organise ... And we organise that which is
not even there, you know, not even on the paper."
(appendix p366).
This movement out from the frame of the format, an encompassing of
the space outside the format, is an invasion of our space and con-
sequently has the effect of pulling us more fully into the space of
the figure. The proximity we thus feel with this figure lends it a
greater degree of intimacy. There is a feeling in his drawings that
this space can be filled and can overflow. As it overflows it reaches
out and draws us into its world, Because the figure he draws fills
the frame, and in some instances overflows it, we feel it as over-
poweringly close, as though we could reach out and touch it. His
drawings become like part of ourselves seen in a mirror held close
to our bodies. This intimacy of spatial concern is a very important
aspect of these drawings.
Wynn Jones also is concerned with exploring this intimacy of
relations. His is the intimacy that rises from the sense we grasp
of the space his figures envelop. He says:
"... once the particular form of the figures are es-
tablished on the paper, they, in a sense, create
their own environment, by that I mean that the sort
of tension that exists in the surrounding space, in
the areas between and around them become as important
as the figures themselves. This has got nothing to
do with 'composition' in the sense of one aspect of
what's going on 'balancing' out another, or anything
like that, but rather with an imaginative grasp of
space growing out of the intuitively felt relationship
within the figurative situation."(appendix p370).
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Here i a clear indication of how one modality of space repre-
sentation is working within the other. As they come together within
this graphic situation, we begin to sense the pulse of the intimacy
of their relations. Here the space of the ground held within the
format becomes the arena for these human dramas to appear. Here
verticality and horizontality, as directions of being, play their
part in the establishing of the felt tensions between these figures.
We shall return to these important considerations more fully later.
Wendy Thompson's drawings are full of the evidence of her working
very much within the frame. Because of this one senses a kind of con-
ceptual distancing of herself from the motif she is drawing from.
There is a sense of intellectual appraisal, very much as though she
is an observer 'looking in' and maintaining an 'objective' position.
Thus she is concerned to register, particularly in (Figs. 65-68) the
fall of the light on the nude giving it a solidity and actuality in
its 'box' of space.
V. 2. 2. Dialectics of 'inside' and 'outside'.
As we speak of the format and the implied notions of the frame,
and the boundary made by its edges, we are inevitably dealing with
the dialectics of inside and outside. Indeed within the whole tenor
of our discussions this dialectic. will be present, for it is impossible
to speak of one aspect of something without bringing it into relief
against another. It is important, however, at the outset of our
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present enquiry that we are mindful of what Bachelard describes
as this 'implicit geometry' (op cit p212). We have begun already
to use terms like open and closed reflected in Poillon's descrip-
tions of l'espace limite and l'espace milieu. We have spoken of
the 'negative' and the 'positive' attributes of the surface, and
of the dialectic of figure and ground. The important issue at stake
is that we do not fall into the trap of too positive a divisionism.
In all the space with which we are concerned it is the movement of
metaphoric space which concerns us. Formal analysis is important
in so far as it offers fresh images, fresh anchorages for thought,
where the graphic image is in a sense given fresh wings as it is
seen within the context of the images rising from our analysis. We
are only caught in the trap of this divisionism when we are blinded
by it. When we allow it to systemtise space. Unless we are careful
we use it to govern all thoughts of positive and negative. But, of
course, as we have discovered, we must move from the lived to the
thought about. It is impossible to be without this implied geometry.
As Bachelard acknowledges:
"Thus profound metaphysics is rooted in an implicit
geometry which - whether we will or no - confers
spatiality upon thought; if a metaphysician could
not draw, what would he think?" (op cit p212).
Thus the space which these drawings are evoking is not the space
of place only. In following the spaces these drawings evoke we, as
it were, are on the point of contact of inside/outside. The spaces
of these drawings reverberate where inside becomes outside, where out-
side becomes insi&e. Every image needs these orientations to become
a synthesis. Thus the format edge is not a barrier, not only a frame,
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it is ackiiowledged as an aspect of the unique space, a moment within
the space which the drawing itself inscribes. Too great a concentra-
tion on one aspect can lose for us the direction of the other.
When we speak of the surface of the format of these drawings it
is not only the physicality of the actual surface; this surface becomes
a field of possibility through which all the action of the drawing is
transposed. But of course, this tensive dialectic of the surface is
indispensable for the image to appear. Indeed the word 'surface' is
• thoroughtly e'ocative, for it becomes the space where being and non-
being coalesce. As Wynn Jones puts it:
"Once I had discovered the kind of surface that I
could work with, the next step was to explore the
power of images and the prophetic reality of space
that were unique to working on that surface."
(appendix p377).
We live these spatial images because they disturb the very equilibrium
of the space of inside and outside. Their presence is testimony that
we are already in movement with them. They are evocative because
they reverberate on the edge of all that is inside and all that is
also outside.
V. 2. 3. 'Surface'and the value of 'white' as ground.
For Arthur Di Stephano the surface of the paper beckons his
activity as a draughtsman. Its very whiteness has a primal essence
which he seeks to preserve throughout the process of his drawing. He
allows its whiteness to speak; it becomes for him a singular value
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which he acknowledges and works with. For David Cowley, however,
the white of the surface is only such as it offers him an occasion
to show the process of his drawing. Thus it becomes scored with
countless marks. It becomes submerged under the onslaught of
myriad strokes of dark. Once established, this matrix becomes in
turn the ground for the white to reappear, through all the erasures
he makes. The white is assaulted, attacked and destroyed, it is wit-
ness to the aggression of the draughtsinan's encounter. David Cowley
works with the surface, very much. as a sculptor with clay. One is
reminded of a draughtsman like Jim Dine who ravishes the surface by
rubbing it, tearing it and sculpting it. So much so, that he has to
have papers specially made for the purpose.
The unmarked whiteness of the sheet is full of evocation. In
whatever way the drau,ghtsman uses it, it is full of the possibility
of daring to go, of the unfettered imagination. Here the divisionism
of inside and outside dissolves, for the white of the ground seems to
be alive with all the pull which for the draughteman is his invitation
to the voyage. Images of touch abound, the dark of the line traversing
in its passage the softness of the white ignites his graphic irnagina-
tion and is the very spur for him to make his drawing. He wants above
all else to see how it will appear.
Our concern is to search the intimacy of these drawings, the
intimate spaces that their figurative elements combine to promote.
In Chapter II we spoke of the expressive potential of the line in
drawing and we shall turn now to a fuller examination of this in
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respect of the drawings before us.
V. 3. 1. Straight and curved orientations of the line.
We have begun to sense already the phenomenological appeal of
the line as a metaphoric utterance for the draughtsman. We have
sensed that through its essential linearity it can carve out and
modulate spaces that, as Merleau-Ponty(5) has so eloquently put it,
rise from a pre-given spatiality (op cit p80). The vary reverberation
of all its image forms is testimony to this. For the draughtemen
there is a world for line a logos of line. In and through the linear
spaces he shapes, he manifests the whole possibility for this pm-
given, this always opening pre-given, this depth to appear. The line
for the draughtsman is graphic testimony of the is of his visual philo-
sophy.
In Chapter II we spoke of the broad difference between linear
directions - of those that were essentially straight and those that
were curved. Of course, straight and curved are only concepts that
describe aspects of the orientation of Being. Once again we must be
careful of the dangers of divisionism, but as directions they do at
least give us a way of ordering the kinds of spatial images which
they promote. It must again be stressed that in talking of these
directions we are talking of their values. As we have seen, a draughts-
man is not measuring without, as though his drawing was so much topology,
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he is reaching within, to that interiority and depth that these
linear manifestations disclose,
We have seen that straightness implies a fixed sense of direc-
tion, a claim to validity, the presentation of an ontology that sug-
gests a system of rules and operations - perhaps also images of
aggression, of hostility and of cold determination. Curved forms
suggest change and. change suggests the proximity of time in space.
The curve is an organic form, fully evocative and suggestive of life
and movement, Worringer(6), in his book Form in Gothic, suggested
that these different linear orientations could form the basis for a
distinction between the Gothic, with its emphasis on the ecstasy of
linear inventiveness through its geometric forms, and the classical,
with its emphasis on the 'natural' expression of mainly curvilinear
forms, For Worringer these distinctions represented two very dif-
ferent modes of Being. In turn, they become for us, anchorages from
which to view the graphic manifestation of the line.
	 ch orienta-
tion is present within the other. A 'straight' line, drawn by the
hand, is full of the minute inflections of change which reflect the
adjustments of the hand to a movement which is not essentially natural
to it.
Of course, for us to enter the graphic world the draughtarnan
makes with his line, we must leave the world of the fixed dialectics
of words. To adventure with the draughtsman, we cannot remain within
the divisionism of straight or curved. To sense their passage we
must move with the images these linear directions carve out for us.
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However, let us pursue these orientations of linear being from
the drawings we have before us. For the phenoinenologist, every
fleeting image, even the image that a word like 'straight' or 'curved'
ignites can be thoroughly productive.
V. 3. 2. The spatiality of the straight line.
In David Cowley's drawing (Figs. 5-17) we see clear demonstration
of how the lines are used to generate a strong directional sense.
Their very straightness reflects the kind of space he is interested.
in disclosing. His space is like the space caught by a grid - full
of interstices which invite our penetration. His drawing is an em-
phatic statement of: 'This goes like this'. It is full of touch marks
that seem to have come from a rehearsal of their directions in the air,
prior to their being registered on the paper - sometimes by the tiniest
whisper. Gradually, toward the central axis and generating core of the
figure, these touch marks coalesce and form a bonded whole (Fig. 16),
that run together in a crescendo of accumulated lines which spiral from
bottom left to top right. The strong directional sense is achieved as
the straightness of the line, acting as a generating axis is given full
rein. Only the parts of the surrounding space - like the divisions in
the screen or the plant (Fig. 9) are used. to reinforce this surging,
uncompromising and very positive movement. So much so, that the head
of the figure becomes engulfed in this surge of direction ad is
grasped only as its skeletal core lends its own dimension to this
uprush of linear direction (Fig. 10). The space is held by webs of
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line, made through constant additions and subtractions (for he uses
the eraser freely) and through tiny adjustments that hold this web
co-ordinated to the format of the drawing itself.
This space is always a constructed space, felt toward from the
first marks of the drawing. Indeed if one looks at the early stages
of the drawing (Figs. 5&6), within the first few minutes the area of
the white is criss-crossed by a constellation of marks - all mostly
straight and made with straight movements of the arm - touches that
mark a fraction of the wider sweep of the hand - and this constella-
tion of marks becomes the matrix in which and through which the sur-
rounding space grows. These initial marks establish the 'going' of
the drawing, the texture of the ground out from which the emerging
figure is shaped and from which the whole drawing speaks.
The drawing is like the crystalline structure of rock - hard
and unyielding, but nonetheless delicately nuanced; very different
from the initial marks of Wendy Thompson's drawing (Fig. 61). David
Cowley's drawing is born out from a kind of ruthlessness, a determi-
nation to aggressively assert that this is how it is. There is
almost an anxious urgency to dominate the space of the white. Wendy
Thompson's initial marks (Figs. 53, 55&61) are like the gentle pro-
bings of an insect's antennae, a hesitant feeling outward - a recep-
tive acknowledgement of the white. David Cowley's drawing is marked
by an uncompromising push, an almost Appollonian rape of the white.
He treats the white very much as an arena in which the go and the no-
go are acted out - physically. This kinetic directness is very strong
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in his drawing, he revels in the drama of the making. He loves this
challenge, he welcomes the savaging of the white, where the half-
erased marks become the whispers of a history of change and counter-
change, the dialectic tissue of the emerging image. Even the marks
made by his erasures are straight (Fig. 7). indeed the erasure lines
form an important aspect of the drawing. Through them, there is a
kind of hollowing out of the space as well as an inscription of it.
The whole movement of the drawing, suggested by all its linear vec-
tors, is an attempt to pierce the shell of the envelope of the mere
physical appearance of things, to reveal their essential inner mobility.
Through this drawing particularly we are dealing with a pheno-
menology of emergence, In describing the drawing, we have begun to
promote what Bachelard calls 'shell' images (op cit p107) - the pic-
ture of something alive within a crystalline structure; a crystalline
structure that is not built from the outside inwards but spiralled
from the inside outwards. But there is here a dialectic tension.
In describing the living creature within this shell, Bachelard says:
"And since it does not come out entirely, the part
that comes out contradicts the part that remains
inside. The creatures rear parts remain imprisoned
in the solid geometrical forms." (op cit p108).
How clear a picture this is of the metaphoric tension that keeps alive
all graphic images David Cowley's drawing echoes with all these
mobile images of the shell. Its crystalline aggressiveness yields
to the sensitivity within, yet not entirely, for this emerging inner
core is caught and held by the supporting matrix of its 'geometric'
forms,
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It is not until quite late on in the process of the drawing
(Fig. 9) that this evolving inner core takes on the significance of
a 'figure' - we sense the disposition of the nude, emerging from its
surrounding space. In a very real sense, the 'habitation' for this
notional figure is built first from all the tissue of lines already
laid down. The emergence is affected by erasures (Fig. 6, frames
ilk, 12A, l3) particularly (l6A). But no sooner are the erasures
made then, as in (frame 19k) they are crossed. Thus the space of
the 'figure' is won against the ground, then subsequently lost. In
(Fig. 8, frame 29k) the erasures take on the significance of white
lines on black - a kind of reversal of the initial marks of the
drawing. There is, as it were, another drawing going on within the
first. A counter movement of straight linear marks made by the sweep
of the eraser appears over the first • This has the effect of achiev-
ing another level or value of white and begins ta open up the space
of the first marks. This counter change creates its own constella-
tion through which we sense the marks underneath.
In (Fig. 8, frame 37k) the long sweep of the line from top right
to centre bottom is interrupted by a cross-hatching of erased marks
that throws us back into the matrix of the central forms. This central
area becomes filled with a terrific concentration of energy as the
latter frames testify (Figs. 15 &16). Furthermore, the whole direc-
tional axis of this central area is oblique. As Arnheim(7) has pointed
out, perceptually this is one of the most powerful (because unstable)
of visual forces when placed within a rectilinear format. There is
a strong sense that the movement generated by the drawing in some way
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comeB from outside the format, enters at lower left and spirals and
twists its way outward toward the top right (see appendix p351).
One feels that so powerful is thia movement that even the marks and.
traces outside it are drawn toward it through its energy. The verti-
cality and horizontality of the sheet are also powerful moments within
this movement which we acknowledge.
Characteristically, Bachelard also does not miss these primal
orientations and directions of being, when, in his description of
the 'house' image, he draws attention to the space of forms that rise,
that rise from cellar to attic (op cit p17). To Bachelard, forms
that rise evoke a space that is toward dreams. For, as he points
out, the attic is the space where we dream, we rise to be part of
that space, we feel the lift of our feet on the stairs (op cit p26).
The motif of rising, with its attendant cadence of falling, as we
have seen from Langer(8), powerfully reflects all our rhythmic inter-
change with the world. There is a sense in David Cowley's drawing
that it, too, builds as it goes. His drawing energises our conscious-
ness of dy-nainic verticality and also, through its concatenated concen-
tration, our consciousness of centrality. Both underpin and inter-
penetrate the whole movement of its graphic significance.
As we come to inhabit the intimate spaces of David Cowley's
drawing, through all its linear directness, we begin to enter and
resonate with these spatial orientations. There is a rising in his
drawing which is also a gathering of concentrated energy. There is
a reach that is both upward and inward. He reaches inward through
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the multiplying of all the marks that track hi passage to the core.
Indeed every form 18 treated as though it were the inside which
mattered, Thus the darks in his drawing take on an energy which
magnetises all the concentration of the search. Their density might
be at the expense of clarity. However, the process photographs cannot
show, and herein lies their limitation, the subtle nuancing present in
the original drawing. The darks seem to brood. This singular spatial
value of the darks in drawing we shall return to.
V. 3. 3. The spatiality of the curve.
If the spatiality of David Cowley's drawing promotes images of
domination and of aggression, eliks Topoiski's drawings evoke very
different spaces. The spatiality of David Cowley's drawing rises
from the way he uses the line as an axis, probing the essential direc-
tions of the forms. With Feliks Topoiski it is very different. He
uses a flowing curvilinear calligraphy to unite and promote their
interpenetrations. David Cowley's line suggests a kind of conceptual
'distance' from the space he is working within. Feliks Topolski's
lines are full of images of passivity and acceptance, of intimacy and
proximity. He says in conversation:
"I am after really being responsive to the atmosphere
and, putting it roughly, to action, to movement and
to character of things. And so to speak, in the
round - scanning the whole circle of vision, not just
the cut-out slice in front of me, but immersing my-
self."	 (appendix p388).
Here the contrast to David Cowley's idea of the 'cube of space'
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is immediately apparent and their drawings demonstrate these different
spatial concerns. Feliks Topoiski's drawings are full of the restless
sweep of his vision. The scrambled scribble of his lines suggests a
total immersion within the activity of seeing. His drawing point, one
senses,is always very close to the drawing surface; one feels his eye
is right at the point where the trace is made (Fig. 94). Here there
are no previous rehearsals. The traversing of his eye as it interro-
gates the nooks and crannies of the face (Figs. 70,71) and (Figs. 72,
73) leaves its track on the paper. Indeed, unlike David Cowley's
drawing, his drawings reflect the absence of conscious deliberation.
They are indeed very like 'automatic' drawings. As he suggests:
"I'm receptive and I work, let's use a simple and
innocent word 'seismographically', in other words,
I react to the rhythm and. motions and clashes of
living. So the result is unpredictable and I watch
it forming on the page with some surprise and it is
sometimes as puzzling to me as it may be to anybody
or as the reality itself may be." (appendix pp388/
389).
Now this state of being receptive, of 'letting be', so character-
istic of the Taoist philosophy of the draughtsmen of the Far East, is
something Arthur Di Stephano also shares. For him too, what is impor-
tant in drawing is to be "the heart that beats with the world" where
there is no 'distancing' no 'interruption' between the draughtsman,
the world of his drawing and the world of his Being (appendix p364).
Both draughtsmen use the line in a calligraphic sense; their line
writes the whole interplay and interprenetration of the forms as it
goes. The essence of this kind of line is its curvilinear transition.
Rawson(9) puts it clearly when he says:
"Curves make temporal transitions visible as process;
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so that art which uses virtually nothing but curvi-
linear transitions is really expressing an ontology
which views reality as fluid anti constantly changing,
without true static forms." (op cit p91).
The curve is the most natural and direct mark made by the moving
hand. Within it graphic presentation, the spatiality of our body
can find an immediate visual anchorage. This is why the curve seems
to invite our participation. For Bachelard, the curve "incites us to
possession, it is ... inhabited geometry t' (op cit p146). But of course,
Feliks Topoiski's drawings, altlough basically cast in this direction,
are made up from many complex and interrelated curvilinear forms. The
expressive quality of the movement of such linear directions depends
greatly on our being able to sense where one transition begins and
the other ends. (Fig. 77) is full of these transitions. Indeed the
'pick up' from one rhythmic transition to the next, which almost as it
were 'prepares' it, is vital to sensing the overall tension and whole
internal logic of the drawing. Thus the sequences, repetitious and
opposed curves which initially were made as united groupings, for
example in (Fig. 77) - over the shoulder of the kneeling priest and.
then up into the robes of the Pope - must not be missed if we are to
appreciate fully the meaning of the drawing. And, of course, in
following these transitions we come to sense the draughtman's scanning
patterns, which gives us so directly an entry into his way of seeing.
The vitality and tension which these transitions set up is funda-
mental to the whole vigour of the drawing. In an interesting analysis,
Rawson makes the point that the curve derives its implicit tension
because of its underlying tendency to resolve itself, to achieve a
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stability (op cit p91). The most stable and static forms is the
straight line, for its very straightness is an indication that it
shows no tendency for deviation. Hence the powerful datwn, as we
have seen, of the verticality and horizontality of the format. It
Is against these stable orientations that the curving line with all
its inflections achieves its expressive potential. Thus curves
derive their tension and. their springing because they traverse a
path which is essentially a deviation and we register all deviation
as change. All deviation is a mark of the presence of time in space.
Deviation is space temporalised. Furthermore, there is a quantum of
direction implicit in all curves. The geometric projection of a semi-
circle, for example, is always uncomfortable in a drawing, for it
only belongs to that geometric and diagrammatic representation that
has no cross-reference in its inflection. It is always only a des-
cription of its own circularity. Thus much of the tension and
vitality of the curved stroke when drawn, that is, when not projected
mechanically, is that it is made up of an infinite variety of straight
inflections which are making relations, not only along the length of
the curve, but to other co-ordinates across its line of direction.
It is these subtle deviations within the curve which give to it its
expressive value. The pure geometry of the circle, with the loci of
all the points of its circumference based on its own centre, is always
complete in itself and. returns to itself. The loci of points along a
curve that is drawn is based on a quantum of points that are directed
not only to the curve but to the value of the space it subtends -
thus the curve drawn by Feliks Topolski or Arthur Di Stephano Is full
of the harmonies, which a note played on a musical instrument has, as
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opposed to the 'pure' note of a computer synthesiser. These subtle
and minute inflections make up relations across, as well as with,
the directions of the curve's passage and, as it were, constitute the
polyphony of related directions which gives the passage of the curve
a plenitude, a richness of expressive possibility.
Now to achieve this expressive sense in one line is immensely
difficult. This full spatiality which a single line might promote,
is what the Japanese draughtsmen seek to achieve in the linear style
known as Ukiyo - e. The great linear draughtsmen. of the West, like
Ltatisse arid Picasso, also valued the visual economy of the line when
used in this way. One of the profoundest values this kind of drawing
promotes is the immediate tension it sets up between itself, as linear
vector incorporating all the diacritical values we have been discussing,
and the surface two-diinensionality of the format.
This intrinsic value of the line is what Arthur Di Stephano is
seeking to achieve constantly, as it were, in one movement of the
drawing which, for him, will bring together the 'moment' of the
drawing. This presence of the drawing is an extraordinary quality of
wholeness, when every inflection of the line with all its attendant
harmonies comes together. In Beckman's(lO) terms the image, through
the means of the drawing, seems to bear a "transcendental arithmetic
progression of the inner being" (op cit p134). In this instance, the
line is not so much describing reality as singing it.
Perhaps one of the clearest examples of what I mean can be seen
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in Arthur Di Stephano's drawing (Fig. 33). The line, gathered in
short knots at the top of the head, runs down into the model's leg
on the left hand side. A5 he moves into the leg he picks up the
drawing of her hand. The drawing point returns to the watershed of
lines which make up the model's hair and then traverses the fullness
of her back, is arrested by the folds in her coat, explores the upper
part of her arm and then moves down into the hand which supports the
weight of her body as it rests flat on the plane of the floor. Even
the drawing of her thigh as it moves out of the format is seen first
through the clarification of the form of her foot as it is tucked
underneath her. One senses here that his line gently caresses the
contours of all the forms he sees and through its singular value of
continuity, shapes all the fluidity of the emerging forms.
This way of drawing means that, for Arthur Di Stephano, there
is no going back. He places the full significance of bringing these
forms together within the inscription of the single flowing line.
Indeed, when he did try to make a drawing where there were multiple
readjustments on the page, the drawing was a disaster - as he recog-
nised (Figs. 20-24). He points outs
"... there's no room for reassessment because the
first assessment has to be the right one and some-
times it works and sometimes, more often than not,
it does not." (appendix p358).
Arthur Di Stephano values this aspect of the primacy of the line.
The line, for him, is in this sense fully evocative. He says:
".,. there's no fudging - you can't conceal anything,
the line is self-explanatory in that sense, it tells
you about how your hand was at that time." (appendix
p 360)
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and again the line:
".., can never be as the world is. But one can
assimilate how the world is, in the way you make
it." (appendix p360).
And he uses the line, not in the sense of a co-ordinate in space, as
a device for mapping out space, but as a means to evoke the 'fluidity'
of space, "... well,we move through its" (appendix p362). For him
the line ... must correspond to how we live in the world ourselves"
(appendix p362).
Thus his visual philosophy is one of using the whole linear
deliverance of his drawing to suggest a continuous present. David
Cowley, onihe other hand, is interested in this present seen through
the history of the process of change. Arthur Di Stephano feels he
does not want to 'interrupt' the condition of the 'beingness' of his
drawing. In his conversation he reads a quote from Simone Well and
suggests that this is how he wishes to be as he draws:
9iay I disappear in order that those things that I
see may become perfect in their beauty from the very
fact that they are no longer things that I see."
(appendix p364).
He uses the efficacy of the line's continuous passage across the white
of the ground. Its going magnetises all its spaces and for him this
primal orientation of the line is crucially important.
V. 3. 4. The phenomenology of 'contour'.
Any description we may make of the line, throughout our analysis,
whether straight or curved, outline or contour, heavy or alight, light
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or dark, is always a description not so much of what the line is,
as a description of what the line does.
In whatever way we might use the conceptual labels of language
to pin the line down, as it were, it always resists such analysis,
it is always on the move, always seeking to move away from itself
to the spatiality it is transcribing. The reason is clear: for the
line to be line, it must already be at work; it must, as we have seen
from Merleau-Ponty, already suggest a spatiality that allows it to
appear as line at all.
It may pay us for a moment, particularly with reference to
Arthur Di Stephano's drawings, to look at the phenomenological dis-
tinction between 'outline' and 'contour'. We have considered to some
extent these distinctions in our discussion of Woliheim's arguments
in our chapter on Representation. At bottom, all lines are 'separa-
tors'. Depending on their context, we read thetn as either enclosing
a 'positive' body, or magnetising an open 'negative' space. We have
already acknowledged the problems that this divisionism brings. In
a sense of course, this implied geometry is bound to follow all the
steps of our consideration. It is useful only if it does not blind
us into constructing a contrived spatiality from these dimensions.
Each is, as we have seen, an indication to us of the orientation of
Being rather than a description of Being. Too much concentration,
for example, on the figure the line encloses, destroys the signifi-
cance of the spatiality it rises from. It is always uncomfortable,
when talking of the linear deliverance of a drawing, to describe it
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as so much outline. To speak of it as 'contour' seems to offer us
a wider imaginative engagement. The reasons are not hard to find..
In a sense, each describes what the other is not. 'Outline' serves
a phenomenological function in modalities of eometric space, of the
space of conceptual systems, space rationalised. It suggests a
marking out; contour suggests a marking within. We can never escape,
even here, the inherent geometrism of the word. Words betray the
direction of their limited intentions. However, when I use the word
outline, I mean a description of the line's function in a particular
sense, a sense which really allows for it within a system of limited
possibilities - like geometry. In using the word contour, I am
seeking to describe the line's function that goes beyond. the limita-
tion of a system, to embrace the possibility of a spatiality that is
not bound by the implied dimensions of height and width and breadth.
Contour is a word, which,for my purpose, promotes a spatiality which
is not divided and resists demarcation. It is evocative of thought
and rethought, evocative of the very movement of Being.
Of course, these irtherent dialectics, this Janus face of dualism,
not only founds the whole of philosophic discourse, it founds the
whole possibility of drawing. When we draw, we draw out, we come out,
we betray this essential reciprocity of Being. Drawing is a philoso-
phic enterprise, for in itself, it asks questions, it is a coming out
in order to be, to raise the very possibility of being not. No sooner
ha the drawing spoken than it continues to speak through the reverber-
ation of all its possibilities. This is why each of these designations
of the line's spatiality is a description also of what each is not.
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How cryptically Bachelard(l) puts it, when in quoting Pierre-Jean
Jouve he says:
"For we are where we are not" (op cit p211).
Drawing is full of the texturing of touch, and one resists, in
the light of this description, the finality of the spatiality of
outline. The draughtsman is finding his way, probing with his line
the directional possibilities of the forms he is making. Hi aware-
ness, as he draws, extends to the spatiality he is shaping 'outside'
the form he is making, as much as the spatiality 'within' it. Visual
form in drawing, and this inclu1es all the rhythmic phiasing of the
line, will always resist the reduction of verbal philosophisin.g.
Bachelard often imagines that words are like 'little houses':
"... each with its cellar and garret. Common-sense
lives on the ground floor, always ready to engage
in 'foreign commerce', on the same level as the
others, as the passers-by, who are never dreamers."
(ibid p147)
and later he says:
"To mount and descend in words themselves - this is
a poet's life. To mount too high or descend too low,
is allowed in the case of poets, who bring earth and.
sky together. Must the philosopher alone be con-
demned by his peers always to live on the ground
floor?" (ibid p147).
Well, if words are like houses, so are lines. They have a beyond,
they have an 'attic' as well as a 'cellar' and this is the spatiality
the draughtsman explores.
There is a further important consideration. The meaning of such
linear figuration is not accessible only as it delivers a kinetic
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sense, only as it is seen as the incarnation of gesture. We under-
stand the significance of the line's passage as this is also clari-
fied through the notional realities it might describe. These may be
parts of the body, like hands or feet. They may be descriptions of
hair, or the folds of a coat. For example, for us to sense the full
significance of Wynn Jones's drawings (Figs. 36-47), it is important
that we recognise these forms as human; that we recognise the twisted
anxiety of their hands and the strange perfunctoriness of their faces
pulled from all the ways he uses the contour as a shaped edge.
V. 4. 1. Rhythmic phrasing of the line.
Thus for the purpose of our analysis we may point to these topo-
logical aspects of the line. However, in search of these directions
we are bound to be caught within the whole spatial network that each
of these aspects promotes. This is also the draughteman's concern.
He seeks to make more by handling less, as Ricoeur(ll) says. Be recog-
nises the implied limitation of his graphic conventions, but through
it all there is a progressive visual logic that engages him. He
achieves this progression as he orders his space through all the
rhythmic phrasing of his forms. There is a logic within this pro-
gression which is something far more than a simple repetition of
identical units. It suggests all the cadential push and pull, all
the adventuring to go which makes up the whole enterprise of his acti-
vity, all the directional enquiry of his search.
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We shall see how this works through the drawings before us.
It can be sensed, of course, within a finished drawing, and indeed
this organic wholeness which a drawing achieves is testimony to all
the movement of its inherent rhythms. It is, however, through the
process photographs that one catches aspects of this progression laid
out in time. This is the value of such sequential images.
The rhythm within a drawing can be sensed through all the variety
of ways that the draughtsman phrases and groups his forms across the
format of the drawing surface. This phrasing is crucially important,
for through it we follow the development and unfolding of the drawing's
inherent spatiality. This is achieved, not so much through a conscious
deliberation on the draughtsman's part, but rather it develops from the
fluency of his own graphic habits. Each draughtsman develops graphic
notations which we recognise as being aspects of his or her personal
'handwriting'. For example, David Cowley's graphic identifying mark
is the cluster of small pulled straight strokes that run in parallel
sequences. In Arthur Di Stephano's drawings it is made from a longer
flexing line that seems to be put together with a studied deliberation.
In Feliks Topolski's drawings, it is made from the twisted scribble
line, often found in parallel groupings - an informal flurry. Wynn
Jones's would perhaps be the taut binding line that draws into its
path textured darks, soft and sometimes brittle. Wendy Thompson's
graphic motif is perhaps characterised by the small pulled broad
mark elaborated by a cluster of cross-hatched lines.
Even within these personal motifs which one can in a sense
291
identify, there are a multiplicity of tinier forms, of vector traces,
of whispered marks, that make up the tissue and texture of the draughts-
man's graphic repertoire. In all of this, one has to point to the
generalities or forms that one can recognise, and from this one accepts
the whole quanta of their interrelationships which in the end make up
their graphic expressiveness, However, Beckman has used the term
'arithmetic progression' (op cit p134) which does indicate that there
is a kind of 'logic' which these interrelated graphic elements betray.
He also, of course, has used the word 'transcendental', and this is
always the indication that, although we may examine the 'instants' of
this progression, it still is the passage of the progression which
promotes the whole ontological status of these visual forms,
Thus when we talk of rhythmic phrasing, it is because we sense
the way the draught sman has used his personal repertoire of graphic
motifs, the way he has grouped them, and also through them, the way
he has achieved graphic invention through the variety of their inter-
relationships, The important thing about the phrasing of these indi-
vidual graphic motifs is that there is a visual logic within their
connectiveness - that is a sequence where each part is seen to bear
a rhythmic relation to the whole and although seen to be part of the
whole, is indivisible from it. In music for example, a composer might
have a particular grouping of notes which we recognise as being his
musical hallmark. On their own they are relatively meaningless, but
when set within the context of the progression of his musical idea, we
recognise them and assimilate their musical meaning into the whole of
its matrix.
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In graphic terms it has to do with how the draught sman finds
his own mean8, developed over the history of making many drawings,
to establish and clarify his visual idea. And of course this will
involve, in an inventive draughtsman, modifications he makes to his
basic graphic motifs as he goes. This promotes the whole progression
of his continuing search, and this is how he develops pathways to
fresh images. If we catch this graphic inventiveness through his
forms, we begin to sense the spatiality of his drawings can take on
an expressive depth. The later drawings of Rembrandt, for example,
are full of this maturation; his marks seem to contain a directness,
a simplicity, an economy, a confidence and a synthesis that has arisen
from all the years of experience of making graphic his vision.
Let us examine how this phrasing works by looking at some of
Wendy Thompson's drawings. In her drawing (Fig. 50) we see her begin
by establishing a rapid placing through a feint linear contour of the
relationship of the model and the stool. She then begins to make
tiny groups of marks along this feint structural filament of line.
These she makes from the top downward. The progress of the drawing
continues downward through further groupings of darks that begin to
set up their own rhythmic relationship. She then moves back to the
top of the drawing making further developments to the form along
directions she has previously established. The effect of these group-
ings gives us a sense of the plasticity of the model on the stool,
but also develops across the surface of the drawing a rhythmic sequence
of darks on light. The darks are made with short 'pulls' of the pencil
from right to left and slightly downward. This has the effect, as it
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finds it repetition through the other darks, of pulling together
the surface unity of the drawing. Sometimes, as in (Figs. 49 & 51)
she changes the way she holds the pencil; this makes a broader mark
which is opposed to the tauter mark made by the finer line. In
(Fig. 53) she traverses the white very quickly by drawing lines that
are full of the pressures of the hand holding the pencil on its edge.
She registers this graphic motif in this way because she finds that
in looking at the model and stool in front of her, she saw opportun-
ities to employ this device. She notices the upright edge of the
stool very early on in the drawing and this edge becomes the spring-
board for the gentler lines of the model to 'float' from it.
These rapid drawings (Figs. 49, 50, 51, 52, 53),each taking only
about ten minutes, are full of the varying pressures of touch. The
lines are phrased in passages of light and dark that register the
pressure of the pencil held not only on its point but also on its
edge. They are also made with a continuous movement that gives one
the sense that the pencil is never far from the surface. These move-
ments are mostly convex, that is, they record the fullness of the
form of the model she is drawing from. This convexity of the line
is a further indication of how she shapes the notional figure from
its ground.
Where the line breaks is also important, for this represents a
fresh act of conceptualisation on the draughtsman's part. In Felilç's
Topolski's drawings, the breaks occur in a trajectory which almost
indicates a continuous movement (Fig. 76). However, these interruptions
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in the passage of the line mark where the draughtaman has sensed new
directions. Read together, these punctuations reflect the rhythmic
movement of his imagination and testify to the opening spatiality of
his graphic interest and intent.
We have sensed this already in David Cowley's drawing. Here
the phrasing is achieved right across the format, from the very first
marks. Indeed these small clusters of marks present fresh acts of
seeing and they build not only from what he is working from, in terms
of the motif of the model, but also what is being evoked from within
the drawing itself.
This rhythmic phrasing of the line is crucially important in
Wynn Jones's drawings too. Here particularly the line is phrased
not only along the whole of its length, but also as it comes together
to form a catena of enclosures. In this case it functions to provide
an existential value to the spaces it surrounds. In his drawing 'An
Anxious Time' (Fig. 42) for example, there is a dark cavernous open-
mouthed void toward which the figure on the left is being irresistibly
drawn. This is achieved through the reciprocity of the two convex
linear movements between the figure and the cave, which makes the
space between a kind of magnet that joins them but also keeps them
apart. Any closer and the figure would be too near. Further away
and the tension would cease to exist. His drawings are full of this
concave/convex tension between the forms where, when the feeling
suggests, as in 'Sacrifice' (Fig. 36), the convex form of the one
offering is received into the concave form of the one receiving. These
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tensive distances promote a haunting spatiality in his drawings.
The line wraps and envelopes the forms, we discern the shapes of
hands or feet, or strangely compressed bodies and paper bag heads.
This binding line gives the forms an insubstantiality - as though
in dreams - for its continousness has the effect of fastening them
to the flatness of the paper. Almost any drawing suffices as an
example but particularly (Fig. 47).
It is through the way these draughtsmen phrase their graphic
motifs that we begin to sense the kind of spatiality which interests
them. The rhythmic phrasing of drawn forms is full of the images of
touch, a distillation of seeing. Thus the contour may be made up of
short broken lines, where its direction is achieved through myriad
touch marks. Wendy Thompson's drawing (Figs. 55-58) is such an
example. This phrasing has much to do with the whole reciprocal dia-
lectic of drawing. It is a constant search, a constant research into
where this line should be, for where this line is made and remade is
where the space of the drawing is born. This statement of the where
is not made for the satisfaction of the casual spectator, it is made
for the draughtsman who is seeking to satisfy himself that he knows.
Drawing from a model for example, is drawing from a model who is
always moving, or if not, the draughtsman's gaze is always moving.
Thus the draughteman seeks as he makes his distillation, to pin down,
to make a fixation through his line, of where precisely the form of
the model's head or her arm or her leg turns in space. He seeks to
catch this deviation which he has seen, and to catch it within all
the movement of his searching gaze across these forms. And this
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movement of his gaze is caught as he phrases his line • Each mark
he makes is a punctuation of the spatiality he is reaching toward.
A fresh glance registers a fresh act of seeing, and. this has also
its cadence in the mark he makes on the paper. So the phrasing of
these grouped marks, these interrelated traces becomes an indication
of his active search to find precisely where this form is in its
space. It is moreover a search for the whole of the space which is
now beginning to reverberate as fresh distillations are made. So
the phrasing and grouping of these tiny marks along the directions
of the line, these inflections, as in Arthur Di Stephano's drawings,
or across the line's vector, as in David Cowley's drawing are all
attempts to make visible this process of interrogation. The restated
contour is a comment on this active engagement in vision.
Feliks Topoiski's drawings offer good examples, particularly
(Fig. 82) where the whole head of the Pope is made from a continuous
swirl of lines, full of all the rhythmic sense we have been talking
about. Another good example is (Fig. 70) which resonates with re-
statements. Each lift of the charcoal registering a fresh act of
sensing and of probing. Other examples are (Fig. 71), (Fig. 72),
(Fig. 73) and (Fig. 74).
Wendy Thompson's line, particularly in her two sustained drawings
(Figs. 55-58 and Figs. 61-68), is short-breathed, hesitant - a probing
touch. These phrase marks are those of the sculptor who is passionately
concerned about the way surfaces turn and change. So the line is like
the trace of her fingers registering the subtle nuance of the fall of
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light on the model. Thus the rhythms are not only along the direction
of the line, but across it and away from it toward the surface spatia-
lity and interiority this tissue of lines seeks to evoke. This kind
of drawing, through all the intimacy of its touch marks, is a graphic
way of indicating the need to feel the surface of the object suffused
by its surrounding space. Thus the lines that are drawn might not
correspond directly to the turn of the edge of the object under the
draughtsman's gaze, but might be a way of indicating the fall of light
on its surface and, in David Cowley's case, its underlying structural
habit. The very hesitancy of these linear staccato phrases indicates
a deliberation, a consciousness of concentrated change and counter-
change. Not for Wendy Thompson the fluent calligraphic gestural line
which writes with such bravura the graphic forms of Feliks Topoiski -
she speaks with a quieter voice, a sensitive, acutely conscious search,
which accumulates by touch, demonstrating how these forms dwell in
their space. In her drawing (Figs. 61-68) we can see this in process.
The early stages of the drawing (Fig. 61), (Fig.62) shows clearly
this accretion of forms through minute additions. Indeed it is very
difficult to sense much 'outline' in these early inakrs, she moves
very quickly (Fig. 61) to register the centre of the forms, building
the whole movement of the model and stool together. Her marks are
like impressions in clay, they are a graphic celebration of the	 -
suousness of touch, The dark accents that run up through the centre
of the drawing, even at these early stages, are like the core of an
apple, whose flesh is built outward into all its spaces.
One is reminded, throughout all these intimate graphic images of
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touch, of Bachelard's descriptions of the nest, built from the con-
stant, minute and gentle pressures of the bird's breast forming a
circle round itself from inside (op cit p101). This is the spatia-
lity of Wendy Thompson's drawings. If Feliks Topoiski's line registers
the passage of the bird's flight, Wendy Thompson's whispered marks
register its habitation.
Our reading of the way one line springs from another, our reading
of the breaks in the line's movement, of the surges and hesitations of
the line's path, promotes our sense of the internal logic of the draw-
ing's spatiality. The reading of this complexity is our entry into
the depth of the drawing's 'world' and our pathway to its exploration.
Furthermore, and this is where the process photographs are useful, we
sense in the scanning of all these rhythms the history of the draughts-
man's engaged activity of looking; we sense the whole process of his
search.
A drawing which can give us a sense of tIis history is one where
its 'leading lines' are not obliterated by subsequent ones which com-
promise these first fresh graphic manifestations of the draughtsman's
initial engagement with his motif. In looking at the sequence draw-
ings of Arthur Di Stephano, there is a clear sense that his lines are
phrased from groupings which begin from around the head of the model.
He recognises this in the conversation (appendix p 363). This cluster
of grouped lines form a watershed from which the rest of the linear
structure is developed. (Fig. 26) and (Fig. 27) are good examples.
Indeed, one sensesthe 'pull' of these lines downward and the fall of
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this linear directions gives a sense of the weight of the model's
limbs.
In (Fig. 28) the line of the inside of the coat is drawn down-
ward from the chin and across the looped fullness of the breasts.
Here he pauses and goes back up toward the left shoulder of the model
picking up the contour of her arm and finding as he draws it, the
springing point for the emergence of her thigh. He then moves across
to the right hand side of the drawing, finding the thigh again and
makes two lines (he discovers the lower one is better placed). In
following the movement of the legs tucked underneath the model, he
resolves the shaped weight of one hand over the other which rests
on the leg. Here, we do not refer simply to the 'stages' in the pro-
cess of the drawing, we grasp the logic of this linear sequence as
it is caught within all the graphic fluency of the drawing itself.
Moreover, this sequence builds up an evocative chain of images which
together fill out and give a plenitude to the drawing. Herein lies
the presence of the drawing and herein lies its world. Where one
line breaks and another begins, where one line curves in the fullness
of its convexity promoting the echo of its concavity, this is not
arbitary. As Ruskin(l2) says, when we sense this rhythmic continuity,
it is evidence of the draughtsman "knowing the way things are going".
These continuities evoke a spatiality that is never static, but always
on the move.
In Feliks Topoiski's drawings, one senses this directly. In
(Fig. 71) we can follow his eye as it has searched the form of the
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head. He began on the left hand side of the head, fir8t making the
mark from temple to cheek, pausing because there was a definite
change in contour, which he picks up with a tiny inflected mark,
waking two subsequent marks for the chin. He moves to the right of
the chin and up the right hand side of the face, pushing the charcoal
against the natural pull of his hand. In doing so, his eye is search-
ing the form ahead and he makes the connections by pulling short
strokes downward. Now we sense, through these tiny inflections, the
convex and concave twists of the charcoal, the wresting of figure
from ground as he searches the living space of this emerging form.
This arises because the marks are so truncated, they are made so
rapidly, that they echo in their tiny fragments what we subsequently
grasp as the nose or the furrowed brow, or the creased chin. The
whole space of this head is built in a revolving spiralling activity
from the left hand side downward, then from the right hand side up-
ward to the crown. Having come back to his starting point he con-
timies the circular activity of his look, as it spirals downward to
the left eyebrow, then twists to the bridge of the nose, down its
contour and across to the cheekbones. All the time the line is dancing,
in short bursts that hardly touch the form, but where they touch they
register the form. It is as though we were picking up the form through
all the amplitude of what is
	 said, for what is said is sufficient
to indicate all the going of these forms. His short linear bursts
are where his eye has touched the play of light and dark on the form,
where he has sensed the turn of the form on its edge. loreover, the
sense of the space across, within and through the head, rises through
all the continuity of his looking. This is why the lines have a logic
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of sequence, their breathless urgency is marked through their brevity.
We are reading the animation of this head's spatiality. It is neither
'here' nor 'there'. It is caught in that tension between all its
'heres' and 'theres'. The vector of each tiny line and all its
'going' is projected and anticipated through the way the receiving
line picks up this implied direction. This lends the drawing its
fluid sense of space. The head is disclosed through all the spatial
evocation these tiny vectors give us.
V. 4. 2. Individual graphic habits of the draughtsman.
Through the way the draughtsman develops the rhyibms of these
sequences, lies all the visual logic and ordering of his drawing.
Each draughtsrnan develops his particular and characteristic range
of marks, his nuclear graphic forms and these, of course, give the
drawing its individual graphic style. As the draughtsman begins to
discover these forms, they become for him his graphic habit. He
comes to use these forms to direct his seeing, because in an impor-
tant sense, his seeing dwells in them. The habit of his looking will
rise from the habit of his drawing. Moreover, they energise his
search, for they are implicit in the motifs he draws from. For example,
the flowing folds of a robe will give Feliks Topoiski a visual ancho-
rage for employing his characteristic calligraphic style. Examples
abound in his drawings but (Fig. 75), (Fig. 76) and (Fig. 79) are
particularly useful. This interdependence he acknowledges when he
says:
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"So my starting point is predominantly amassed
humanity in movements and conflicts, but as gathered
human beings with characteristics of shape, of cos-
tume or whatever; but I am not documenting it, I am
leaping off that, bouncing off that into the realm
of linear creation." (appendix p 389).
And Arthur Di Stephano also acknowledges the importance for him
of working from the model:
"... I want to know how she sits in one particular
day - how her arm8 interlock with her head ...'
arid
"I have to find, as Matisse stated, the 'individual
rhythm' which is in every face, and this is distin-
guished by the contrast existing between the face of
the model and all other faces ... What I was saying
about Matisse is that he worke& from her ... she was
there and she was not there at the same time. It's
that thin line again that I'm talking about.t'
and finally,
"One needs the physicality of the presence of her
there, one doesn't mean you're a slave to that at
all."	 (appendix p361 ).
Thus these motifs feed. the drawing quite as much as the drawing
feeds these motifs. In drawing from the draughtsman is also drawing
toward. The motif the draughtsman works from becomes charged with
fresh possibilities as these are in turn funded by the graphic formu-
lations, the graphic sequences the draughtsrnan builds within his
drawing. This is, of course, how the spatiality of objects in the
world takes on, for the draughtsman, an interiority - an interiority
that springs from the inventiveness of his own emerging graphic forms.
His seeing is directed very specifically throui them.
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There is in all this a sense of development, a sense in which
the draughteman moves through his fixations toward a resolution.
But of course, he never resolves completely and this funds the whole
of his activity. Graphic innovation is only such as the draughtsman
discovers the graphic possibilities in the marks he makes, within
the context and boundness of his drawing. In a sense, we can only
talk of graphic innovation and. visual suggestiveness as this bound-
ness is realised. The logic of any sequence of development implicitly
acknowledges this bounded context. Forms do not evolve arbitarily,
they are held together as one recognises the context in which they
function as forms, Thus within any range of graphic marks there is
a kind of quantum, recognised but never defineable, an area around
which the richness and inventiveness of these marks can be employed.
Thus the expressiveness of the range is characterised by how far the
draughtsinan explores this area of possibility, rather how far he is
able to suggest it. Rerein lies the importance of the visual
ambiguity of the drawing. This is where the drawing, through all
the quanta of its linked nuclear forms can become, as Merleau-Ponty
(13) says, 'coherent deformation'; can promote, in Ricoeur's terms
'a surplus of meaning' (op cit p45). The richness of this visual
ambiguity rises as the draughtsman acknowledges that through the very
limitations of his means, through his 'handling less', as Ricoeur
says, he can reach toward the disclosure of the 'more' (ibid p40).
Herein lies the whole efficacy of drawing. Its very 'iconic auginen-
tation' (ibid p40) is testimony that the draughtsman is finding his
way toward the possibility of condensing his vision around the graphic
forms he makes. Moreover, through this condensation, lies his pathway
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to fresh vision, These graphic motifs the draughtsman finds for him-
self, these clustered touches, are full of directional significance.
They have arisen primarily in answer, not only to what the draughts-
man sees, but also to how he sees. This reciprocation is crucial to
their ability to transcend, to their ability to suggest. Furthermore,
their reciprocity funds the internal graphic logic of the drawing.
They spring from the draughteman's urgency to see how they will appear
and how far they appropriate to all he is reaching toward. The rich-
ness and density of their variation will be testimony to how far he
himself has penetrated their evocative spatiality. This spatiality
is held together and promoted through all the rhythmic sequence of
images that his drawing suggests.
V. 4. 5. Thematic development and innovation.
Thus, these graphic nuclear forms which the draughtsman develops,
initiate what one might call the thematic advance of the drawing.
Their appearing serves to promote fresh movements of the draughtsman's
graphic imagination. This development is crucial, for within it lies
all the possibility, all the richness of the drawing's unfolding
spatiality. As he takes these forms, as he augments, heightens, inter-
relates and orchestrates them, he delivers the very texture and 'going'
of his drawing. They structure his 'topic', as Rawson has it, and
become the focus, the spatial anchorages around which the drawing's
graphic meaning can coalesce. By providing a kind of invariant, they
magnetise the possibility for his further graphic 'inventiveness'.
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They provide a potential for fresh acts of seeing and fresh directions
for his enquiry. He rmist sense the coming rise of possible graphic
forms and marry these to what he has already developed.
An example of the thematic development of graphic forms can be
seen in Wynn Jones's collection of drawings. (Fig. 47) was done, as
he says in his conversation, very early on. in the sequence. The line
in this early drawing is rigid and sparse. It has not yet opened out
into the kind of space which it subsequently achieves in his later
drawings. It seems to be restrained and hesistant. It does not yet
have the expansiveness which it takes on in 'Void' (Fig. 38) for ex-
ample. In (Fig. 47) it is as though he is just beginning to sense
the possible richness of the play along the edge of these lines. We
sense that the line has not yet developed its full amplitude, nor
its haunting spatiality. However, the promise of this development
lies in the earlier drawing.
This kind of graphic development in drawing is never a pre-
determined movement. It evolves and is revealed to the draughtsman
in and through the activity of making the drawing. The internal logic
and connectiveness between the graphic forms the draughtsman makes and
the possibility for their development are constantly coming under
review and revision as he works. His task is always to make a cohe-
rence within these forms, which he always seeks to keep open, to allow
their fecund ambiguity to work, but always within a boundness which he
recognises. He advances his theme through what he gives primary sig-
nificance to. In Wynn Jones's drawings we are gathered into the light
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and dark passage of enclosures and we are compelled to follow the
softness of the line's edge as it opens cavernous darks and charged
voids. For a mainly linear draughtsman like Feliks Topolski, all
his forms will, spring from the inventiveness of his rine as it searches
all the spaces he sees. David Cowley develops his thematic sense from
the way he penetrates, through all the interstices of his drawing, the
space the model inhabits. Wendy Thompson's drawings advance along
the line's soft probing as it is married to all the tonal transitions
of touch (Fig. 69, Drawings 30A and 37A). In Arthur Di Stephano's
drawings, his theme rises from all the linear inflections of the
sinuous contour as it wraps the space of the model (Figs. 34 & 35).
In all these accumulated groupings, in all the rhythmic inter-
change between these forms, fresh directions are always implied.
This is the very process of drawing, the drawing from that is also
drawing toward. This thematic advance, of which we have been speaking,
is testimony to the whole graphic movement of the drawing. As we have
begun to see elsewhere, it is not so much 'thought about' as lived.
We move with these forms as they catch and resonate fresh evocative
spaces. In this they never merely describe reality, they sing it.
Furthermore, in seeking to uncover this thematic significance, we can
only point toward areas of its possible generation. To acknowledge
it, and to follow it within a drawing is already to be moving with it.
We reach this essential movement of the drawing, grounded in all
the catenae of its forms, not only through the graphic elements of
the drawing itself, but also through what we might term it notional
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'subject matter'. Thus the transition of one graphic form to another
can be held together for us because we recognise the fall of the
model's hair, the twist of her thigh, or the weight of her arm. We
recognise the imploring gesture of the raised hand in Wynn Jones's
drawings. This aspect of the drawing's spatiality we shall return
to later. The graphic forms the draughtsinan uses can offer a kind
of counter subject to this notional subject matter. Of course some-
times, this counter subject becomes the primary theme of the drawing,
as it does with a 'non-figurative' draught sman like Cy Twombly. His
drawings rely solely on the graphic meaning rising from their marks
and transitions.
However, the richness of the interplay between this counter sub-
ject and the notional subject gives a unique opportunity for the
draughteinan to develop his thematic material. In all this, whether
it be the motif the draughtsman works from, or the nuclear graphic
forms and motifs he employs within his drawing, each provides a Locus,
a point for the distillation and coalescence of his graphic meaning.
Each takes its place and offers an entry for our advance into the
spatial interiority of the drawing.
V. 5. 1. The line and the dialectics of 'open' and 'closed' forms.
So far we have mentioned that these linked chains of forms are
promoted in drawing primarily through the line. We have examined its
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springing and. we have also begun to speak of the way, from its figure
in passage, it animates all its ground. This leads us now to examine
a little more closely how it also inscribes enclosures which, in turn,
are sensed and read and complete themselves within the whole rhythmic
movement of the drawing. In graphic terms it is impossible when
speaking of the line and all it evokes, not to speak also of the spaces
the line ignites. Now these 'enclosures' are not static and defined
areas - as so much measured geometry. They are read as figures against
their ground. Much of this has to do with the sense they bring of
recognisable forms like people, robes, hats, hands, feet etc. but, as
we have seen, these graphic representations never simply point to
objects in the world.
The simplest figure occurs when a line encloses an area, like a
circle, where in its closure we sense immediately the figure of the
circle. Here the line is acting in its primary graphic function as
a separator. There is also a second kind of enclosure where the line
does not fully enclose the figure and, in our perception of it, there
is sufficient visual indication for us to 'complete' it. One is re-
minded here of Sartre's (14) views on the way we 'enact' this comple-
tion and read the line as though it were there. This enactment in
vision goes on all the time - and is how we read the whole movement
and continuity of forms. Perception demands this 'wholeness', this
active search for meaning. The impulse is always, as Arnheim(7)
suggests, to reach the most 'stable' (op cit p406) resolution. The
completion occurs through the need to resolve the imbalance and, of
course, in graphic terms is the ground from which all the expressive
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tension of forms rise. When we see the figure of the circle as
described by the line, it seems to 'come forward', to immediately
have a spatial significance. The centre of this figure seems denser,
seems to have weight and body. Arnheim maintains that this is because
perception is always seeking the 'simplest' (op cit p246) of resolu-
tions. Thus this 'standing out' is in order to maintain the essential
planar concern of the surface of the format. We have met this 'stand-
ing out' before - in all our discussions on the unity of time with
space - this existential, this ex-stance. To see and experience the
figure is to catch at the roots of this reciprocity of time with
space. The figure is the cry from the silence of its ground. The
essential temporality of being, of beingness, can only come-to-be,
can only appear, as this temporality finds its co-existence with space.
Here is pre-figured the move of time into space, the pre-figuring of
the primordial dialectic of Being. Thus the reading of enclosure is
a fundamental movement in all our perception, a primary orientation
of Being. It is irradicable and inviolable; this movement awaits us
as we open our eyes, this there, There because we are already at work
in the world.
In terms of drawing, Arnheim makes an interesting comparison
between the line drawings of Rembrandt and JAatisse (op cit p216).
Rembrandt achieves a tremendous 'solidity' to his forms in space be-
cause he kept his outlined units relatively small and, moreover, he
reinforces the enclosed surfaces with linear designs like folds of
cloth etc. In I.tisse drawings, particularly in his later drawings,
the units are often 80 large that the contour all but loses its effect -
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the border line character of 1gatisse'a line 18 weak - they have much
the quality of independent lines. The 'enclosed bodies' have a loose-
ness about them - they tend to reveal that they are nothing but pieces
of 'empty' paper surfaces. The drawing lies like a transparent web -
the space of the illusion of 'depth' reduced to a minimum. This, of
course, is not due to negligence or incapacity, Rembrandt wanted to
express the weight of volume and a clearly discernible depth illusion.
Matisse was far more interested in the way he could graphically 'de-
materialise' the object and this through minimising this illusionist
space. Thus Matisse drawings are not intended as illusions of physical
reality - their concern is the surface from which they spring. These
different approaches represent very different visual philosphies, they
promote radically different ontologies.
Prom this example of Matisse's drawings, we can see that enclo-
sures need. carry with them no specific suggestion of figure arid ground.
Indeed the focus here becomes purely the figure of the line, rather
than what it encloses. In drawing the draughtsman must be supremely
aware, however, of all the ground he is shaping as he makes his figure.
Thus the presence or absence of the notional 'bodies' within the draw-
ing, like faces or hands, sky or trees, are not at this stage important.
Indeed enclosures carry implicitly the significance of areas of the
format surface and they can be read as figure, but always their ground
is tacitly acknowledged, if the full expressive sense of their spatia-
lity is to be achieved. Some 'enclosures' can suggest 'voids'. (How
we echo all the discussions of the dialectics of inside and outside
that we have shared with Bachelard.) Wynn Jones's drawings are full
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of this essential descriptiveness. The expressive tension of these
'figures' resonate as they animate all the voids they also inhabit.
We sense in all he says in his conversation, his own incisive con-
eciousness of their presence:
"... once the particular form of the figures are
established on the paper, they, in a sense, create
their own environment, by that I mean that the sort
of tension that exists in the surrounding space, in
the areas between and around them becomes as inipor-
tant as the figures themselves. This has ... to do
with ... an imaginative grasp of space growing out
of the intuitively felt relationships within the
figurative situation.' t (appendix p370 ).
We can see this, particularly in 'Void' (Fig. 38) and 'Bond' (Fig. 38).
There is a further important point. In their interrelationships
within and with the format edges, enclosures are always full of the
activity of movement, always bearing within themselves this tension
that springs from our seeking to resolve all their 'imbalances'.
They are always on the move. They can 'open', 'condense', 'coalesce',
'connect', 'bond together'. However, these are only verbal descrip-
tions, caught within the confines of linguistic determination. They
can never fully encompass the opening metaphoric spatiality these
graphic enclosure forms promote. They also, like lines which are
'enclosures' of a kind, have their own diacritical values. In their
passage, whether seen as either 'positive' or 'negative', the whole
expressive significance of the drawing is embedded.
Within the distinctions we might make between 'figure' and
'ground' there is never any separation when we come to live and in-
habit their spaces. Graphic images are only evocative as we sense
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the tension across the surface of all their interchange and permea-
bility. Where one becomes figure and the other ground, where one
becomes ground and the other figure, lies the very condition for all
appearing. By means of the drawing, this 'transcendental arithmetic
progression', as Beckman says (op cit p134), can come to be.
Thus the contour of any enclosure is always a shared border,
not a boundary. Contours, as we have seen, point both ways. Their
Janus face is turned toward all the figure they describe, from all
the ground they are inscribing. The drawn curve is full of the im-.
plications of both concavity ansi. convexity and depending on how the
draughtsman is using it and the contexi of his operations, it will
reflect how far he is thinking, as he draws, away from the line.
What is this here from which all the theres arise? In Dasein,
in 'being-there', where, asks Bachelard, is the main stress to come,
on 'being' or 'there' (op cit p213)? We make a mistake, he says, if
we try to enclose Being, if we try to encapsulate existence as a
simple dialectic of inside and outside. The insidious determinacy
of language would lead us in this direction. Unless we are careful,
this there carries a kind of dogmatic assertion, as though it were
in some exteriorised place. Existence does not have to come clothed
only in physicality. Graphic images are not concepts, frozen in
clusters. As soon as we sense a graphic enclosure as an enclosure
per se, we have already been imaginatively engaged in the movement
of its significance,
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Thus a term like 'enclosure', only becomes for us a handle in
uncovering aspects of the spatiality of these drawings. To grasp
the resonance and. reverberation of image forms within a drawing is
to reciprocate with all the dialectic of inside and outside, of posi-
tive and negative, of figure and. ground. They resonate because in
our movement with them we do not follow only one dimension of their
possibility. Their density and richness is because as forms, as
forming, they do not stand still long enough to congeal. They con-
dense, coalesce and go on working. Like the figure of the spiral
which is an image, as Bachelard says, that can move either inward
or outward, full of 'invertible dynamisms' (op cit p214), coalescence
suggests also a move toward what is, as well as toward what is not -
the very possibilit1 of being.
V. 5. 2. Rhythmic continuity of such forms.
Let us turn. now to a consideration of the various ways some of
our draughtsmen have made use of enclosure forms.
It is interesting that in. David Cowley's drawing for example,
he keeps open the 'enclosure' of the model as figure, for as long as
possible. It is as though he were engaged throughout his drawing,
and. wanted to keep 'alive', the whole interplay of space which presses
in upon and permeates and penetrates the figure and from which she
finally emerges. Through all the directional vectoring of his line,
he inscribes the space the figure animates. The figure is caught, as
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it were, in the suspension of her own space. Arthur Di Stephano,
on the other band, has a very different intention. He seeks to main-
tain and preserve the primacy of the areas of full and void through
the inflections of his contour. However, David Cowley holds back
from fully defining this positive and this void. His interest is
the total interpenetration of this whole 'cube' of space and., as he
says in his conversation, the points he makes are like hand holds
which chart his progression through it (appendix p344). The ambiguity
which rises from this conflict and interchange is an important source
of the drawing's significance. It is this continuity of the forms
moving through and interpenetrating all their space which provides
the counterpoint and thematic development of his drawing. He is at
pains to obliterate and indeed to run across the 'positive' areas
he makes, to deliberately ignore, as it were, their positive presence
in order to activate the voids. It is not until at least (Fig. 11)
that we begin to sense something like the figure of the nude emerging.
Indeed, it is as though he were laying down his ground through building
up a multiplicity of linear forms into which and through which, through
erasures and. cross hatchings, he builds toward the sense of this solid
figure spun within the fibres of its casing. The tensive dialectic
between open and closed takes on an important dimension in his drawing,
so much so that one feels it is øtill in process, still fluid and that
he could. 'go on' with it, for it continually suggests its own direction
(appendix p355).
Feliks Topoiski's drawings have enclosures that are very much
'open'. His particular calligraphic style ensures that he is only
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ever really suggesting enclosures and not defining them. As he points
out in his conversation, he does not set out to 'copy' the
"... existing scene in front of me ... enumerating
every element ... . I am after ,.. scanning the
whole circle of -vision, not just the cut-out slice
in front of me, but immersing myself." (appendix
p 388).
Thus his line interpenetrates forms and where there are enclosures he
moves through them. His enclosures such as they are, are always
moving into and through other suggested enclosures. Much of the
expressive vitality of his work, as we have begun to discover, is
that his line does not prescribe. His line follows his gaze as it
actively searches over and through boundaries, to give the suggestion
of volume - rather as we sense something rising from the sea, with
rivulets and streams of water running off and across the surface of
the emerging form. So much is left for our own enactment in these
drawings, our own participation in following all the line's closure
paths. Thus there is always in his drawings the logic of the linked
connectiveness of forms - for the line weaves together the magic of
their interrelatedness. His enclosures spring from his constantly
searching line, which is never still. It reaches into all the inti-
mate interstices of these concatenated forms in their passage across
the drawing surface.
If we look at (Fig. 83) and (Fig. 84) we can see this clearly.
There is much that is left 'open' and in leaving open we are constantly
brought back to the presence of these lines as they not only activate
depth through their interpenetration and overlapping, but they trace
out a surface structure which is a modulation of the whole format of
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the drawing.
In (Fig. 83) and also in (Fig. 93) he superimposes forms, heaping
them up on the page, juxtaposing heads, improvising all the intricacies
of scale. The vigour of these drawings lies in the free use of all
their space, where each form seeks its resolution within the space of
its neighbour.
In his 'Procession' drawing (Fig. 85), with minimal bravura and
with studied restraint, he orchestrates this slowly moving space through
the pressing convex forms of the priests. They move beneath the chatter
of mitred hats towards the raised upright of the cross. On the page
these linear forms beat like a musical score; the voids, like pauses
are never empty, but seem charged with a melodic continuity. The shuff-
ling movement of their recession is caught not only through their
diminution, but also through their overlapping. These graphic conven-
tions of representing space become expressive as they are held together
by all the subtle resonance and reciprocation of concavity arid, convexity.
This dialectic can be sensed in and through the forms of the
drawing itself. However, the whole space of the format can be consi-
dered as either concave, where one seems to be looking into this bowl
of space through the format frame, or convex, where, as it were, the
drawn forms rise toward us out from their own space. Here we meet
the distinction of space as limite and space as milieu that we have
discovered already. These contraries are evidence that metaphoric
space can never be contained, but each becomes the occasion for the
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springing and orientation for very different spatial ontologies,
Wynn Jones is a draughtsman who uses most specifically areas
of enclosed forms to promote a rhythmic development across the format.
It will be useful to investigate his use of enclosure forms, because
more than anything else they exemplify the principles we have been
discussing. We have already spoken of the kind of line he uses but,
in a sense of course, this is really an enclosure form in itself.
As it moves across the format surface it carries in its thickness a
sharp and suffused aspect. This he makes by drawing areas of tone
right up against the line - where it comes in soft and goes out hard.
The forward thrusting arm in 'At One' (Fig. 41) is an example and has
the effect of suggesting a turn to the form right on the contour.
This gives the enclosure, not a great voluminosity - a sculptural
plasticity, like David Cowley's, but rather an extension which main-
tains the flatness of the enclosure area. He reduces the illusion of
volume in these figures to an extenuated surface uniformity, which is
just sufficient to give them substance, but a substance which one
feels is ephemeral - paper thin - not really tangible, yet there none-
theless. He works across his enclosures with drawn tone, and there
is a wide range of tone, from very light-breathed marks, barely dis-
cernible, to areas of dark which one senses, form themselves through
a patina of touch, built up from a delicate and patient working across
the surface, This lends these velvet darks a very different qua.lita-
tive sense from the savaged, aggressive accumulations of David Cowley's
drawing. Wynn Jones's darks murmur in their softness across the format
surface. A good example is 'Manoeuvres' (Fig. 37). Sometimes these
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darks represent the figure, as in the figure on the left, and some-
times the ground, like the dark tonal area underneath the white shape
toward the bottom left of the drawing. This antithesis gives an
extraordinary ambiguity to the forms. It relates them very much to
the surface structuring of the format and is a further way of giving
them a kind of insubstantiality. He draws not only what is 'found',
but also what is 'lost'. This he does con5tantly along the edge of
forms, through a counterplay of light and dark. 'Hurrying By' (Fig.
40) and 'Having Fun' (Fig. 43) are useful examples.
Through this catena of darks and lights, Wynn Jones opens up
the interiority of his drawings. He speaks of his penetration of
this depth when he says:
"I should say that I often start with one figure, but
I feel it will never stay at that - being about one
figure. Because what's interesting is what that
figure can do when. its confronted with another fig-
ure ... I feel that what happens is that in the be-
ginning these images are very much like shadows in
their ebb and flow, in the way they resist coming
out into the light." (appendix p 372/373).
This eloquently suggests his search for the intimacy of these shadows
and his stealth as he patiently seeks to clothe them in a substantia-
lity which will be just sufficient to promote their haunting spatiality.
We sense these images of intimacy through his treatment of the surface
of these drawings. They are drawings that are put together, like
Wendy Thompson's, through a contemplative perseverance. lie echoes
this when he says:
"They're all done on the kind of paper which allows
a certain amount of exploratory activity to go on
and I develop a very intimate kind of relationship
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with the surface I'm working on." (appendix p 375).
And earlier he says:
".., the ideas that I have in relation to that area,
do have a kind of texture, I mean there is a sort
of texture to my thinking which demands a response
in terms of the materials I'm using." (appendix
p 375).
We shall return to these images of touch and of the texture and
intimacy of drawing later. But all their evocation is felt within
the subtle nuancing of his forms. From the texture of his thinking,
from these evocative images of touch, develops the intimate surface
of his marks. In his drawing 'Seekers' (Fig. 45) the soft searching
touch of the two shapes with their sensitive hands that twist through
the ambience of the surrounding space, is not a frenetic anxious
seeking, it is a probing, a movement toward each, with the suggested
whisper of contact and away again. Even images that are seemingly
aggressive are never openly so, this is an aggressiveness that lets
be rather than dominates, for example, 'Show of Strength' (Fig. 41).
'Caring Gestures' (Fig, 43) is full of the soft evocation of intimate
involvement, The pattern of dark enclosures rise from the bottom edge
of the format and twist away like tendrils of smoke into the upper
area of the space and die in a cadential curve.
V. 5. 3. Rhythmic transitions of dark and light.
The rhythmic movement of these dark passages is further reinforced
as tonal groupings are made within their transition. Thus we pick up
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the spatial disposition of very dark areas and these may be counter-
pointed by passages of lighter tone. This subtle changing harmonic
of tone is very important. It is of great interest to both Wynn Jones
and. Wendy Thompson, and to some extent, Feliks Topoiski. It will pay
us to give this qualitative aspect of their transition some attention.
If we look at Wynn Jones's 'Manoeuvres' (Fig. 37), we can see
that there is a rising pattern of dark areas that group themselves
in an oblique movement from the bottom left hand corner of the drawing.
They are almost opposed to each other in an alternating way, rather
like a tessellated checkerboard. Indeed this counterchange gives a
clear spatial sense of 'manoeuvering'. The lighter grey areas play
a secondary movement beneath and around these principal darks. Not
only is there this patterning, but in the darks themselves there is
a sympathetic echoing of shape, particularly in the dark 'commas' of
the hair. In 'The Lesson' (Fig. 44) there is a modulation between
the shape of the coat on the left-hand figure and the bonnet of the
figure on the right. These principal darks often rise from a ground
of suffused grey. There are many examples, 'Confidences' (Fig. 36),
'In the Dark' (Fig. 39) and. 'Dressing' (Fig. 43).
These rhythms of grouped d.arks, these areas of grey, have for
Wynn Jones a special value. In his conversation he points out:
"... one of the reasons why most of the work does
tend to move between areas, degrees of grey is that
that's how things are, shades of grey, arid they
work at their best when the conflict between atmos-
phere and activity is held in a very fine balance."
(appendix p 376).
Now for Wynn Jones finding his way through the subtle movement of
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these greys, suggested also by the kind of surface he worked with,
a surface that was sufficiently grained. to catch the charcoal or pen-
cil in its pools and hollows, was a way of inscribing the spatial
texture of his feelings, Grey is full of spatial value; it offers
in a visual way an opportunity for him to explore, as he says, the
power of images and "the prophetic reality of space that were unique
to working on that surface" (appendix p377). In all its suggestive-
ness there are images of tentative probing and the distillation of
positive affirmation, full of the metaphoric tension held in fine
balance.
Wendy Thompson uses in both her extended drawings a very full
range of greys - almost as a painting might. For her, these greys
give the opportunity to fully investigate the plasticity of the model
and her space, as she says in her conversation; it is this 'physica-
lity' (appendix p 381) that interests her. Not a 'copy' in any way
of the physical object she might have been working from, but the over-
powering physicality of the space arising from the drawing. So grey,
for her, becomes a value of change and modulation - of presenting the
sense of surface articulation.
Through the sequence photographs, one senses the way she establishes
from very early on, patterns of dark with attendant harmonies of lighter
tone right across the format. In (Figs. 55 & 56) we can see this chain
of looped darks beginning to suggest the spatiality of the figure slung
between chair and stool. She sometimes feels, as she says, that she
overworks her drawings in her anxiety (appendix p383). There was a
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period in the middle of her second extended drawing (Fig. 64, frames
36A, 37A) when the visual 'balance' of the surface structure of the
drawing was about right (appendix p383). However, as he says, she
is interested in the whole process of drawing, so sometimes she finds
herself moving too far but this, for her, is the challenge of drawing
(appendix p 383).
Feliks Topoiski also makes use of these grouped rhythms of darks.
In his drawings they are often caught within a surge of linear move-
inent. Sometimes he will make them with broad hatched strokes with
the chalk. Sometimes they appear through the sheer concentration and
coalescence of the lines themselves, (Fig. 78), (Fig. 80), (Fig, 86),
(Fig. 87), (Fig. 88) are good examples. In (Pig. 89) he makes strong
accents with a black felt-tip pen, that read as insistent punctuation
across the passage of linear verticals. In (Fig. 91) they are grouped
in clusters along an arched axis, at the apex of which is the centred.
dark of the Pope's head. Through a change in pressure and sometimes
with a change in medium, he suggests a strong sense of space through
the weight of the darks in the lines he draws. (Fig. 83) and (Fig. 90)
are clear examples. Heavy interpenetrates with soft, dark with light;
through all their fluctuating pressure and tonality one senses the
weave of all their space.
V. 5. 4. Rhythmic relatedness of 'figurative' forms.
Our entry into the spatiality of these drawings is not only
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through their formal graphic means but also, as we have seen, as these
are married to recognisable figurative forms. Thus the rhythmic inter-
play of enclosed forms can become the rhythms between forms that are
recognised as hands, or heads, or figures. Their various aspected.
related and grouped positions across the format can be powerfully
evocative. Thus we sense the space of the pointing finger, we feel
the enclosed space of a clenched fist.
Wynn Jones uses these figurative opportunities to explore the
intimate space of human interaction. His drawings are full of the
gesture of hands and the mask-like face. He says:
"I think that the more obviously expressive areas of
the human body are the face and the hands. And it
interests me, the way that these two areas of the
human body have been depicted, going back to pagan
ritual ceremonies where sometimes make-up and masks
were used to transform the identity of a person, to
induce a kind of belief in something other than who
that person actually was." (appendix p371).
The expressive gestures of these forms describe the space of their
habitation. We feel the charged space between the glances of the
figures in 'Bond' (Fig. 38) and the strange groping foolishness of
the hands in 'In the Dark' (Fig. 39).
Of course, their tensive significance rises also from the direc-
tion their titles give. For Wynn Jones, the verbal descriptiveness
of the titles of his drawings makes a positive contribution to the
spatiality of his visual images. He says in conversation that the
connection between the verbal and the visual has always intrigued him.
He points to Kitaj as being an example of an artist who seeks to find
links with other forms of art. He also mentions Beckman who, of course,
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found a wealth of expressive potential in the poetic use of language
(appendix p373). The titles Wynn Jones gives to his drawings are
not simply labels, they offer far more than that, He says:
"... I never feel that a piece of work is complete
if it doesn't have a title. Usually the titles are
pretty straightforward, there's nothing bizarre about
them. They are about simple things, everyday activi-
ties and. I think that's an important point to make,
because at a superficial glance I think that the
esoteric, appearance of things can be misunderstood
and the title is meant to place the idea in its pro-
per context."	 (appendix p374).
These titles, of course, have their own spatial orientation.
Then they are caught within the spatial directions of the drawn images
a new density, a fresh metaphoric deliverance is achieved. Almost any
drawing serves as an example. He talks of his use of titles in respect
of 'A Day out' (Fig. 46) and from its description we find the context
for seeing the shape of a boat's hull and the heads of those in it as
sails caught by the wind. There is a brief suggestion of a horizon
and the shape of clouds.
The significance of the gestures in both 'Caring Gestures' (Fig.
44) and 'The Lesson' (Fig. 44) is reinforced and given a plenitude
through the image generated by their titles. It is Wynn Jones's con-
cern that these verbal images set the direction for the visual images
to multiply and advance. It is a device that is effectively employed
to clarify their direction and to set in motion the orientation of
their graphic significance. It is interesting that most of the titles
suggest images of expressive activity and taken together with the
gestures of hands and faces amplify these specific graphic forms. His
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titles move in conjunction with his images; their intrinsic spatia-
lity interpenetrates, permeates and provides a locus for the ignition
and subsequent distillation of the visual images themselves.
These verbal descriptions, when seen within the vectors of direc-
tion set up through the exchanged glances or the clasped hands of
these figures, deliver a powerful spatial orientation and together
play an important part in and through all the formal means of the
drawing in establishing the tensions and linked connectiveness of
the space across the drawing surface. Indeed, these invisible vec-
tors, as it were, modulate the whole spatiality of the drawing itself.
The 'hands' in Wynn Jones's drawings are given a special kind of atten-
tion and are full of this directional sense, their vestigial fingers
probe out like antennae into their surrounding space. The fingers,
for example, in 'In the Dark' (Fig. 39) grope through the emptiness
which becomes charged with the significance of finding one's way.
The chain or sequence of these figurative forms through the
drawing is enormously important. Of course, these linked sequences
can only be followed and suggested and prompted by the graphic connec-
tedness and 'logic' which we have so far described. Indeed such is
the power of the mind to group like with like and to see the deviation
of like with unlike, that a powerful sequence of movements and counter-
movements can be orchestrated within a drawing. It is this drama of
linked forms which animates Wynn Jones's drawings. The tenderness,
tenuousness, fragility, aggressiveness, stridency and apprehensiveness
which characterises so much of our own human spatiality, is here
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figured in graphic terms. In 'Welcome' (Fig. 45) one feels between
these two figures that strange uncertainty and apprehension that occurs
when one first meets and greets someone else. The figure on the right
is ready to embrace, but the figure on the left still has some reser-
vation, his upheld arm with closed hand offers a resistance, very
different from the openness of the advancing figure on the right.
Again in 'Formalities' (Pig. 40) one feels the strange backward hesi-
tancy of the figure on the left, his face raised with mouth slightly
open, that makes him appear caught in the foolishness of his own
embarrassment. His hand. is held back, forefinger and thumb together,
as if mimicking the tieing of the bow which is being done for him.
In 'Surprise' (Fig. 37) the figure on the right has one hand raised
to cover his mouth while the other is covered with the fingers of the
figure on the left. In 'Manoeuvres' (Fig. 37) this linked sequence
of gesturing hands promotes a rhythmic cadence that marks out a kind
of counter theme in and through and across the dark axes of the figures.
This drawing is full of charged space. One figure comes from behind
the other, another plants a foot as if to stake out a position and
the whole has a feeling of jostling for a place, of searching and
adjusting for a personal space. The rhythm is established in the
bottom left of the format and moves through the linked forms of dark,
directed by the gesturing fingers, themselves twisted and contorted.
A minor theme runs up from the base of the drawing to meet this major
cross current and is directed into it through the two hands in the
centre of the drawing. This rhythmic surge is partly checked by the
halting and hesitant position of the head of the figure pressing from
the left. Further the movement is from left to right, as though from
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uncertainty to certainty. There 18 a minor drama being played by
the hands in this drawing which seek to 'touch' but do not do so com-
pletely. Two hands with splayed fingers seem to be marking out the
open area of the top right of the drawing, as if to establish an
anchorage. He has found within the intimacy of the gestures of these
hands and within the aspects of these 'faces' the spatiality of
manoeuvreing. The sequence of their passage across the drawing, the
subtle rhythms of the tiniest form, begins the reverberation of this
space. We are caught up with images that rise from we know not where,
but they together promote the song of the drawing. And this is not
arbitary, this spatiality rises from these manifestly present graphic
images.
Thus it is that the hands of the figure on the left in 'Sacrifice'
(Fig. 36) are raised in mild opposition against the forward extension
of the hands of the figure from the right who proffers the gift. If
we look at the space between these gestural forms, we sense the arti-
culation of all the feelings of hesitancy and of acceptance. And in
'Confidences' (Fig. 36) the space between the figures is closely inter-
woven, the figure on the left whispering from behind his raised hand.
In 'Void' (rig. 38) the fingers of the figure on the left seems to
probe the open space with that touch of the man temporarily blinded.
In 'Bond' (Fig. 38) the fingers are tightly laced and there is a par-
ticular importance given to them through the care with which every
detail of them is delineated, through to the finger nails themselves.
In 'Show of Strength' (Fig. 41) the repetition of the folded fingers
over the strings gives a sense of unity and confidence. And in 'The
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Lesson' (Fig. 44) the figure on the left is demonstrating with clarity
how to tie a knot, contrasting with the hidden awkwardness of the one
receiving instruction on the right.
Thus within the main directional axes of these figures run these
counter themes set up by the smaller forms of the hands and the faces,
sometimes only recognised as such through the suggestion of an eye, or
a half-open mouth. These faces, moreover, are nearly all drawn in
profile - their aspected directions are across the format. Only in
one drawing 'An Ending' (Fig. 39) are we presented with a frontal
aspect. A single baleful eye peers out toward our space, we become
locked into this space of personal confrontation. In all the other
drawings we are, in a sense, 'outside' them, as though witnesses to
a drama. This is also the only drawing in this particular series
where there is a single figure. It is almost as if the only dialogue
this figure can have is with ourselves. We are the other half of its
contract, forced through its stare into its suicidal space.
Examples of this linked sequential cadence of grouped figurative
forms is clear also in Feliks Topolski's drawings. In particular
from this point of view, we have noted his 'Procession' drawing (Fig.
85). Similarly in (Fig. 83) links are set up between the various
heads as they cascade down on each side of the Pope's raised arms.
In (Fig. 84) we can follow the rhythms of the m.itred forms of the
priests' hats and in (Fig. 91) we find him enjoying the smaller rhythms
made by the nuns' habits on the right. All these forms are held to-
gether by his line, which moves between them, uniting them in their
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rhythmic rise and fall.
David Cowley's forms rise from an interest in all their dynamic
axes. This directional sense he gives to the forms of the emerging
nude characterises the whole thrust of the drawing. He describes
the motif and situation he was working from with the same energy that
his drawing subsequently reveals:
"... she was squashed between those two quite power-
ful masses, one being that bed at the back and the
other was a wooden block and it was quite interesting
how, I know there wasn't much space in that life-room,
but you had. an
 area of fairly open floor which was
somehow drawn up into her legs, went along her thighs,
up across her stomach and up through the head and
then there was quite a big gap between some screens
and so that kind of movement disappeared right through
and went right back, in fact, into the open door just
behind her. So that was quite powerful. There was a
restatement of the two massive blocks as well, because
the chair at some stage had arms, not arms in the sense
that they were physical arms, but there was an area be-
tween her buttock and the edge of the chair which was
defined by her black coat and they gave a very powerful
feeling of again squashing this very luminous flesh
between areas of black." (appendix p351).
Here we find him describing his whole interchange within the process
of his drawing. Images of his intimate involvement with the experience
abound., His whole desire is to catch these movements within the fixa-
tions of his drawing.
V. 6. 1. The spatiality of touch - concluding remarks.
All the formal considerations of graphic structure that have
occupied us thus far are not such that they are wrought with 'self-
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consciousness' on the draughtsinan's part. The logic of all the inner
rhythmic movements of the drawing, all the progression of its inner
being, all that constitutes its world, are made with a freedom caught
up in the process of all its shaping. Drawings are the intimate man!-
festations to the draughtsman of his investigations of the world.
They are not so declamatory as paintings or sculptures, they speak
more as soliloquies, and herein lies their value. For above all else,
they evidence the texture of the draughtsman'a thought. Wynn Jones
comes very close to the significance of this when, in quoting Paul
Klee, he says:
"I'm interested that Klee, back in 1909 was saying
that he would 'now dare to tread once more the
original ground of psychic improvisation. With a
link to an impression of nature now only quite in-
direct, I may once more give shape to what is actually
weighing on imj soul. To note down experiences which
could translate themselves into lines in complete
darkness. This is a potentiality for original crea-
tion which has long existed - interrupted only tem-
porarily by the timidity caused by isolation. In
this way my essential personality will be able to
speak, to free itself with the greatest freedom.'."
(appendix p 378).
In using the materials he does and through working with a parti-
cular surface, he finds he becomes increasingly conscious "of the
expressive possibilities of the materials I am using" (appendix p 375).
These possibilities prompt him to feel that their texturing, their
fecund images of touch give him a sense that "... there is a sort of
texture to my thinking which demands a response in terms of the mate-
rial8 I'm using" (appendix p375). This does not mean, of course, that
he is 'drawing textures'. The metaphor he uses is rich in all its
suggestion of how these images of touch are reflected within the
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process of all his graphic improvisation.
Drawings through all their means evoke these spatial images of
touch. Their graphic utterance testifies to the intimate meditations
of the draughtsman. Through their intimacies they can open up path-
ways toward immensity. By immensity we do not mean that spatiality
in which we are lost, where we have no anchorage, rather this immensity
is a hollowing out, an enlarging from the space where we are. Drawings
lead us toward such spaces. As we have seen, they offer through the
logos of all their linear pathways the opening of a world. Intimate
has a sense of a world which opens up from a world that is miniature -
the world within a world. Bachelard gives an example of the cyst in
a pane of glass which when we come up close to it, in a kind of inti-
mate union with it, reveals to us a world that invites our habitation
(op cit p157).
It is from this intimate that images begin to abound and. escape.
In Wynn Jones's drawings it is as though he were inviting us to follow
the texture of the passage of these forms, not to hurry by them, but
to taste and savour them. In allowing ourselves to move with their
textural punctuations and surfaces, we come to the edge of voids which
hang in immobility. He, within the intimate security of his drawings,
opens up for us the texture of fresh worlds, their possibility no less.
Bachelard echoes our thinking when he says:
"Large issues from small, not through the logical
law of a dialectics of contraries, but thanks to
liberation from all obligations of dimensions, a
liberation that is a special characteristic of the
activity of the imagination." (op cit pp154/155).
332
Wendy Thompson is aware of this. In her conversation she says:
"... in my mark-making I always look for things - I
don't consciously look, but over the years I have
built up a way of drawing so that I can tack on to
anything that I need - it could be a dot or a squiggle
or a blue line, I don't know, it just could be a mil-
lion things, but that its extremely opposite to the
next thing that I put down - that's so important to
me to get some kind of tension and I suppose, in a
larger sense, it's exactly how I feel ..."
(appendix p383).
So it is also with Wynn Jones. He also moves out into this space,
with care, patience and deliberation; watching with an eye which is
sensitive to the slightest change and nuance of his line's passage
across the white. Tiny fragments, faint impressions, images that
coalesce along the line. Images which spill over from the drawn line
of charcoal on paper, leaving as it goes the dust of its passage, all
of this begins to sharpen the appetite of touch. Drawings which ex-
plore the texture of this possibility open. up for us images of the
cosmic.
It pays to dwell on minutiae - so easily is this sense of a draw-
ing's intimacy lost, so soon its meaning evaporates to an eye that looks
only to an immediate representation - a kind of taxonomy that reaches
only toward a partitioning for classification. Indwelling takes time,
and. it takes a commitment. It takes the pinning of one 8 faith in the
direction this movement is making. This is only within the reach of
the eye which comes to inhabit these enclosures; to an eye which savours
the tracing of these borders; to an eye which traverses these 'open'
and 'closed' forms; to an eye which lifts to all the singing of these
lines and readily goes with the evocation of their calling and follows
them as one which resonates with all their harmonies. As Bachelard.
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points out:
"All small things must evolve slowly. ... Also one
must love space to describe it as minutely as though
there were world molecules, to enclose an entire
spectacle in a molecule of drawing. ... It is as
though the miniaturist challenged the intuitionist
philosopher's lazy contemplation, as though he said
to him: 'You would not have seen that Take the time
needed to see all these little things that cannot be
seen all together.'."	 (op cit p159).
Drawings are 'world molecules' that invite our participation. Their
invitation is to follow the adventuring of the draught sman' s imagina-
tion, to share his appetite for discovery.
Bachelard writes illuininatingly on the word 'vast'. He says that
for Baudelair the word haà a vocal value (op cit p196). It is there
to be pronounced, not simply read. This is the space of immensity.
As he says:
"It transmits to our ears the echo of the secret
recesses of our being." (op cit ppl96/197).
This movement toward speech which the voice has as it apprehends the
word 'vast', is a movement toward the gesture of making sound. Bache-
lard likens this to a sixth sense, like a delicate Aeolian harp, set
at the entrance to our breathing.
"It quivers at the merest movement of metaphor; it
permits human thought to sing ... I begin to think
that the vowel 'a' is the vowel of immensity. It
is a sound area that starts with a sigh and extends
beyond all limits." (op cit p197).
Drawing is the draughtsman's sigh for sounding. It is gesture
begun in vocalisation. It is the mark of his coming out. The 'ah'
of his having seen at the root of the sounding vowel of 'vast' is
testimony that he is already participating in images that begin to
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reverberate toward this fresh orientation of possibility, this opening
cosmic spatiality. These images of intimate immensity are magnetised
in drawing through all the images of touch. Through the drawing's
touch we catch the cadence, the 'ala', of the draughtsman's graphic
imagination, his daring to go. The song of all his line, the harmonies
of all his tonalities, only resonate, only move as his touch delivers
them. Touch is the texture of his thought in act and it is always
caught, implicitly and inevitably in the way the drawing is put to-
gether. Touch registers the draughtsman's appetite (or lack of it)
for search, his hunger to bring together, to satisfy himself that he
knows. Ayrton(15) senses this when he says:
"Thought is not, I imagine, ultimately divorced from
appetite even among philosophers. C 'zarine's urgent
groping for form could not achieve its powerful
grip upon the solid without a certain greed for the
solid as a tangible satisfaction. An apple has no
final reality even for the painter unless he bites
it. So he bites, but the decision to bite into the
apple and where to bite it and how exactly it will
feel as lips and teeth meet it and the fingers hold
it for the biting are, in the process of transferring
these intentions and sensation to paper, subject to
an intellectual transmutation." (op cit pp67/68).
The drawn line, as we have begun to sense, reveals directly this
transmutation, this appetite and hunger to make visible. It can re-
veal strength of purpose as well as weakness of spirit. This it does
unequivocally. Herein lies its magic and herein lies its potency;
for in revealing courage, it can also betray cowardice; in revealing
integrity, it can also reveal only posturing and in revealing truth,
it can also betray falsity. Where the draughtsman bites, where he
makes his fixation, where he takes his grip on the world, will be
known in his drawing through all his touch. Rawson(16) has so ably
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summarised, it when he says:
"What every draughternan does is to enact a positive
proposition, amounting to a statement without words.
'This', he says, 'is how it is'. His acts in draw-
ing define the terms in that proposition: 'this',
'how', 'it' and 'is'. He opens up by these creative
acts fundamental questions about our perception of
form, about the meaning of what we perceive, and
about what we mean by the reality we assume we know."
(op cit p56).
This is why for the draughtsman his drawings are so important,
they offer through their transmutations routes for the interrogation
of how things are. Within the scope of all the ways he makes his
marks, through all the means he uses to put his questioning together,
through all the formal structures he employs, he seeks to inscribe
a spatiality that allows for this interrogation, a spatiality that
feeds his continuing appetite for the search.
(6) WORRINGER Wilhelm (1927)
(7) ARNBEIM Rudolf (1954)
(8) LA.NGER Susanne (1967)
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CONCLUSION
The phenomenon of drawing with all its attendant images made
actual in drawings has occupied us during the course of this thesis.
We have sought to examine and describe drawing as the means through
which the draughtsman actualises his experience of the world. Caught
within the activity and process of his drawing, he is a pure phenomeno-
logist, for through these images he seeks to describe, rather inscribe
the experience of all his seeing. Rawson's comment at the conclusion
of our previous chapter is a fitting focus for our concluding remarks.
In making his drawing the draughtsman enacts his proposition, makes
his statement. The draughtsman through his drawing is saying 'This
is how things are'.
The 'this is' of drawing brings it immediately into the realm of
the actual - of the act made form. 'This is' in drawing is a demon-
stration, a way of showing, a disclosure. In making this affirmation
the draughtsman has an anchorage from which he can interrogate the
world. As he moves out, he also begins to move within all the opening
spatiality his image forms promote. Within this affirmation lies all
the opportunity of possibility uncovered through this singular act.
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'This is' moreover begins the whole process of drawing, the drawing
from to draw toward. This enactment is the invitation to the voyage.
In making his move across the primal whiteness of his ground, in his
move to draw, he himself is drawn out and is caught within all the
movement toward which characterises the core of his endeavour. The
'this is' of drawing brings space and time together in that reciprocal
dialectic that lends to his emerging image all its expressive potential.
His move to make his representation, his fixation, is testimony that
he himself has already been moved by what he has seen, has already
been inagnetised. The 'this is' in drawing discloses the implicit
orientation to make sense.
If the 'this is' of drawing is the draughtsman's visual thought
made actual in form, the 'how' gives to it its clothing. Our final
chapter examined the 'how' of drawing through all the various means
the draughtsman employs as he moves to make. The particularity he
gives to his thought only clarifies itself as he clothes it through
the graphic structures he himself discovers. Herein, as we have seen,
lies the whole efficacy of drawing. More clearly than any other form
in the visual arts, drawing immediately betrays how the draughtsman
thinks. It betrays because it also reveals. By these forms shall
you know him. However within all its bounciness and implicit coherence
lies his opportunity for uncovering the 'irnaginaire' in vision. Un-
equivocal as these lines are in their appearing, their truth or
falsity, their courage or timidity, will stare him in the face. They
will moreover, reveal his touch, for his touch is where he has sought
to grasp what he has seen. The 'how' of drawing gives us insights into
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the pathways of the draughtsman's thought-in-act, and in doing so
ignites all our own images of touch, images of intimacy and images
of depth.
'This is how things are'. Drawing, through all the richness,
variety and particularity of its graphic forms can give a fresh sense
of the'objectness' of things in the world. Pathways made moribund
through habit take on a new significance through his images. Through
his 'coherent deformations' he can uncover a spatiality not known or
acknowledged by us before, he can remake our world. He can lift the
mist that surrounds objects, can pierce their skin, uncover their
envelope and generate new directions. Things no longer become 'objects'
coldly appraised, they become immersed in an aspect, they take on a
voluminosity, a thickness, an expressive significance; they offer
routes for new knowing.
Finally, the draughtsman seeks through his drawing a sense of a
continuing presence. 'This is how things are'. In the 'are-ness' of
his drawing the draughtsman is seeking not so much to define, as ex-
plore; to open up within the acknowledged boundness of his drawing
the reverberation of images; the sense that they present areas of
fecund possibility. A spatiality that testifies to the fact that
we are where we are not, caught in that contact between being and non-.
being. Herein is the texture of the draughtsman's image, the work
working, leading us toward rather than simply pointing to. What is
reached in drawing is still being reached toward. It is a disclosure
of what is,yet is always becoming. Drawings, if they are working, are
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not simply texts to be read; they offer a promiscuity caught within
the richness of their visual ambiguity that is never an 'all-done'.
Herein lies their ontological and epistemological status.
The whole of our philosophic endeavour has sought to move within
the orbit of this tolerance. To seek to make definitive what these
drawings so eminently suggest, would be to undermine the whole imagi-
native concern. Speculation is not uncertainty, speculation points
toward possibility, possibility that rests within an arc of probability.
Neither philosophy nor any other science of knowing can do more. All
it can do is seek to narrow down the arc's compass.
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TRAflSCRIPT 0? CONVHRSATIO' t1Th DAVID CC'1EY LAY 2,, 1979
DC David Cowley
GB Geoffrey Bailey
GB I'd really like to start with the things that you were doing at
St. IJartins over the two days and really to say something first
about the process photographs and then perhaps to move on to
some of the other things you have done in the past. One of the
things that strikes me immediately and certainly as I was watching
you when you were drawing, was the way that you're constantly
concerned with exploring the space in which the model is situated
even though very early on you're not really concerned whether
it's a model or whether it's another kind of object. The marks
that you make seem to me to indicate that you're building up a
kind of constellation in which this space can begin to happen.
Is this perhaps a realistic sort of assessment of the way you
are thinking about the drawing initially?
DC Yes, and I think it is very true that you ... for a drawing to
work, or whatever that means, it's also dot to live and it's got
to live within a kind of environment and I know that sounds a
bit strange, but you've got to get it somehow to be able to operate,
or work, or function, or live within that kind of environment which
is both two dimensional, you can never get away from the flatness
of the paper and yet it's more than just being totally an illusion
of three dimensional space on that two dimensional space, but the
marks have got to be both on the surface of the paper but they
have also got to work beyond it and in front of it, so you really
are working within that old convention of a 'cube' rather than a
flat sheet ... though you can't deny that ... So that's quite
important, I mean very early on I think, with the marks I'm making,
are eventually marks moving backwards, forwards, rather than ones
just marking out boundaries ... well, I suppose they are marking
out three dimensional boundaries and directions within those
boundaries rather than just going for where one surface turns
and joins another.
GB How much are you affected by the actual boundaries of the paper?
Is the cube of space that you are talking about situated somewhere
within these boundaries or are you making the kinds of initial
sort of tentative probes around this space, with the boundaries
of the paper in mind? Because that obviously is part of the two
dimensionality of the surface - the actual boundaries of the paper.
Is that important in the initial stages of the drawing?
DC It's difficult to know how important it is because immediately I
say, "right,the edges of this so-called cube are the edges of the
paper", there's a limitation. So what I probably say is that it
fluctuates four or five inches in from the edges and four or five
inches outwards. I mean, I wish it was possible to have such a
large bit of paper that you never really were limiting the edges
of this. I mean, I tried a thing, that quickly became a cliche,
very early on, by framing, making some marks within and framing
the drawing within the edges, moving in say three or four inches
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D from the ecies of the paper and markin: those out and saying those
are the edges that you work in and around the edges of that. But
that very quickly became a kind of cliche and so you're aware of
the edges of the paper, but they mustn't be a restriction of any
sort, but just a vague delineation in some sort of way. I wish
in looking at the photos ... the whole sequence now, that the
edges ... perhaps the whole thing had been worked right through.
I mean, I try ar.work right from top to bottom and in every way
through, the edges seem a bit, not ill-considered, but not as
totally relevant as they should be.
GB So that space, within which this image is beginning to emerge, is
tacitly assumed as you begin the drawing, it's something that you
are in a sense perhaps intuitively feeling your way in and out of,
as you build up the image of the drawing, and so therefore the
marks that you make are, in a sense, in response to that tacit
knowledge that you have of the space that you're trying to make
even though you haven't got to it.
DC No, I think the marks, in fact, mark the space and create the
space in a way that's very different from how the spate exists
in front of you, or how you think how it exists in front of you.
And, I mean, we haven't mentioned time at all and it must change
in a sequential way as well, so it's not only a spatial thing, it's
time as well as space. But the space you're trying to create has
some visible links with what's in front of you, but it must operate
in its own right. Because, I mean, they're only anchor points,
what's in front of you, but they are very important anchor points
that give what you're particularly looking at its particularity.
So the marks are made v:ith the space in mind, but with the sense
of it being able to develop its own space as you go along, so
they are tentative feelings out to a kind of reality, rather than
a
GB Rather than a definition of that reality.
DC Yes, yes.
GB I was going to say, at what point does the sense of that take
over ... of the space that you are trying to achieve within the
image, begin to happen for you? I mean, is this, in fact, what
you really are concerned about all the way through the drawing,
so that when you leave the drawing at the end, to some extent it
may or may not be successful, but it is, in fact, an exploration
along that kind of direction that you're concerned with?
DC You mean the spatial thing?
GB Yes.
DC No, it's only one tiny part of it. I think you stop a drawing
when you realise that the image is there and whether you've
arrived at it by rnesns of reaching out toward that spatial
those series of spatial elements or whether you've achieved it
by the very two dimensionality of the mark working in a very
surface level, are only just ways of achieving the image and the-
image for me seems to be able to be found within a three dimen-
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DC sional examination of spatial marks as well as two dimensional
ones, but it varies. I mean, sometimes the marks you are making
you are very conscious of them being marks ... on the surface
and tying together in that sort of way across and up and down
and suddenly you put one rrore mark that will take it back and
it will rrke all those marks work in a very three . dimensional
way. So I am not out to produce a three-ciimensional drawing in
any way.
GB An illusion.
DC An illusion, no, I mean I wouldn't Imow what ... the illusion...
No, it's not an illusion of an image because the image must be
very tangible, 'out it's the ira r;e and . you know, at some stage
or other there is no reason why I shouldn't completely destroy
the three dimensional qualities that exist within a drawing in
order to achieve the image.
GB How important in the achieving of that is the actual subject
matter? For exarmie, you talked earlier about anchor points
and references to sone kind of outside spatial reality. How
important in the forrulation of this ir;ae that you're talking
about vliich has to do with all these elements that you have dis-
cussed, how important is the actual subject, is that crucial or
not to you?
DC You mean subject matter in terms of whether it's a figure or an
object?
GB Is the figure an object?
DC The fiLure is a figure and the figure is an object and the figure
is an ir.age and the figure is whatever you want it to be, but
essentially it's a series of reference points. And obviously you
respond very differently to a figure than you would to a particu-
lar type of object. You are very aware of ... I mean, I was awane
of that :irl very early on in the terms of hcw sullenly agressive
she was, in a ray, al::.ost wanting to say what the hell am I doing
here? And more importantly what are you doing there drawing rte
when I need to be somewhere else? And I think that came through,
it must have cone through, I think in a way over a long period
of time, and that's rhy I like to work on drawings as long as I
possibly can. I mean if I could get hold of that model again I
would go on with that drawing. But that vas a kind of immediate
thing that I was vr- aware of nd care throui at the beinnin.
I think it cned very sii.htly on the second session, she wasn't
so openly a-:ressive or s'ller; there were odd spurts of it, and
I rust have resoonded to that as well. So drawing a figure is
very differer.t frc drawing an object. I'm quite pleased that
she chaned her rose a bit, I was never too worried about that.
I mean I rnould find it a great restriction if she was always in
the sa:.e rose an I certainly oudn't paint her with little r.d
crose aid sa don't 'sh for a week. (ahtcr)
GB No, no, so the way that Euan Uglo, for example
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5C Yes, I was thinking of him. I mean it's very necessary for his
work and that kind of tenacity and singlemindedness is very in-
teresting. So going back to that initial point, I would respond
very differently to a figure than to a series of objects, though
essentially they wouldn't be approached in any very different way,
the anchor points would still be there, I'd try and create the
image from there.
GB Yes, I was thinking more in terms of your subjective involvement
with the figure is obviously an important element in you preferring
perhaps to work, in that sense of involvement, more than just with
an object - I mean that's fairly important isn't it?
DC Viell, what do you mean by subjective?
GB Lre you interested ... you talked about the kind of sullen aggre-
ssiveness ... is this part of a characteristic that you want to
try and achieve?
DC Ro, not that mood. feeling.In a way I think it perhaps determines
initially how you attack a drawing and it gives you again another
anchor point, doesn't it. But that's all and those are things
that pass and move in, just like, you know, suddenly you realise
that the whole thing is very grey and you long for a bit of colour
and it's a very instant thing and you know perhaps, I didn't do it
with this drawing, but with other ones you reach for colour and
very quickly work the colour in because that is what you need at
that time. You can work through the colour back to black and
white or shades of grey if you like ... but it's an anchor point
and you think it suddenly seems to be something that might be useful
and so ... I tend to be impulsive in th2t way and I jump into it,
you know. I think we talked a long tine ago, when I did the first
series abouthow fascinating I found Rick's approach to drawing
when he went from state one to stage two. This is something I
couldn't do. So if I suddenly felt the need that the whole thing
should be red, I'd do it.	 -
GB Lhich indicates a very real feeling... You are feeling all the
time that the thing is in flux and is constantly shifting both
backwards and forwards, in and out. That kind of flax situation
is indicated, one might almost say, by the kind of technique, by
the way in which you actually draw. So you're not so much interested
in defining as exploring, would'this be true?
DC Yes, yes, I think that's it. You're exploring but with the hope
that something will be defined.
GB Yes, it's a different kind of definition isn't it? I mean, in the
sense that somebody picking up the line of a contour and actually
working through it, like one of the subjects I am working with at
the Royal College does that in terms of his own drawing. This is
a very different way from the way in which ou actually see your
approach to making the image and your approach to definition in
that sense. You're not involved with putting a line round some-
thing, you're actually involved with exploring the shift of spatial
concern along an edge within a total context, aren't you?
DC Clarity can come in very many different ways and I think that
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DC gradual build up to clarity can be a way of working and I think
that's initially how I approached drawing when, you know, when
I v;as at college and painting as well. Vie were taught by people,
in fact, who worked in that way, so you worked by gradually map-
ping the whole thing in and gradually worked in to knuckles,
nipples and kneecaps, but it left out so much and you weren't
free; you were working to a kind of formula that produced well-
defined drawings, but they were empty and hopeless and they didn't
have any kind of excitement about them. I mean that really is
what is important, the excitement of achieving the invisible by
looking at the visible.
GB Yes. Were there any points in the process of the drawing where
you felt this was really coming through. In other words, were
there points in the drawing where you achieved this to some
extent ... this is the image isn't it; this is really what you
are talking about and then it moved away from you.
DC I think it happened all the time quite honestly. I find there
is an initial period where you're looking around for anchor points
and you want to rush these. I mean, the first mark you make
might be one you discard at the end of a drawing or in a couple of
days or a couple of minutes, it doesn't matter, but you are tenta-
tively searching for a kind of framework on which to hang the
image and tie it together if it's possible to tie ... and you
always think that mark you have just made is quite relevant to
the build-up of that image and you see it there and you lose it
and you move inwards and outwards from it.
GB It's a kind of morphology isn't it?
DC Yes it is, but in a way I'd stop a drawing iumediately I felt
that I had achieved the image because it would, it would force
you to stop if you were aware of what was going on ... if you
were not aware then you would be working to some kind of formula,
which is what I try not to do. I know it's impossible not to
work to some sort of limitations. It's this discovery thing or
desperation, it's excitement in the drawing and once you've done
the drawing, in a sense, it's both interesting and irrelevant.
GB I was going to say, once you have moved past the history of its
making, you have a very different attitude to the whole of the
drawing itself. I mean, this is another aspect of the temporal
nature that you were talking about earlier. In the process of
actually bringing this image through, which is what it is you
are endeavouring to do, you have a very much more dynamic link
obviously with the drawing because it is in process. VThen the
drawing has passed, how important is it to you?
DC It's a way of reliving the looking which is quite interesting
and that's quite relevant. It's a way of reliving the sensations
you had when you were drawing. The sensation of her stretching
back on that chair is as important as the marks that lead you into
it, so there is a series of feelings that are tied to it, as well
as visual experiences - that's very interesting.
GB :But it always rn2kes you go on to make fresh drawings.
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DC 3akes you want to ... Yes, or continue, with that dr?wing if that
was possible. It doesn't tell you any more about how you should
draw or ... it doesn't lead you on to a path ... because that
seemed. to be a very particular experience and I find it very dan-
gerous to try and relive those experiences hoping that they will
help you to draw or live better.
GB Are you always trying to refine your way of drawing, because of
what you've just said?
DC I'm trying to be more articulate if that's refinement, flO, I don't
think it is. Io, I don't think it's refinement, in a sense, it's
trying to be more articulate in that way and in a very momentary
way too. I mean, going back to that thing about how relevant is
a drawing after you have done it. I mean, many people say I can't
see the drawing because there's so much'shine' from the pencil or
whatever and I can, perhaps, only see the drawing if I walk past
it very quickly and in a particular moment I can see the drawing
clearly and I say fine - that's all and it's really rather like
that moment ... the walking ... or the drawing you have done, for
that one drawing, suddenly in that one moment you see the clarity
and that's all.
GB And that really is the image isn't it?
DC Yes, I th3nk so ... the one that makes you stop and, perhaps,
re-examine it and go back to that position and try and re-evaluate
the whole thing.
GB And the holding of that image for contemplation, in a sense, is
what makes the presence and the feeling of the drawing?
DC Yes, I think so.
GB And that is what you're moving towards when you are talking about
clarity and articulation, that is the kind, of thing
DC It's clarifying the image in a far more potent and powerful way.
There are other ways ... I was quite interested in Wmn Jones'
drawings because his image is clarified by the marks he makes in
the bottom right hand corner
GB The titles.
DC Yes ... The problem is with something like that, is that the clarity
is given to you - it's not a clarity that you achieve. I'm quite
interested in the clarity that comes out of the drawing.
GB Visually.
DC Visually in any way possible ... I want people that look at the
drawing to arrive at that clarity in an equally personal way and
that's why I'm quite reluctant to put titles, althoui, in fact,
it would help ... you know, imnediately .... somewhere on that
drawing, if I put 'reclining fiire' people would then start to
operate visually in a particular way; they would start to sort
out things. I mean, perhaps the triage is far more powerful if
it ... if they see it in a series of forms, shapes and surfaces...
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DC connu.nicate a feeling of' something reclining in a chair without
it being stated.
GB A lot of what you're saying, David, seems to include the whole
area of visual ambiguity in the image forming process, which you're
actually very, very interested in aren't you? Because this is part
of the image's 'clarity'; this is part of its sense; this is part
of its meaning - the visual ambiguities that are coming through at
various points in the drawing which are contributing to this
momentary sense of vriat the image is. Would this be tnie? Is
ambiguity, in the sense of what I've just said, important to you?
BC I don't want the drawings to be anbiguous for the sake of being
ambiguous - because they give a kind of false excitement, I mean,
you know, if you are not certain about what one thing is or another.
But if you're going for a kind of clarity, a kind of orgunisation
of what you think is important and a kind of articularity, in a
way, you have got to be aware of the ambiguous, the things that
lead you away from what you want. I think it can be used.
GB Aren't these part of the structure though of the image that you
are making
DC ''ell, it's that ambiguous thing vve were talking about - the two
dinensional surface of the drawing and the marks that could indi-
cate a three dimensional quality. I mean, you're aware of both
aren't you? And perhaps you should be aware of all the other
possibilities - the ambiguity, in fact.
GB Vould another therm be tension - a kind of visual tension, or does
this go too far toward a sort of structuralism feeling about the
drawing. Is visual tension and visual ambiguity something that
operates ... it obviously operates in what it is you're doing
DC I think it could be an area that could be the basis of attention,
yes. On the other hand, marks working against one another can have
a tremendous amount of tension as such, but they don't necessarily
have to be ambiguous do they? Though you could say in certain
areas of the drv;ing, you're not absolutely certain whether the
mark works backwards from point A or forwards - but that's, per-
haps, when you just see it in isolation, don't you? The ambiguity
is when you don't see the totality, and it's one individual part
that can ... it's like watching a film, isn't it? Where you for
one reason or another see the wheels of a stage coach go backwards,
and if you're looking just at those wheels, they could be a kind
of ambiguity, but if you're seeing the totality of the image,
there's no doubt in your mind. So ambiguity, perhaps, could come
from isolating things and because the image, we could go back to
this really, the image is not powerful enough to override those
ambiguities.
GB Yes, yes. have we at any point, do you think, clarified what
the image is that it is that you are trying to achieve?
DC I don't think ve could really. I think we tried this last time,
didn't we? To try and clarify what the image was. I don't think
I could, I mean, perhaps I could come nearest to it by saying
that it's the totality of visual and emotional experiences in
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DC that activity of drawing that seem to be the most fruitful and
the most powerful, but that's all. I don't ... the image isn't
more powerful if the figure looks 'fleshy', or the image is not
more powerful is the drawing is very 'spatial', the image is not
more powerful if ... well the if's go on and on and on, don't
they? But it's something that I take responsibility for and the
viewer takes responsibility for as well - the identification of
that image, and. you know, people have got to work at looking at
drawings too. Philip Rawson is fine when he says, right at the
beginning of his book, and it's really a restatement all the way
through of the 'language' and how the particular language of a
drawing and how to read it and all that. Well, O.K., but I
think people should enjoy working that out for themselves, if
the drawing holds them for long enough. I want to be able to
hold them for long enough for them to be able to work out the
'language', if there is such a thing, of that particular drawing.
GB So really this is asking for somebody to become involved in your
own scanning processes and your own particular directional involve-
ment and interest and absorbtion with this image that it is you
are trying to make and to, in a sense, draw them in through the
efficacy of the drawing itself. I mean, this is really what it
is you are trying to do, isn't it? This is the kind of truth;
this is the kind of value; this is the kind of meaning that a
drawing would have for you.
DC Yes, yes. I mean, it's like looking at one of Czanrie's self-
portraits and working your way with total involvement from one
section of the head across the whole of that hard skull right
to the other side. I mean, you are, you're grabbed, you're in-
volved, you're working your way across that surface in a totally
committed concerned way, and you're reading it, you're reading
it as perhaps he wanted you to read it; but I mean, how vre you
grabbed, what made you want to do it - the power of the image.
GB Yes, yes. How far do you find yourself at certain points in the
drawing possibly being seduced by the kinds of marks that you're
making? Is this a danger that you have been aware of and actually
deal with in the process of making your drawing? Are you ever
actually seduced by the sorts of marks that you make?
DC (Laughter) Yes, I am all the time. I mean once you've made a
mark you're seduced by it - either with going on or going back
or whatever. I never really look at a mark and say: "Gosh,
isn't that a beautiful mark, let's keep it". I think there is
a danger and anyone that makes marks on canvas, paper or whatever
is aware of it. But if that mark isn't relevant for what it con-
tributes, as well as being relevant in its own right, I think it
should go - but I think you are ... I mean, there's something
really very satisfying in a notebook and I've done this more than
once - just sitting, making marks and trying to get the most
seductive marks out on the paper, the problem is that once you
try and make seductive marks they never look seductive. Seduc-
tion is something that takes you unawares sometines.
GB Right - and it's also something after the event, isn't it? In
other words, if the thing is working and if it's actually in con-
text you can actually, in a sense, stand back from it and then
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GB begin to assess it in its context for what it is which actually
means you can continue the drawing rather than become involved
just with the sort of drawing that it is. I mean this is the
difference, isn't it?
DC Yes, I think the thing too is that I tend to work over a drawing
in a very radical way. I'll put a mark down but I will re-assess
it, very very soon after having put the mark dov.-n, in relation -
ship to the marks that came before and the marks that cam on after
it. So, if I suddenly find, and this is probably vrre these
sequences are so interesting, if I suddenly find that a mark has
stayed untouched for any length of time, (a) it's got to be very
important or (b) it's beginning to have a negative influence on
the total drawing. And I assess that and it might mean that I
would need to remove that mark totally, see how the drawing oper-
ates vithout it and then perhaps come back to it and restate it.
GB Do you remember, at points in the drawing, when vre stopped for
coffee and wei just ta1kin about it, the graphic anchor points
that seemed important to you in the middle stages and certainly
in the early stages of the drawing, was the way in which the space,
or the areas around the figure, was compressing this figure up
through a kind of diagonal, leaning back core. Now this was a
very, very visual and graphic thing that you were holding on to.
That was important to you, wasn't it, at some stage in the drawing?
DC 1el1, at that time, I mean, she was - she was squashed between
those two quite powerful masses, one being that bed at the back
and the other was a wooden block and it was quite interesting
how, I know there wasn't much space in that life-room, but you
had an area of fairly open floor which was somehow drawn up into
her legs, went along her thighs, up across her stomach and up
through the head and then there was quite a big gap between some
screens and so that kind of movement disappeared right through
and went right back, in fact, into the open door just behind her.
So that was quite powerful. There was a restatement of the two
massive blocks as well, because the chair at some stage had arms,
not arms in the sense that they were physical arms, but there
was an area between her buttock and the edge of the chair which
was defined by her black coat and they gave a very powerful feeling
of again squashing this very luminous flesh between areas of black.
So that WaS quite important ... I held that for most of the time.
It changed character a great deal, the marks weren't as graphic
as you said they were at the beginning, but essentially that
feeling was there all the way through.
GB And that's the feeling of the drawing, isn't it? Because that
in the end is what comes through in the last frame - that sense
of compression and tension, that in a sense is running up right
through the core of the fiixre, twisting over, turning, incor-
porating the various nuances within the change, within the figure.
And, in a sense, one might almost say, the graphic meaning of the
drawing lies in that kind of explanation, that kind of eloration
really. Would you say that this was possibly true?
DC Yes. I had to weigh that up equally with another series of marks
that were very, very strong vertical marks. I think while there
was this graphic, twisting end bending as you said, there was also
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DC a very strong vertical one that was stated quite early on if I
remember, just slightly to the left of her head and it went down,
straight down across the body into the leg of the chair. Now it
stayed there, it altered, it shifted to the left and the right,
the angles changed a lot too, sometimes they were quite accurate
in the terms of what I could see, the leg particularly of the
chair. But I felt it was somehow an anchor point, I removed it
at some stage ... the vertical mark also became a kind of angle
which reinstated the floor, sometimes the mark went right to the
edge of the paper, right off the paper and at other times it stays
quite compact underneath the chair. So I played around with these
two elements and in quite a formal way theyre contributing some-
thing quite poerful to the image. I found, after a bit, that
the bottom vertical mark had to move over slightly and I think
if you look at the drawing, you'll see that it has shifted quite
considerably at the top as well as at the bottom - so I wanted
to emphasise the verticality of the drawing in conjunction with
the twisting and bending backwards.
GB And how important is the floor, David? This other dimension that
is moving, in a sense, underneath this verticality because the
verticality is almost a two dimensional thing that links it almost
to the surface of the paper, the floor actually is another tension
moving against it. And that seemed quite important, because you've
made marks that describe the cube of the chair on the floor.
DC Yes, the floor was important. At some stage I thought I wanted
the floor and one foot to be very, very closely linked together
and for the foot to take off the floor and carry your eye up the
leg and where the knees were bent and across. Very soon after
that I decided I did not want that obvious anchor point; I wanted
it to be implied two or three inches out of range of the drawing.
I wanted to imply that the floor and the foot were ... and I think
they do work together in quite a good way. So the floor had to be
spatially seen in order for that foot to operate outside the draw-
ing, in fact, that was quite important.
GE Yes, yes, which is another indication of this cube of space exten-
ding past the boundaries of the edges of the paper that you were
working on. I mean, here is a very real example of their working.
Not only is there a spatial sense within the drawing but it is
actually seeking to break the bounds of the edge of the paper.
DC But you see that spatial ... this series of spatial relationships
are important for v-hat they do, not for what they are. I mean,
I've done drawings that are illusions of spatial elements, that
work really quite well, but they don't do it for any other way
or any other reason that they're spatial drawings, which is like
saying I'm going to do a pencil drawing - so what, so what if
something operates spatially, there's got to be something far
more beyond that, that really is the most important thing.
GB Is this something that you might talk about in terms of the visual
idea of the drawing?
DC Yes. I think it's the visual idea that develops from the drawing.
I don't think I started off with that idea; I think it gradually
crept up and into the drawing; the idea might change. I rdght
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DC have found half-way through th't I really v.asn't that concerned
about the black coat and the space enclosing the figure and
crushing it and squeezing it, I was far more concerned about
the way that light flesh was a kind of gap that was torn between
the areas of black and, in fact, the flesh was actually seeping
into areas of black and permeating the whole thing rather than
the other way round.. It didn't develop that way I must admit,
but it could have very easily gone that way.
GB Yes, and if you were continuing the drawing that it is at the
point where these ideas are suggested to you through what you
have already achieved in the drawing - which is an important thing
about drawing, isn't it? I mean, it is actually developed a par-
ticular kind, of thing that you have begun to try and sort out but
weren't clear about, but which is now giving you a platform from
which to move forward into fresh areas of exploration and possi-
bility that are provided within the visual structuring of the
drawing itself.
DC Yes, the thing too is that many people have said I can't see your
drawing, why don't you do a whole series of them; rather like the
way potters make objects, they never work one idea out with great
clarity by destroying what they've got, they simply make a whole
series, which would' be fine
GB Blind you by number.
DC Yes. I mean, I think painters do this as well, everybody does -
somehow feels the image is so precious that you can't bear to
destroy it. I think 'that intention of being able to destroy it
is important. Anyway that's a side track. It's important that
all the events and ideas, the misjudgments, whatever, are held
within that drawing, because I think that's what gives it its
kind of potency, in a way, so, if somehow or another I had felt
very strongly that the idea of having a fissure expanding into
the areas, and opening the space out was important, I would have
done it, quite consciously, over the top of what already existed;
it's not another drawing, it's the same aspect of the same drawing.
I mean, this perhaps leads to a kind of difficulty in being able
to read the image with clarity, but you know, you've got to say
what is important, a well seeable drawing or a well readable
drawing. The real excitement is that in the next moment it might
fall apart - totally, and you have got to be aware of everything
at a very crucial level in order to keep it where it is - because
you can lose it.
GB This tenuousness is something which you touched on before and is
a kind of fragility, that is an aspect of the image that you are
trying to reach toward, isn't it? And yet it ... in other words,
it can be or not be, and the line beteen it being or not being
is a very, very fine one indeed, isn't it? And the livingness
of the drawing depends on almost the tension that exists bet'een
that kind of dichotomy, isn't it?
DC Yes, yes, the excitement of knowing or not knowing.
GB Or of falling
DC Yes, I mean, you start a new piece of work with a real excitement
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DC in the sense, that not only are there so many things you want
to put down and say and look at and examine or whatever - we
still haven't Lot used to this idea of wasting time have v.e?
That you mi6ht, in fact, spend two or three weeks drawing some-
thing every day of the week and find at the end that there'8
nothing; that you were neither up to seeing what was there or
putting down what you felt was important. And I'd much rather
have nothing than something that vas nothing. I nean, I've been
drawing for myself - I clarify the way Isee, I clarify the way
I look, as well as clarifying the things I'm looking at - clari-
fying my response to thing's - that's all. It's nice when people
look at the drawings; it's even nicer when they quite like them,
but really they have Eot nothing to contribute apart from what
they want to contribute when they look at the drawing.
GB Is that what makes drawing, for you, something which is very
essential to the way you think and operate? Is that why drawing
is important to you, because of its very, very private kind of
DC I was trying to explain to some students in the Fine Art Depart-
ment about how drawing had, in fact, become an activity that was
totally natural to itie - that I didn't think about drawing and I
can't imagine not making marks on paper for a day or two ... It's
just something that is as total as picking up a book or reading
or looking at a newspaper.
	 an essential part of ..., not
because it's anything important or vital, but it's just an acti-
vity that happens - because many people have to make a very
conscious decision to draw or they draw for a reason, you know,
does that drawing relate to what your work's about or what you're
thinking about, but the actual activity of drawing is something
very important. I mean, I was trying to explain, when I had been
brout up on the farm in Rhodesia, that drawing suddenly became
the activity of living and finding arid being , in a way - making
marks was as natural as reading books. I was lucky, in a sense,
that my parents encouraged me to read a great deal and, I suppose,
because there was a kind of sense of isolation very early on, and
not wanting to have anything to do with my younger brothers and
sisters as they were two or three years younger than I was, made
this a kind of way of living and operating end it's totally natural.
I mean, I don't draw except for any reason apart from just drawing.
GB Yes, yes. So for you it really is an extension of yourself out-
ward into the world, just as language is, just as the way you use
clay and so on. It's as natural to you as that, in the sense, of
how it operates for you.
DC Yes it is. It's not only in the way I use clay, but it's in the
way, as you said, the way I use language, the way you use anything
you use the body or a tool to communicate something. Drawing
is another way, it seems totally natural to make a gesture on
paper rather than a gesture in the air. Sometimes, it can say
far more in terms of pin-pointing something or making it more
articulate. It's not drawing really, is it? It's clarifying
something in a way that it's possible to clarify.
GB The interesting this is that it formulates the history of these
gestures doesn't it? Into a form that can be lived through again,
whereas a gesture is lost on the air, words are lost, unless they're
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GB recorded, words are lost once they have been spoken, drawing has
a very tangible way of bringing back and evoking the sense of
the excitement of its making and that's important also obviously
in your own drawing, isn't it?
DC Yes, I think so. Though I'm not absolutely certain whether ges-
tures that are made in the air ever are lost. I think there are
ways in which they are recorded either via other people, I mean
you must be able to know the particular gestures or remember the
gestures people make, rather than what they were trying to com-
municate when they made the gesture. So I think it is a way of
trying to form links and trying to re-examine that period of two
days when we were doing the drawing and perhaps a mark or a photo-
graph in a way will do just that, pull you back to it.
GB You enjoyed doing this particular drawing, Dave, didn't you?
DC Yes I did. The nice thing about it was that I had the chance
to do two days of concentrated drawing that wasn't linked to a
self-portrait of one sort or another. I'm always there when I
want to draw myself and that's fine but having a model over these
two days, yes, it was very good. Then you become greedy, don't
you ... (laughter) ... you wish you could go on for four days or
five days, a month
GB So, as far as what you've done is concerned, there's a sense that
has come through from the drawing to you of something vital that
happended - of one is to talk of success or not in terms of the
drawing, one might say that this drawing really began to work.
DC Yes, I mean, as I said earlier, I think I would certainly go on
with it, for there are many things that need very radical changes
and I wouldn't know what those are now. I mean, I wouldn't work
on the drawing away from the model. I'd have to have that figure
back there in order to make those marks formed far more relevant.
Vhat I'd. do if I ... I mean, I've done this sometimes, worked
away from the model; I tend to use the solutions of other drawings
in order to solve the problems of this, which becomes a strange
sort of mish-mash of nothing in the end. But I might, yes, I
would be quite interested, perhaps, in going back and re-looking
at that model and re-examining the drawing in front of her. I
might find it would lead me on a new track; it might be just a
way of clarifying certain parts there. But it certainly has
it isn't successful in the sense that I couldn't do any more. I
mean, that's when a drawing really is successful and it stops.
It's very interesting seeing these drawings and I really will
spend some time looking at them and I'm glad I didn't look at
them before hand, before we talked, because I think it might have
sorted things out in a way that I didn't want to. But the danger
is that you look back over these and you suddenly think: I wish
I'd stopped there. There's a path there that I didn't take that
might have been more fruitful. So there is a chance of you almost
beginning, if you are not careful, of negating some of the acti-
vities because the rest of the activity might have been another
path - and that's a problem. You've got to be quite strong with
yourself and say: No, that's the path I chose and I've got to
stand and be responsible for that.
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GB Being too self-conscious of your own activity in that way could
be inhibiting of course, couldn't it? While, for example, you're
making a drawing and you have remembered what these sequences
looked like to you - there is a danger in that, isn't there?
Where you could come across, in terms of your next and subsequent
drawings, a point where you think ... I remember what this was
like when I looked at those sequences, I'd better stop here.
That could be a real danger, couldn't it?
DC Yes, yes. It is like when I paint, for example, scraping down
at the end of the day is quite important, because sometimes you
leave something there. I mean, either you've finished a painting
or you haven't and if you leave what's there and come fresh to it
the following day, the following morning - you can be seduced by
what you've left, rather than seeing it in a totally clear way
and, perhaps, it might be an idea the next time I draw to remove
everything that's there at the end of the day if it doesn't work
and start again. I don't mean with another bit of paper, but on
that same paper where there are only slight remembrances of what
was there rather than too many, as it were.
GB Yes, yes. Well, David, thank you very, very much indeed. You
have found it valuable looking back through the processes?
DC Yes, as I said earlier, drawing is a natural activity. I find.
doing natural things valuable.
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B Vere ou surprised to see your own process in action, as it were, was
there any kind of surprise coming from looking at the process photographs
themselves?
DS The surprise of making?
B Yes, and also the surprise of perhaps a recognition of a new kind of
order, when you actually started to see the way you worked through the
kinds of images that the photographs obvioDsly gave you - was there
anything particularly interesting about that to you?
DS No, because the way I work for the moment ... is that I ... it's a step
by step progression and in a way it's a very methodical way of working,
all that the photographs do is that they chart, that it's just pleasant
to see what the decisions were.
B Do they indicate to you something that you already knew - about how you
work?
DS Sure, there's nothing in them that I could say, eOh, that surprises me",
as opposed to anything else.
B Yes, the one that you did where you did a great deal of change, do you
remember? And you rubbed it out and rubbed it through and so on. That
kind of tracks an event of the drawing itself and you weren't really very
happy with that drawing were you? (Figs. 20-24)
DS Ve11, see, that was an exception. I did. that, to tell you the truth,
because you were there. I thought it would be a worthwhile endeavour
just to push the drawing further than I normally would have done anyway.
For, as you know, I would have stopped earlier on and would have got a
new clean sheet of paper and begun again, but instead, I decided, 'I'll
overcome that and push it through'.
3B But that's not your normal way of working, is it?
DS No, no. I don't want to confuse the idea of labour - for nie.that was
a laborious drawing, where one was working against pentimenti, you know,
the lines that were already there and I was working more against those
than what was actually there and the response to that
B You mean in terms of the model?
DS Yes, it seemed like I was trying to make a 'life drawing' of the errors
that I had made rather than what wa actually there in front of me.
B So, really your drawing is very much concerned with an immediate response
to what's there
&DS Yes.
GB And not a great deal of reassessment
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DS No, no.
B On the paper...
.DS No, the reassessment - there's no room for reassessment because the
first assessment has to be the right one and sometimes it works and
sometimes, more often than not, it does not, due mainly to the fact
that, what can one say, one is a student and one has to learn how to
draw lines, develop the language of drawing, tone, line, shape and so
on - the vocabulary of drawing.
B But your approach is very much to do with sensing what it is you want
to say almost before you put it down
DS Rather, I know what I do not want to say; to have a pre-formed notion
of the image is not the motive for drawing. The only concept I have
before making a drawing from the model is that the image should create
itself; to find itself via modes which come into being during the act
of drawing. These modes are not necessarily arbitrary but based on
the 'non paint' of view ( which, however, is a point of view) of
allowing everything there is to be included in the drawing, but in-
evitably creating only one. Hopefully the one most appropriate at that
most specific moment in time.
B In other words you want a kind of clarity first of the image.
DS Yes.
B You don't want this clarity to emerge by a reassessment on the paper
LDS No, no.
B You want it first and then you deliver it by the line
DS Ve11, what I do is ... I think I said. this to you before, is that I
alrays walk a thin line. It's no use having an a priori image inside
your head right? Because that destroys the making of the drawing itself.
But also there is, as you said, this wanting of clarity, but trying to
make, achieve that ... through ... not forcing it, let it happen. It's
a 'state of being' when you're drawing, for me - of having knowledge
right? Of experience of drawing through continuous drawing and making
use of it ... well, not making pictures ... the drawings in themselves
are revelations of this experience of drawing so that they are experien-
tial in that sense, but they are not ... going through the motions of
drawing - so you have to recreate yourself everytime you get a new sheet
of paper and so on.
B So the white paper is an immediate kind of challenge in the sense of
its being open to you - as being you know
DS Yes.
within this experience, but it's also got a kind of tension as well
hasn't it?
DS Yes, the whiteness of the paper has a beauty in itself, right? Which
I acknowledge and one has to make something of that, it's cognising that
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DS that fact riaht? One begins a drawing with the whiteness of the paper.
B It's using it, isn't it?
DS Yes, if we are going to talk about paper - texture, colour, that too
is important as much as what I'm going to put on it.
B Yes, so this last series of drawings, where you were working not on
newsprint but actually on fairly good. quality white cartridge - was
a different kind, of experience which you actually felt, wasn't it?
DS Yes, oh yes, I respond to the paper, sure.
Th But you respond to it not as a surface on which you can then, in a
sense, like Jim Dine, sculpture the thing, by rubbing out and re-
assessing, the primacy of the white
US Yes.
B Or the space, if you like, is a very important thing, isn't it?
UDS Yes. Could I just mention about Jim Dine. Re's a draughtsman, I feel,
who is very aware of the fact that he is sculpturing, and he is making
use of the paper and it's an awareness of which I ... don't like
it's something I try and extirpate from myself, you know. It's a con-
sciousness I do not want - that you're consciously using the beauty of
the paper to make an artificial beauty which isn't as beautiful as the
initial ground, you know.
B So the drawing becomes a kind of resolution between the tension between
the whiteness of the paper and
UDS The model.
the model.
UDS And the day.
and the day, yes ... and Lerleau-Ponty talks about the line as a
gouging out of the in-itself, and this is something really which you're
appreciating in the kinds of experiences that you're talking about when
you're talking about drawing, isn't it?
UDS Yes, yes, well you know that I read. him quite a lot, yes.
]B That you would share, woulftn't you?
UDS Yes, the line itself has a primacy, different kinds of line, how they
arrange and how they organise themselves on the space. See ... and I
think thatmight almost contradict what I said - there is the model right?
And the time of day and also when you see the drawing taking on its
appearance, you know, its in itself - that too makes demands on you, so
you've got to keep almost a third eye on the drawing, you see
B What is emerging under your hand?
UDS Right - so you have to pay tribute to that as well, so you have to say
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DS "This line Iray not correspond to what's out there, but it iny help the
structure of the drawing as a thing in itself".
B So if anyone was to say - Your drawings are simply about putting a line
round an object"- this couldn't be farther from the truth, could it?
DS Right - right. Well, as you know, there are no lines round objects
anyway - nature's not ir.ade up of human lines. You know, what a human
being does is create equivalents for those, that's all we can do and in
that sense they're artificial constructs; they can never be as the world
is. But one can assimilate how the world is, in the way you make it.
B Right, so this for you, is really the value of the line, isn't it? This
kind of double aspect that it has
DS Yes.
not only of being what is is within itself but also what it is that
it's making outside itself
DS Yes, yes.
B ... which is n important part of the value of the line for you and you
try and preserve this kind of ... I suppose it is a primacy really, within
the way in which you draw.
DS 'cell, the line ... there's no fudging - you can't conceal anything, the
line is self-explanatory in that sense, it tells you about how your hand
was at that time. whether it as confident of itself, whether your hand
was at one with what your brain ... the thought it was transmitting and
so on. That's why I use the line, though in some cases, such as Ingres,
the line has been used almost cosmetically, you know.
•B As an addition?
DS As a refining process, as a symbol of some kind, of order which he had
right.
B Predesigiated.
DS Yes, an a priori order which is something I don't want - I can't achieve
anyway, I haven't got ... To me, the act of drawing is to' put the chaos
of the world into some kind of order, I carry with me every day and I
try to exemplify the ordering of this chaos in the way I draw.
•B Yes, that's fascinating. The other thing is, you were talking earlier
about the model and how important the model is within this kind of tri-
partite thing that's goind on within the drawing. Why is it important
to you to draw from the model?
DS I can only repeat what L'atisse said "that if there were no model one
could not deviate from it". It's not as if he could not draw without
her, he used the model as a starting point - right? Henever relies
she's not a crutch - an artifice that one needs. I find her useful in
that as an examplar of the world I can create my experience of her (and
so the world) and thus in the deviation of her recreate it anew.
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B The sense of the value of the expressiveness of the line that you can
achieve, seems somehow perhaps from what you are saying - to marry most
when it comes in conjunction with the human figure.
DS Yes. I want to draw the human figure. I want to have an intimate know-
ledge of the human figure. Well, we have to talk about the human figure
in the terms of a woman, more often than not, the human figure to the
artist is synonymous with the woman and for me, that requires that I be
with her for a long time, just as when you are with someone else that
you wish to know for a long time - they're the only grounds that one has,
when you can say - well I know the human figure - you draw her all the
time. We're not talking about anatomical - you know I know how many
ribs there are, I know how the blood ... the blood system and so forth.
I want to know how she sits in one particular day - how her arms inter-
lock with her head - I'm more interested in the external physiognomy,
rather than in the internal.
B So you're seeing the model 'like yourself'. I mean in the sense of you
being in the world, you're sharing this kind of sense as you look with
the ... at the model, this kind of evocation that you feel within your-
self - because you also are a body - you talked about the physiognomic
significance of the forms that you're drawing from, which seems, in a
sense, to echo the directions of your own experience with the world.
DS Yes, it's only through myself that I experience the world, so whilst I
acknowledge the other bodies are like you ... I have to find, as Latisse
stated, the "individual rhythm" which is in every face, and this is dis-
tinguished by the contrast existing between the face of the model and
all other faces.
B It's because you have a history in the world that you can respond to
the kind of history that comes through when you are actually drawing
from the model.
DS Well, I never know the extent of that history. I never know what it is.
I always have to discover that, you know, i1s not as if it's there all
the time as if it's there for us to see. One has to go out and interro-
gate this history, one has to pick it up and examine it. I have to
clarify why I work from the model. What I was saying about Jatisse is
that he worked from her. If you see the sequential photographs of him
at work, he always began with a likeness, slowly he moved away from that -
that's what I mean, she was there and she was not there at the same
time. It's that thin line again that I'm talking about.
B It's the fugitiveness of that, isn't it?
DS One needs the physicality of the presence of her there, one doesn't
mean you're a slave to that at all.
B So like K1'ee would say - drawing for you is not physical-optical seeing -
it's about a kind of sense of getting beneath - piercing the skin of
things, isn't it?
DS ;el1, yes, if we're talking about piercing the skin, we have to talk
about Giacornetti. Giacornetti's a great example of that, for me he holds
a lot of value, in that he made the human body transparent - what is it -
you know, there's this great density of lines, but there's always this
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DS light coring through it, if it wasn't there he would, you know, erase
some parts - vhat you had was the front of the body and also you had
what was behind.
B The essentiality really - of this being in space, but not a kind of
space ... where the space became as tangible as the tangibility of the
object, you know
DS We1l, I think he would say that he was concerned with the space. But
how do you experience space? Because there are objects, concrete things
of phenomena in the world which we can touch bodily or sense, gauge the
nature of their order with our vision, and thus intellect, that we can
discern space as the net of our being which we can haul in, find what is
there, and throw out again. When one draws, paints sculpts etc, we draw
in this net.
B So this really, coming back to your own drawings, would be the kind of
value that you're really seeking to achieve, isn't it? It's not spatial
concern in the sense of mathematical three-dimensional measurement.
DS No, no. No, no. That's not space anyway. I'm not interested in co-
ordinates. I'm not interested in co-ordination of space. I'm not in-
terested in the mapping out. I may be one day, but I'm certainly not
at the time being. No, I'm interested in the fluidity of it - well, we
move through it!
B Yes, yes - it's a flux isn't it?
DS Yes, yes.
B would you say this is why the line is such an important element to you
within the drawing?
DS Oh, yes, if you look at the lines, they're always different, there's
always equivalents, there's always ... must correspond to how we live
in the world ourselves.
B And this is their beingness, isn't it?
DS Yes.
B It doesn't mean to say they define in the sense of contour, but they
actually are delivering a sense because they are to do with an essential
feeling that we have about our sensing of what is out there and the
focussing of this sensing, to denonstrate the flux of it.
DS Yes, yes.
B The other thing from the photographs, is the way that you begin always
in the same place with the drawing. You begin with the head and the
drawing unrolls almost. It moves downward through from the head. I've
notices, and you must have noticed, when you were looking through the
process photographs, how over and over again, your initial marks are
to do with the area around the head and around the eyes particularly
and the nose and so on. Is there a reason for this? It's done so regu-
larly isn't it through your drawings - can you say why this happens?
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3 1ell, maybe it's a habit which one day I may have to overcome, but why
not? I don't try to defend myself, but obviously it's the most human
thing in the world to look at the head, it's the most exposed part of
human beings. I don't use it - as we read character from it, it just
seems to be the most important part of the body, it's the top.
And in a sense the body reaches out to the space surrounding it from
the head. Is it in any way, I don't know, is it in any way symbolic
for you that you start from the head?
S It's the c3.po di monte, it's the head of the ... it's the top of the
mountain, in Italian tcapo also means 'head' so it's ... it's like a
descent. If I was climbing a mountain one would start from the bottom,
but because a drawing is not a mountain, only an analogy, we can begin
anywhere, and I begin from that place from which we near the mountain
of the world - the head.
But you would never feel, would you? I mean, starting from the feet
and arriving at the head?
S No,.because it's an unnatural progression. If you work with line, the
tendency is, you know, to work downwards, lines are more often than not
dovrnwards and to draw from the bottom up is lamost like a reverse process
you know. It may be interesting to do one day, but •for the time being
it's difficult enough to draw in the usually prescribed manner, you know
in the Western way of doing things. (laughter)
So your drawings, when they are complete, are read as a whole, but the
interesting thing always is that the lines although they proceed down
from the head, are always in a sense bringing back your focus to the
head.
S Yes, yes. If the initial lines of the head are not right, whatever that
means, then more often than not the drawing is usually abandoned. I con-
tinue on it with increasing reluctance. So somehow they have to be right,
they have to have a sense of being in the right place. The marks do
comprise a unity in themselves.
Because it is from where you look out on the world, you know
S Sure, yes.
... you were talking about capo di monte, it is, in a strange kind of
way, almost the centre of the beingness and so the progression outward
from that, not only outward into the space of the paper - which is the
designation of the form that you are seeking to make, but it also has
a sense of •.. you were talking earlier about the rightness of this,
establishing this rightness first - which is a kind of genesis for the
whole of the drawing isn't it?
S Well, I wish I could elaborate on what I mean by rightness. I mean if
anyone was to ask ... to say to me, I would demand that they explain
themselves. At the moment I can't - it's just a felt experience, you're
either happy with it or not.
One of the drawings on the sequence toward the end, where the model had
her arm crooked and ... this one (Fig. 33)
a
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5 Oh, sure, yes.
You were quite happy with that one, weren't you?
3 Yes.
Where she's got her head resting on her knee and I remember you had two
goes at that didn't you?
3 Yes, well it was such a beautiful pose you know, it was one of those
things where you really respond to it. The pose drew itself really,
that's why I was so happy about it - one was just a mediator for a
change and you weren't imposing any kind of pre-aestheticised notions
it just drew itself
Yes, what you're talking about in a sense Arthur, is not a kind of
Appollonian domination, but it's almost a Dionysian thing, isn't it?
You're actually allowing rather than dominating aren't you?
3 Well, yes, one has to ylve oneself all the time, not in a submissive
sense, not in a ... Don't be obsequious with the world, but one has
to allow the world to be as it is, for me anyway. With regard to the
Appollonian sense, it's something I wish to eradicate from myself -
that most anotomical drawings are not even beginnings, they're not even
aware of how the world is. It's something I don't wish to acknowledge,
one goes beyond that. Do you mind if I read?
No, no.
S It's a quote from Simone Well, in her book 'Gravity and Grace' and the
quote I am going to read out more or less embodies what it is I do, or
what it is, or how it is that I ari when I draw, it's this (reads):
"J?ay I disappear in order that those things that I see
may become perfect in their beauty from the very fact
that they are no longer things that I see."
- that's one right? And another thing she wrote, it's in a chapter
called 'Self-effacement'
"To see a landscape as it is when I am not there. When
I am in my place I disturb the silence of heaven and
earth by my breathing and the beating of my heart."
That's it, what she's saying in fact is that there has to be an acquies-
cence with regard to the world right? That man ... I almost regard the
human being as an interruption of that process. What we must do is to
be that, to be the heart that beats with the world and that's what it
is, that's what I try to ... the state of being I aspire to be in the
drawings.
A oneness really?
S Yes, well, yes, it's all ... sounds ... it's not ... I mean j5 almost
a cliche, it sounds a cliche, but that's more or less how it is.
Where your interruption with the world is not something that actually
interrupts, but is in a sense a passage of yourself through the world.
It's that kind of thing, isn't it - it's a kind of unitary thing with
the world, isn't it?
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)S The drawings are evidence of that, they may not be seen so, you know,
if someone was to look at them they might not at all think of what ...
they might not understand what it is that I'm doing.
B You could really say that that is a kind of philosophy of drawing. That
is the philosophy of your drawing, isn't it?
[)S Well, yes. One has to draw. It's not for no reason that people have
to draw. They draw for something, it's not for some kind of entertain-
ment. To me it's a revelatory process, it's a ... aspiring to be
in a state of being. That most human beings in this world have not got
the opportunity to do... 1 don't know what the word is, happier, may be,
..; better off, who knows.
B They would know themselves.
DS Yes. O.K. Right.
B iat you're really saying is that drawing for you brings together the
fragrientary elements of experience, that coalesces them into a single
kind of focus, in which you can then live through yourself.
DS Yes, right, that's a good assimilation.
B Now the other thing is the speed at which these drawings are done. I've
notices for example and I've made some notes about the way in which your
drawings very rarely take more than about twenty minutes, half an hour
perhaps. But you move very rapidly from one drawing to another through-
out the course of a day. This is again evidence of your seeking that
moment
DS Yes, seeking that moment but one also loves the activity of it as well -
but I like to draw, I don't like to obscure the paper too much, unless
one has to. But you are right about the moment, sure. Although you
can only achieve it once, if you know you haven't achieved it, there's
no use in trying to pull it back, I mean, the evidence is there on the
paper.
B This is why I think it's fascinating that we've got evidence of a drawing
which you did try and pull back and which in the end you were very un-
happy with and you almost did it because there was a recording session
going on. Did the recording session interrupt you? I mean did you find
it difficult to work alongside that situation?
DS At first, I did., even in the second session I did, you probably noticed
I was, but once you get
B Once you're lost
DS Once you're lost, you don't care who the hell's there. I'm not saying
I could draw in a crowded room, but one could draw in a room where the
person's are allowed - that doesn't matter. I found it quite useful,
it almost acted as an intensifying agent, you know, it made you all
that more keen, acute.
B You've seen Peter de Yrancia and you've talked to him about the drawings
and so on and he mentioned. an
 aspect of the power of some of these
drawings that they are not contained within the paper.
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DS Yes.
•B That was interesting wasn't it? Because it related to the space in
which you were drawing in.
DS Yes, right, right.
B You know - the space at the college, because it is quite narrow there,
isn't it? There you're having to work. And also a kind of optical
distance that he was talking about - but that never seems to get in the
way of their significance. One never looks at them and feels, 'Oh, I
wish he had got the whole of ...'
DS The figure in, yes
B The figure into the boundary of the format of the paper - that's inte-
resting, isn't it?. Because itagain demonstrates this sense of the way
in which the moment of the drawing can actually be found as an embryo
within part of the drawing and without it necessarily being a line that
is completely round the figure.
DS V1e11, the embryo in most cases is often the totality of the thing -
because all the figure isn't there, doesn't mean that it's not complete.
I think there's more of a foot that's not shown than one that is, be-
cause one has to imagine things as well, we're not mindless, we do
organise right? And. we organise that which is not even there, you know,
not even on the paper. If you're talking about the viewer - when the
viewer comes along and says 'How is that foot?' then he must know how
that foot is by the way the hand is, I don't see why that's not
B No, true, true. So really the sense of the wholeness of these drawings
is coming from an awareness again of v'hat we've said earlier of our own
being in the world.
DS Yes.
B 'Vie have self-knowledge of ourselves in the world.
DS Of course.
B Vhich we lend to the drawings.
DS Yes, yes.
B And again, as I think 1.'erleau-Ponty says, we don't see the drawing so
much as see according to the drawing, you know, the drawing is the
shaper of our forms and our feelings and this doesn't have to be a
shaper which is a format or a stereotype, you know
DS Well, there are things that are most interesting ... to artists anyway.
Seeing those things which more often than not do not relate to how we
usually experience things in the world, they present a different point
of view. It is as true to say there are many different points of view
and that's the beauty of them, because there are so many there isn't any
one.
B So these drawings are as much about what is not there in visible terms,
as what is demonstrated by what is there, through the visible terms.
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B It's a very phenonenoloical point of view, isn't it? The whole aspect
of your own drawing is rooted very much within that kind of feeling and
thinking.
DS I suppose it is phenomenological - but this is the way I've always been.
Then if there was such a thing as phenomenology I fall within that cate-
gory - it's the way I am.
B The whole essence of these is the emergence of this image that is to do
with the moment, isn't it? And that, going back to what we were saying
earlier, has a great deal to do with the speed at which you work and
their execution.
DS Yes, right, but they're not so fastly done are they? If you notice that
they are quite considered.
B Ah, yes.
DS You see, when I am talking about moments it almost sounds like saying -
I'ts so fast how does he realise ... how do you recognise this moment?
They are considered, it's just that the marks have to correspond, they
have to be right within themselves, then one can progress to do something
else, to carry on down and across, over and above, beyond and so forth.
B Yes, in a sense when you're talking about speed, you're talking about
another aspect of time, aren't you? Which actually doesn't come into
what you have just said, you're talking about moment, which is timeless.
DS -Right, right, that's just what I was going to say actually, you can pro-
long it - the power is in how long you can prolong this moment that hits
you hard, which you feel very strongly, it will show in the drawing how
it was.
B Lnd this is when you leave the drawing and say 'It works'.
DS Or leave it and say 'It doesn't' and do another one.
B Yes, but that's the whole exploration of the drawing - is really a move
toward that kind of distillation really.
DS Yes, yes.
•B These drawings are things in themselves, aren't they. They're not pre-
paration.s for paintings, are they?
DS No, no, how could they be? If they were preparations for paintings I
would have had definite plans about how the model must sit and so forth.
But if I liked the position in which she was moving I told her to stop
and I drew her, you know, it was a day to day activity, it wasn't any-
thing planned.
B Right and that's important as far as your own drawings are concerned -
that they are considered as something in their own right.
DS Yes, but they are not intended as objects with a social function. If
one wanted to make social, beautiful drawings, one could do that anytime
with one's eyes closed. They are not intended for show - they're for me
really.
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GB I acknowledge that and have been glad to be part of that with you
because obviously when soriebody has been coming in and observing a
very private process that's going on there are problems. But this
is almost a dialogue with yourself, isn't it?
ADS And ... well, it's a tripartite dialogue, with myself, the paper and
the world.
GB And in that sense there are ways in which you are beginning to re-
inforce and establish this kind of unitary thing that you were talking
about earlier and this is where for you the drawings are important.
ADS Yes. All life is figure and ground (laughter).
GB I read somewhere in your studio, where you had written down on a piece
of paper, 'I'm not so interested in craft as cunning' (laughter).
ADS Yes, that's right, that still goes (laughter).
GB That still stands, does it? That's fascinating.
ADS The cunning is from Joyce - you know, the craft is also another form
of cunning, also craft in the social sense means a pre-acknowleciged way
of doing things, which I do not acknowledge, which is something I wish
to escape from - that's right.
GB That's really in a sense what would summarise what these drawings are
about. Is there anything else you want to say?
ADS Only that I am not illustrating some kind of philosophical dogma - that's
what I may sound like, but I'm not; but one reads these things and finds
that the coin is also rolled for you, that you too can use it, and it's
nice that other people are of the same mind.
GB But you could never ever think of yourself not drawing.
ADS Oh no, drawing must ... drawing imist be like breathing for vie.
GB So for you it is a very natural expression of yourself.
ADS It's not natural enough - it will be, one has to cultivate that, there
are some things that have to be cultivated. Drawing must be a natural
form of activity - the primitive man drew and that's the first signs of
anarchy I think (laughter) - sounds flippant but I don't think it is.
I think all those people who draw must be anarchists - they must be be-
cause today it has ceased to be a form of expression natural to everyone,
the state of our societies in which we live has alienated man from the
very sources of his sustenance, from the very activity which would enable
him to put an end to his oppression.
GB Yes and in a sense they are trying to reshape the given, aren't they?
That kind of anarchy is something that is going on all the time, isn't
it? In an interesting sense I suppose the only real resolution of that
comes about when you see it demonstrated within the drawing, because until
you're able to give it form it has no value. And this is what these
drawings are doing, they're giving a significance to that anarchy which,
you know, you feel and you want to resolve in some sort of way.
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kDS Right. When a society has a set of knovn precepts and accepted modes
of behaviour so therefore you want ... you read things you know; the
rich are allowed to be rich and racialism and so forth. I know this
sounds incredibly general, it's a gross generalisation, but I agree with
Jean-Marie Straub when he made his film 'Anna Magdalena Bach' he said
"This is my contribution to the war in Vietnam, you know, and he wasn't
being flippant. This is a man doing what he has to do in the world and
that's all he can do. Re can't be anything else other than what he is,
right? And this is all I can ever do, it is as important as demonstrating',
it is as important as
GB Of course.
AIDS It's my voice, you know, it will be heard one day. There will have to
be a time when ... one can't be like the blind man, one can't be pre-
maturely blind-folded all the time, one has to open one's eyes and make
well I suppose I am making my stand. This is my stand.
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Can you say what it was initially that interested you in drawing with
the figure as the primary kind of motif, or 'figurative' as being the
primary sort of motif?
J I think it's tied in with the interest I have had in paintings which
has always been figurative. Progress has been very slow and I've
watched with interest the way that people have developed figurative
interests in their own work. I've learnt a lot, not just from people
working now, but from the past, Beckmann and so on. But I've never
really wanted to show work until I felt that I was speaking with my
own voice. As to the question of where the actual images come from,
I think that's rather difficult, it's rather difficult to give a
straight answer, it might be something that will come out in a more
indirect way.
B But you've always been interested in the figure as human, rather than
in the figure as 'object' haven't you?
J When you say 'object' what do you mean exactly?
B By that I don't mean something that just occupies space, but a figure
that has a mood, a figure that actually seems to indicate some sort
of drama that's going on, within a space, within even the space of
the figure's own dimension, but a kind of drama that is not just to
do with a figure in an environment, as might be thought of if it was
just an 'object'. Would you say that was true?
I'd prefer to say that once the particular form of the figures are
established on the paper, they, in a sense, create their own en-
vironment, by that I mean that the sort of tension that exists in the
surrounding space, in the areas between and around them becomes as
important as the figures themselves. This has got nothing to do with
'composition' in the sense of one aspect of what's going on 'balancing'
out another,or anything like that, but rather with an imaginative grasp
of space growing out of the intuitively felt relationships within the
figurative situation.
Now, these drawings, the scale of them is obviously important, they're
about28cms X 53cms.That interests you specifically in the drawing of
these figores that is a distinct concern from the painting of them,
for example?
Well, the drawings, the actual ideas that I'm still involved in were
first of all explored in drawings. I think the reason for this is
that I have always found it difficult to paint small. It's got nothing
to do with the fact that drawing is a more 'throw-away' activity than
painting. I felt that if I could make some kind of breakthrough on a
more intimate scale then I would have a lot that I was looking for and
could learn from.
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These represent a series, though within a fairly short space of time,
don't they, these particular drawings we're looking at now?
Yes: Well, none of them go back to the beginning obviously, but I think
that that drawing -
Pig. 47
Yes, and there were several drawings of that sort, although that's the
only one left. I did try, quite unsuccessfully for some time, to
literally translate some of the drawings into paintings, until I realised
that I was making a great mistake, that what I should try to do was
work within the spirit of the drawings - so that the kind of emotional,
felt tension which was emerging in the drawings could surface quite
naturally in the paintings.
And drawing does this for you in a particular and unique sort of way -
I mean, this is one of the elements of the medium of drawing that you
particularly appreciate is ittThe fact that you can work these things
out within a scale that you can manage and that you can actually begin
to explore these tensions through the particular graphic means that
drawing offers. Would this be true?
Yes. Obviously I feel now that this is just as successfully done in the
paintings. But in the beginning, it was something that was quite unique
to the drawings. It took a long time to achieve this in the paintings
as well.
These drawings are nonetheless things in their own right aren't they?
They're not preparations for paintings in the sense of sketches or
work-outs.
Oh, yes, yes. I think that each one of these drawings is as independent
as a painting. In fact, there are very few of the drawings which have
things in them which have surfaced as a literal transposition in any of
the paintings. I mean, I have felt that there are certain sorts of things
going on in drawing that I do want to explore further in a painting -
such as the recent drawing 'A Day Out'. In fact, I have done a painting
which has the same title, but the painting is incredibly different from
the drawing.
Yes, I've seen it. Can we talk for a little while about the element of
gesture which is obviously very important within the figurative concern
of the drawings? Can you say where this comes from, where it arises? Why
Is It that you are particularly interested in the gesture of the figure?
Well, I think tt the more obviously expressive areas of the human body
are the face ana ande. And it Interests me, the way that these two
areas of the human body have been depicted, going back to pagan ritual
ceremonies where sometimes make-up and masks were used to transform the
identity of a person, to induce a kind of belief in something other than
who that person actually was.
Another kind of person?
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Yes, and in a much more subtle, in a much more devious kind of way, I
think this kind of thing still goes on in our society. I think in our
relationships with one another, we still function very much in this way,
we're not that sophiBticated.
So we're reading signs all the time, from each other, that are often at
a kind of subliminal level, but they're nonethe less recorded in our
overall awareness of the person's mood and their feeling and our reaction
to it. Would you accept that?
Very much so, that's got a lot to do with what interests me. I falter a
little because I feel its very easy to get into an area where you are,
perhaps poychologising and I don't know a great deal about that, I only
know what interests me and where I can find it in the art of the past
and in the thinking of the present.
Would you agree with me if I said that these drawings could be considered
as narrative or would you be happier with them as descriptions?
Perhaps depictions would be a word I'd be happier with, although the way
that people want to designate, the designation of what they are, it doesn't
interest me a great deal. I am interested in, as I am discussing things
with you now, in clearing up any misunderstandings which I feel quite
strongly about. But as to how people respond to the drawings and paint-
ings..... I acknowledge the fact that there will be a lot of different
kinds of reactions to what I'm doing and I regard that as healthy,
The worst that could be said would be that they would be 'illustrations'
- because that would be furthest from their whole orientation and
intention wouldn't it?
Yes, I think that would be a gross misunderstanding. I don't think I'm
talking in a way that would suggest my ideas are 'illustrations' of
anything. I think I'm discussing them as explorations of situations
which interest me, figurative situations which interest me.
That's very important, I think. The other thing is the figurative situat-..
ions that interest you always seem to have some element of confrontation,
some element of relational concern. In other words, there are very few
of these drawings that actually give an indication of one figure in
isolation that obviously has to do with gesture doesn't it? Interaction
between figures within this space that you've been describing?
Yes. I should say that I often start with one figure but I feel it
will never stay at that - being about one figure. Because what's interest-
ing is what that figure can do when it's confronted with another figure.
I feel that the work can be seen in two ways. There are some things which
are very strongly theatrical - the drawing '}anouvres' for instance, is
quite strongly theatrical in its aspect and the other thing obviously
is the confrontation.
But a confrontation that doesn't necessarily have a literary kind of
sense about it - it's a confrontation that actually emerges within the
visual sense of the drawing isn't it?
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JJ	 Oh yes.
B That brings us to the point of the titles of the drawings and earlier
you were saying that these don't occur first, they emerge subsequently
as the drawing develops. Would that have a bearing on your exploration,
not only of the confrontation situation between figure and figure but
also the way the idea of that begins to crystallise into something
that you can give a name to?
U If I can go back a little bit, the answer I gave before was in some
ways unsatisfactory. I feel that what happens is that in the beginning
these images are very much like shadows in their ebb and flow, In the
way they resist coming out into the light. At other times there is a
more fluid interaction, there is quite a lot of movement and this is
a very exciting time. Exploring further the various dimensions which
the confrontation between the various Images have, can become very
prolonged and difficult. Now I hope that what I have said so far
doesn't give the impression that I have a kind of philosophy which I
turn to in each piece of work I do. I don't really have a very clearly
defined philosophy. I feel that everything one does is somehow sign—
posting one's own life and, I expect in many cases, the situations
that develop are an elaborate cover—up, in a sense, for things which
one feels very deeply, but can only be expressed in an oblique way.
;B And in this sense can only be expressed in a particular and unique
way.
IJ Yes, I think so.
B Yes, so in a sense, when you talk about a philosophy, you're not
trying to 'say' anything through these drawings, you're hoping that,
in fact, the drawings will illuminate areas that can't be 'said' in
any other sort of way. That's really what it Is isn't it?
TJ Right. Yes, yes.
;B I mean, if you could say what it was that was going on, you'd write
about It wouldn't you?
1J	 I would.
B You'd cast it in another kind of direction altogether.
IJ Yes. Having said that, there are various areas of twentieth century
painting where the connection between the visual and the verbal has
always intrigued me. I mentioned Beckmann earlier, I think at certain
stages of the way that my work has developed other artists would come
to mind, ... It's almost impossible to function as a figurative artist
today without acknowledging the fact that Kitaj exists, and one of the
appeals, I think, of his work has been the fact that there is a strong
affinity with other forms of art. In a totally dofferent way Guston
would be another example. In theatre I would cite Beckett and in
cinema, Bresson.
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B Other forms of expression really.
J Other forms of expression.
B Yes, that tension that arises between the linguistic sense ohe
thing is about and the visual sense of what the thing is about is
something very important to you, isn't it?
,1J	 Yes, it is.
B Because you title the drawings after you've made them, in order to
clarify something that has already occured visually within the
drawing, but you're giving it another kind of dimension by giving
it a title.
JJ	 Yes.
QB Do you think sometimes the title can get in the way?
J Well, it obviously doesn't for me, because I never feel that a piece
of work, whether its a drawing or a painting, and I only do drawings
and paintings, I never feel that a piece of work is complete if it
doesn't have a title. Usually the titles are pretty straight forward,
there's nothing bizarre about them. They are about simple things,
everyday activities and I think that's an important point to make
because at a superficial glance I think that the esoteric, appearance
of things can be misunderstood and the title is meant to place the
idea in its proper context. The drawing 'A Day Out' is basically about
three people, and I felt the necessity to draw and paint the images
in the way that I did because that was the only way to get at the
kind of tensions, the inner tensions of the situation. I mean it wasn't
possible to get at that kind of point by showing the figures in detail -
noses, eyes and so forth, I felt to bring that essential drama out as
strongly as I possibly could it was necessary in fact to conceal them.
GB Yes, so what is actually mysterious in the sense of these figures is
what is actually consciously concealed by the way in which you have
made them. Do you do this in a conscious kind of way?
WJ Oh, yes, yes. There's no attempt to mystify, I want to make that very
clear. There's absolutely no attempt to mystify. I insist that every-
thing I do is about, basic ordinary situations but I always felt there
was more to that ordinary kind of activity th people have been able
to express in painting, a psychic dimension that has humour as well
as pathos.
GB And this kind of extraordinariness that is within the ordinary is
really what it is that you are exploring in these images isn't it?
WJ Yes.
GB It's that element that is not stateable but nevertheless is felt.
WJ I feel as a painter. its only possible to express this kind of thing
visually, the strong feelings of tenderness or.gression that develop
between the figures is something that has to be faced up to and here
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I'm hesitating because I do feel that in figurative painting today
there is an awful lot that is being skipped. In many ways I think
there's nothing easier than dome painting with figures, but to do
paintings that sa something about those figures is something else
entirely and I don't know many artists today who are really doing
this in an interesting way, in a way that is actually related to the
time we live in and yet at the same time accessible to people.
GB Yes, it's giving sense and objectivity to something which emerges
between people, but giving it an objectivity that's cast in a new
kind of form. I mean, somebody like Beckinann for example, would
give an objectivity to the interaction of figures in a particular
sort of way through almost a kind of super objectivity, through the
realism of the figures themselves.
WJ Yes.
GB 1ow you are interested in that kind of objectivity are you?
WJ I'm interested in it but I don't, well,I was going to say I don't
it. I think that's fair enou,gh, yes, I don't use it ... I feel
that I am functioning most of the time in an objective way in the
sense that I've become increasingly conscious of the expressive
possibilities of the materials I am using. It's very easy to use materials,
paint and so on in a predictable kind of way that does nothing to
deepen one's sensitivity to the essential subject matter.
GB. Yes, Surface is very important isn't it - in these drawings?
J	 Yes , it is.
B Can you say why?
!J Because, although the actual activity never really occupies the whole
of the area I'm working on, nonetheless, I think the drawing or paint-
ing is about the whole of that area, and I think the ideas that I have
in relation to that area, do have a kind of texture, I mean there is
a sort of texture to my thinking which demands a response in terms
of the materials I'm using.
B Yes, so in graphic terms you can find some kind of solution to that
continuing situational problem really. You talked about the texture
of your feelings, which I thought was very illuminating because these
drawings have a direct access to that kind of thing through their orn
surface don't they?
J1 Yes. They're all done on the kind of paper which allows a certain
amount of exploratory activity to go on and I develop a very intimate
kind of relationship with the surface I'm working on.
;B The interest that you have in interaction and in this human drama has
to do with another kind of thing which is a sort of theatre of human
experience, isn't it? Can you say anything about the kind of space
that these drawings have which is a kind of indication of this theatre,
this arena in which these things occur?
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WJ Can you say a little more about that?
GB Yes, the sort of
action of these
these things are
feeling about it
space that is brought about through the inter-.
figures is a kind of arena, isn't it - in which
being acted out. And that has a kind of theatre
, that's important isn't it?
WJ Yes. It t s
 a thing I accept. What came to my mind then was the
attachment of the word 'arena' to the abstract expressionist notion,
as expressed eloquently by Harold Rosenberg, of the artist working
in the context of an arena, the actual canvas itself being the arena
in which he functions. I am just trying to express really the difference
between that kind of thinking and the way I would see it. Possibly,
it does come dom to the way I work. I very rarely work 'in the dark'
as it were, and perhaps this Is where the difference lies. At the end
of each day that I work, I'm hopeful of some sign of light, that there
Is something there to come back to, very often there isn't and, there
are times of extreme depression in doing this work, but I don't think that
it ends up... for me anyway, none of the things that I do end up as
depressing.
GB Earlier you spoke of the genesis of these drawings beginning from
one figure and then their development and subsequent articulation of the
particular feeling that it was you were trying to achieve, arrived
not only as you worked out tensions that were within the figure you
were making but also a you began to work out into the space surround-
ing the figure and by making another figure set up a kind of dialectic,
a dialogue between them and the space within them.
WJ Yes, and that obviously involves being completely aware of the whole area
I am working on. Yes, the drama is as powerful in the way that the
figures circulate, move within this space as it is within the figures
themselves, Sometimes, this sort of spatial drama, is dictated very
strongly by a gash of colour and the way it forces attention onto a
contour and the way that contour leads the eye into the total drama.
This kind of concern is so much a visual one in front of the object
that I find it difficult to express in words. I think one of the
reasons why there is less colour, although there are some paintings
which use colour very powerfully, very strongly, nonetheless, one of
the reasons why most of the work does tend to move between areas,
degrees of grey is that that's how things are, shades of grey, and
they work at their best when the conflict between atmosphere and
activity is held in a very fine balance.
B	 That is very specifically a visual concern isn't it - the connotation
of greyness through the articulation of the drawing which Is funda-
mentally cast in that way, because of its graphic nature is something
:that is very particular to the feeling of the drawing isn't it?
WJ Yes.
GB Did you develop this as a particular aspect of the drawing or did you
discover it as it were as being part of the nature of drawing itself?
wJ
	
o, I discovered it as something which I, well.., let's go back a little
bit, I think once I had discovered the surface ... the sort of paper -
377
we are referring now to the drawings. Once I had discovered the kind of
surface that I could wnr with the next step was to explore the power
of	 images and the prophetic reality of space that were unique to
working on that surface.
B But this greyness is not lack of clarity is it? That's what I'm saying.
IJ	 I hope not.
B This greyness is a positive attribute, that actually contributes to the
feeling doesn't it?
13	 Yes.
B Because you were saying that feelings are like that.
IJ That's true. In the same sense that in this discussion there are areas
where one is being very tentative and other areas where one is being very
positive. It echoes, I feel, very much the way that I work.
;B Arid, these drawings are really visual explorations of that ambivalence,
aren't they?
13 That and other things yes. That's certainly a strong feature of them.
;B And this kind of tension that we were talking about is partly due to
kinds of ambiguities that we are picking up through the drawings. Would
you say that was true?
J I feel that without actually using the word I've been talking, discussing
the concept of ambiguity all along. The fact that it is impossible for me
to get interested in an art which is so declamatory that it says it all
for you..I'm interested in the viewer finding a way into these things for
himself, some space in them that he can occupy even if it's only for a
short space of time. That's a notion that comes back to what you were
saying earlierabout the theatrical and,I would say meditative nature of
the work.	 0
B Is there a kind of despair, a kind of ennui within this space that's
created? Are you making a comment about the fragility of human experience?
JJ I'm sure that comes into it. Although it's not my intention to be as
specific as that, I realise that it's inevitable and can't be avoided.
B But that is a very real part of their content isn't it?
JJ It is for a lot of people, it obviously is for you.
B But would you accept that that is part of what the ambiguity of the
drawings is about, because you were saying earlier, the necessity of the
role of the spectator in terms of these drawings...because that's also
a kind of tension, that's also a kind of drama isn't it?
J Yes, yes, it is. Could you say what 	 mean 'by ambiguity?
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By ambiguity, I am not really meaning lack of clarity. I am really
meaning the kind of space you allow someone to work in and feel their
way through which is being prompted by the sense of the drawing that
the role of the spectator in respect of the drawing is in fact being
allowed for.
Yes, right.
That's what I mean, because you saia earlier you didn't want to say
it all so that there was nothing left to be said and it's that area
of ambiguity which I think is one of the richest elements or character-
istics of these drawings.
Yes, that is much clearer in my mind now. My interest really is in the
fact that I am actually offering people something, - when the drawings
and paintings are on view, you can go back the next day, and perhaps
something different happens, the feelings you had the day before become
enlarged. Conversely it could be that you get a big disappointment, it
isn't what you thought it was.
But your interest is very much in the evoking isn't it?
Yes.
In the bringing into focus of these particular kinds of senses,
particular kinds of feelings - that's what you're offering.
Yes, if I can come back to the point I made that I felt this particular
area 'was largely ignored in painting today. The fact that I feel that
makes me all the more determined to try and do something with It myself.
I'm interest)that Klee, back in 1909 was saying that he would 'now dare
to tread once more the original ground of psychic improvisation. With
a link to an impression of nature now only quite indirect, I may once
more give shape to 'what is actually weighing on my soul. To note down
experiences 'which could translate themselves into lines in complete
darkness. This is a potentiality for original creation which has long
existed - interrupted only temporarily by the timidity caused by
isolation. In this 'way my essential personality will be able to speak,
to free itself with the greatest freedom'. Well ) Klee said that and it
stands up. I feel that the way twentieth century artists have been
interpreted, and their achievements analyzed ... is depressingly academic
and I also feel that many have been neglected because they represent a
challenge 'which is not acceptable to the academic mind - it's really
being left to the painters, other painters to gradually work to a point
where the balance is redressed, where the real quality and breadth of
what's happened in the twentieth century 'will eventually be seen in its
true richness and depth.
And it's that kind of self—knowledge really that these particular
experiences as expressed through these drawings are seeking to un-
cover isn't it?
In my own modest way, yes, that's what I'm trying to do and obviously
I'm speaking about now, this moment in time. I can only see it going on
at present because I'm excited and still very involved in all that I
have spoken about. I don't really think about the future very much, I
think one lives with the possibilities that are open now.
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GB So it's really an exploration of this king of Beingness that these
images are about isn't it? Not something that's yet to come, or even
an exploration of the past, but something that really is of now.
WJ Yes, but in saying that, I don't want to be imisunderstood. We don't
have any perspectives on what is happening to us now, the only
perspective we have iswhat we've learnt from the past. I speak of
the past in two ways, in the deeply personal sense of myself and
also the past as uncovered by other artists.
GB This would be what one would talk about in terms of the kind of
'truth' of these images... their efficacy, would you agree?
WJ I think it's easier for somebody else to say that than for me. You
see that again is a statement and I'm not really given to statements
a great deal. I know I've quoted Klee, but he was a marvellous
diarist and the quotation I felt to be particularly apt. I find it
difficult to respond to statements ... I think remarks are really
more interesting.
GB Asides.
WJ In some cases, yes.
GB When there isn't actually a posturing.
WJ Yes.
GB When there's a revelation occurring beneath that posturing in
a sense.
mental
Wi Yes, I think where the person is leaving room for f note taking to
take place rather than a kind of dialectic.
GB Yes, yes, and that's, in a sense, what these gestures deal with in
the drawings, don't they?
Wi When they are precise. I very often change drawings, not because I
don't like what they look like at the time, but because that precision
is missing, I haven't been able to pin down the precise nature of
a particular feeling or gesture. It could be a very fine thing, or
it could lead to a complete transformation, a complete reappraisal.
GB Wynn, thank you very, very much. I think the discussion has been
enormously illuminating in terms of 	 the	 potency that lies
within these images themselves.
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GB Vhat do you find useful, looking back through the process photographs,
that you find valuable? You were saying earlier that what, for you is
important about the drawing, is the kind of dynamic that's going on in
the making process. The making process for you is very important isn't
it?
VT Yes it is, the activity
GB The actual business of bringing the image together
T Yes, right from the very first marks. I expect really it's ... it's
just fot to be a complete building process, building up, taking away,
because I think that any image is illusive anyway and the nearest way
you can come ... I don't think I ever draw anything as it is because I
don't think anything is anything for long enough to be drawn that way.
But I think you can come to some kind of consolidation of ... It's like
what Philip Rawson calls a 'gestalt', you know there is ... somebody put
it in a very good way - like when you meet someone, it was in a film
yesterth?y, you meet them as a personality, you don't start examining
their eyebrows, you know - that's it really. There is, I think, a vital
image which confronts you about anything, if it's a person or anything
which is the only real thing which you can hang on to and it's not ever
complete but it's made up of many, many different, little oscillations
of vibrations, changing
GB That's really interesting. Do you find that when you first come to
drawing from the model for example, as these drawings are about, you
see that, as it were, right at the beginning or is it something that
emerges for you as the drawing goes on?
VT 'ell, when I first come to draw from the figure, I know ... I know it
from the beginning, because I get an enormous excitement and I ... know
there is just going to be a way of doing it and it isn't a way that I
could preconceive and it would be different tomorrow but I know that the
feelings the same. I suppose it's a question of different application,
that's all really ... like it's so much to do with atmosphere as well.
GB So that drawing in a sense is a coming to a realisation of this, through
the means of the drawing itself. You might see it, but in the end the
drawing has to make it, has to coalesce with the same kind of feeling
that you have of the image as you see it from the beginning.
VT Yes.
GB •.. and the whole process of the drawing is perhaps a bringing of this
coalescing together is it?
T Yes, definitely ... that's a good way of putting it.
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GB So you're constantly trying to find raphic equivalents, 2nd marks and
means to kind of foriulate this image, so it begins to actually happen
from the drawing.
WT Yes that'5 right, to take on its own form of energy end dynamic and I
think ... I suppose to ... just use anything, any mark, any .. and not
a mark that corresponds with the figure but one that corresponds ith
a way of saying what the figure is like ... about ... so really it's not
of the figure at all.
GB No, and yet it's important for you to draw from something, isn't it?
WT Oh yes. I mean without ... it could just be a black sort of scribble,
but if it hasn't got ... if it isn't absolutely one hundred percent con -
tent to me then it, I couldn't even do it anyway. I think there has got
to be that sensating, like in those Turner things, you don't know if
they're to be a tree or a person on the beach or a bit of a log, but you
know that Turner knew and they're done in a way with such conviction that
they exist completely in their own way and I think that's ... so to say
that it doesn't matter whose in front of you, or ... anybody could be,
but once that person is in front of you then it's not anybody, that's
what I mean.
GB How much of this, Wendy, has come from your own background as a sculptor
because you began really in sculpture, didn't you?
WT Yes.
GB You vere talking about the forming process, the formulation process in
your drawing. Has your drawing a lo to do with the way you worked in
sculpture and the kind of plastic sense you developed there?
WT Yes, the thing is though, I did start with drawing and I started drawing
very large physical things, so I was already reaching for some kind of
plastic sense, but they were very much surface drawings to do with tex-
ture and all sorts of ... they weren't from the model, they were from
myself, but they were bringing in, I suppose I did them in front of things.
Now, I always want to work from life, I don't mean directly but I mean
when I did these drawings they were completely from myself and they be-
came very obsessive in that way, but I was always looking for that kind
of, sort of plastic sense and when I started making things I found that
it wasn't the physicality, the physical object that I wanted to make but
the physicality I suppose and that's why ... it did, the sculpture helped
me enormously, coming to terms with that and realising then that I was
trying to disintegrate forms and that this physicality was far more
powerful than the drawing or the sculpture.
GB So this physicality doesn't have anything to do with the illusion of
three dimensions or anything like that
T Oh no, no.
GB It's a kind of core thing, isn't it?
V.T Yes, it is.
GB That perhaps goes back to what you were saying about the image and is
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GB this thc thing that you sense, is this part of the excitement that you
sense when you begin a drawing say from the model or from something...
VT That physical ... oh yes, definitely. I would think it's also my own
physical excitrnent that I'm projecting probably, I suppose in a way I
don't think I could be objective, you know.
GB How do you mean?
VT Well, I don't think it could exist in drawing I don't think it does.
I've thought about this a lot and I don't think anyone can be objective.
You know even people who say they are doing very objective drawings, I
think it's always projection to some extent.
GB Yes, so you really can't say, unless you're a machine that you can stand
outside
WT like a caE.era, like a camera vbould yes.
GB Yes, so really what you find exciting about drawing is the way that you
interpenetrate things ...
	 -
\IT Interrelate yes. I think that's it really, it's about relationships,
points of contact - electricity (laughter).
GB And things out there, in the world, you don't see them as 'objects' then -
just as objects.
V.T Oh no, never, I never see things as objec ts. I see everything ... I
always think of things in relation to other things. Because ... I mean
like ... if you go out ... I remember going to the Lake District once
and seeing ... there was a beautiful lake and mountains and the sky changed
and I was a long way from the lake so to me it was just visual anyway and
the sky went black so the lake took on the black and it looked like lead,
or sludge or molten metal or something and the mountains became covered
in mist and they were only drawn in, they had no mass and this kind of
perceptive turn around ... I felt that was absolutely wonderful, that
was the key really, I realised it was all about relationships, you know,
because the sky being like that.
GB Yes, and the whole drawing process for you is in a sense about finding
ways in which you can ..., not clarify the 'objectness' of objects in
a kind of physical—optical sense, but really illuminate the relationship
between objects
V.T Yes, yes.
GB So the kind of ambiguity that objects have, the way they can change their
appearance and give a different sense is part of what you're doing, isn't
it?
VIT Yes ... I think, yes in the way that you change towards them, not they
change and. the way ... well, i. think that's what's so enormously exciting,
nothing's ever the same, nothing ever ends, it's just that relationships
keep altering.
GB Yes. V'here do you come in a drawing when you leave it and you say 'that's
it I've got it', you know - do you ever get to that point?
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VT Yes. I think it's a very fine balance and I mean I think these drawings
are slightly overworked, but then I wanted to overwork them, in the photo-
graphs ... that turned out more important and the end product, I suppose
never is ... I mean that's not why I do it. I suppose it's coming to
terms all the time, I mean, that's what you do - that's what life's all
about - it's just basically a coning to terms with what's in front of
you ... I know when it's just right because things do have a balance.
GB And looking at the process photographs is there a point in those where,
you know you said perhaps the end product might have been overworked
is there a point where you feel you could have left it and from the record
that the photograph gives that would have been the point which was right?
?T Yes, yes there is definitely I would have said it was bang in the middle
(lauhter).
GB (laughter) Right in the middle? Of the long one of the model sitting
on the stool? (Fig. 64, frame 37A)
YiT Yes, I would say probably after a day which is quite strange because the
next day it wasn't quite right, maybe I should have carried on with it
for another week you know - but I would say it came to the point, back
in this drawing - the balance
GB That's No. 30 on the first day, isn't it? (Fig. 64)
T Yes the balance - like the background or the ambience around her was as
strong as herself and afterwards when she became stronger it's not quite
right although the shadow there (turning the pages as she talks) balances
it out.
GB On No. 24 on the final day, the second day. (Fig. 67)
VT You see ... I always have to do that if somnethin& gets too strong like
a figure, that I need to relate to something straight back, outside the
figure, like make immediately a shadow or make a tree or a bird. I think
it's all a matter of balance
GB Yes that's interesting because it means that the process is as much taking
away as it is adding, isn't it?
\VT Yes definitely. I think that ... I think to generate any kind of power
for me it's got to be a process of opposites always. I mean in r mark-
making I always look for things - I don't consciously look, but over the
years I have built up a way of drawing so that I can tack on to anything
that I need - it could be a dot or a squiggle or a blue line, I don't
know, it just could be a million things but that it's extremely opposite
to the next thing that I put down - that's so important to me to get some
kind of tension and I suppose in a larger sense it's exactly how I feel
once you get outside the figure, it's how I feel about the environment,
it's got to have the same ... it is important ... I mean ... if I could
make ... I like to make air solid you know, I like to put a solid mass
round figures, you know, I think maybe that's again, talking about a
relationship between the figure and ... I know air isn't solid, but what
goes on between things is you know.
GB That's interesting tendy, because it points to something which perhaps
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GB these drawings are about - we've talked about interrelationship and so
on, and balance - space is enormously important, isn't it?
Y.T  Yes.
GB But not space in the trite cliche of illusion
WT No, no.
GB But a space that is tangible
\T Charged, yes.
GB That's v'hat really you're talking about isn't it?
\,T Oh yes, definitely. But I think that's the only way ... it's like
I'm really interested in negatives, you know, I only draw half-positive.
I suppose that's why I like that fiEure there, because it's only half-
positive.
GB No. 30 yes. It's the yin and yan, isn't it?
WT Yes, I can see the opposites, without negative, positive is just valueless
you know.
GB This goes back to what you were saying earlier about subjectivity and
objectivity doesn't it. There's a balance between the two
VT Yes.
GB Subjectivity is felt into objectivity and objectivity comes back into
subjectivity - but the tension is what's important, isn't it, between
the two?
WT Yes.
GB And that's what makes the dynamic, isn't it?
WT That's right, yes.
GB And that's what in a sense you have been talking abo ut as the core of
your drawing sense - the tension that comes out of that relationship.
T Yes, I think it is that, I'm sure it is. It's not A and B, but it's the
distance between A and B that I am drawing really and it's a way of getting
there and back.
GB How important, therefore, is the mark to you?
v.T I think it's absolutely vital - you see it is always a question of complete
opposites because I think the mark has got to be absolutely right. I think
you have no second chance and I think the mark ... if each tiny mark isn't
right then the whole thing won't be right, so that has to be absolutely
critical, so the thing isn't loose really, it isn't arbitary.
GB But you're not always conscious of that are you?
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WT Oh no, not at all, I think no ... I couldn't work at all if I was con-
scious of my mark making. I think if you thought of every word you spoke
you wouldn't be able to think of what to say, would you?
GB Right, right, so it only comes subsequently?
WT Yes, the recognition does, so it xmist be unconscious,
GB Yes, so really, in a sense, you're bouncing back of these marks that you're
making and tuning your sense finer and finer to this kind of framework,
this kind of constellation that you're making and then moving forward
within that kind of sense that's coming ... it's very difficult to put
into words because the drawing says it much more than words can do.
WT Yes, that's a good way of putting it, in fact, I'm ... I've often thought
it's a bit like ... it's awfully akin to say theatre, you know, where you
get your piece of paper, like you set the stage and then you start to
play the part and the whole thing starts to hang together.
GB hnd that's what pushes you on always in drawing? That kind of potential
that's coming back from that is the spur to move forward again?
T Yes, it is always in co-ordination with that ... that you know inside,
of that image that ... I call it an image - that enerr pattern or what-
ever it is. I think I started off by saying it didn't matter what you
did and I still agree with what you say, but I do think ... I'll sort of
amend that by saying it isn't arbitary at all.
GB There is a logic about it.
WT Oh yes, I think so definitely.
GB But it's not a logic you can work out in advance it it?
V.T No ... although you can like sharpen all your tools (laughter). You can
prepare everything in advance. I think that's why I love the whole thing
really so much, because it's so ... it calls on powers of challenge and
intuition and sort of survival things - it's part of the whole excitement.
GB Yes. Thy then is drawing particularly an important means for you to say
this?
T Because it's absolutely immediate. To me, because visually, enormously
moved visually, it's the only way I can make symbols to express a feeling.
Lark - making I'm sure is absolutely ... has a basic symbolic significance
and I think it's mark-making that's the basic, stripping away everything -
in a way that you can get down exactly how you feel and it's got to be
fast for me because as I say it's about things that are constantly changing.
GB Yes, I think the kind of immediacy thing is probably the closest that one
comes to why drawing offers this sort of entry.
WT Yes, I suppose so, I suppose immediacy also means vitality and honesty -
you certainly can't make it up.
GB Yes, there's a kind of unequivocalness, isn't there? Once you've made it,
it stares you in the face.
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T That's right, you've got to come to terms with it immediately.
GB So really you're talking about a complete kind of dialectic aren't you,
that's going on all the time and you're trying to find that within a pro-
cess of change and counterchange? That for you is the dynamic of drawing?
%T Yes, because I think it's ... life, you know. I don't think I could ever
divorce art from life, nobody could, it's ridiculous, but, it's not re-
porting, but it is in a way. It's not reporting in an illustrative way
but I suppose it is in a perceptive way all the time - reaffirmation and
reconsideration - like you do all the time, you've just got to.
GB Is the subject matter important to you, by that I mean what the drawing
is about?
1'.T  Yes it is ... let's think. No, I don't think it is actually (laughter).
I was going to say yes it is, because I always choose my subject mattet,
but then when I've been told to draw, you know, earlier, it's never
mattered. No, I don't think it matters what you draw.
GB So the subject matter is actually coming out of the drawing itself?
YT Yes.
GB That's the real subject matter, isn't it?
WT It is. The drawing - the relationship is what matters. No it doesn't
matter what you draw or where you are. In fact, that's remarkable - when
I first realised that there was a wonderful feeling of freedom. I think
that's got something to do with it. You see, I think it's so many meta -
physical things, I mean I've been trying to think, like sort of trying to
think of logical reasons, but there's so many reasons bound up that are
about things like freedom, ascending material ... you know - physicality
ascending the flesh, if you like, spirituality, I think that's why I do
it actually.
GB And the image gives you that freedom to move?
h11'T Yes it does, that's right.
GB Because it's not tied to things in the world - it actually transcends.
T Yes it does, that's right, that's the word I was looking for.
GB And that image that you are striving for is what you are trying to encap-
sulate or hold within the drawing itself aren't you?
V,T Yes.
GB But not screw it down, but give it freedom to move.
YuT No, that's right.
GB So that you can move with it.
YT Yes, that's a very good way of putting it, yes I think that is it ... I
suppose it is still about that relationship ... what you make, yes it
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V,'T it transcends, yes it does, it transcends limitations, what's real,
what is there.
GB And for you, drawing is sharpening all of that perceptual ability to
reach that.
WT Yes, yes. I think •.. as somebody once told me and I think it's very
good advice, like Rembrandt - it isn't what he put in his drawings but
what he didn't put in, that's what the drawing was about. I think that
must sum it up really for me, that the marks I make are there to catch
what isn't there really - they're just signs; I suppose that gets back
to the symbolic thing again.
GB Yes - anything else you want to say Wendy?
WT Yes, (laughter) I can't think of anything else at the moment.
GB Terrific - thanks very much.
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GB Feliks, I'd like to start by asking you what kind of description is going
on in the drawings that you are making. It's not illustration, but it is
a kind of description, what sort of description is it?
FT Vel1, I feel I have to open the whole subject with an establishment of
the frontiers of your interest because my work goes in many directions
and spreads itself, as you know, towards the ultimate which is the vast
environmental panoramic painting and that really, I think, is beyond your
problem. I think you are, and let's establish this and put it down on
record, you are interested in my mostly linear drawing which is entirely
connected with the function of myself as an eye-witness, as it were. In
other words, I wander through my experiences and I note them down. So
it's a straight action from the eye to the hand, to the pencil, to the
paper or whatever; and this is really the area you want to talk about.
But I also think it necessary to state that this drawing 'in action' is
not self-contained; the whole of my work feeds on life and this notation
is my natural harvesting which later serves the synthesis of my painting.
Only some of these notes - drawings - may 'come out' and deserve an exis-
tence on their ov.-n merit - and many of these found their way into print,
they're mostly in my 'Chronicle' and books.
So now, when we have established all this, we can return to your question:
the description, the word you use, is naturally embedded in those drawings,
that kind of drawing, because there are other drawings that I do which come
out of my imagination, or are sketches preparatory for compositions. So
this kind of drawing is derived or comes into existence out of facing
reality. Therefore, it is in its essence a descriptive drawing but with
one correction, all important, that I'm not setting myself, as many artists
do, to 'copy' nature, to 'copy' the existing scene in front of me or to
take the extreme case, where they sit down on a stool and carefully draw,
and we are talking of drawing now, but even in drawing, under an umbrella
and whatnots spread, draw for hours, enumerating every element, every
window, everything which they see, mostly drawing static scenes, static
landscapes, because that's somehow within their capabilities and hence
within their interest.
I am after really being responsive to the atmosphere and, putting it roughly,
to action, to movement and to character of things. And so to speak, in the
round. - scanning the whole circle of vision, not just the cut-out slice in
front of me, but imnersing myself.
GB So really you're not so much an observer, as an interpenetrator; you're
somebody who not so much faces reality as allows reality to come in and
search you as much as you are searching it.
FT I think you put it very well.
GB That's the kind of inter-reaction that you have.
PP True, I simply yield myself to the situation and then I work almost auto-
inatically; all this is instinctive and not deliberate. I am not trying
to pass on a message. I'm receptive and I work, let's use a simple and
innocent word 'seisnographically', in other words, I react to the rhythm
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FT and motions and clashes of living. So the result is unpredictable and
I watch it forming on the page with some surprise and it is sometimes
puzzling to me as it may be to anybody or as the reality itself may be.
GB So really, Feliks, the kind of space that you're dealing with is not the
kind of mathematical space that we were talking about earlier when you
ere talking about delineation and marking off points and so on; it's a
space which is really beyond that, isn't it? It's a space that's emerging
as you're exploring your reaction with reality, with what's round you and
so on.
FT I would add this, that because my drawing is both instinctive and impre-
dictable, although it springs from reality, it isn't a copy of reality.
In fact, there must be a starting point to creative process, in painting
and drawing: a colour-pattern, a still-life, a tale from mythology, a
human face, a landscape. So my starting point is predominantly amassed
humanity in movement and conflicts, but as gathered human beings with
characteristics of shape, of costume or whatever; but I am not documenting
it, I am leaping off that, bouncing off that into the realm of linear
creation - that is even before I move into painting.
GB Yes, so the reality is, in fact, directed by the line, very, very speci-
fically in your drawing.
FT Well said.
GB The line, I remember reading that Bernard Shaw said of you, "He only uses
line" and then he added, "but what a line"; and I wonder if, in fact, all
the way through your career, that is why drawing, for you, has been of
such importance because of its linear characteristic and so on.
FT I must say, just in brackets, that something similar was said not by Shaw
but by Augustus John. But I think v.hat you said stands, it is correct.
So to finish that point - possibly going beyond that point, my drawing
reaches almost absurd selectivity, when, as often, I would sit in a moving
car and going through a moving crowd and scribbling continuously, thus
either getting a sketch-book page composed (I repeat: instinctively, at
speed) of elements selected over some distance, or several pages forming
a sort of action-strip. In fact, jf I stopped to draw carefully, placidly,
then I would tend to do, by my standards, a bad drawing.
GB Thee's a very strong element almost of the pre-reflective in what it is
you're doing, isn't there? Where you're not reflecting and then delibera-
ting, but you are allowing this image to occur spontaneously and being
as surprised by what is happening on the paper and that, in a sense, is
structuring what it is you're seeing.
FT Indeed, yes, because in a way that seismographic or instinctive reacting
to the scene round me adds up to a certain essence of that reality. So
I am told, people react to those scribbles of mine stating that they offer
some penetrating truth; they can read into them and out of them a variety
of information or even points of view, which I didn't attempt to offer.
GB No, that perhaps shows the kind of universal quality that they might have;
that they can actually structure other people's experiences for them in a
way which surprises you. They read through your drawings and. they enter
into the world of your drawings, as it were, and find for themselves the
same kind of echoes.
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F1' 1.ell, I feel I have to produce some sort of counterpoint at this juncture,
because it's not true if, from what I said just now, we build a picture
of a complete medium, or a complete zombie who simply scribbles in a trance.
Of course, I am a huirian being with some sort of intellectual powers and
some preconceptual blinkers and opinions and, of course, those play their
part and I suppose, now and again, when I select, I probably select partly
because sornethirLg strikes me as being in character, worthy of dragging out
from what I see onto the paper. So there is that element, that definitely.
But I am sure that the maximum of the result is given through this yielding
to the scribbling situation.
GB This description then - how much of it involves social or political comment?
FT That more or less superficially I touched on just now when I said that I
have my normal human set of reactions, intellectual assessments, opinions.
However, I am not terribly concerned with them when I am facing my 're-
portage' situation - reportage in inverted commas. So the elements of that
sort of comment slip in. Slip in or seep in?
GB Seep.
FT Seep in, you know because
GB They colour, they tone
FT Yes, of course, unavoidably; but they are not dominating. In other words,
I would not do what the cartoonist does, where he offers a political com-
ment and justifies it by his distortions; or a social realist who tries
to propgate some point of view. Incidentally, my distortions serve to
emphasise character, not to mock.
GB So you're closer to Daumier than you are say to a cartoonist who is making
another kind of comment?
FT If-I understand you, I would agree, yes. Because Daurnier was mainly, I
imagine, stimulated to draw by gesture, by characteristics, by human
comedy this light-shadow formal intensity was the means, not the aim),
and not by dogmas, principles, political convictions. Of course, these
would come out, because he was, as a political cartoonist for "
engaged in commenting regularly on the very dramatic period for Prance.
GB For you Feliks, did this really begin when you were a war artist?
FT That's a good question. I didn't think about it, but possibly you are
right because it developed then, yet I should think that it was there,
but it became more conscious and pure; in other words I matured through
the challenges of wartime.
GB That was the platform for all of your work in the 'Chronicles' and so on -
the kind, of documentation of the human condition worldwide was something
that really fired you, as it were - from that whole situation.
FT Yes. I think it's probably correct because I have been rather playful
in my earlier years and wasting a lot of my time and my gift on shallow
journalism and illustrations; on draughtsmanship that was not sufficiently
digested, however it may have been accepted by the public. But war in-
duced the seriousness for me which concentrated me on reality and., in
fact, indeed you are right, because during that period I ceased to draw
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PT from memory or redraw my sketches. Because I was tending before to
develop sketches, to work them up. And then I simply began to realise
that as soon as I touched up, as I ceased to rely on my instinctive
initial line, I spoiled the draughtsmanship, I spoiled the impetus of
the creative draughtsmanship. So I really began during the war to
rely on the drawing as it came instantly from under my seismographic
scrutiny and never went back to that sort of thing.
GB I've heard you say, and you have been quite annoyed sometimes, when
people talk of your drawing as 'gestural', now this is quite untrue
isn't it? Because the gesture you are talking about really is nothing
to do with something that comes from nothing as it were. It's something
much more positive than that, isn't it?
FT I don't remember the annoyance, but you are right in what you say, because
I would accept in myself, if one looks for ancestors, a link with the
draughtsmen of the East, of China and Japan, who were gestural draughts-.
men, but they were tremendously, not so much controlled, as trained, and
made gestures that were unerring, because they wanted, in their gestures,
to render precisely movement and character.
GB It's a philosophy really of being ift union with the world rather than
being just an observer outside the world, isn't it?
FT Yes, yes. Even more; the gesture, say, in the modern tradition of abs-
tract art, the gesture of the kind that Pollock would apply, is a corrup-
tion, a flight from reality, part of that development in art which started
to fear the image; so gesture became at one point, particularly in
American abstract expressionism, an ideal - and they would fling the
paint and consider that painting was achieved because it had freedom -
but freedom from human creativity, thus, being like a gesture of nature,
like rain falling; it had, in consequence, certain charm and freshness
but very little content. while the Easterners would have a purpose.
GB You said 'fear of the image', which I think is very interesting, could
you say a little bit more about that?
FT This is a vast theme and possibly not our theme because it's really what
was happening in consequence of the general tendency of modern art, of
the logical development away from the pictorial tradition into establishing
painting as independent abstract performance - as an object in itself.
And so the image became a dangerous taboo to such an extent that even
that element which remained for a long time and still existed in modern
art as 'La bellepeinture', the brushwork, the textural marks of the
artist's touch and bravura was eliminated and the avoidance of any effect
of human hand became more and more dominant. Of course, by now the tide
is turning, but who cares about tides (laughter): I've never been following
the vogues of the day. I have kept on being true to myself, that is to
my natural gifts and private (not modish) exploration.
GB The drawings that we are looking at of the inauguration of Pope Paul had
a very special significance for you, didn't they? Not only because he is
a countryman of yours and in the light of recent happenings in Poland and
the joy with which he has been received, there is obviously a deep felt
feeling. Can you in any way summarise your feelings to the commission?
FT I do not want to sound a cynic, but I would question all those elements
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FT because they, with your forgiveness, everything you said just now tends
to sentimentalise the issue and I am not a sentimentalist. And, as you
can see from my work, as you can see from contact with me - I am tending
to be sharp-eyed, as it were; if one is looking for some sort of adjective,
some sort of pointer to what I am as an artist. So I fear sentimentality,
and possibly I never touch landscape because landscape turns in me a sort
of sloppy quality of worship, of adoration which simply is not my metier.
GB That's very clear. How did you approach then this particular thing that
you had to do?
FT In Poland of the twenties and the thirties, that is in my day, in my
youth, the young people of all classes vere moving away from religion
very steadily; and now - I know masses of people of so-called education
who being educated are set unavoidably outside religiousity and so the
Polish acclaimed Catholicism is really an outlet for patriotic need to
protest begun wider Hitlerian occupation - of finding the feet of inde-
pendence as it were, in other words, Catholicism is not a pure thing there.
Really, all in all, I really ... 1.aybe I'm toning down my feelings, but,
although I don't deny my ties with Poland, I am sure I went simply because
I was very curious, because I was given this opportunity and because my
ingrained 'eye-witness' mania pressed, but there was no ... maybe it was
suppressed subconciously, but there was no saccharinish feeling at all.
I say	 - I don't deny my ties with Poland, which, however,
find expression more often than not in impatience and irritation - the
usual family syndrome.
GB So when we look at the drawings - the ones you did of the Pope, particularly
the ones where you were able to come fairly close ...
FT Well, fairly close. I had all possible facilities, through the British
Legation to the Holy See, who were very helpful and gave me passes on
the diplomatic level. But even with these I wound myself pretty far from
the centre of things because the diplomatic seats were embracing the Royals,
the Presidents, the Ambassadors and the wives. So this parade of vanities
between me and the Ritual served, nicely and I simply went on drawing what
I saw; but because the ceremonies were prolonged and often very static, I
could use now-and-again my Japanese one-eye 'lorgnyon' thing held in one
hand while drawing with the other which was very difficult and uncomfortable
but still the only way to get a close view of the Pope.
GB Now the drawings of the Pope that you did are mostly in charcoal, do you
find that medium
112 Not only no, they are a mixture. I had with me various materials, 'but
when it came to balancing myself on one foot on a chair with crowds
pushing at the public audiences which I attended during the next days,
well then, then, of course, there was only one single drawing material I
could muster and it would be charcoal as the swiftest. But those more
complicated drawings, you will see, are in mixed media, used where I
could sit and have things on my lap. As it happened [have no rules and
habits) these were biros, markers, pencils, charcoals, coloured pastels
and pens.
GB Viich is an important part of their whole sense. Not only is the media
mixed but the images are superimposed and there's a kind of collage of
irrages across the whole page.
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FT Quite, yes.
GB This is important in the way that you're seeing it and also important
in what it is you're trying to say about it. Are these preparations
for paintings?
FT Oh, no. I didn't draw them with such a definite idea, no. I drew them
straight from the shoulder, as I said earlier, as is my usual reaction
to reality. I was noting down, but colour was an important part of the
whole occasion. So I pushed in colour. Vlhat you call collages were
often a sort of double-take, as it were. For instance, the one which
we are looking at now(Fg 83)happened to have been the result of a very
nasty mix-up (laughter). Namely, at a big audience when I had got a
very ambitious - well forward ticket, I began to draw - the Pope didn't
appear yet, but the platform was full of ecclesiastical celebrities and
I settled to draw them from that comparatively good position; and I had
been leaving central space on the page for the Pope about to arrive.
And then I was attacked by brutal heavies, the Vatican is full of heavies
in civilian clothes (laughter) who claimed I was in the wrong seat and I
must move back, but in the meantime the whole place was completely filled
up. So I quarrelled, struggled, protested, gave various arguments and
though they saw what I was doing, they were just bloody brutish and so
while quarrelling, I gained time to finish what I could. And then even-
tually they almost physically pushed me out of the chair. Luckily, a
friend who was with me, a Roman, foresaw the outcome and secured two
seats much, much further back, but safe. So then, when the Pope entered,
I put him into the drawing, as I could see him from my distant seat, in
a vague outline.	 -
GB The gestures that the Pope made in his various activities, did they in-
terest you and were they part of what it was you were trying to say about
the Pope in this particular situation?
FT You know, that I don't calculate, I don't preconceive, I don't propose to
prove something in my drawing - I draw. But of course, he moves, the
action is there and is important and I try to grasp it.Because of the
difficulties I had with this eye-glass and things, I really felt more
secure with the drawings that were embracing larger scenes. Although
some, like this one (Fig.77)I consider rather satisfactory, because it
emanates a certain mood and carries it through movement and somehow sums
up the theme; what I'm saying though, comes a postereori, when perusing,
sorting out the results - to say the obvious: many drawings fail utterly,
or appear to be inferior to others. VThen I looked at this drawing, I saw
the value of it. In other words, I hadn't looked at, that is taken in,
the drawings while drawing them - only later. So amongst those which give
the cardinals coming up the steps for a blessing and an embrace by the
Pope, there were two or three(Pigs.78/9)'hich had intensity, possibly more
than the rest, because these, for instance,(Figs. 8l/2re very static and,
although very accurate, somehow, don't offer enough. But then, this
drawing (Fig85)which was a more distant view, which led to that group which
I pointed to earlier, somehow oozed that particularly intense feeling per-
meating the whole ceremony. rhile those utterly different, those crowded
ones(Figs.86_94) I also rather like
GB Because what we can't get here, is that you also used colour
FT Colour, yes, very much so - and I rather like them - but as decorative,
well, acrobatic pieces, as it were, offering my ability to give costume
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FT shape and crowding, but they are somewhat dry eiriotionally. The pro-
cessional one, which is somehow well-liked, was a very rapid scribble
rushed through while they were moving away at the end of the ceremonr -
which is possibly the closest to purity of gestural drawing, because
having fought against time, this drawing contains the minimum of line
and the maximum of gesture, offering again those two elements which
seem to come to the fore in my linear work: character and movement.
GB Feliks, thank you very much indeed.
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APPE1tDIX II:
PREFACE TO FIGURES
1. Notes on the contributors.
David Cowley. Potter. Trained as a painter. Now teaches in the
Ceramics Department and in the Fine Art Department at Goldsmiths
College School of Art, London. The drawing presented was done over
a period of two days (2 x 5 hrs.) in the studio at St. [artin's School
of Art. The photographs were taken from a distance of about 4 metres
using a telephoto lens (see technical notes below).
Arthur Di Stephano. Painter, First-year student at the Royal College
of Art, London. Completed his graduate study in painting at Goldsmith's
College School of Art, London. The drawings presented were done over
a four-week period in his studio space at the Royal College of Art
and photographed at a distance of about 3 metres using a telephoto lens.
Wynn Jones. Painter. Works in London and teaches at the Byam Shaw
School, London. The series of drawings included here were from an
exhibition of his work at the 'House' Gallery, Regents Park Road, London.
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Wendy Thompson. Painter. First-year student at the Royal College
of Art, London. Completed her graduate studies in sculpture at
Nottingham College of Art. The drawings presented were done over
a four-week period in her studio space at the Royal College. Drawing
6 (Figs. 55 - 58) took a day and Drawing 7 (Figs. 65 - 68) was done
over two successive days. They were photographed from a distance of
4 metres using a telephoto lens.
Feliks To'polski. Painter. Currently working in London on an
'environmental' painting, based on events during his life-time. He
is perhaps best known for his 'Chronicles' which commented on and
documented important world events. The drawings presented here are
from a series commissioned by the Italian Government on the occasion
of the inauguration of Pope Paul II in the Vatican (1978).
2. Technical notes.
The photographs were taken with a Pralctic.a LTL 3 camera using a
Pentacon telephoto lens (2.8/135) on a tripod. The film used was
Ilford BP4 and the negatives printed on Grade 3 single weight paper.
The sequence photographs are to be read from the top left-hand
corner downwards and. from left to right.
Eugne Delacroix Drawings
Oxford. Bruno Cassirer (1946)BAJYT Kurt
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